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ART. I.—*The Inspiration of Holy Scripture: its Nature and Proof. Eight Discourses preached before the University of Dublin. By WILLIAM LEE, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College. London: Rivingtons, 1854.*

WE should be doing great injustice to Mr. Lee, were we to withhold from him the credit of having made, in this work, a valuable and in many respects a remarkable contribution to our Biblical literature. It would, indeed, be difficult to name a more ample and varied storehouse of information, bearing upon the general question of the matter and manner of Holy Scripture. In point of range, it may really be said to be coextensive with the literature of its subject, from the earliest to the latest day; while its tone, viewing it as a controversial work, is perfectly free from asperity, and renders it almost a model of calm and dignified argument.

At the same time, we cannot forbear, at the very outset, from pointing out, that writers as well as readers of works of this class are in great danger of over-estimating, and indeed of misconceiving altogether, their bearing upon the subject to which they refer. The idea under which a treatise of this sort, making some pretensions to completeness and exhaustiveness, is taken in hand, whether by author or student, is apt to be something of the following kind:—

‘Here,’ it is thought, ‘is a great question upon which one cannot but feel a little uneasy, and about which countless volumes have been written, and continue to be written daily:—here it is going to receive a full investigation, and, we may hope, a satisfactory settlement. So much has been said, of late years more especially, on this subject of Inspiration, that it is most desirable that we should at length come to understand the exact nature of it; and be put fully in possession of the various and irrefragable proofs that doubtless may be alleged for its existence.’ Such, accordingly, is the title of Mr. Lee’s volume: ‘Inspiration: its Nature and Proof.’ Of course, this title

might, on inquiry, be found to mean no more than that the author was about to tender such *illustrations* as the subject admits, of the nature of that influence under which the sacred penmen produced the Holy Scriptures. And again, the *proof* offered by him might turn out to be no other than that one and only kind which can be strictly so called, or properly accepted as proof; of which more presently. Such, however, is not the case. On perusal, we find that Mr. Lee's design is no less than to give a full, satisfactory, and conclusive account of what Inspiration is, or was rather; how it acted on the subjects of it, where its operation began and where ended, and the like. On these points it is assumed that we are or may be perfectly informed. Such exact knowledge is conceived to be, somehow or other, a part of the Church's heritage. A Christian has a right, it is represented, (in effect, if not in so many words,) to full satisfaction on these matters. And it is supposed to be the business of theologians and doctors of the Church to render them such satisfaction—to furnish, in a word, a full and exact 'Theory of Inspiration:' and that too not merely as a topic of interesting and instructive inquiry, which of course it is, but as a matter of life and death for the Church; so that if she cannot make good her 'theory' against all the world—then *actum est*—it is all over with her, and with Christianity.

It is not improbable that both Mr. Lee and the majority of his readers will, at first sight, think that we have not a little misrepresented him in what we have now said. But we may challenge any person, writer or reader, on calm consideration of this book as a whole, to gainsay that its entire drift, and the idea upon which it really proceeds, is apparently such as we have represented. The line taken throughout is that there are no difficulties which are not either actually solved or soluble by the application of a just method of exegesis. The preface, for example, sets forth very distinctly that the thing that needs and has long needed to be done, is to produce an absolutely unexceptionable theory. All who in time past have sought to elaborate such a theory, are by no means represented as having been mistaken in their general aim, but only unfortunate in the particular theory adopted by them.

'The vagueness which too often characterises the language employed by writers who, in modern times, have treated of its Inspiration, seems to render a fundamental examination into the nature of this divine influence daily more desirable. So long, indeed, as the "mechanical" theory of Inspiration was generally maintained, there was no want of distinctness or consistency in the views put forward. So long as it was believed that each word and phrase to be found in the Bible, nay, even the order and grammatical connexion of such words and phrases, had been infused by the Holy Ghost into the minds of the sacred writers, or dictated to them

by His immediate suggestion, so long must the opinion held respecting Inspiration have been clear, intelligible, and accurately defined. But such a theory could not stand the test of close examination. The strongest evidence against it has been supplied by the Bible itself; and each additional discovery in the criticism of the Greek or Hebrew text confirms anew the conclusion that the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture can no longer rely upon such a principle for its defence. The "mechanical" theory having been tacitly abandoned, at least by all who are capable of appreciating the results of criticism, and *no system altogether satisfactory* having been proposed in its stead, there has gradually sprung up a want of definiteness, and an absence of consistency in the language used when speaking of Inspiration, owing to which those who are most sincere in maintaining the divine character of the Bible have not unfrequently been betrayed into concessions fatal to its supreme authority. And not only is there a vagueness in the language which most writers employ when approaching this topic, there is also a want of *completeness in the method* usually adopted when discussing. With reference to the nature of Inspiration itself, and to the possibility of reconciling the unquestionable stamp of humanity impressed upon every page of the Bible, with that undoubting belief in its perfection and infallibility which is the Christian's most precious inheritance, it may safely be maintained that in English theology almost nothing has been done; and that no effort has hitherto been made to grapple directly with the difficulties of the subject.—*Preface*, p. iii.

It will be observed that the *desiderata* intended to be supplied by the work are: 'a system altogether satisfactory;' 'completeness of method;' such a treatise, in short, as will expound the *nature* of Inspiration, with especial reference to 'the possibility of reconciling the unquestionable stamp of humanity impressed upon every page of the Bible, with an undoubting belief in its perfection and infallibility.'

And such as the preface is, such, as in duty bound, is the book. It proceeds from first to last upon the plan of stating, candidly and dispassionately, the difficulties alleged by rationalistic, or infidel, or otherwise 'scientific' writers, and then showing that there is, in fact, in each several instance, no difficulty at all. There are, it is represented, certain distinctions, more especially one between Revelation and Inspiration—treated in a sufficiently interesting way—by duly bearing which in mind, we shall see our way through whatever of cloud or mist may have gathered around the subject.

We trust it will be understood—and if not, we shall abundantly make it clear hereafter—that we by no means deprecate, nor have any wish to depreciate, the very interesting discussions upon which Mr. Lee has entered, and from which we ourselves, at any rate, have gathered much both of instruction and interest. The mistake against which we would most earnestly warn the reader, is that of representing the *summa rei* of Christianity as being at stake in these encounters. What we do deprecate is this *arrière pensée* with which these studies are

entered upon. For it is manifest, that to attach this degree of importance to them, is to suspend the Christian faith on the issue of a contest between human wits. This is admitted by Mr. Lee to be involved in the line taken in his volume. Speaking of the character of his work, he says:—

‘My object throughout has simply been to collect as many facts and results as my acquaintance with ancient and modern researches into the text or interpretation of Scripture could supply; and thence to declare what appeared to be the necessary inference. In every inquiry so conducted, the safety of the inference must, of course, depend on the extent of the induction; and, consequently, the success of the method which I have ventured to suggest is susceptible of being indefinitely increased, in proportion to the number of new facts and results, which may hereafter be accumulated by those whose learning and attainments far surpass any that I can pretend to possess.’—P. v.

‘The safety of the inference,’ he truly observes, ‘must depend upon the extent of the induction.’ So that, according to this view, our faith in the authority and credibility of Holy Scripture hangs upon the soundness or unsoundness of an inductive conclusion: in other words, upon the success of ‘ancient and modern researches,’ designed to maintain that authority and credibility. The obvious corollary is, that if, in any single case, all our research fails to give a satisfactory account of apparently contradictory phenomena in the Scriptures, we must give up our reliance upon them. It is very true that, as is here said, ‘new facts and results’ may, and in all probability will, hereafter be accumulated, of a kind favourable to the authority of Scripture. But, then, new objections may be, and are accumulated likewise; and, in striking a balance, we have no reason for saying that it will be *pro* rather than *con*. It is surely a *naïve* admission, and points to something defective in the whole treatment of the subject, that ‘the success of the method’ pursued in this work ‘is susceptible of being indefinitely increased.’ We profess ourselves unable to comprehend a *graduated success* in a matter of this kind. If the proof alleged for the divine authority of Scripture is sufficient, why, it is successful, and there is an end of the matter. It may receive fresh illustrations, confirmations, and the like, but more successful it can never be.

The truth is, that in some respects the able and learned author of the book before us has, in common with many, perhaps with the great majority, of those who think about such subjects at all, suffered himself to be beguiled into placing the authority and credibility of Scripture upon a wrong issue—upon one which the Church has never accepted, nor can for a moment consent to be bound by. A few clever but unstable, and, it must be added, notwithstanding their pretensions that way, really unphilosophical men, have managed to persuade a good part of the religious and

literary 'public' that a more formidable onslaught than the world has yet witnessed is in preparation, or indeed is in a measure already come, against the Holy Scriptures, considered as the written depositories of the Christian faith. The slogan of this onset was thus sounded by Dr. Arnold, speaking of the late S. T. Coleridge's speculations, in a letter to Mr. Justice Coleridge:—

'Have you seen your uncle's "Letters on Inspiration," which, I believe, are to be published? They are well fitted to break ground in the approaches to that momentous question, which involves in it so great a shock to existing notions; the greatest probably that has ever been given since the discovery of the falsehood of the Pope's infallibility.'

On this Mr. Lee remarks:—

'It cannot be doubted, I apprehend, that Dr. Arnold's remark is, to a certain extent, well founded; and that this treatise of Mr. Coleridge has done more than any modern work to unsettle the public mind in these countries, with respect to the authority due to the Bible as a whole.'

Now, it may be very true that increased vehemence and some novelty of tactics have of late been displayed, and that the minds of not a few have been in a measure disquieted by this treatise of Coleridge and similar works. But what we would most strongly affirm is, that this by no means proves the real formidableness of the attack, but only the weakness and unpreparedness of the general mind. And we hasten to reassure plain people, hearers, perhaps, rather than readers of these things, that there is not the least occasion for any uneasiness. The evidence for the authenticity, inspiration, the divine origin, or call it what you will, of the Scriptures, stands exactly where it did some seventeen hundred years ago. When we come to look into the matter, we find that, vehement as the assault and battery may have been, nothing can well produce less effect than have these missiles on the real position and *status* of the Scriptures. To the superficial eye, they may have done somewhat of the indignity they were intended to do to the outward shell and surface, but that is all. The actual damage to the fortress is, as we shall point out presently, absolutely inappreciable. The only real mischief is not so much a material as a moral one. Such a bruit and storm has been raised about the ears of the Church's defenders, that unwary men have been prevailed upon to leave their stronghold, and to descend into a battle-field upon which they have no sort of commission or warrant for risking her cause.

This is by no means an unnatural or an uncommon result of assaults of this nature. A special onslaught is observed to be made against some outwork or other; the defenders muster around it with an eagerness quite disproportioned to its importance, and fare as they may in the defence of it; and if in any

single point they fail to make it good for their side, immediately the cry is that all is lost. But all is not lost, it may be, for all that; nor perhaps anything that the defenders were really interested to maintain.

And now, to drop our metaphors. When the Church is asked for her proofs of the divine authority of the Scriptures, her first word is—Testimony; and her second is—Testimony; and her third is—Testimony. It is true there are countless subsidiary confirmations of their claim to be what she says they are; just as there were many subsidiary things which went, in Demosthenes' view, to make an orator. But in the last resort, when pressed with the inquiry as to what her mind rests on as ultimate and beyond appeal and gainsaying, the proof which the Church alleges is one, and one only. The whole thing has been a matter of testimony from the beginning. Before the Scriptures of the New Testament existed, Christianity rested upon testimony; and when they were written, it rested upon testimony still. The original testimony deposed to a vast body of facts, relative both to our Lord and to His disciples,—among them, to that inspiration and divine commission imparted, in all necessary measure, to the latter. And after a little while, the testimony on which the Church relied included one fact more, or rather one peculiar development of a fact all along testified to. A divine commission *to speak*, to teach authoritatively with the mouth concerning the Gospel, had been from the first deposed to; and it was quite as probable, neither less so nor more, for aught that appears, that men should be divinely commissioned to write, as to speak. Accordingly, side by side with the original undoubting belief that the apostles and others *spoke* the truth,—side by side with this, only a little junior in point of time, and incapable of being disentangled from it by us,—had grown up the no less undoubting belief that the same persons *wrote* the truth; that they taught, to all intents and purposes, correctly and effectually by writing, no less than by words. You cannot, we repeat, disentangle or discriminate between the belief and *fiducia* reposed in the oral teaching of apostolic days and men, and that reposed in their written teaching. The same men who unhesitatingly accepted the one, unhesitatingly accepted the other also. What was the *kind of evidence*, or the *amount* of it, which satisfied them on the subject, we are more or less ignorant, perhaps absolutely so. But what we do know is, that the evidence, whatever it was, *did* satisfy them; that they accepted what we now call the New Testament Scriptures, as coming undoubtedly from God,—as teaching soundly and truly concerning the faith: just as they accepted the apostolic verbal teaching as good for the same purposes. And exactly as the original deposit of the faith, *i.e.*

the facts of Christianity, and the bearings of them, embodied mainly in the Creed and the Sacraments,—exactly as these were handed on from mouth to mouth, and from each generation to the next, just so was the slightly newer adjunct—the deposition as to what was authentic Scripture, or, in other words, ‘the Canon of Scripture,’—handed on likewise. So that, as we have said, the Church knows no difference as to the grounds on which she believes the New Testament to be Scripture—*i.e.* divinely authorized and originated writing—and those on which she believes that the apostles were apostles, (*i.e.* divinely authorized and empowered messengers and teachers,) at all. She never saw the apostles in the flesh, nor can she, perhaps, point with a certainty to a single historical monument of any one of them; ‘their sepulchres’ may, or may not, ‘be with us to this day.’ But she is quite sure that there were such persons, for all that; and that they were what they represented themselves to be. How? Simply by the evidence of those who lived at the time; who had seen them in the flesh, and who could satisfy themselves, and were perfectly satisfied of the genuineness of their pretensions and of the truth of their wondrous story. We cannot shake that evidence, were it only because we do not know what it was.

Will any in later times rise up and say they are not satisfied with this proof? Be it so. But then, be it observed, they must give up at the same time all historical belief whatsoever. They must absolutely give up, for example, all belief in the existence and the received accounts of Julius Cæsar. Why? Because the evidence for his existence and actions is precisely of the same kind, and can be of no other kind than that which exists for the existence and actions of the apostles, of our Lord Himself; with only this difference, that the evidence in the latter case is ten-fold—we might say ten thousand-fold—greater than in the former. Not merely the vast number of Churches throughout the world, who were found (say, at the time of the Nicene Council) to believe precisely the same general facts, and *every one of which represented ultimately one or more contemporary witnesses*; not this merely, but the immense interests at stake in the first instance; the radical change in ways and notions involved in the act of becoming a convert:—these, and various other well-known circumstances tending to impede the acceptance of the apostolic teaching in the first instance, serve to swell the amount of evidence for the reality of the alleged facts of Christianity, far beyond anything that can be adduced for any common historical fact, or set of facts, such as the history of Julius Cæsar. What do these facts rest on, setting aside for the moment written testimony? On a very vague and loose tradition indeed. Certain monu-

ments at Rome or elsewhere, certain coins bearing his image and superscription, are held to be sufficient evidence that there was such a man, that he was a general and a ruler, and the like. But who sees not that these monuments themselves require to be shored up by many a buttress of 'common belief'—these disjointed links of evidence to be woven together by many a cramping ring of testimony; and that, after all, the strength of the evidence lies in this, that, looking at the entire case, no reasonable, or otherwise than very captious person can doubt of the truth of the facts alleged; simply because it never was doubted of. And why never doubted of? Because fame and common rumour, more or less vague—nothing very systematised, or that you could lay your finger upon—always represented that there had been such a person; those who lived at or near the time could not well be deceived about it; the story must have originated with them, or it would not be so general:—and the like arguments. It will be seen that we have only applied here the well-known 'historic doubts' argument. Now who will think of comparing this amount of traditional evidence with that which upholds the general facts of Christianity? Where are the societies of men, independent more or less of each other, and scattered over the face of the whole earth, who, with perfect unanimity, have believed these things as far back as the alleged time of their occurrence, on the strength, we must needs suppose, of original and ocular witnesses? Where is the uniform document or symbol, common to numerous and very various nations and lands, embodying any such belief in the existence of the Roman conqueror, as that in which the Christian creed has been conserved? Where are the rites or customs equally pervaded with the same belief? There is nothing of the kind, or in the slightest degree approaching to it.

We repeat, then, first, that the grounds on which the Church believes in the general facts of Christianity must be accepted as sufficient and satisfactory, unless we are prepared to give up all history besides; those grounds being from first to last of the nature of testimony—testimony which satisfied the first receivers of the facts, and which, therefore, have always satisfied her. And next, that the divine character and commission of the Scriptures is only one particular item in the sum of those things which are thus believed on the strength of primeval testimony. As we never saw the apostles in the flesh—have no ocular or personal evidence of our own of their existence or fidelity, to allege—cannot scrutinise their claims—cannot demand to see their credentials, but only know, as certainly as anything of the kind can be known, that *there were those who did*—even so is it with the Scriptures. We know not, any otherwise than by

testimony reaching back to the time of their being written, who wrote them; or that the writers had a divine commission to write them; or that they are to be accepted as teaching no less soundly concerning the faith than did the apostles, and other inspired teachers, by word of mouth. But we do know that those who lived nearest to the time of the writings *did* put these two sources of teaching perfectly on a par: the same men who appealed to one appealed to the other; taught, reasoned, dwelt on the written words, exactly as on the spoken teaching: and that is enough.

Nor can we reasonably be called upon to give up our belief of the divine origin and authority of the New Testament Scriptures on any other grounds than such as would deprive the historical existence of the whole Christian story of all claim upon credibility, since the historical facts and the written accounts of them both rest on precisely the self-same evidence, viz. contemporary testimony, which there are no means of shaking.

The following passage will illustrate the manner in which the acceptance of the apostolic and other writings grew up, inseparably interwoven with the acceptance of the original oral teaching, as has been here represented:—

‘We may remark,’ says Mr. Keble, in his Sermon on ‘Primitive Tradition,’ ‘the comparative rareness of quotations from the New Testament in writings of the first century:—in the Epistle of Clement, for instance, who, while he produces in almost every paragraph some testimony from the Jewish Scriptures, has only three or four references to the New Testament. Where such might be expected, he rather uses to remind men of “the depths of divine knowledge into which they had looked;” of the “immortal knowledge whereof they had tasted,” and of the apostolical examples which they had seen. Whereas the writers of the following age—Irenæus, Tertullian, and the rest—add to the argument from tradition—on which, in itself, they lay as much stress as S. Clement—authorities and arguments from the New Testament, much in the manner of controversialists of our own time.’

‘And thus,’ as the same writer observes elsewhere (Note E), ‘when exact traditions, of all at least but fundamental doctrine, would have become gradually more uncertain, its place was providentially supplied by the Canon of Scripture becoming fixed, and thoroughly known all over the Christian world.’ And the point which we are now concerned to dwell upon is, that it is absolutely impossible that these Scriptures could have thus come to be accepted as equivalent, for all purposes of teaching, argument, &c., to the living voices of the first preachers of Christianity, had not irresistible evidence been possessed, and possessed universally, that the one were as divine as the other—the writings as the men.

In a word, supposing these two points admitted—1, that there is a God, and 2, that it is not inconceivable or impossible that

He should open a communication between Himself and man,—*the divine origination of the New Testament Scriptures is as perfectly authenticated a fact as the whole range of history presents*—if, indeed, there be any which can, for certainty, be compared to it: so absolutely unassailable is the TESTIMONY upon which it rests. As we have already said, in speaking of the original oral account of Christianity, so we repeat with regard to the divine origin of Scripture—you may call it in question if you will, but you must give up with it the whole fabric of history.

And it is remarkable enough, that the latest and not least acute or laborious *redacteur* of the results of modern inquiry into the circumstances under which the New Testament Scripture originated, makes out that, judging by internal evidence, early quotations, and other symptoms, they cannot possibly be detached from the apostolic period. Mr. Westcott, in his recent work on the Canon of the New Testament, speaks as follows:—

‘Modern scholars, from various motives, have distinguished its constituent parts, and shown in what way each was related to the peculiar circumstances of its origin. Christianity has gained by the issue; for it is an unspeakable advantage that the Books of the New Testament are now felt [qu. ? probably shown] to be organically united with the lives of the Apostles, that they are recognised as living monuments, reared [qu. ? to all appearance] in the midst of struggles within and without by men who had seen Christ, stamped with the character of their age, and inscribed with the dialect which they spoke. It cannot be too often repeated, that the formation of the whole canon involves little less than the history of the building of the Catholic Church.’

This, we say, is valuable enough in its way, as an incidental confirmation, and as a remarkable conclusion for one to have arrived at, who has trodden the whole circle of German theology. But we utterly disallow the claims of any such merely scholastic and scientific conclusions to take their place in the highest rank of evidence; were it only that some yet more knowing man than Mr. Westcott may give, or seem to give, a serious shake to the whole fabric, by the help of the same scientific processes which have reared its imposing but precarious structure. For the truth is, we can, in this department, *prove* nothing; we may point to certain indications, but beyond this we cannot go.

There is, we repeat, but one absolutely unassailable ground to take. This, and this alone, is left perfectly untouched by rationalistic attacks on the Scriptures, from Celsus to Spinoza, and from Spinoza to F. Newman. Nor can anything be more weak than to descend from this vantage-ground to do battle over ‘difficulties,’ ‘discrepancies,’ and the like, under any such understanding as that the authority of Scripture hangs upon the issue of such discussions. The Church has never lacked among her sons those who are fully able to deal with these matters, as

far as they need to be dealt with; Celsus will ever, as of old, be sufficiently answered by Origen, and Spinoza by Butler. But for the entire security of her position, it may confidently be said that

‘Non eget his armis, neque defensoribus istis.’

Her grounds of belief are exactly what they have been from the beginning, whether such defenders are raised up or not. Clouds may pass over her sun, or spots be detected upon its disk; but the orb itself has in no whit the less certainly, on the evidence of irrefragable testimony, been placed in her firmament by Almighty God Himself. ‘He hath made it fast for ever and ever; He hath given it a law which shall not be broken.’

The Church’s reply, then, to all exceptions on the score of discrepancies, inconsistency with results of scientific research, or the like,—in a word, to the threatened extinction, by the powers of modern exegesis and science, of the claim set up for the Scriptures, as being of divine authority,—is not unlike that which was made on the occasion of a similar threat by a power no less would-be tyrannical, and equally illogical and inconclusive: ‘We are not careful to answer thee in this matter. If it be so, our God whom we serve is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace, and he will deliver us out of thine hand, O king. *But if not*, be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up.’ These cavils will ever be made to the end of time, and be gloried in by some, and dreaded by others, as fatal to the authority of Scripture; and sometimes they will be better answered, and sometimes worse. But whether they are answered well or ill, or not at all, the Church utterly refuses to suspend her faith on any such issues. In testimony, the sources of which lie so deep that they cannot be meddled with, she has just such a ground of confidence as ‘the Three Children’ had in the goodness of the cause which they represented. Whether their God would save them on the instant,—how they should pass through that particular trial, they had no certainty: of one thing only, on grounds of old Israelitish faith, they were quite certain, viz. that the test proposed was a fallacious one altogether; the burning fiery furnace had no sort of commission to serve, *negatively*, as an assay of their pretensions as servants of the Most High God; though it might *positively*, as in the event it did, confirm the truth of them.

The application of all this is obvious; so much so, that it would have been superfluous to dwell upon it, but that, as we have said, the impugnors of Scripture have contrived to mystify the defenders of it, as to the true issue upon which alone they have any commission to rest their cause. Books on exegesis, harmonies,

and *hoc genus omne*, are useful enough to confirm the authority of Scripture, but they are absolutely without power to shake it; just as the experiment tried upon the persons of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, turning out as it did, was a valuable confirmation enough of the existence of the God of Israel, but would have been absolutely null and void (and was indeed protested against before trial) as a presumption against it. And we do not hesitate to say that more harm than good is done to the Christian cause by the best and most 'successful' book that can be written in its defence, if it proceeds upon the notion that Christianity depends for its position upon answering all possible cavils and objections: first, because it is impossible that all cavils can be answered, either in themselves or to the satisfaction of all men,—*ἀπλῶς* or *πρὸς τινὰς*; and next, because such a course involves the abandonment of the one ground which no cavil can touch or reach.

Mr. Lee's, then, is an excellent book; but not for the particular purpose for which it seems to have been written; viz. to give the true bearings of the whole question of the inspiration of Scripture. It does not do this. On the contrary, by its structure and its line, it entirely misleads the unwary as to the relative importance they should attach to the different kinds of alleged proof in the matter of Inspiration; and as to our capacities for defining with exactitude the nature and limits of that divine agency. Its *chiaro oscuro*, so to speak, is defective in more ways than one. It does not assign to different kinds of proof their due proportions; and it magnifies unduly our faculties for separating and discriminating the human and the divine. This defect is not peculiar to Mr. Lee; it is the fault incident to the whole class of writings—such, for example, as Mr. Westcott's otherwise valuable 'Elements of the Gospel Harmony.' All such works are apt to be looked upon as so many advances towards a sort of exegetical millennium, in which all 'difficulties' will have disappeared in the light of a 'science' at once sound in its processes and orthodox in its results; their appearance is hailed as if they were the great discoveries of the day—the very saviours, *pro tanto*, of the Christian cause. Whereas, except so far as their true place is clearly understood and habitually assigned to them, their influence, on the whole, will be, as we have already ventured to affirm, rather mischievous than beneficial.

We cannot better illustrate what it is that we desiderate in Mr. Lee's work, as far as regards the importance to be attached to different species of proof, than by drawing attention to his second lecture, entitled, 'The Immemorial Doctrine of the Church of God.'

‘No inquiry,’ says Mr. Lee, ‘respecting the subject of Inspiration can possess greater importance than that which will exhibit the degree and kind of estimation in which the writings, which contain those “oracles,” have been always held. . . . I propose, in the present discourse, to give the leading outlines of the doctrine respecting the Inspiration of the Divine Scriptures held by the Jews, as well as by the Christian Church from the earliest period. The importance of such external evidence is too obvious to permit us to pass it over without due consideration, or, as is too frequently the case, to assign it a subordinate place in our chain of proofs.’—P. 40.

So far, good. Shortly after, he well states what we may call the phenomena of the original testimony, as follows:—

‘The facts to be explained are briefly as follows:—Firstly, from a multitude of writings extant among the ancient Jews and Christians, a selection of certain books was made, to the exclusion of others. Secondly, the several books thus selected were received as infallible and divine; those which were excluded being regarded as fallible and human. Thirdly, in defence, not merely of the doctrines and religious system contained in these books, but of the very books themselves, both Jews and Christians have submitted to persecution and death.

‘To the first class of facts I can only advert in the most cursory manner. The selection of the writings acknowledged as sacred by the Jews cannot have been owing to their antiquity merely, for we learn from the Book of Numbers, that even in the days of Moses, there was extant a record entitled, “The Book of the Wars of the Lord.” Nor, in order to confer divine authority upon any book, was the fact sufficient, that it had been written by a prophet known to have received revelations from Heaven; for, if so, why do we not find in the Canon “The acts of Uzziah first and last,” written by “Isaiah the Prophet, the son of Amoz?” Nor, again, did the circumstance of a document having been composed in the Hebrew language secure its recognition as divine; for the Jews never admitted among their sacred writings the Book of Ecclesiasticus, which was undoubtedly drawn up in Hebrew, and whose author, moreover, assumes the prophetic tone, and lays no small claim to authority. Add to all this, the astonishing fidelity and affection with which the Jews preserved the writings which they did receive into their Canon,—writings, too, which were not the memorial of their glory, but of their shame; and in which their lawgiver, from the very first, calls heaven and earth to witness against them.

‘The case of the New Testament is no less peculiar. It is plain that the primitive Christians did not consider apostles as alone qualified to compose inspired documents; for, were such their belief, how can we account for the reception of the Gospels of S. Mark and S. Luke? Nor is the admission of these Gospels to be explained by saying, that no other memorials of the life of Christ existed than the four evangelical narratives, and that the early Christians gladly collected every fragment of their Master’s history: for not only, as the best criticism explains, does the introduction of S. Luke’s Gospel refer to “many who had taken in hand to set forth” a narrative of the works of that period, but the earliest of the Fathers also (e. g. S. Irenæus, A.D. 167) describe the Apocryphal Gospels as being “countless in number.” Nor, again, can we account for the admission into the New Testament of the writings of S. Mark and S. Luke, by alleging that, as companions and friends of the Apostles, these Evangelists had opportunities of gaining such accurate information respecting the doctrines of the Christian faith as was not within the reach of others: for, if this be so, why did the Church never recognise as canonical the Epistle of S. Clement of Rome—“my fellow-labourer,” writes S. Paul, “whose name

is in the Book of Life;" or, which is still more remarkable when we recollect the relation of S. Barnabas to S. Paul, how comes it to pass that the Epistle of S. Barnabas was rejected from the New Testament, while the Gospel of S. Mark, "his sister's son," was received?"—Pp. 43—46.

But then follows the conclusion, containing our author's comment on these correctly-stated phenomena.

'The several details connected with the general question here considered belong, (?) however, to another department of theology. I would merely add, and this even the most reluctant are forced to admit, that the reception of the different parts of the New Testament as Scripture, took place without external concert,—from an inward impulse, as it were, at the same time and in the most different places; and that, with scarcely an exception, each writing which it contains was all at once, and without a word of doubt, placed on a level with the Old Testament, which had hitherto been regarded as exclusively divine. In short, the authority conceded to this new component of the Scriptures, seems to have grown up without any one being able to place his finger upon the place or moment when adhesion to it was first yielded.'—P. 47—49.

This extract contains a singular mixture of correct and incorrect conception. It is rightly pointed out, that with scarcely one exception, each writing was, all at once and without a word of doubt, placed on a level with the Old Testament, and that the authority conceded to them 'seems to have grown up without any one being able to place his finger on the place or moment when adhesion to it was first yielded.' But it is surely most surprising that our excellent author should, after predicating such great things of it at the outset, treat this part of his subject so slightly and cursorily after all; saying that 'the details of it belong to another branch of theology,' (we would fain know what branch.) But the account itself, rendered or suggested, of the universal reception of the New Testament Scriptures, manifests a strange misapprehension as to the real state of the case. It is set down to 'some inward impulse pervading the Church.' We are unable to see the difference between this view and that of Dr. Tholuck, which Mr. Lee himself seems to disallow; viz. that the primitive Church was led, 'by an unconscious but sure historico-religious tact,' to receive such and such writings into the Canon. This is only one instance out of many in which Mr. Lee has allowed himself to be led away from the plain state of the case by his German guides, and by the mysterious phraseology in which they couch their oracles. The whole thing was, as we have said again and again, a matter of *testimony* from beginning to end. On that ground, and on no 'inward impulse,' by no 'historico-religious tact,' were the pretensions of candidates for admission to the Canon decided. Another and equally feeble reason is given in the following passage:—

'It may be urged, in explanation of such facts, that the very nature of the books themselves occasioned the preference given to them. It may be

said, that the difference in point of style, and manner, and contents, as well of the books of the Old Testament from the Apocrypha, as of the New Testament from the writings of the Apostolical Fathers, is such as admits of no comparison; that the superiority of the books of Scripture is uncontested and incontestable; and that, as Hooker observes of the sacred writers, "a greater difference there seemeth not to be between the manner of their knowledge, than there is between the manner of their speech and others." And, finally,—it may be further argued,—without any need of supposing special divine guidance, the simple facts of the case account for the formation of the Canon, and enabled the early Christians, not only to judge certain writings to be unworthy of the name of Scripture, but also to select others as deserving such acknowledgment. Be it so; such an explanation but serves to exalt the critical accuracy, the profound insight, the refined taste, of those who passed that judgment, and made that selection. The admission which such an explanation involves I claim wholly on the side of the present argument, and at once transfer it to the cause of Inspiration. That continued exercise of solid judgment, which selected such writings, and such writings only; that critical sagacity, which the most ingenious and subtle investigations of modern times have never been able to prove at fault; that unceasing caution and anxious vigilance, which never admitted into the Canon a single book for the rejection of which any valid reasons have ever been shown—such qualities, conceded to the Fathers of the first ages of the Church, only serve to enhance the value of their opinions upon every point connected with the Scriptures, and, above all, upon the subject of their Inspiration.—P. 50.

This time we are invited to repose our belief in the authenticity of the Canon on the 'critical sagacity,' 'taste,' 'solid judgment,' &c. of the first ages, exercised in the selection and discrimination of the true Scriptures from the false. Was ever anything much more preposterous? It is true this is only thrown out as an *argumentum ad hominem*. But why suggest so baseless a view at all?

The pith of the whole matter has been correctly enough stated by authors referred to by Mr. Lee,—Doddridge, for example :—

'I greatly revere the testimony of the primitive Christian writers, not only to the real existence of the sacred books in those early ages, but also to their divine original: their persuasion of which most evidently appears from the veneration in which they speak of them, even while miraculous gifts remained in the Church.'

And again, by Sack :—

'The recognition of any book by the Churches of either Old or New Covenant, is a fact at least as important as its having been written by such or such a person. For the question does not so much relate to the author in his individual capacity, as to the circumstance that, as a matter of fact, he was acknowledged by the Church as a person divinely qualified or called to write of divine things for the Church.'

We are glad, again, to find Mr. Westcott, in his work on the Canon, already referred to, speaking in the following terms :—

'It is of the utmost importance to remember that the Canon was never referred, in the first ages, to the authority of Fathers or Councils. The

appeal was made, not to the judgment of men, but of churches. . . . Its limits were fixed in the earliest times *by use, rather than by criticism, and this use itself was based on immediate knowledge.*

And he proceeds to relegate internal criticism to its due place.

'But though external evidence is the *proper proof* both of the authenticity and authority of the New Testament, it is *supported* by powerful internal testimony, drawn from the relations of the books one to another, and to the early developments of Christian doctrine. Subjective criticism, when used as an independent guide, is always uncertain, and often treacherous; but when it is confined to interpretation and comparison of historic data, it *confirms as well as illustrates.*'—*Westcott*, p. 539.

Elsewhere he remarks (p. 548), in full accordance with what has been said above, that 'the idea of the New Testament and 'the Creed grew out of the same circumstances, and were fixed 'by the same authority.'

We trust we have now made good, to the satisfaction of all reasonable persons, the assertion hazarded by us some pages back; viz., that the proof of the authenticity and divine character of the Holy Scriptures stands exactly where it did from the beginning; that the Church's principal *pièce de résistance* is absolutely untouched by arguments directed against their contents and character.

We would now briefly point out how this fact affects the attitude to be assumed towards such objections. For it is one thing to show that such and such a line of argument, considered abstractedly, is invalid, and quite another to deprive it of its disquieting effects on the mind of particular persons.

It is then notorious, that a class of writers has risen up in England, who, with various degrees of boldness, and motives scarcely less various, impugn the divine authenticity [of the Scriptures on the following ground (to which, it will be found, all their objections reduce themselves):—that they contain certain elements visibly human. Were they really divine, it is argued—were they accredited channels of divine teaching—they would be absolutely raised above all inaccuracy whatsoever; inaccuracy rhetorical, descriptive, pictorial, or whatsoever. And, in particular, the narrator's own view of anything, the aspect under which it appeared to him, would nowhere be allowed to influence the narration. The absolute, strict, literal truth about everything—that, no more and no less, would be told us. The reason for exacting this species and this degree of accuracy is, we are told, that, if the narrator, viewed as a teacher, is (in any sense, and from whatever cause) incorrect as to a single particular,—we cannot tell but that he may be deceived in the main circumstances and events of Christianity.

M. Gaussen and his school have accepted the challenge, and maintain that it is even so, as the objectors require. But are the objectors themselves willing to follow their demand out to its logical results? We are sure they dare not. Strictly speaking, it is simply impossible to give in words an absolutely accurate account of anything. Events, nay objects, are not so absolutely translatable into language, as that the language shall perfectly reflect and render them. To use an illustration. A mirror, or a smooth expanse of water, cannot correctly reflect the whole of an object or a landscape; it can only reflect that side of either which is turned towards it. And just so language cannot go round about an object or an event, and so render all the sides and aspects of it, that the narrative shall omit nothing that is in the object, and exhibit nothing that is not. And yet, for all that, events are said to be correctly described, and may, for all human purposes, be described sufficiently, so that a man may say that the account is true and not false. What these objectors then ask for, is simply an entirely new machinery for the rendering and narrating of facts. To follow out our illustration: something of the nature of the stereoscope ought, according to them, to have been provided; a narrative professedly divine ought to exhibit objects to the eye with a solidity, a rotundity, and a completeness beyond what is exacted in ordinary narrations. If it does not do this, but shares the ordinary limits and incapacities, so to speak, of ordinary language, it cannot be a safe or reliable vehicle of knowledge.

This is, in fact, to demand the supposed Septuagint miracle over again. Two different narrators, as long as they continue men, and have the natural use of their faculties, will unavoidably narrate the same event with more or less of discrepancy. One will say merely that there was 'a storm;' another would describe it as 'a great storm of wind'—words conveying a much enlarged idea. And this kind of variation may take a very wide range without impairing the truthfulness of the narration.

The question, then, is not whether there should be, in written accounts of divine events, discrepancies, either with each other or with the absolute, abstract facts of the case. Such discrepancies there must and ought to be. You may call it a 'difficulty' that there should be such variations; but it would be a much greater 'difficulty' if there were none. The only question that can properly be entertained is, what amount of discrepancy would Almighty God be likely to overrule and prevent, in writings destined to be the deposit of Christian truth? And this is a question which we can only answer, if at all, by the help of very general analogies, and by looking to the scheme of God's dealings on a large scale. Thus we know that there

are ingredients and elements of injury in the most necessary and healthful products of the universe. It would surprise an unchemical, but very logical person, to have it proved to him that there is in the air he breathes a certain amount of *azote*—an element altogether uncondusive to life, if not absolutely, in its proper nature, destructive of it. Yet this *azote* is not only an ingredient of air, but, as it should seem, a condition of its respirability. So too in food, pure, unmixed nutritiousness is not only unattainable in the abstract, but all food, to be practically nutritious, must contain some parts which do not redound to nourishment. In a word, a certain coarseness of process seems inseparable, as far as we know, from the finest results. The most perfect products reach us in a certain follicle or husk, which is not, indeed, that which we seek, yet is inseparable from it, considered as communicable to us. What, then, if it pleased the Creator of all speech and all writing to take them such as He found, or rather such as He made them? Is it, of the two, more or less probable, that he should interfere to disengage from what we may call its *azote*—that is to say, from the ordinary imperfections inseparable from language as a vehicle—the divine knowledge of Himself which breathes in the Scriptures? Is it philosophical, is it reasonable, to conclude, that because some trifling and unimportant variations—for no one pretends that they are important in themselves, or in their bearing upon divine truth, but only as affecting the veracity and credibility of the writers—that because these exist, amounting even, as far as we can perceive, to irreconcilability, that therefore the whole narrative is deprived of its claims, however strong otherwise, to divine origination? Is the slightest imperfection of statement as to the entire facts of the case—the smallest difference of rendering between two narrators, such as, for example, the mention of one or two blind men—is this to be held ruinous to the entire fabric of Scripture? Have we the slightest reason for asserting that He who permitted one Evangelist to speak of the ‘storm,’ the other of the ‘great storm of wind,’ would interfere precisely at this point, to secure the mention of the second blind man? Or, in general, shall the *humanity* of each several writer, manifestly appearing in his work—shall this create a moment’s misgiving as to his authority as a teacher?

For this line of argument, as we have before observed, cannot stop here. It must go on to the denial of the possibility of any communication between God and man, through man. If you cross-question S. John’s Gospel, you must cross-question S. John too. The same mind which doubts an Evangelist as an Evangelist, because he comes forth also as a man, must inevitably refuse to S. Peter the character of a divine teacher,

because once, in a matter demanding the wisdom of the serpent, he rather acted with the simplicity of the dove, and fell into the toils of Judaizers, so that S. Paul 'withstood him to the face.' Nay, a single lapse of memory on the part of an Apostle as to any minor event of our Lord's days in the flesh, ought in reason to stagger such a mind as to his credentials, though he could show otherwise all 'the signs of an apostle.' And thus these miserable and absolutely unphilosophical objections land us on the dreary shore of the negation of all divine light as communicable to man at all. If they are worth a moment's thought, they claim hopelessly to shut the door between heaven and earth; because, on their showing, all communication is simply impossible. The archetypal mystery of the Incarnation is, we need not say, to such objectors an impossibility.

Nor can we forbear to dwell for a moment on the self-deception, if, indeed, it be not a form of hypocrisy, which pervades these works—the writings of the Froudes, the Newmans, the Gregs of the day. It is, we are asked to believe, out of their exceeding zeal for the interests of truth, that they urge their objections against the divine authority of the Scriptures. So fearful are they of accepting anything that is not true, that they are bound in conscience to urge these objections. Now, if they had set out with saying that the whole or the greater part of the teaching of the Bible was shocking to their moral nature, they might have some reason for thinking that they were in earnest in this plea. But though one or two objections to the morality of Scripture have ever been harped upon—as, *e. g.*, the command to destroy the Canaanites—they cannot deny that nineteen-twentieths of its entire teaching, alike in morals and divinity, is incomparable: that no book or system in the world is anything near so pure and glorious in its conceptions either of the Divine Nature or of human duty. And they have great reason to mistrust the sincerity of their unwillingness to receive so excellent a gift of teaching, so lofty a theism, or so pure a morality. If they were really seeking, as they profess, for *wahrheit*, they would prefer running the slight risk—which is all they can prove, even on their own showing, against the reception of the Scriptures as God's truth—rather than, for fear of this trifling alloy, give up so great, even if it were conceded to be not an unmixed benefit. To be consistent, they ought to forbear to draw another breath, for fear of the azote; and to stand in awe of the medical science, which teaches us that we must needs receive into our bodily system much that is not food, or go without food at all.

The only intelligible attitude then, on grounds of common sense or reasonableness, for the mind to assume towards

writings accredited to us as divine by testimony which we cannot shake, and have no reason for questioning, is that of *reverence*; a deep sense of the mystery, which must encompass whatever reaches into two spheres of being, the divine and the human. To such as are armed with this, (and he who throws it away is in an untenable position,) 'the shock to existing notions,' in the matter of inspiration, need not be much, after all. When we look around and ask ourselves calmly what has been shaken by the concussion, we find that all that has been proved is, that there is a mystery in the matter; and this we knew before. And till it can be shown—which it never has and never can be—that the things which we believe at the bidding of Scripture are altogether, or even in any proportion worth speaking of, shocking to our moral nature, and to the rooted instincts of humanity; or, again, are absolutely contradictory in themselves, one great palpable and self-convicted falsehood—so long we may calmly and uniformly point to the original *testimony* on which the divine origination of Scripture rests, as an infinitely stronger ground of belief than any which can be alleged on the other side. And we sit down to the consideration of difficulties, discrepancies, &c., and to the general question of the kind of guidance under which the sacred writers wrote, without suspending one iota of our faith on discussions of the kind, and without in the least undertaking to frame, or expecting to find propounded, a 'Theory of Inspiration' which will exactly fit into all the intricacies of the mystery before us. We shall be prepared to find that our 'existing notions' were, more or less, crude and ill-considered. Our minds may have misconceived, in some respects, the phenomena of the mystery. It may never have struck us before, and may a little surprise us now, to notice this or that strongly human characteristic in a writing claiming to be divine. But what of that? It does but shift to a certain extent, as compared with our former conception, the conditions under which the human and divine element coexist; it cannot touch the original fact of such coexistence, which we have believed on grounds totally independent of these subordinate adjustments. Nor shall we be a whit the less satisfied with a Theory of Inspiration, for its not undertaking to explain everything.

In this spirit, then, we would approach, and counsel others to approach, discussions like those contained in Mr. Lee's volume. So entering on them, we may not, indeed, attach to them all the importance which seems to be claimed for them, but we may find in them an agreeable study, not the less so for being no longer an anxious one.

Mr. Lee insists very strongly, and of course with good reason,

on what is called—awkwardly enough, we must think—the ‘dynamical’ as opposed to the ‘mechanical’ theory of Inspiration; meaning thereby that the Holy Spirit operated as an influence, not reducing the subject of it to a mere machine. This, we say, is of course the true account of the matter; only we cannot think that any statement or nomenclature of this kind can have any pretensions to divest the subject of its inherent mystery, or to penetrate very far into that mystery. The union of human freedom of action with divine control—whether the latter be special, as in the case of apostolic teaching, or ordinary—must ever, as to the exact nature and limits of the two involved elements, elude our faculties of discrimination. Mr. Lee has well described the view of the early Church on this subject:—

‘The primitive Church did not shrink from expressing a decided opinion as to the effect produced upon the sacred penmen while actuated by the Spirit’s influence—an opinion clearly indicated by the series of similitudes which the different writers employed who approached the subject of Inspiration, and which were admirably calculated, had there been occasion to develop them, to illustrate that mutual cooperation of the divine and human agencies which, as we have seen, forms the first condition of our problem. The language made use of plainly denotes that the human element was not thought to have been suppressed or suspended, but to have been filled and exalted by the divine illumination: and to this notion belongs that entire system of illustration so familiar to the Fathers from the earliest times.

‘They compared the soul of the man of God, when subjected to the Divine influence, to an instrument of music into which the Holy Spirit breathes, or the strings of which He sways like the plectrum of a harp or lyre, in order to evoke its vital tones. Such illustrations were obviously suggested by the very etymology of the word Inspiration—or as S. Paul terms it [qu.?] *Theopneustia*; and when they are applied to men as the agents of the Holy Spirit, we should remember that the tone and quality of the note depend as much upon the instrument itself as upon the hand which sweeps over its strings. And, carrying out the analogy, we can easily see, when we reflect upon the full and deep harmonies of Scripture, how much of their power and beauty lies in the divine union of the different human instruments through which we listen to the breathings of the Spirit. Thus, Origen, speaking of the consistency of the various parts of scripture, finely observed, “Scripture, as a whole, is God’s one, perfect, and complete instrument; giving forth to those who wish to learn, its one saving music from many notes combined; stilling and restraining all strivings of the Evil One, as David’s music calmed the madness of Saul.” All such illustrations, no doubt, clearly recognise a relatively passive state in the sacred penmen; but they by no means imply that such a state involved inaction or unconsciouness. On the contrary, the decided manner in which the very writers, who have made use of the similitudes in question, oppose the erroneous views as to Prophecy with which they had to contend, proves how sensibly they felt the distinction which subsists between the vibration of the strings of an instrument of music, and the pulsations of a human heart touched and animated by the Spirit of God. Add to this, the marked omission by the Fathers, while adopting the language and analogies employed by Philo, of any allusion to that suppression of intellectual

energy, and of the exercise of reason, which, as we have seen, was so much insisted on by the Jewish philosopher.'—Pp. 79—81.

The treatment of the Old Testament is, we are disposed to think, the most successful part of this volume; it abounds in valuable disquisitions, as well as summaries of opinion, on many topics of interest connected with the elder Economy. The Second Person of the Holy Trinity, considered as revealing, even in the older times, the knowledge of God the Father, is dwelt on in a valuable chapter entitled 'The Logos, the Revealer.' After speaking, in language pervaded with the spirit of a sound and deep theology, of the Divine Word as the Creator, Mr. Lee thus proceeds:—

'But the Old Testament does not confine itself to this representation of the fact, that the revelations which it contains are but new instances of Creative Power, thereby leading us back to the Author of all creation—the Eternal Son; it presents Him directly to our view, as unfolding in Person the divine counsels, under the mysterious character of the ANGEL OF JEHOVAH. To this title, employed for the first time to describe His appearance in the age of Abraham, laying the foundation, as it were, of all future revelations to the chosen race, some attention must be devoted.

'The passages of the Old Testament which refer to this aspect of Revelation, may be reduced to three heads. In the first place, the Angel of Jehovah, by the use of the first person singular, identifies Himself with the Divine Nature. Thus, "The Angel of the Lord said unto Hagar, I will multiply thy seed exceedingly;" and in a subsequent verse we read, that "She called the name of Jehovah that spake unto her, Thou God seest me." Secondly, reference is made to the Angel, so as to prevent our understanding any other than a Being essentially Divine. For example, Jacob says, "God, before whom my fathers Abraham and Isaac did walk, the God which fed me all my life long unto this day, the Angel which redeemed me from all evil, bless the lads;" where the identification of the Angel with Him from whom alone all blessing flows, and who redeems from all evil, cannot be doubted. Thirdly, a certain distinction is made between the Angel of Jehovah and Jehovah Himself; but in such a manner as to represent that the essence of Deity had become manifest and operative in the former. Thus, Jehovah says, "Behold I send an Angel before thee to keep thee in the way . . . Beware of Him, and obey His voice, provoke Him not, for He will not pardon your transgressions, for my Name is in Him;" where even without dwelling upon the signification of the phrase, "Name of Jehovah," we can only understand such words as describing a distinct divine Personality. An expression in the Epistle to the Hebrews casts further light on the class of texts which have been just considered. The sacred writer observes: "Wherefore, holy brethren, partakers of the heavenly calling, consider the Apostle and High Priest of our profession, Christ Jesus." The true force of these words will at once appear, if we compare the etymology of the expression "Apostle," with that of the title applied in the Old Testament, as we have seen, to the Person of the Eternal Word, in His character of Revealer. Christ is here called "Apostle" or "Messenger," with plain reference to His office, under the former dispensation, as "Angel of Jehovah." The term "Angel," indeed, could not have been employed without confusing the meaning; for in the two preceding chapters, it had been used to denote the species of Angels as distinguished from the human race; and hence, it could not fitly

describe in the passage before us the peculiar office of Christ as "the Angel;" the inspired writer accordingly selects for this purpose the term "Apostle," which equally denotes the same idea, and which is borrowed from a verb continually employed by S. John, in a strictly technical sense, to signify the "mission of the Eternal Son into the world," this Evangelist repeatedly describing Christ as "the Apostle," or as He "whom God hath sent." S. Paul, therefore, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, alludes to the Angel of Jehovah, who, under the Law, had revealed God to the people; referring at the same time to the High Priest, who was the representative of the people before God. With these features of the theocratic dispensation, he compares the Christian scheme. "Consider," he writes, "the Apostle and High Priest of our (*i. e.* the Christian) profession;" and he then goes on to develop at some length the comparison thus instituted.—Pp. 120—124.

In more than one passage, very interesting analogies and correspondences are pointed out between the treatment of the same subject in the Old Testament and the New—all of which are so many new vouchers for the unity of design which pervades the whole. The following is a good instance:—

'But even here we are reminded, notwithstanding all such traces of the prophets' own personality, how a higher principle moulds and directs their words. There was one topic which was not submitted to their own style of representation. Amid the copious and varied symbolism of Scripture, we can observe how the pictures of those visions in which Jehovah himself is revealed, always preserve a character quite peculiar; although, when describing certain attributes of Deity—which in no case can be described otherwise than by metaphors—each prophet still employs his wonted imagery. When Jehovah Himself appears, the sacred writers borrow no colouring from external sources;—were they to do so, indeed, they would manifestly abandon the whole genius and spirit of the Theocracy; and this uniformity in describing their visions of God, characterises the compositions of all the prophets, notwithstanding the prominence in other parts of their writings of their own individuality. To satisfy ourselves of this fact, it will be sufficient to compare the accounts of the visions of Jehovah vouchsafed to Isaiah, Daniel, and Ezekiel.'—Pp. 181, 182.

"It is unnecessary," a note adds, "to quote from the Apocalypse. Cf. *e.g.* Rev. iv."

Two of the Lectures are entitled 'Revelation and Inspiration.' As usual, there is a fund of valuable matter in them: but after the maturest consideration, we cannot but demur altogether to the distinction which our author here advances, and on which, indeed, he relies for the clearing up of all such difficulties as the 'dynamical theory of Inspiration' fails to solve. His view is, that 'revelation and inspiration are to be distinguished by the sources from whence they proceed; revelation 'being the peculiar function of the Eternal Word; inspiration 'the result of the agency of the Holy Spirit.' We are not indisposed, indeed, to admit that there are considerable indications in the *Elder Economy*, of such a distribution of offices, so to speak, between the Second and Third Persons of the Holy Trinity. That the Logos was emphatically the Revealer, is, as

we have already had occasion to recognise, a doctrine as true, probably, as it is old. Yet, certainly, on the other hand, the Spirit did *reveal* to those on whom it acted—as David—knowledge of future events, and the like. And God the Word did as certainly inspire the old prophets, since they ‘searched ‘who or what manner of time the *Spirit of Christ that was in them* ‘did signify when it testified beforehand,’ &c. So that even as regards the Old Testament, it is only true *in a sense*, that the Logos is the one Revealer; or the Spirit the one Inspirer. And much more, if possible, does this hold in the New Testament. There, as has been many times observed, it is impossible to dissociate any of the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity from agency in any of the great acts or processes of the Gospel. The Resurrection, for example, is at one time the act of the Father; at another, of the Spirit (Rom. i. 4); at another, of Christ Himself. And that entire influence under which the apostles and other persons discharged their great functions as messengers of Christ, is absolutely incapable of being exclusively assigned, as to any part of it, to any one Divine Person. ‘It ‘is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which ‘speaketh in you.’ And yet it is said again, ‘For I’ (that is, Christ) ‘will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your ‘adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or resist.’ And yet, after all, it was the Spirit that was thus to speak in them: ‘When He,’ the Spirit of truth, ‘is come, He will guide you into all truth.’ It is surely impossible, in the face of such passages as these—and the whole of S. John xiv.—xvi. is to the same effect—to lay down any such canon as Mr. Lee proposes. We cannot, we must not say, that the Holy Spirit alone dictated the New Testament Scriptures—that our Lord did but reveal, or make known, the Holy Spirit alone prompting the inditing of that which was known. We have no grounds whatever for drawing such distinctions; sound theology repudiates it: and it is indeed one which we have no faculties for entertaining. The very instance which Mr. Lee adduces in illustration, proves this: ‘Certain Tyrian prophets said to S. Paul, *through the Spirit*’—mark the expression—‘that he should not,’ &c. ‘To them,’ then, ‘had been *revealed* what the Holy Ghost was witnessing in every ‘city,’ &c. These prophets, however, *enjoyed no Inspiration*; (!) ‘they adulterated the *Revelation*, &c. which the guidance of the ‘Spirit enabled S. Paul to understand and obey.’ Surely there is an astonishing confusion here—men who ‘spoke by the Spirit’ had ‘no inspiration;’ and what Scripture plainly says came from the Spirit, really came from the Logos alone, &c. A passage no less self-contradictory, on the same subject, will be found in p. 268.

The truth is, that Mr. Lee does not take a sufficiently *large* view of the nature of the Apostolic inspiration. He evidently, in fact, though in one place he seems to protest against it, sets down their oral and their written teaching to two totally different influences—or, however, as he himself expresses it, ‘the difference was specific, or one of kind, not of degree.’ S. Paul preaching and S. Paul writing were evidently, he seems to think, two very different, or differently influenced persons. Surely there is not the slightest ground for any such view. To suppose that Christ spoke in his Apostles, or was ‘in them of a truth,’ as teachers by word of mouth, but withdrew Himself, and gave place to a separate operation of the Holy Ghost, when they sat down to write, is simply incredible and untenable. It is the more extraordinary that Mr. Lee should insist, as in effect he does, on this view; since in one place he states the true view of the matter:—

‘Such assurances of *Christ’s continued presence* with them in their teaching are most conclusive; for it cannot be regarded as just or reasonable to maintain that the Divine influence guarded the Apostles from error, when orally conveying the truth, but that they were left to all the hazard of human fallibility when instructing by letter their converts in Corinth or Colosse.’

It is evident that this is perfectly irreconcilable with the view of the Logos, or Christ, being the revealer only of the truth, not the co-inspirer also of the inditing of it.

The following passage, (deducting the untenable distinction between Revelation and Inspiration,) well describes some characteristics of the composition of the Scriptures:—

‘It forms a prominent feature, it will be remembered, of the theory of Inspiration maintained in these Discourses, that each writer of Scripture made use, on all occasions, of such materials as were in his power, whether supplied by his own experience or by the information of others. This principle, as we have seen, forms the foundation of the distinction between Revelation and Inspiration. The particulars recorded in the pages of Scripture were not all matters of Revelation; the sacred writers have touched upon many topics which were not originally communicated to them from Heaven; but this circumstance in no respect invalidates the assertion, that the narrative of each and every fact of which the Bible takes notice has been handed down to future ages, under the influence of Inspiration. In other words, the Holy Spirit provided that each portion of the Bible should convey such information as best subserved the Divine purpose, irrespectively of any consideration as to the character of that information, whether it consisted of plain historical facts, or of immediate disclosures of supernatural truths. Hence, therefore, any one of the hypotheses proposed in order to explain the origin of the Gospels may be accepted as true, without in the least affecting the force of a single argument put forward in this investigation. Each evangelist may have borrowed, to the fullest extent, from those sources which modern critics have attempted to define, and yet his entire composition will remain, in the most literal sense, inspired. But however irrelevant to the inspiration of Scripture, the fate of all or any of the hypotheses alluded to has thus been shown to be, it

would be ungrateful of the Biblical student to deny that the thorough ventilation which this question has received, has been productive of the most beneficial results as regards the elucidation of the New Testament.

'The mutual connexion of the different portions of the Gospel history has been more fully brought to light; the phraseology of the sacred writers has been more accurately analysed; and the structure of the whole Evangelical word more perfectly exhibited, in consequence of their discussion, than in any previous stage of Biblical exegesis.'—Pp. 319, 320.

The inspiration of the Old Testament is well deduced, on occasion, from phenomena in the New:—

'Under this class comes also a series of references by which the writers of the New Testament exemplify, in the plainest manner, their belief in the inspiration of the Old Testament; and from which it obviously results, that each portion of Scripture must be regarded as part of one divine whole:—I mean the system of collective quotations, where a number of passages are brought together, in the same connexion, from various books of the Bible, in order to establish some one point of Christian doctrine. Of this, the Epistle to the Hebrews affords many instances; but the most striking example is, perhaps, supplied by the passages commencing at the tenth verse of the third chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, where five different texts from the Psalms are combined in the same quotation, with a text from Isaiah,—the whole series commencing with the formula, "As it is written." It is plain that in these collective quotations, the Apostles adduce the several passages as all denoting, and from the first pointing to one great truth: although, separately, in their primary connexion, such statements of the Old Testament had often merely reference to more special relations.'—Pp. 332, 333.

Much curious illustrative matter will be found in Mr. Lee's notes, more especially Hebraic and Patristic learning. It is also shown in several places that the *novelty* of certain methods of attack on Scripture, and also of defence, has been assumed without any reason. See, *e.g.* p. 337. The learning and ingenuity displayed in these notes, indeed, would alone entitle Mr. Lee's volume to a place on any Biblical student's shelves: and we trust that, though we have been unable to assent to the general line taken in it, we shall have not ineffectually commended it, on other grounds, to the attention which it so well deserves.

ART. II.—*An Inquiry into the Credibility of the Early Roman History.* By the RIGHT HON. SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS. 2 vols. London: J. W. Parker & Son. 1855.

WHAT we are to believe and what *not* to believe in the wide domain of history; how much is to be accepted as objective fact, and how much as mere legend or ingenious conjecture; where the line of demarcation is to be drawn between solid truth and the creations of fancy;—these are questions surely of no mean interest and importance, problems to be ranked among the deepest and most serious which can occupy the human mind. For such inquiry, when engaged upon the loftiest objects, is inseparably entwined with the eternal destiny of each one of us; when descending to matters of a somewhat lower nature, it is still intimately concerned with our inward life, as moral and spiritual beings; and, finally, even when occupied with questions of an apparently trivial character, it is probably tending, however unconsciously, to the formation of a habit of mind—a habit either of that easy acquiescence in all that is brought before us which leads to an excessive credulity and to superstition; or of a restlessly critical temper, which distrusts the surest evidence, and finally lands its possessor amidst the dreary, deadly wastes of universal scepticism.

These questions must, in some sort, be almost coeval with history itself. The rudest ballad which ever professed to impart to a nation in its infancy anything approximating to a true account of its heroes, and their achievements in peace or war, must have been framed with a view of satisfying the requirements of those who heard it. Untrustworthy as might be the matter, and uncritical the listeners, there were yet, doubtless, certain bounds to credulity, which the minstrel could not safely venture to transgress. Some criterion, however vague and shifting, would exist in the hearers' minds. The standard might be most illusory. We are all acquainted with the story of the King of Siam, who, very naturally, refused to believe in the existence of ice; and with that of the worthy pair who, after unquestioning acceptance of the greatest marvels which the imagination of their sailor son could impose upon them, were arrested in their career of belief, and *compelled* to reject the narrative, when it arrived at the mention of flying-fish. And in like manner the pilgrim of the eighth century, who was expected, says Amedée Thierry, if he would please the in-

mates of noble castles, to have visited the realms of fantasy, to bring news of their goings-on, and to have held intercourse with heroes who never lived, or at least were never so circumstanced, —even *he* would find a limit placed upon his powers of invention by the existence of certain conditions of fitness and probability to which he would be rigorously bound to conform. To this day, no ballad-singer in the streets of Naples would dare to cast an imputation upon the fair fame of that idol of popular esteem, *Rinaldo*. Rinaldo may have achieved much that is marvellous; he *could* not have done anything that is cowardly or base: the thing is simply incredible.

In times and in countries where the standard of education is high, we should naturally expect to find a correspondingly just and reasonable standard of criticism. This gift, however, appears to be very variable, and not necessarily referable to the amount of general information which is extant in a given age. Thus of mediæval times it has been justly observed, that the *literati* who were giants in logic and the metaphysics of theology were but the merest children in criticism. Witness, for example, the unhesitating acceptance of the work upon the Angelic hierarchy which bore the name of Dionysius as its author, as a genuine production of S. Paul's distinguished convert, the Areopagite. In this too, as in other departments of human skill, original genius has frequently shone forth like a beacon, in solitary grandeur, amidst surrounding darkness. What writer of ancient Greece, early or late, has displayed the truly critical temper so fully as Thucydides? Among the Fathers of the Church, can even the great doctors of the fourth and fifth centuries be placed, in this respect, on a level with Origen? Nevertheless, there are seasons in which this faculty gains perceptible advancement. Increase of critical skill, as respects both history and literature, has been truly termed 'one of the real boasts of these later generations, over the most intellectual and able of the ancient world;' and if the possession of this faculty has been, and continues to be, very morbidly and mischievously abused, we must not on that account be betrayed into the denial of its real growth and stature, any more than of its interest and importance.

And for once,—a rare event, it must be owned, in a great question of mental philosophy,—the inquirer, who would fain make acquaintance with the most brilliant exhibitions of recent critical research in the field of history, need not be exclusively or even primarily referred to the learned labours of France and Germany. We are but giving utterance to the convictions of far better judges than ourselves, when we challenge for Great Britain the first place in this department of knowledge, on the

strength of the productions of Mr. Grote and Colonel Mure; and finally, though perhaps less confidently, of the present volumes of Sir G. C. Lewis.¹ It is likewise remarkable, that whereas the prizes of our bar and senate are supposed, and not without reason, to engross the powers natural and acquired which on the Continent would have been devoted to studies of a more abstract and recondite nature, these three distinguished authors all are, or have been, members of the house of 'Her Majesty's most faithful Commons.'

If, after all the toil and learning expended upon them, the present aspect of the questions connected with historic credibility remains somewhat shifting and unsettled in its character, it does not therefore follow that nothing has been gained by the examination which they have undergone. The profit has not been scanty; and even a hasty and imperfect survey may suffice to make good this assertion. The mere attempt to perform such a task may indeed appear to render us liable to a charge of presumption, inasmuch as it involves more or less of criticism upon very learned and highly gifted writers, and essays to arbitrate between conflicting opinions, of which each has been supported by deep research and consummate skill. But, on the other hand, the vast store of materials collected by several of the investigators, and more especially by Mr. Grote, are sufficient to enable a very inferior scholar to form *some* opinion of his own; and as in the most intellectual of games, that of chess, a bystander who is not comparable in ability to either of the combatants, may yet occasionally detect oversights in the play of both, even so too may the student of the very opposite theories of Mr. Grote and Colonel Mure, of Niebuhr and Sir G. C. Lewis, be alternately inclined to accept or reject the arguments of each, without making the slightest pretensions to one tithe of their ability and information.

All history may, for our present purpose, be divided into, *firstly*, that which rests, and, *secondly*, that which does *not* rest, upon contemporary written evidence: a distinction impressed upon us with great force and ability in the volumes of Sir G. C. Lewis. Such a division is, of course, an exhaustive one: but the former class may admit of a convenient subdivision into (1.) history which has remained, if we may so speak, untouched by the addition of legendary matter, and (2.) history which has become the groundwork of subsequent legends. Thus, for example, the lives of Pericles, of Scipio Africanus, of Louis XIV., appear to be the subject of narratives, which we may fairly

¹ For the sake of brevity, this work will be here cited simply as 'Lewis.'

entitle pure history: while, on the contrary, the career of a Cyrus, an Attila, or a Charlemagne (albeit each is as truly an historical personage as the preceding) has been made the basis of many a wild romance in Persia, or in Gaul and Spain, or again in Italy and Hungary. We shall thus obtain three main classes, each of which we propose to consider separately.

I. History which is based upon contemporary written evidence, and has not been made the subject of subsequent legend.

II. History which is based upon contemporary written evidence, and has likewise been made the subject of subsequent legend.

III. History which does not rest upon any contemporaneous written evidence.

I. Let us first look at the case where there is contemporary evidence, which has been preserved by writing and unmixed with the legends of after ages. Much that is valuable in connexion with this branch of our inquiry may be derived from the lectures (especially the final lecture) of Dr. Arnold, and the first lecture of Professor Smyth, upon Modern History; as also from one of the few (alas!) unexceptionable works of Mr. F. W. Newman, his very clever *Lectures on Logic*.

The first question to be asked is, whether the documents on which we rely are genuine. That this is a practical question must be known to all from sad experience. The case of the false Decretals of Isidore will at once occur to many. Or let the inquirer take up a single volume of the Benedictine edition, say of St. Augustine, and see how many pages of the smaller print mark the existence of treatises and sermons *falsely* ascribed to that great doctor. Such ascriptions, however erroneous, may indeed have been made innocently in an uncritical age. But modern times supply examples of a more direct and conscious forgery. In this very culpable species of deceit a melancholy preeminence must be ascribed to our neighbours across the channel. Thus (to take one example out of many which might be adduced) during the French Revolution there was published, in Paris, a collection of letters purporting to be the composition of the unfortunate Louis XVI. So skilful was the deception, that an English lady of much literary ability, Helen Maria Williams, paid handsomely for the manuscripts, and translated them. A leading Edinburgh Reviewer, Francis Horner, by no means a credulous person, criticised, and pronounced in favour of the authenticity of the work: and it was even quoted as genuine in one of the French Chambers after the restoration of the Bourbons. But doubts arose; and at length two men came forward, and avowed with easy effrontery, that they had

composed the letters as a literary speculation.¹ A very similar work, containing the observations of Louis XVIII. upon the events of his times, appeared in 1831 or 1832. This, too, was so cleverly constructed, as to incline Professor Smyth to accept it on the ground of *internal* evidence, though his knowledge of the previous forgery (and of many similar ones) preserved him from yielding a too hasty credence, and adopting the revelations it contained as trustworthy evidence whereon to comment. In course of time an *exposé* of the sources whence the work was derived, from the pen of Mr. Croker, appeared in the *Quarterly Review*; the book sunk, and has never more been heard of.²

Happily, however, there exists for the service of the historical inquirer a large mass of documents on which doubt has never cast its shadow, and whose genuineness lies beyond the possibility of reasonable dispute. The next question that arises is, the *intention* of the author in composing his work. For a mistake in this respect may lead us into serious error. Thus, for instance, we may imagine a compiler of history arguing against the truth of some famous achievement of a Greek or Roman worthy, on the ground that it was not mentioned by Plutarch in his biography of the personage in question. But by a reference to the *intention* of Plutarch, as stated by himself, we should at once discover the argument to be worthless. For at the commencement of his account of Alexander, he expressly states that he does not intend to relate everything in detail; that he is not writing history, but biography; and that, inasmuch as apparently trivial circumstances, an apophthegm or a jest, frequently furnish more indications of character than the conduct of the greatest siege or battle, he must be permitted to aim, like a portrait painter, at a real likeness, by taking pains with the more striking features, while he leaves to others the composition of a more circumstantial narrative.

Somewhat similar remarks may be applied to Xenophon's *Cyropædia*. Rollin and others accepted that work as authentic history, as being even more trustworthy than the accounts furnished by Herodotus. But, even waving the extreme improbability of its author having been able to collect information which could be fairly traced to sources contemporary with Cyrus, there is a growing, and apparently just, conviction among modern scholars, that Xenophon did not intend his book to be a perfectly exact portraiture of the great founder of the Persian monarchy. He appears to have aimed rather at the composition of a political romance, a sketch of what a perfect prince should be. And thus the dying speech of the hero, which Cicero

¹ Smyth on the French Revolution, vol. iii. pp. 277, 278.

² Ibid.

reproduces in his *De Senectute*, may very probably contain the sentiments of the biographer upon the immortality of the soul, but cannot be appealed to as the expression of the mind of Cyrus. Indeed the Roman author seems aware of this, as he elsewhere speaks of 'Cyrus ille à Xenophonte, *non ad historiarum fidem, scriptus, sed ad effigiem justi imperii.*'¹ We trust, however, to exhibit more fully the importance of this principle of regarding the intention of a writer, and its bearing upon historic credibility, when we arrive at the second division of our subject.

Supposing now that we are satisfied in these two respects; the genuineness of the work before us, and the intention of its author to write real history, we naturally proceed to ask what were the writer's opportunities of learning the truth. It is evident that the mere fact of his being a contemporary is of little avail, unless he enjoyed means of access to adequate sources of information. *We* are contemporaries of the present Shah of Persia: but not one Englishman in a million could be listened to, as a witness upon his character, or the events of his reign. Even of things much nearer home but few men are actual witnesses; and fewer still are acquainted with the secret springs of action in the case of individual rulers or of parties.

And then, again, when we are in possession of the narratives of those who were not merely passive witnesses, but positive actors in the scenes which they describe, we are compelled to consider how far either actual want of honesty or the unconscious working of self-love may have warped the fidelity of their account. Xenophon in his *Anabasis*, the Archduke Charles in his history of his campaigns in Germany and Switzerland, Cæsar in his *Commentaries*, Napoleon in the pages dictated to Montholon and Gourgaud, all occupy this vantage ground of having not merely seen but of having taken the leading part in the events narrated. But they do not all inspire equal confidence in the reader. Xenophon and the Austrian prince may respectively occupy a lower rank as generals, but they claim a far higher one as trustworthy narrators, than either Cæsar or Napoleon. As, however, in general, the actors in high places must necessarily be in danger of being unduly influenced by prejudice and passion, the historian of a generation just younger, who outlives them long enough to allow time for their secrets to ooze out, is in a better position for the attainment of truth. By the comparison of the accounts of foes, by the letters, speeches, and journals of great men, by cross-examination, as it were, of the evidence of each, by reference to codes of law, contemporary treaties, monuments, and medals, he must be able to elicit a vast

¹ Ad Quint, Frat. 1, I. § 8. (Cit. ap. Lewis, ii. p. 526, note.)

amount of sound and substantial information; and if he be free from that passive acquiescence in the popular view, that listless kind of investigation which Thucydides so laments,¹ we shall probably gain from him as high a standard of historical accuracy, as we can in this world hope to reach.

It is likewise justly observed that the internal evidence of a writer's style will furnish us with another test. The most feeble-minded observer may give us *some* insight into his own time, and will at least, even if unconsciously, draw a sort of portrait of himself. He who in some respects may be inclined to colour highly, as being the hero of his own tale, may be listened to without distrust in others. On many topics the commentaries of Cæsar and the *Memorial de Ste Hélène* of Las Casas are above all suspicion, inasmuch as there could be no motive to deceive; and falsehood, if attempted, would have been so easy to detect. And sometimes even the *primâ facie* improbability of a story becomes in after times a claim upon our acceptance of it. A signal and well-known exemplification of the truth of this last remark is afforded by Herodotus. That historian informs us² that Necho, king of Egypt, sent certain Phœnicians to circumnavigate Africa. They started from the Red Sea, and having taken seed with them, (as Timour is said, in A.D. 1405, to have done, in his expedition against China,) sowed and gathered in the corn, which would grow in less than three months in those torrid regions. And thus in the third year they came through the Straits of Gibraltar, or Pillars of Hercules, as the ancients called them, and arrived in Egypt. One point alone in the narrative causes any difficulty to the Greek historian. These Phœnicians asserted that in the course of the voyage they had the sun on their right; that is to say, apparently to their north. This one circumstance Herodotus declines to believe. How surprised would he be, could he arise and learn that it is this very declaration of these bold mariners that in our day wins them credit. We know that when they had crossed the equinoctial line, and were descending deeply into the tropics, the sun *would* appear to be on their north: and this is precisely one of those circumstances which, being unexpected, and *à priori* incredible, men would not think of inventing with a view to deceive. Indeed the credit of Herodotus himself has in this way risen greatly during the present century: almost every traveller of note in Greece, in Egypt, and other parts of Africa, having brought home some fresh particulars in confirmation of his statements. One instance is so remarkable that we

¹ οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἀκοὰς . . . ὑβρισάντως παρ' ἀλλήλων δέχονται . . . οὕτως ἀταλά-
 κωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, κ.τ.λ.—I. 20.

² Lib. iv. cap. 42.

cannot but notice it. Herodotus¹ asserts, as many will remember, that Xerxes cut a canal across the isthmus on which Mount Athos (now called, from the number of its monasteries, *Monte Santo*) stands. Thucydides² alludes to the "king's canal," as he terms it, as an unquestioned fact. But the Roman satirist selected this very topic as one of the legitimate subjects of his famous sneer at the kind of narrative which lying Greece had the presumption to put forth as history.

"Creditor olim
Velificatus Athos, et quidquid Græcia mendax
Audet in historia."³

Now, considering the opportunities enjoyed by both of the great writers above-named, and especially by Thucydides, who was well acquainted with those regions; considering that the numerous Greek settlements would have been able to test the accuracy of the report, and that Plato, Isocrates, Lysias, and Diodorus, all concur in believing it;⁴ an utter rejection of the story always appeared to us to be an unwarrantable degree of scepticism. Nevertheless, Juvenal had many modern partisans. Some began to utter doubts of the entire narrative, which could admit a fable so apparent: a French traveller, M. Cousinery,⁵ avowed that he could find no traces of such a work; and, above all, those who were disposed to accept the story were taunted with their inability to produce a rational motive for the accomplishment of such a work. And certainly this last point, however insufficient to shake the evidence, had always been felt by us to be a real difficulty. Herodotus, who had lived to see ships hauled by a mechanical process across the Isthmus at Corinth and elsewhere, expresses his surprise that the Persian monarch did not resort to this plan (with which he was probably quite unacquainted), and imagines the cutting to have arisen out of Xerxes' love of display and desire of leaving memorials of his greatness. But the question still arises in the mind of one who examines the map of those regions, why the king should undergo the delay and expense of cutting through the Isthmus of Mount Athos, when two other very similar tongues of land, those of Sithonia and Pallene, look equally formidable, and were yet left untouched. The acute observation of a recent traveller enables us to answer this question. Not only does Colonel Leake agree with Choiseul-Gouffier⁶ (who was previous to Cousinery) in finding traces of its existence, but he removes our remaining difficulties by the contribution of the following very important information:—

¹ VII. 22—24.

² IV., 109.

³ Juvenal, Sat. x, 173—5.

⁴ Stocker in loc. Herodot.

⁵ Bähr in loc. Herodot. Cf. Grote, vol. v. p. 29.

⁶ Cit. ap. Bähr in loc. Herodot.

'The canal seems not to have been more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labour, be renewed: and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the *Ægean*; for such is the fear entertained by the Greek boatmen of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the mountain is subject half the year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbours in the Gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. *Xerxes therefore was perfectly justified in cutting this canal*, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition, under Mardonius, had suffered, suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum [the headlands of Sithonia and Pallene] *was much less dangerous*, as the gulfs afford some good harbours, and it was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed.'¹

But even apart from particular corroborations of this nature, there is frequently something about the general tone of a writer, which of itself creates a feeling of confidence, or the reverse. Thus, for instance, Colonel Mure, who is far from being lenient to the faults of the 'Father of history,' yet admits that 'every portion of his work is pervaded by an air of candour and honest intention, which the discerning critic must recognise as reflecting corresponding qualities in the author.'² And Hallam, in like manner, having occasion to refer to the authority of the Sire de Joinville's very beautiful and characteristic *Vie de S. Louis*, remarks with equal justice that 'Joinville is a real witness, on whom, when we listen, it is impossible not to rely.'³ Those who are acquainted with that interesting portraiture of 'the noblest and holiest of monarchs,'⁴ will easily call to mind many details which might be singled out, if necessary, as betokening the great honesty of this lively writer. His *naïve* confession of his own standard of duty and dread of sin being lower than that of the saintly king, his assertion of the good reputation which he enjoyed for his strength of understanding, his admission of the fright he suffered when he was taken prisoner by the Saracens, are instances in point. Hypocrisy is slow to grant that it *ever* adopts a moral standard short of the very highest; mock humility takes pains to conceal the very semblance of vanity; real cowardice is afraid to divulge the emotions of even the most reasonable fear. And where we can trace obvious signs of such wilful dishonesty, or of prejudice so deep as to cause unconscious dishonesty, it is natural and right

¹ Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. p. 145, (Cit. ap. Grote vol. v. p. 30.)

² Literature of Antient Greece, vol. iv. p. 351.

³ Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 32.

⁴ Arnold.

to be on our guard against the general representations of the writer. If, to adopt the suggestion of Arnold,¹ his narrative is filled with wondrous accounts of small forces triumphing over mighty hosts; if one party or nation be always described as foolish and treacherous, another always fair and upright; if every transaction be ascribed to the impulse of the very noblest, or (which is far more common) of the meanest and basest motives;—*that* history cannot possibly be trustworthy. And to sum up the internal evidence, arising from style, in the unimprovable language of the same author: ‘If it is very heavy and cumbrous, it indicates either a dull man or a pompous man, or at least a slow and awkward man: if it be tawdry and full of commonplaces enunciated with great solemnity, the writer is most likely a silly man; if it be highly antithetical, and full of unusual expressions, or artificial ways of stating a plain thing, the writer is clearly an affected man. If it be plain and simple, always clear, but never eloquent, the writer may be a very sensible man, but is too hard and dry to be a very great man. If, on the other hand, it is always eloquent, rich in illustrations, full of animation, but too uniformly so, and without the relief of simple and quiet passages, we must admire the writer’s genius in a very high degree, but we may fear that he is too continually excited to have attained to the highest wisdom: for that is necessarily calm.’²

The patient reader, who has thus far followed our somewhat (we fear) tedious course, has already gathered that we are not of that school of thinkers, who disbelieve in the truth of history at large: who dwell upon the possibility (and actual existence) of exaggerations, and the difficulties surrounding all human investigation, until the records of the past become in their eyes one vast moral and intellectual chaos—

‘rudis indigestaque moles,
Nec quicquam, nisi pondus iners, congestaque eodem
Non bene junctarum discordiâ semina rerum;’

from which no mortal skill can hope to extract the order and the beauty of truth. No; far be from us any such extreme and unmitigated scepticism! We agree with the distinguished historian just referred to, that such utter disbelief of the memory and the accuracy of the narratives of other men would naturally lead to distrust in the correctness of our own faculties, and thus ultimately to insanity: and, further, that thus to disannul the value of historical testimony, would indeed ‘touch us in one of the divinest parts of our nature, the power of connecting ourselves with the past.’ Nevertheless, the amount of difficulty

¹ Lectures on Mod. Hist. Lect. viii.

² Ibid.

inherent in all historical research appears to us to be very frequently underrated. It has been recognised probably by many great masters of this species of composition, by a Thucydides and a Tacitus, a Hallam and a Sismondi, but it seems to be virtually ignored by a large tribe of historiographers of *calibre* too small, or prejudice too ingrained, even to perceive the dangers by which they are beset. Some too of a more respectable class have been betrayed, we think, in a greater or less degree, into the same fault, from their very fondness and partiality for historic study, and their consciousness of its value. They cannot endure that any abatement should be made from the preciousness of the jewels which they have learnt to prize so highly. Among those who have thus erred we must venture to include the late Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, and (if we understand him aright) a French philosopher of great celebrity, M. Victor Cousin.

Professor Smyth observes, that 'history consists of the narrative of facts and the explanation of those facts; that the facts 'and events are points which are *perfectly ascertainable*;' and that the explanations must be 'traced out by the same processes 'of reasoning, which are applied on all similar occasions through 'life; from a comparison of events and of appearances with 'the acknowledged principles of human actions.'¹ Allowing that 'there are facts and events that have occurred in the world, of 'which history does not undertake to give any solution,' and 'that the moral character of statesmen may not always be 'exactly estimated,' he still evidently holds that no very serious difficulty is hereby incurred, and that on the whole we may, without any overwhelming trouble, arrive at satisfactory conclusions. Now *we* too trust, with him, that such conclusions may be arrived at in the main; but we are by no means prepared to grant that the task is so easy, nor so all but universally successful as he seems inclined to represent it. Let us try to analyse his statements.

'The facts and events of history are,' he tells us, 'perfectly ascertainable.' This broad assertion can only be accepted as true under very considerable limitations. There certainly are facts and events on record, which were either plainly cognisable by the senses of contemporaries, or which rest upon evidence that is equally valid. Thus, for example, no sane person doubts that Julius Cæsar was slain in the Senate-house at Rome, on the Ides of March, B.C. 44; that Lisbon was overthrown by an earthquake in A.D. 1755; or that the French were victorious at Austerlitz and Jena in 1805 and 1806, and defeated at Leipsic and at Waterloo in 1813 and 1815 respec-

¹ Lectures on Mod. Hist. (Introductory Lecture.)

tively. But it is truly surprising to observe how soon, as we proceed, we quit the sure and well-defined territory for the soil of a 'land debateable.' Take the last-named event, the battle of Waterloo. The fight itself, and the defeat of Napoleon, are, of course, as has been said, beyond the reach of any sceptical criticism. But it must be a fact, that the first corps of the Prussians did or did *not* arrive on the field as late as four o'clock P.M., and their main body at half-past seven at night; it must be a fact, that the absence of Grouchy, with more than 30,000 men, did or did *not* materially affect the result of the contest; and, finally, it must be a fact that the English and the Prussian commanders were or were *not* taken by surprise by their opponent's invasion of Belgium on the 15th of June. Now, will any reasonably impartial inquirer maintain that these facts can be perfectly ascertained and settled with ease? If they can be thus securely demonstrated, a vast quantity of ink and paper has been consumed which might have been spared. Yet this is only one obvious illustration out of hundreds that might be adduced, of the difficulty frequently attendant upon the *facts* which history discusses.

Moreover, the majority of readers who are merely acquainted with the text of some standard historians, and have never been engaged in verifying the authorities whom they quote, are scarcely conscious of the part which *hypothesis* is compelled to play in the arrangement of the sequence and connexion of events. 'The invasions of Italy,' says Mr. Stanley, in reference to Alaric, 'are involved in great confusion, . . . especially by 'Jornandes, who blends the battle of Pollentia in 403 with the 'massacre of the Goths in 408. *By conjecture and inference* 'they are reduced in Gibbon to the order which has been here 'followed.'¹ This is by no means the only instance in which the historian of the *Decline and Fall* is compelled to resort to narrative of an hypothetical character. That he has frequently applied such conjecture with marvellous skill² and success may be appealed to as one of the many evidences of the richness of his intellectual qualifications for his great task; but that powers such as his should be required in order to attain that success, is certainly no proof of the facility or the perfection with which the truth of events may be usually ascertained. And what is here said of Gibbon may be extended to most authors who have attempted to write history upon a large scale. The wit of a satiric novelist, in a recently completed tale, is not

¹ Smith's Diet. of Greek and Roman Biography. *Art.* Alaricus.

² This topic is treated with the author's invariable acuteness, though, of course, with a purpose, in a theological work of our time, the celebrated *Essay on Development*. (Chap. III. Sec. V.)

without foundation: it is 'the case with the most orthodox histories,' that 'the writer's own guesses or conjectures are 'printed in exactly the same type with the most ascertained 'patent facts.' Nor is it easy wholly to resist his conclusion: 'Blunders there must be in the best of these narratives, and more asserted than they can possibly know or vouch for.'

But the battle which is at times carried on with respect to *facts*, is light and trivial compared to that which is ever being waged concerning their *explanation*. We cannot resist citing from the clever writer just referred to, a few words which immediately precede our previous quotation. 'Where dialogues 'are written down, which the reporter can by no possibility have 'heard, and where motives are detected which the persons 'actuated by them certainly never confided to the writer, the 'public must once for all be warned that the author's individual 'fancy very likely supplies much of the narrative, and that he 'forms it, as best he may, out of stray papers, conversations 'reported to him, and his knowledge, right or wrong, of the 'characters of the persons engaged.' Is he not justified in more than hinting that there are histories extant which rest upon a very similar foundation?

Now, the danger respecting such interpretation of facts, as implies inquiry into human motives, will probably be found to be of a twofold character. In the first place, where the motive is tolerably clear, and proved by unimpeachable evidence, the historian may be so devoid of sympathy with the object of the character he is describing, or, on the other hand, so biassed in his favour, as to call the principles of action by their wrong names, and thus very seriously to mislead us. Let us suppose, for instance, that a statesman has been very determined in his resistance to some change in his country's policy. The historian happens to consider the point a trivial one, and accordingly terms his conduct *obstinacy*. But the historian is not infallible, and his judgment may herein be quite at fault. 'Obstinacy,' as Edmund Burke once told the House of Commons, 'is certainly 'a great vice; and in the changeful state of political affairs it 'is frequently the cause of great mischief.' 'It happens, how-' 'ever,' he continued, 'very unfortunately, that almost the 'whole line of the great and masculine virtues, constancy, 'gravity, magnanimity, fortitude, fidelity and firmness, are 'closely allied to this disagreeable quality, of which you have 'so just an abhorrence; and in their excess, all these virtues 'very easily fall into it.' Now let the reader only reflect with himself for one moment, how constantly the annalist and biographer are called upon to draw that line of demarcation, which

¹ Speech on American Taxation, April 19, 1774.

Burke so justly hints to be a narrow one, and then let him judge whether it be probable that a merely mortal pen can be expected to draw it in all cases correctly. How frequently are actions the most similar in character condemned or praised by the same censor, in consequence of some determining motive of his own. In A.D. 1442, one of the best and greatest of the Turkish sultans, Amurath II., abdicated his throne, and retired to the society of Moslem Dervishes in Magnesia. A famous French infidel applauds the act; but what is the slyly just comment on this applause which he obtains from his brother sceptic Gibbon? 'Voltaire admires "le Philosophe Turc;" *would he have bestowed the same praise on a Christian prince for retiring to a monastery? In his way, Voltaire was a bigot, an intolerant bigot.*'¹ But is Gibbon himself unimpeachable on this score? Does he not again and again refuse to give credit to the assertion of motives which he could not himself comprehend? S. Augustine, for instance, is found expressing his regret that so many came to ask for his decision in questions affecting their temporal goods. Gibbon records the fact, but cannot believe that the reluctance was sincere; it is evidently in his judgment incredible that a Christian bishop could be insensible to the honour, the pleasurable sense of power thus imparted to him; incredible that he should prefer to have his time unbroken, that he might devote himself to spiritual duties. Of course to a certain class of minds, which we will not pause to designate, it *must* be incredible. These things (to adapt a sentence from Lord Bacon) must continue as they have been; but so will that also continue which faileth not: *Justificata est Sapientia à filiis suis.*

And, secondly, where the motive has not been handed down to us, how commonly do men of narrow minds, or men who are under the influence of some strong prepossession, impute their own motives to those whom they describe and criticise. '*Ces coquins*,' Condé is reported by the Cardinal de Retz to have said of historians—'*ces coquins nous font parler et agir, comme ils auroient faits eux-mêmes à notre place.*' The temptation is indeed a sore one, and perhaps less frequently resisted than one might expect. This point demands a few illustrations. Professor Newman considers Polybius to be an unbiassed narrator, 'except when treating of his patrons, the Scipio family, and perhaps the Achaean towns, his native state.' We should venture at times to doubt his accuracy in another respect, namely, in attributing motives. Polybius is remarkably free from superstition. But it is a profound question (which must, we fear, be answered in the negative), whether a heathen can, without superstition, be religious. This generally careful and accurate

¹ Decline and Fall, chap. lxvii. note 13.

observer by no means vilifies religion as regards its effects. He does not, with Lucretius, cull out any legends of the seemingly evil result of devotion:

Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.

On the contrary, he is at pains to express how fully he attributes to the influence of religion the exceeding good faith of the Romans, both in public and in private life. But, for all this, he cannot be said to believe in the supernatural. Religion is, in his mind, an instrument of state policy, an excellent moral police.¹ This, indeed, is an opinion very prevalent among public men, both in ancient Rome and modern Britain. Of its falsity, of its fearful danger to men's souls, we do not stop to speak; we are at present only concerned with it as an element in fitting men to judge of the motives of their fellow-creatures. And, assuredly, if there be a real world of deep and energising thought unrecognised by them, undreamt of in their philosophy, the holders of the opinion in question must needs be in a very bad position for rightly estimating character. Polybius tells us, that Scipio Africanus and Lycurgus appear to him to have used religion in this manner.² Both seemed very pious; the Spartan lawgiver got the sanction of the Pythia to his institutions, and the Roman general seemed attentive to dreams and omens; but, in either case, it was in order to influence the many to carry out their respective civil and military designs. Now admitting that in the case of Scipio the personal knowledge of the historian may have justified him in making the assertion, we should like to know on what ground he entertained the same conviction with respect to Lycurgus. For our own part, we believe that he reached it by a syllogism, in which the *major* premiss was tacitly assumed; that *major* being somewhat of this sort: 'No man of great intellectual powers can believe in religion, excepting as a useful state-engine.' The *minor*, that Lycurgus was a man of great intellectual powers, was indisputable; and the conclusion of course followed. How easy is it to imagine the kind of treatment which some of the facts of the Scripture history would have received from disciples of the school of Polybius, and far more of Lucretius! When the Syrian captain stood at the door of Elisha, and sought to be cured of his leprosy, how clearly would it have been shown that the conduct of the prophet in sending a messenger, instead of coming out in person, arose from priestcraft and spiritual pride! But we are not obliged in

¹ ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν πλήθός ἐστιν ἐλαφρόν καὶ πλήρες ἐπιθυμιῶν . . . λείπεται, τοῖς ἀθλοῖς φόβοις καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραχυδίᾳ τὰ πλήθη συνέχειν. Διότι οἱ παλαιοὶ δοκοῦσι μοι τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας, καὶ τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν ἄδου διαλήψεις . . . εἰς τὰ πλήθη παρεισαγαγεῖν.—Lib. vi. cap. 56, §§ 11, 12. See the whole passage, §§ 6—15. Cf. Lewis, vol. i. pp. 51 and 417 (note).

² Lib. x. cap. 2, §§ 8—12. Cf. Lewis, vol. i. p. 448 (note).

this matter to rely upon mere imaginations. Heeren, in an otherwise very useful 'Manual of Ancient History,' has given us actual specimens of this species of judgment. In *his* eyes, the policy of Joseph respecting the landholders of Egypt must have caused 'the troubles which already threatened the kingdom to assume a more dangerous and alarming aspect:' Samuel 'desired to make the office of judge hereditary in his own family,' and though this plan was 'defeated by the conduct of his sons,' he displayed 'a crafty policy in that election' of Saul, 'which he could not impede:' and Solomon exhibited 'the brilliant government of a despot from the interior of his seraglio.' Instances of a very similar assignment of motives have lately met our eyes in the pages of a contemporary Review. Yet these writers doubtless hold that they are following the rule prescribed by Professor Smyth; that they are judging 'from a comparison of events and of appearances with the *acknowledged* principles of human actions.'

The temper of mind displayed in the above passages is not the sole cause of error in this department of history. Not only from a want of reverence, and by ignoring (as Heeren has done) the very existence of spiritual motives, may the judgments of historians be led astray; it is evident that in many cases where the motive has come down to us on good authority, it is one which could scarcely by any possibility have been guessed aright. He who has stood within the Ducal Palace at Venice, will remember the noble hall which contains the portraits of the Doges. He will remember how his eye, as it glanced around the array of these memorials of the earthly greatness of the fallen city, alighted at length upon the spot where, in place of a portrait, is seen the imitation of a black curtain, with the inscription, most impressive, despite its unclassical Latinity, 'HIC EST LOCUS MARINI FALIERI DECAPITATI PRO CRIMINIBUS.' The story is known through the history of Sismondi¹ and the works of English poets. That Marino Faliero (or more correctly, we believe, Marin Falieri) should be beheaded, for attempting to overthrow the Venetian constitution, is not surprising. Such attempts must always be a game, in which the losers can expect but one result. Justly or unjustly, it has been the fate of many such bold adventurers, from Spurius Cassius at Rome, and King Agis of Sparta, down to the Scottish Lords Kilmarnock and Balmerino in 1746. But in most cases we can discover a motive not inadequate to the undertaking. Personal ambition, the hope of riches or a crown; the desire to rescue from oppression a hardly-used commonalty, or to restore a fallen and much-loved dynasty;—these are intelligible incite-

¹ Histoire des Republiques Italiennes, chap. xli.

ments to such a course. The historian, therefore, who reasons 'from the acknowledged principles of human action,' would surely seek to detect some such grounds of proceeding in the case of Falieri: and if they were not to be found, might very possibly take the liberty of imagining them. Yet none of these ordinary motives had worked up Falieri to his desperate resolve. The mere circumstance of the Council of Forty having punished a personal insult to the Doge with less severity than he thought due (the offender being himself the president of that body) was sufficient to induce the Head of the Venetian State to attempt the overthrow, by a conspiracy, of the entire oligarchy which governed it. Strange, and antecedently improbable; yet not more strange, not more improbable, than many other links of cause and effect which may be found in the chain of human history. Men will from time to time prove wayward, inconsistent, enigmatical; will act upon principles the most alien from those which might naturally be expected to influence them. And can history *always* hope to have documents at hand, which will supply authentic information of these extraordinary influences? Is it not, on the contrary, notorious that those who have enjoyed opportunities of being behind the scenes of public life, do very frequently acquire, in consequence, an extreme (it may be, an exaggerated) distrust of the truthfulness of the goddess Clio? The *mot* of the Prince de Condé has already been quoted: who is ignorant of the kindred sentiment of an English premier, Sir Robert Walpole? 'Anything but history, for that *must* be false,' was his reply to the proposal of his son to amuse him by such reading. This speech is attributed by Smyth to the unconscious affectation of a man who had been habituated to power for forty years, and was desirous, like King James I., of making a mystery of state-craft. Yet even if we make some deduction on that score in this particular instance, there remains on record a great body of similar expressions, the force of which cannot be so easily evaded. Few men, perhaps, have lived to a mature age, even in private life, without having been engaged in scenes wherein their own conduct was determined by very different influences from those which appeared upon the surface.

We have spoken separately, for convenience sake, of facts and motives: but, in truth, they are wondrously intertwined. In how many narratives does some motive in the teller prompt him to suppress or colour facts! For *one* history that is rendered partial and unfair by the assertion of what is false, there are *twenty* which are made so by the suppression of what is true. Like the soothsayer Onomacritus at the court of Xerxes,¹ they

¹ Herodot. vii. 6.

only tell the oracles that suit their purpose. And that this tangled web of facts and motives cannot be so easily unravelled as some maintain, is constantly shown, we think, in our courts of law, and illustrated by works of fiction. It is shown in our law-courts, for (although we agree with De Maistre that upon the whole justice is administered more equitably than might be at first sight supposed, and that a prisoner who may chance to be innocent of a particular crime may morally deserve, for some other unknown offence, the punishment he suffers, yet) it cannot be said, that either in criminal or *nisi prius* courts is the process of eliciting truth an easy one. Yet here there is, for the most part, that confronting of face to face, and that power of personal cross-examination, for which the historian sighs in vain. Nevertheless, in most countries trials have occurred of which the decision has been mooted in society. Take, for instance, the case of Elizabeth Canning, which was hotly contested in London about a century since. Here was a girl convicted of perjury, after a trial of five days, by a jury of her countrymen; and yet not only was a mob enthusiastic in favour of her innocence, but numbers of respectable persons subscribed handsomely for her, and obtained permission that she should transport herself. Thirty-six pamphlets were published upon the subject. Even two of the jury who condemned her had misgivings, and swore that what they had done was contrary to their consciences: and like a sister adventurer (whose story was going the round of the newspapers in November 1855) the girl Canning had robbed for a time of their liberty, and almost of their lives, persons now generally presumed to be innocent.¹ This may be an extreme case, but there are numberless approximations to it. 'People talk,' said a late Lord Chancellor, 'as if the causes that come before me were black and white; I find that most of them are grey.' And, further, this difficulty is illustrated, as has been intimated, by works of fiction. For such works are intended to be portraiture of actual life, and, in the hands of men of genius, they do, to a very great extent, succeed in portraying it. Now what is more common than to find a hero represented as misjudged by society at large; and that, though most cruelly and unjustly, yet withal on the most plausible grounds? True, that for the sake of poetic justice, and that the reader may close the volume with pleasurable sensations, relief is generally at hand: some happy incident, some *Deus ex machinâ*, arrives in time to avert evil consequences, and everything is made clear and smooth. But we are always left to imagine that it might have

¹ The details may easily be met with. See e.g. Entinck's 'History of London,' vol. iii. p. 83; 'Beauties of England and Wales,' vol. x. part v. p. 729. The year was A. D. 1753.

happened far otherwise; that the explanation may not be forthcoming another time, and that injustice may have its way. The patronizer of circulating libraries, nay, even the occasional reader of novels, must be able to call to mind several instances of the kind of plot to which we allude. Two only shall here be named: the Comte de Jarnac's tale of 'Rockingham,' and Sir Walter Scott's 'Fortunes of Nigel.'

Smyth, however, ventures to suggest, that in many cases judgment may go by default:—

'Statesmen who perceive that their conduct may hereafter be liable to misrepresentation, have it always in their power, and have in general been induced, to leave documents to their family for the purpose of explaining their views, and justifying their measures; and as they know beforehand the nature of that tribunal of posterity, which is to determine on their merits, *the conclusion is, if they refuse to plead, that they foresee a verdict, against which they have nothing satisfactory to urge, and which is therefore right.*'

The assertion, which we have here italicised, appears to us perfectly monstrous. A question might probably be raised as to the degree in which it is possible for men to anticipate 'the nature of the tribunal of posterity.' The early Greek navigators, who regarded piracy as a decidedly gentlemanly occupation, did not look forward to a day when such practices should die out, and be considered not merely wrong, but likewise low, and adverse to the growing spirit of civilization.¹ The Christians of the sixteenth century, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, disciples of John Knox, all agreed that the civil power had the right, nay, was in duty bound, to use the temporal sword against men believed to be heretics or idolaters. This has been proved by Robertsope, Hallam, the Duke of Argyll, and others; but by none more amply than by Smyth himself, in this very course of *Lectures on Modern History*. Did the men who acted thus know what after-ages would say of their conduct in this respect? Did they care to leave on record a defence of what they supposed indisputably right? Examples of a like nature might be multiplied without end. S. Ambrose could never have imagined that his noble and righteous reproof of the Emperor Theodosius, at Milan, should, 1,000 years afterwards, be made the subject of the scorn and contumely of a Diderot. S. Dunstan could not anticipate that his rebuke of Edwin the Fair, for unkingly and very questionable conduct on the day of his coronation, should be represented by modern historians and dramatists as a cruel attempt to blight the happiness of an honourable and wedded love. There are many points whereon the thirteenth century could not dream what would be the decision of the eighteenth;

¹ Thucyd. I. v. Hom. Odys. III. 69—74.

many, respecting which our own age can have little idea of what may be the judgment of the twentieth, or twenty-first century.

But, waving this point as one which need not materially affect the case, (since allowance can always be made for its operation,) there would constantly be found men who, from pride, or from true self-respect, or from a yet deeper feeling of reverence, would altogether decline to plead. From pride, if they acted from a mere haughty disregard of the opinion of their fellow-men; from true self-respect, if they felt that they could not recognise the collective wisdom of those whose individual judgment they would repudiate, or if, strong in the convictions of the goodness of their cause, they cared but little for the sentiments of future ages, and could well nigh address to their own spirits the language of a living lyricist—

‘O thou lion-hearted warrior!
Reck not of the after time:
 Honour may be deem’d dishonour,
 Loyalty be called a crime.
 Sleep in peace with kindred ashes
 Of the noble and the true,
 Hands that never fail’d their country,
 Hearts that baseness never knew.’

From a still more deeply reverential feeling, if they bore in mind that their pleadings could hardly be fair, and would be certainly of no real benefit to themselves;—hardly fair, for that no man is a good judge in his own case,—of no real avail, because all is known, the good and its alloy, the evil and its palliation, to the righteous Judge, before whom each must finally stand.¹

We have taken these arguments as fair representations of a certain line of thought upon these subjects. Professor Smyth, however, it may be urged, though careful and conscientious in fulfilling the duties of his professorial chair, had no claims to the title of a deep thinker. But what shall be said of the following remarks of M. Cousin? He at least is upheld by his numerous followers as a great and profound philosopher; and although we have not by us the particular volume from which the following extract is made, we presume that it is neither garbled nor in any way unjust, seeing that we receive it at the hands of an evidently enthusiastic admirer:²—

‘The science of the just, of the good, of the beautiful, is subject to the same law of the absolute and the relative, the necessary and the contingent. The philosophic science of history cannot escape from it; and as the great facts of history are the decrees of the government of providence, as God or providence is in nature, in humanity, in history, and that humanity and

¹ 1 Corinthians iv. 3—5.

² M. Tissoit (the French translator of Kant’s *Logic*), in the *Nouvelle Biographie Générale*, (Paris, 1855,) *Art. Cousin, Victor*. Tome xii. p. 260.

history have also their necessity, *the judgments of history are the judgments of God himself*. History being thus the government of God made visible; everything is in its place in history; all is right there. War itself has its own blessings; and the victory is necessary, useful, just in the strictest sense of the word; *the conqueror is always right*, and the people have always what they deserve. Generally, all is just in this world; both happiness and misfortune are distributed as they ought to be. Hence that historic optimism, the loftiest idea at which philosophy has hitherto arrived.'

Strong indeed must be that man's conviction of the entire credibility of history who can thus speak of the justice of its judgments. There is surely great confusion here. That the judgments of history are identical with the Divine judgments (or in our author's own words, *les jugements de l'histoire sont les jugements de Dieu même*), may be understood to mean, either that the opinions taught by history concerning character are necessarily true, or that the events of history of themselves make manifest the Divine judgments. But in neither case is the sentiment defensible. If the decision of history upon character be always just, and a reflex of the judgment of the Most High, perhaps M. Cousin will in his next work be so good as to inform us what that decision is in the case of Mahomet, or of Hildebrand, or of Mary queen of Scots. Is Mahomet to be regarded as a mere imposter, or a self-deluded man; a very Antichrist, or a benefactor to the human race; or something between these two extremes, a blending and commixture of both? Must Pope Hildebrand be inexorably condemned as a tyrannical usurper of others' rights, or is he rightly canonised as S. Gregory? Is that winning beauty, in her very grave, as in life, the object of chivalrous adoration, to be described as the innocent victim of a rival queen, or to be branded for all time with the terrific names of hypocrite, murderer, and adulteress? If, however, it be meant that the events of history show clearly to mankind what the Divine judgments are, it must be suggested that though the page is frequently thus spread open, we may often prove incompetent to read its declarations aright. A man may have suffered death by the axe, or at the stake; but does the event, merely in and by itself, teach us whether he has suffered as a criminal or as a martyr? Two nations, each win a territory by the sword; the one loses, the other maintains its conquest: is the justice or injustice of the seizure to be decided by this retention? 'God... hath judged already, and hath written his impartial sentence 'in characters legible to all Christendom.' So wrote one, who on a particular occasion chose to interpret the rules of Divine equity; so wrote Milton (they are his very words)¹ concerning the cause of Charles I. But does the event excuse the deed of

¹ Iconoclastes. Chap. I. (*sub fin.*)

blood enacted at Whitehall in 1649? Writers of the political school most opposed to Charles—as Macaulay and the Duke of Argyll—now at length term it ‘a crime,’ ‘an unwarrantable and needless crime.’

We had devoted a few pages to the examination of the ‘*might makes right*’ teaching of other portions of this passage, a teaching which in M. Cousin’s case, as in that of Mr. Carlisle, seems to harmonise but too well with a somewhat pantheistic system of philosophy. A few words had likewise been added upon this writer’s attempt to render philosophy wholly independent of religion, a feature in M. Cousin’s schemes which has been touched upon by continental pens, as that of Prince Albert de Broglie in his *Etudes Morales et Littéraires*, and of the Spanish divine, Balmes, in his *Cartas á un Esceptico*. But on second thoughts we cancel these sheets as being too divergent from the main subject of this article.

But we do not, we repeat, feel tempted to abandon history for its difficulties. Its treasures are, after all, far too ample, too edifying, to be lightly resigned, under the influence of apathy or despair. The most valuable things in life are not the most easy of attainment, nor always when attained the most complete. A lofty standard almost implies the existence of difficulties and imperfections. Truly says the ever-eloquent author of the *Stones of Venice* (so gloriously right when he is right): ‘The wild grass grows well and strongly, one year with another; but the wheat is, according to the nobleness of its nature, liable to the bitterer blight. And therefore, while in all things that we see or do, we are to desire perfection and strive for it, we are nevertheless not to set the meaner thing in its narrow accomplishment above the nobler thing in its mighty progress; not to esteem smooth minuteness above shattered majesty; not to prefer mean victory to honourable defeat; not to lower the level of our aim, that we may the more surely enjoy the complacency of success.’ All that we have been asserting is, the worldliness and carelessness of much that passes for history, and the danger of trusting too implicitly to the sole guidance of some one or two favourite authors. And it is with deep satisfaction that we are enabled, in confirmation of these remarks, to appeal to a living author among the very first for the depth of his research, perhaps the very first in his loftiness of conception of the true duties of an historian. ‘Clio,’ writes Sir Francis Palgrave, in his *History of Normandy and England*—

‘Clio has no toleration for the unprosperous: the mirror in which she reflects their images magnifies every blemish. She courses after the triumphal car, shouting like the crowd whom she encourages, and by whom she is encouraged:—Woe to the vanquished, woe to the weak, woe to the oppressed, woe to the humble, woe to the poor,—men, nations, kingdoms!

As in the world, so in the page of history.' * * * * *

'All that we can expect from each historian is that he should stammer forth a few imperfect developments of truth: each inquirer partially elucidating some obscure passage in the progress of society: dispelling favourite or deluding visions or dreams: cutting, when practicable, the conventional pictures out of their frames, and replacing them by portraits taken from the life; but above all, uncramping or shattering the pedestals supporting the idols which have won the false worship of the multitude, so that they may nod in their niches or topple down.'¹

In the recognition of these and similar lessons appears to lie our best chance of attaining such truth as can be mastered here below. The real wish to be fair,—to know where there is evil, and hate it, to learn what is good, and cherish it,—is the best road to the knowledge alike of the present and the past. Our judgments cannot, it is true, affect the real condition of the departed, nor change their awful destiny for weal or woe; but they exercise an incalculable amount of influence upon our own inward life and principles. In the words of our departed Laureate—

'We live by Admiration, Hope, and Love;
And, even as these are well and wisely fix'd,
In dignity of being we ascend.'

And thus M. Cousin's identification of the judgments of history with the Divine judgments, though inadmissible as a fact, is admirable as a principle. Assuredly we *ought* to wish, that the opinions which we form upon the characters and events of history may be, however partial and incomplete, at least not opposed to that aspect in which they are viewed by an All-just and All-merciful God. *Some* such opinions we cannot avoid forming: in some instances we must *think*, as we are called upon to *act*, decidedly. And if there be cases wherein the veil appears too thick for mortal eyes to penetrate, let us be content to abide for a season in suspense. Great masters of physical science are, to say the least, as far from piercing the darkness which shrouds myriads of the secrets which they desire to know. The very deepest of such philosophers are among the first to make the most ample confessions upon this score: and good men of their number have imagined that the solution of their difficulties, and enlightenment of their ignorance, would prove an enjoyment even in the courts of Heaven. There is extant, if we mistake not, a prayer by Dr. Barrow (preserved in the library of the noble college over which he presided) in which that excellent mathematician and divine expresses his ardent desire for the day, when no longer by the slow steps of reasoning, but by the keen glance of intuition, he shall perceive the scientific truths which he is now engaged in painfully exploring. May not a similar thought occasionally cross the minds of those

¹ Vol. i. pp. 131, 353.

few (alas ! that they have been and are so few) who, having been endowed with competent abilities, have approached in a religious temper the study of the vast, and often perplexing, problems of history ?

II. We turn to what may be considered a connecting link between the history which does, and the history which does not, rest upon contemporaneous written evidence; we mean (as has been stated), the history which has a basis of tangible contemporary evidence, but has since become the subject of legendary additions. Our limits will compel us to treat this branch of the subject with comparative brevity, lest we encroach too much upon the space which will remain for the concluding section. But we may at any rate indicate sources of information, to which recourse may be had by any who shall be disposed to work out these problems more fully for themselves : and it will be hard if even a hurried comparison of the history and legend be not suggestive of many valuable hints.

The most obvious examples of legend engrafted upon true history are to be found in the medieval biographies of saints. There have been many holy men, of whose existence there is contemporary and satisfactory proof, but concerning whom, in the course of two or three centuries, a crowd of marvels has come to be related. This topic is so strictly connected with our subject, that we must venture to make a few remarks upon it.

If, as we trust to show, contemporary evidence is to be desired in the case of ordinary events, much more must it be requisite with respect to those of a supernatural character. There are, at least, three or four ways in which even contemporary narrators may, without the slightest intent to deceive, lend an air of supernaturalism to circumstances which are in reality non-miraculous. Such is, for example, the ignorance of physical facts. When we read in Eusebius of stones weeping, we may fairly suspect that the original witness had probably been unacquainted with the frequency of this phenomenon in hot climates, and thus associated it with the afflictions of the Church, over which Nature herself seemed to be lamenting. Then, again, there is that class of miracles, which Aquinas ranks as the lowest ;¹ where, *e.g.* sickness is cured, or rain vouchsafed, at the instance of earnest prayer. An incredulous age, like our own, will doubtless often fail in such cases to recognise an extraordinary intervention of Divine power, where it is really granted : but, on the other hand,

¹ Sum. Theol. Pars 1. Qu. cv. Art. 8.

a credulous one will often pass the line of separation in an opposite direction, and term events *miraculous* which in truth were brought about by the ordinary workings of God's providence. Nor can we omit from this list the well-attested effects of imagination, which frequently take a form not easily to be distinguished from miracle. And, lastly, we must name what may be called the hardening into fact of metaphorical expressions; as where a devout person is said to overcome Satan, and the unlettered multitude (and subsequently even annalists) translate the saying into an actual combat with material weapons against the Evil One; or another is said to have borne Christ, *i.e.* in his heart, and is reported to have carried him on his shoulders.

Most Christians, we believe, would now acknowledge the necessity of vast deductions on this score from the hagiology of the middle ages. Bishop Kip, in his 'Christmas Holidays at Rome,' informs us that Italian clergy thus explained to him the history of S. Dunstan; and we ourselves have conversed in Paris with the estimable Curé of one of the principal churches of that city, who spoke similarly of the legend of S. Denis. Few indeed are the penmen of the present day who do not relate these narratives in an apologetic tone, and with lurking distrust. That they have lost their hold upon the great mass of the people, is shown by the manner in which French writers upon art allege the unfitness of such subjects for the painter. Artists cannot awaken interest by the representation of scenes no longer held to represent the truth.

Shall we then withhold our credence from all accounts of miracles, as miracles, saving and excepting those which are enshrined in the pages of Holy Scripture? Such a conclusion, however acceptable to many excellent persons, we believe to be utterly untenable. We doubt whether it would be now maintained by any men of really logical and, at the same time, reverent minds, who had given the subject a proper examination. And let those who may be inclined to consider such belief as superstitious and fanatical bethink them of the company in which they condemn us. In that company are numbered Grotius,¹ Bishop Warburton,² Milner, the Church historian,³ Burke,⁴ Dr. Arnold,⁵ and, probably, Neander.⁶ All these, and several others of less name, have expressed their belief in some one or more of the ecclesiastical miracles, and they are a strange assembly to be brought

¹ On S. Mark xvi. 17, *et alibi*.

² On Julian's attempt to rebuild the temple at Jerusalem.

³ On Julian's attempt, &c.

⁴ Fragment of English History.

⁵ Lectures on Modern History.

⁶ Church Hist. vol. vii. p. 356. (Bohn's English Edit.) His language is slightly ambiguous.

up upon a charge of credulity and superstition. The tests which have been mentioned in the preceding section, as genuineness of documents, intention of narrators, means of information, sources of prejudice, internal evidence of style, may of course be justly brought to bear upon the contemporaneous records of supernatural events, in addition to an examination of the possible causes of error just detailed. And further, it must, we think, be allowed that, by the constitution of the human mind, our judgment is in these cases greatly affected by our opinions concerning the antecedent probability of a special Divine interference in the particular instance under consideration. Let this last-named element be allowed, then, its due weight and influence upon the formation of our judgments: only let it be so employed that we forget not reverence and humility. For our ignorance herein is very great; we are but poor judges, *à priori*, of the kind of circumstances in which it would please an All-wise Creator to suspend or contravene the operation of his own laws. We are far from being able to guess what He may deem the *dignus vindice nodus*: will any pretend that we should *antecedently* have supposed that the loss of a borrowed axe-head, or the failure of wine at a marriage feast, or the need of money to pay the temple-tribute, were fit occasions for the intervention of miraculous power?

When, therefore, the question of historic credibility comes across the profound and solemn problems connected with the indefinable boundary of the visible and the invisible, it is obvious that we must look, even more closely than heretofore, to the tone and temper of our informant or our critic. He may doubtless be so prepared to look for special interference from on high, as to see the supernatural in many a circumstance, which can be easily and satisfactorily explained by natural causes; but he may, upon the other hand, be so incredulous of the very existence of the world of grace, as not to deserve the attention of a Christian, when the point at issue may possibly be concerned with the unseen.

Non-recognition of supernatural, as well as natural, causes is a blemish even in a heathen work. It is surely a defect in Polybius; and it injures the value of the ingenious replies of Cicero, in the second book of his '*De Divinatione*,' to the arguments which he puts into the mouth of his brother Quintus in the preceding book of the same treatise. For, when natural causes have been worked to the uttermost to solve the apparent instances of magic or divination, we may only have arrived at half the truth: and if so with respect to marvels among the heathen, much more so within the pale of Christ's Church. The very fact, that false prodigies have been narrated, is right-

fully appealed to as an argument, which favours the probability that there have been true ones likewise; just as usurpers, or base coins, or paste jewels, or forged notes, imply the existence of lawful monarchs, of good money, of real diamonds, and true bank paper. The manner in which this principle is ignored throughout an elaborate treatise, which has excited attention both on the Continent and in England,—we mean M. Alfred Maury's '*Essai sur les Légendes pieuses du Moyen-Age*,¹—is, in our judgment, a stumbling-block upon the very threshold of its author's argument. M. Maury attempts, by an examination of authorities, and by the lights of modern science, to show that the entire mass of medieval accounts of miracles may safely be disposed of, as being either deficient in respect of attestation, or else referrible to natural causes. That his Essay displays great learning and considerable acuteness is not to be denied: nor indeed do we doubt but that its pages contain a large amount of truth. But this is not a subject to which the Baconian laws of induction can safely be applied. Nineteen instances of erroneous belief in a story of miracle, do *not* establish a general law, do *not* prove the twentieth to be false. Each case must be judged upon its own merits. But what are the qualifications of M. Maury to be guide in these delicate questions? His critical remarks are not faultless, his arguments frequently capable of introversion. No one, with any pretensions to scholarship, ought to dream of inventing for the origin of legends such a term as *legendogonie*. Well may he fear that he is framing *un mot trop barbare* (p. 40), seeing that the first half of his coinage is from the Latin, and the second from the Greek. Had he spoken of *mythogony*, the term, though not classical, might have honourably claimed a place beside the title of Hesiod's famous poem, the *Theogony*. We are likewise surprised to find that M. Maury's great research has not enabled him to perceive the origin of the horns with which Moses is frequently endowed in painting and in sculpture, as in the grand statue of Michael Angelo, to which he has himself referred (p. 197). Whatever amount of Jewish tradition may have been mixed up with the matter, there can be no doubt that the artists of the middle ages thus represented Moses because their one authority, the Vulgate, had rendered Exodus xxxiv. 29, by the words, '*Ignorabat quòd cornuta esset facies ejus.*' But these are trifles; it is more important to observe, that by approaching some parts of his thesis, as it were from the wrong side, this essayist represents symbols, which were typical of Christianity, and 'wrecks of paradise' preserved among pagans, to be mere

¹ Paris (Ladrangé), 1843.

thefts of the primitive Christians, instead of property rightfully reclaimed. What if Paganism *did* employ the images of the lion, the wolf, the dragon, &c., with an aim not wholly unlike that of Scripture and the Church? Such usage cannot really prejudice the Christian's right to avail himself of them; and a reverent philosophy, such as that of Keble or M. Nicolas, will justly teach us how to see in these resemblances a confirmation of all holy truth. We will not stay to examine how far the materialising views, which M. Maury imputes (and not without reason) to the middle ages, may be justly charged, in many respects, upon himself. But since the merits of this work have been recognised in quarters wherein its grievous faults are either passed by, or perhaps not admitted to be faults at all, we take the opportunity of saying a few words upon its tone. M. Maury is simply a disciple of Strauss, who is anxious (as he informs us) to impart to ignorant France a share of the riches of Germany. With Strauss he sees in the history of Daniel a story made up from the salient points of that of Joseph (p. 7); the incident of the viper fastening upon the hand of S. Paul, is evidently to him a mere invention to confirm the truth of the evangelic prediction, recorded in the closing chapter of S. Mark (p. 141); the account of the wise men from the East is simply *ce mythe des Mages*, based upon astrological ideas; every instance of resuscitation to life in either Testament, inclusive of that Resurrection on which Christians base their faith, is cavilled at (p. 236); and the wondrous scene of the Transfiguration resolved into an ocular deception, such as is often witnessed on the Brocken (p. 244). Of what possible avail can it be to discuss with such a writer the evidence for a particular case, when that case is evidently prejudged by the admission of certain general principles? Why pause to weigh the credibility of exorcism, with one who clearly does not believe that there are any evil spirits to *be* exorcised; one, who appeals to the enlightenment of modern science, but on finding that a great physician believed that men might still be 'possessed,' coolly remarks, 'le célèbre 'médecin Frédéric Hoffmann admettait encore, *sans doute de* 'préjugés religieux, des maladies démoniaques?' Why argue that a given miracle may have truly happened, with one who asserts (p. 237) that from the point of view in which we of this age are placed, any further miracles and prodigies are impossible? The *abstract* possibility of miracles forms no part of our present subject. Many will remember that the reasoning of Hume has received a reply from the pen of Mr. J. S. Mill, which is satisfactory for the particular purpose. Further arguments, with special reference to our own times, may be found in the valuable works of Mr. R. C. Trench, and in M. Nicolas'

'*Études Philosophiques sur le Christianisme*;' but nowhere perhaps has the subject been handled in a more masterly manner than in the replies to Strauss by the late lamented Dr. Mill.

We have relegated, however, the subject of miraculous narratives to this division of our theme, because we do not doubt that the great majority are not traceable to contemporaneous witnesses, who have left behind them written evidence. It was observed, that in this section the question of the writer's *intention* must especially come under consideration. It is time to touch upon it in connexion with the marvellous. Did the author, whose book we may be reading, *intend* us to take this and that marvel for an objective fact? He may have had another purpose, which in his eyes justified the greatest laxity. Polybius affords a curious hint in this respect. He treats with skilful, and not perhaps unmerited, scorn, the story of a divine being having appeared upon the Alps to show the way to Hannibal; and again (in another part of his work) the account of a statue of Diana, which, though exposed to the air, is neither rained nor snowed upon; as also an assertion of the wonder-loving Theopompus, to the effect that those who enter into the sanctuary of Jupiter in Arcadia, anticipate Chamisso's Peter Schlemil, by becoming shadowless. Nevertheless, Polybius is for allowing historians to insert as many of these wonders as tend to preserve popular piety towards the Deity, and thinks that the quantity, though hard to limit, may yet be kept within due bounds.¹ Now, if a writer has only inserted marvels with such an intention as Polybius suggests, we shall of course fall into the greatest mistakes, if we accept for actual fact, things which he only meant to be understood as moral fiction. It is almost as if we should take up a fable or an allegory, and, not content with the moral, insist upon the objective accuracy of the narrative. 'But he,' says Origen, 'who reads histories with prudence, and desires to preserve himself from deception, will judge of the points to which he should yield acceptance, and of those which he should interpret figuratively, seeking out the intention of those who feigned such things (τὸ βούλημα ἐρευνῶν τῶν ἀναπλασμένων τὰ τοιαῦτα).'² There may at times be difficulty in following the whole of the advice here given us by this great and, if we may so term him, anticipatory genius; but his language will be seen to imply a clear admission of the principle, which is now being discussed by us.

And this brings us to another very important question connected with historic credibility, and one which may most fitly

¹ Lib. iii. cap. 47, 48; lib. xvi. cap. 12.

² Cont. Cels. lib. i. cap. 42.

be introduced at this point of our inquiry; namely, how far legends or anecdotes, which are not actually and objectively true, may be considered as being in certain cases as potentially true (as Aristotelians might call it, *δυνάμει*), and consequently a fair basis of argument. It will be easy to show that such cases may exist, but at the same time their treatment will be found to demand peculiar caution. Let us first then supply a few illustrations. We have been told of a farmer who, at the conclusion of an extraordinarily fine season, when every crop had been gathered in without stint or failure, grumbled because there was nothing spoilt to feed the pigs. Now, if name and time and place be required for this anecdote, they will probably be sought in vain; but we can all understand that there *is* a sense in which this farmer may be said to live in every shire, or rather in every country parish. And if a foreigner should adduce the story as a proof that this class of men were in England believed to be not easily satisfied with the weather, his conclusion would be just, whether the tale were a fact or an invention. There are numberless instances of a more serious character, where the value of the story consists, not in its having actually happened, but in its having been *believed* to have happened. For the existence of such belief is in itself a fact, though of a different character from the thing narrated. Thus divines may justly appeal to the story of a Codrus or a Decius, as instances of the idea of one man sacrificing himself for the good of a nation, prevailing at Athens and at Rome: for, prove the accounts to be traditionary and untrustworthy as you please, you do not thereby get rid of the evidence for heathen belief in the availing nature of such self-devotedness.

Or again, let us turn to that great work of S. Augustine, his '*De Civitate Dei*.' Therein, he is compelled to reply *in limine* to the assertion of the pagans, that Rome and Romans invariably prospered while Jupiter and the pantheon of Olympus were the objects of worship, but that disaster followed the acknowledgment of Christ. Among other examples of their erroneous connexion between virtue and the certainty of temporal prosperity, S. Austin appeals with forcible eloquence to the far-famed history of Regulus.¹ If, he argues, that pagan religion ensured happiness to its votaries, how came it that one, so nobly constant to his oath and duty, perished by a mode of death so terrible and unheard-of? But if his grand resolve to lose all outward and material blessings rather than offend the gods by whom he had sworn, was to win for Regulus felicity as a reward hereafter, why calumniate the Christians, who with sure faith

¹ Lib. i. cap. 15.

look for a home on high, and know that they are strangers upon earth? Now it is maintained by Niebuhr, that the fame of Regulus has been much exaggerated: that he was less skillful as a general, less great as a man, than has been commonly represented; that he had been overbearing in his conduct towards Carthage in its hour of weakness; that his martyrdom is apocryphal, and that his death most probably happened in the course of nature. Be it so, for argument's sake; yet who would therefore pretend that the inconsistency of which the bishop of Hippo complained is thereby lessened, or his argument against Paganism invalidated? The embassy and heroic death of Regulus, whether true or not in fact, had been sung by the poets and extolled by the orators of Rome, and, for the purpose in hand, at any rate *represented* the truth. A recent writer, Mr. Helps, thinks that fables, current opinions, and the like, have received too little attention from historians. We doubt the justice of the allegation, so far at least as regards the present century. Gibbon, Guizot, Lord Lindsay, Dean Milman, and others, occur to us as having fully recognised the worth of such materials, when properly employed; and Mr. Henry Taylor, after laying down the general principle, justly observes by way of instance, that however fabulous may be the first decade of Livy, 'the Discorsi of Machiavel, generalizing from them, have lost little or nothing of their value.

The suggestion of Polybius, above noticed, justly offends the moral sense, because he supposes the historian to insert marvels of which he himself is utterly incredulous while he is telling them. But let us take the case where, in an uncritical age, the writer is far from imagining his narrative to be abstractedly incredible, though he may not be very particular in examining whether what he is telling appertains to the particular person to whom he assigns it. He would think with himself, that if these self-denying or those miraculous deeds were not true of *A* they were true of *B* or of somebody else: that he is only setting forth in a recognised form the holiness of the subject of his biography, and that since his knowledge is imperfect, the sketch may be profitably filled by the workings of imagination under the influence of religious feeling. There is a German proverb to the effect that everything is true, which makes you better (*es ist alles wahr, wodurch Du besser wirst*); and in the spirit of this saying appear to have been composed a vast quantity of medieval legends. The writers did not, as Polybius recommends, invent or narrate what they actually disbelieved: far from it; but they did regard the moral and religious effect of what they were saying, far more than its objective truth. This seems to be admitted by thinkers of the

most varied schools; by Dr. Arnold and Dr. Newman, as well as by M. Maury and Mr. Grote. How fully these legends satisfied the cravings of men's souls in those tumultuous days; how amidst outward miseries the ideas of right and order, law and justice, were cherished and supported in their minds by these glimpses of a brighter sky, thus seen between the thunder clouds; how little the hearers would be disposed to ask for the evidence on which the story rested; how the love of novelty, of striking adventure thus portrayed, relieved the monotony and dreariness of existence, from which the mass of the population then suffered;—all this has been set forth and illustrated with his usual clearness and vigour, by M. Guizot in a well-known chapter (the seventeenth) of his '*Civilisation en France*.' Told by a thousand minstrels and reciters, reduced to writing by monks, and everywhere enshrined in the labours of artists, these legends, amidst a crowd of trivialities and absurdities, yet testified to the existence of an unseen world; and that in a manner perhaps more calculated to impress the medieval mind than any other which could have been chosen.

It was well that M. Guizot and the many authors who (like Dr. Arnold and Mr. Stanley) have followed in his wake, should thus proclaim the many excellences of the medieval legends, and shield their composers from the common charge of mere folly and deliberate intention to deceive. It was well that others, as M. Rio, Lord Lindsay, and Mrs. Jameson, should explain to us the bearing of these histories upon the wonderful creations of medieval art. One more excuse, too, for their authors shall be mentioned, because we do not feel sure that it is distinctly enunciated in the works to which we have referred; we mean, the great difficulty of teaching the uneducated to discern the difference between fact and allegory. The educated mind may cull the deep lessons to be drawn from one of our Lord's divine Parables, as *e.g.* that of the Good Samaritan, without supposing that the details of the narrative are binding upon the conscience as facts; but the poor and uninstructed accept parable and facts as one united whole, until at length (as has really happened) the place where the Samaritan found the object of his care is shown to the traveller in the Holy Land. In this manner do the humble parishioners of many an excellent pastor read the tracts which he purchases for their edification: can we wonder that, in a ruder age, the same (often very innocent) mistake was enacted upon a very extensive scale?

But while we show charity to errors which were frequently so venial, and recognise the benefits which this species of legendary literature conferred upon humanity, we must not be blind to its faults, nor forget that it had at least one very

injurious aspect. It is after all a grievous fault in any narrative *claiming* to be historical, that we should not (even the highly educated) be able to understand what portion rests upon the comparatively solid basis of sober contemporaneous evidence, and was intended by its author for fact, and what was merely allegorical, or the growth of later ages, when direct means of knowledge could no longer exist. For a day comes, when doubt is proved to be legitimate with reference to one portion of the story, and thence arises a sad amount of scepticism concerning the true and sound remainder. How much of modern unbelief may be connected with unwarrantable demands upon credulity, which have been made of old! How significant is the circumstance, that when the ablest living apologist for Christianity among French Catholics would defend the miracles of the Gospel, he is compelled, in the first place, to get rid of the objection arising out of the false miracles of the middle ages! Let us, by all means, make due use of the less trustworthy tales which have, as has been said, a value in their measure; only, if we really care at all to aim at discovering laws of historic credibility, let the line in this case be strongly drawn, lest that which is merely subjective and fanciful be confounded with objective truth.

It would assist the inquirer in these matters if he could examine any considerable number of histories in which the contemporary narratives and the later legendary additions can be compared. Thus, for example, it would be interesting to possess any earlier account of Cyrus than that of Herodotus, who lived when many of the Persians desired (as he himself informs us) to embellish and dignify the founder of their empire, that so we might contrast it with the later stories. It is curious to read the biography of Belisarius, and then turn to that, we suppose (*pace* Lord Stanhope) very questionable and subsequent, story of the *date obolum* *Belisario*, impressed upon the European mind by prints and pictures, and the romance of Marmontel. Or, again, to study Charlemagne, who is 'always in danger,' says Palgrave, 'of shading into a mythic Monarch. . . a personified theory,' in the light first of history and then of romance: a task in which much assistance may be derived from the writings of Sir F. Palgrave himself, and Sismondi, and, we presume, M. Fauriel.¹ But since a single specimen is all that

¹ Judging from other works of M. Fauriel, and from the specimen given by Mr. Grote, his papers on the romances connected with Charlemagne must be very valuable, but they appeared in the leading French Review so long ago that they have become extremely difficult of access.

we can here attempt to produce, we prefer to devote a page or two to the consideration of Attila. For in *his* case it is not only easy to turn to the pages of distinguished English writers for the history; but both history and legend have been recently given to the world with admirable distinctness and graphic effect in a series of articles contributed to the *Revue des deux Mondes*,¹ by the brilliant pen of M. Amédée Thierry. If our attempts at conciseness cause obscurity, the reader can hardly do better than refer to these papers. Nowhere perhaps in the same compass will he obtain an equally good example of the difference between history and legend.

The most prominent features of Attila's career admit of an easy and rapid sketch. Descended from the ancient kings of the Huns, he became, in A.D. 434, the sovereign of that vast array of tribes which extends from Gaul to China (exclusive of either of these countries); thus alone, in the history of the world, combining under his sway both the German and the Slavonic races. A Kalmuck in his physiognomy, which was repulsive, but not destitute of a certain awe and majesty; a heathen and savage conqueror, commanding an army of at least 500,000 men, he enjoys the terror which his approach everywhere excites, and is by no means unwilling that the scared hosts of Christendom should regard him as the personal Anti-Christ. But he can display generosity, and in discovering a plot of Theodosius II. against his life, will not wreak his vengeance, as most wild chieftains would have done, upon the Emperor's innocent ambassador. From the Eastern empire he gains a large tract to the south of the Danube, and an annual payment of tribute. As he subsequently marches onward against the Western Empire, in A.D. 450, whole nations are displaced, and their homes become the seat of other tribes and peoples. The Slavonic race descends to the Black Sea to take possession of the countries abandoned by the Ostrogoths; the white Huns and the dark Huns, the Avars, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Turks, hitherto external to Europe, each advance one step nearer to its frontiers. Beaten, with enormous loss, by the Roman general Aetius, at Chalons-sur-Marne, in June 451, he retreats to the Danube, recruits his forces, and succeeds in crossing the Alps in the very year of his defeat. Aquileia, though a strong city, is captured and utterly dismantled: Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Brescia and Bergamo fare but little better, and the flying inhabitants of the district take refuge in the seventy-two isles of the Adriatic lagoon, which are afterwards to become the city of Venice. Lombardy is overrun;

¹ Tom. xiii. (1852). Tom. xvi. (1852), and No. for 1 Août, 1855.

Milan and Pavia are pillaged. Rome trembles at her seemingly inevitable fate. But at this juncture a deputation comes to Attila from the Eternal City: it is composed of Trigetius and the Senator Avienus, headed by their Bishop, the holy Pontiff S. Leo. And the spell of Rome's greatness is upon him; sickness has begun to waste his army; he bethinks him that his predecessor, Alaric, did not live long after the capture of Rome, and even his own officers suggest to him, that a like destiny may await him if he advances. The majesty of Pope Leo's mien and the impressiveness of his words complete the charm; he accords a favourable truce and returns homewards. But the days of his life and his empire are numbered; in a year or two (the date is variously given) the king of the Huns adds a young beauty, Ildico, to the list of his numerous wives. The nuptials are celebrated with barbaric pomp and enormous feasting; but the morrow morn displays Attila dead in his tent. Some accounts have placed a dagger in the hand of the young spouse; but it is more probable that the bursting of a blood-vessel had caused suffocation, and that this hæmorrhage had been so brought about as to justify the quaint moralizing of our Chaucer,—

“Loke, Attila, the grete conquerour,
Died in his slepe, with shame and dishonour,
Bleding ay at his nose in dronkenesse:
A capitaine shulde live in sobrenesse.”

He is bewailed by his countrymen with savage rites and tears of blood: they bury him secretly by night, and the slaves who dig the grave are slain that they may not betray the spot. His empire dies with him.¹

Such is the Attila of history: history derived from contemporary witnesses. Turn we now to the Attila of legend, who is the same and yet another. In both he has won a place by the side of Alexander and Cæsar; if they have inspired admiration, he has at least inspired fear. Yet the fear, as Thierry justly remarks, seems to be less connected with his actual exploits, than the consciousness of what he *might* have done; and the shock that he gave to the prestige of the inviolability of Rome. Neither Genserik, who sacked both Rome and Carthage, nor Radagaisus, the most savage of conquerors, have left behind them a name so full of dread, as that of the monarch who failed to take Orleans, was defeated at Chalons, and who, yielding to

¹ This sketch is largely drawn from Mr. Stanley's excellent summary in Dr. Smith's Dictionary (*Art. Attila*), compared, however, with Thierry, Gibbon, and the '*Nouvelle Biographie Générale*.' In what follows Thierry is our chief, almost our only guide.

the prayer of S. Leo, spared the ancient capital of the world. Shall we see in this the mere caprice of fame, or recognise the prerogative of genius? Perhaps both elements are discernible; we must leave the decision to the reader. The Attila of legend has a threefold existence. In the traditions of the Latin races, he is mainly the destroyer; in the Germanic ones, he is the originator (as in truth he was) of a new national existence; in those of Hungary he is the ancestral king to whom indirectly, strange to say, the Christianity of the country is owing. The middle age in southern Europe, which assigned every anonymous building to the hand of Julius Cæsar, in like manner attributed every ruin to that of Attila. The two, says Thierry, were correlative types; the Roman of fructifying and civilizing conquest, the Hun of barren and exterminating warfare. There was no enormity, no pillage, massacre, or persecution of saints, so incredible, as to surpass belief, if its epoch were only made coincident with the invasion of the Huns: all was rendered easy of acceptance, by the bare pronunciation of the name of *Attila*. The death of S. Ursula and the supposed eleven thousand maiden attendants has been laid upon him. True, they were considered to have left Brittany in A.D. 383, and Attila was at Cologne in 451: but such trifles are as nothing in a legend. On the other hand, Treves and Strasbourg claim to have been enlarged and embellished, if not founded, by this destructive chieftain. Christian Strasbourg honoured the king of the Huns as her patron; while Christian Cologne execrated his memory as the slayer of S. Ursula and her virgins. Yet those who condemned ever asserted that the prayers of holy men had (either with the consent, or in despite of the will, of Attila) saved many cities from the terrors of the Hunnish brand. Not only had Rome been preserved by S. Leo; but Orleans was said to have been saved by S. Aignan; Troyes by S. Loup, and perhaps Paris by S. Geneviève, from the same danger. Here was another source of interest; here was an answer to such calumniators of Christianity as S. Austin had contended against in the *De Civitate Dei*: here was the voice of the Most High speaking from heaven in the barbarian's heart, and working the greatest of all miracles—that of making Attila merciful. Certainly, we incline to agree with Dean Milman and with Thierry, that the far later legend of the eighth century, which makes the Apostles S. Peter and S. Paul appear in the air behind S. Leo, as he pleads for Rome, is, however glorified by the art of Raphael and Algardi, in reality, more materialised and less spiritual and sublime than the simple fact of history, which exhibits the conquest of a wild and lawless ambition by the might and majesty of chastened holiness. Of the same date (at least it is not found sooner) is

the famous appellation of the 'Scourge of God' (*Flagellum Dei*), probably alluded to by Dante, when he speaks of

'Quell' Attila, che fu flagello in Terra,'¹

and which the conqueror is supposed in legends to have consciously adopted as his own title, until it ultimately became a kind of personification absorbing his historic reality. With the mention of one more feature, we must leave the Italian accounts of Attila. Just as the descendant of a Scotch Covenanter would delight to think that his ancestor, if he had fallen in the cause, had been slain by no meaner hands than that of Claverhouse himself; even so too, cities which the army of the Huns had not approached, boldly asserted that they had been besieged by Attila, and could furnish details as exact as those of the duel in a famous modern comedy: for to admit that the hero had not been there, was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in his days. Ravenna particularly distinguished itself in this way; and had two (very opposite) versions of an arbitration in a question of Christian orthodoxy, made by Attila between S. Leo and its Archbishop, Agnellus. So that while in parts of Germany the great Hun was made intimate with Satan, and almost his human counterpart, in Italy he could on occasion serve for a judge of doctrine, and moreover be recounted to have preached good morality to the Romans, and to have given dowries to their virtuous maidens.

But, northward, plentiful additions were in store. The most ancient monument of German poetry is concerned with Theodoric and Attila; and even Norway and Greenland sang of the mighty leader. And belief in the historic truth of these poems appears to have been unhesitating. Some well-read monks and bishops entered protests; but they could not find readers for their comparatively uninteresting narratives. So the character of the conqueror changes with the birth-place of the song: among the Scandinavian bards he acquires a sort of Norwegian fierceness; in the lays of the *Minnesingers* he is softened down to something like a specimen of Christian knighthood. In Norway his mother is a witch, and his sister a Valkyre; he is prudent, full of stratagem and finesse: while in Germany he is frank and open. Both agree, however, in making him a conqueror satiated with victory, and yearning for peace. We cannot follow these wild traditions of the North. Suffice it to say, that occasional gleams of an historic light dart, though but faintly, through their misty atmosphere; and certain vague hints incline M. Amedée Thierry to think that the accusation against Ildico may, after all, be just, and that Attila died a violent death.

¹ Inferno, xii.

But the tales of Italy and Germany, Gaul and Scandinavia, must yield in point of beauty to the Magyar legends respecting Attila. In these last he is surrounded with a very halo of poetic glorification: Attila is to the Hungarians their ancestor, their patron, the founder of their institutions. In the lapse of years their holy king, S. Stephen, was to obtain the sacred crown, the palladium of the Magyar empire. That is historic enough. But, say their traditions, that crown was gained in virtue of a compact between Attila and the Redeemer himself at the gates of Rome, as the ransom of the Eternal City and the tombs of the Apostles. Well may the distinguished historian, who is here our guide, pause, while he admits the fantastical character of this account, to admire eits poetic beauty. We will venture one step further. Such as are in the habit of looking in legends for moral and spiritual truth, rather than absolute truth of fact, may surely perceive it here. The real retirement of Attila at the petition of one who had no earthly weapons to repel him, was a deed to be ridiculed by those who had no dread of what is supernatural. But elsewhere it may have been judged far differently. And there is nothing forced or violent in imagining that a special blessing may have been vouchsafed to it to be shed upon generations yet unborn; just as the holy deed of Rodolph, which has been sung by Schiller, has been regarded (and who shall presume to say, idly regarded?) as the charter of long prosperity to the house of Hapsburg. And as Italy changed the simple circumstance of the interview into a vision of Apostles; so Hungary made our Saviour appear in person to the king of the Huns, and bid him spare the tombs of the Apostles, and promise him, that in return for his docility, one of his successors should receive from a successor of S. Peter a grace which should be shed upon all his race.

We cannot spare any space for details; though the tale is but bare and lifeless without them. But the grand point for consideration in connexion with our present subject is this:—*These legends may be read in the light of authentic history.* By its aid we detect the degree of truth inherent in the varied versions of the events. We see, for instance, how *both* the legendary accounts (the Hungarian and Italian) of Attila's withdrawal of his troops from Italy, agree, amidst their differences, in portraying him as acting under the impulse of a religious awe. We see that the Attila of Hungary is much nearer the truth of history, than the Attila sung of by the Norwegians. But supposing, and it is no impossibility, that the works of Priscus and Jornandes had been lost, can we believe that a modern critic could have restored for us a satisfactory account of Attila out of these legendary materials?

There is a school of critics which will boldly answer, *Yes*. We must take the liberty of dissenting from them.

III. We now approach the most difficult portion of our subject, the treatment of that species of history which is not based upon contemporary written evidence. And here, where 'doctors disagree' so seriously, it becomes us to speak with diffidence, and to request, in all sincerity and earnestness, the kind indulgence of the reader. Far be it from us to dogmatise on such a theme; let our reflections not be taken for more than they assume to be: *valeant quantum valeant*.

It appears, then, that there are, in the main, four ways in which such history may be handled.

1. It may be accepted on almost precisely the same terms as history which *does* rest upon contemporary written evidence.

2. It may be utterly rejected, as a fiction.

3. It may be regarded as a mixture of truth and falsehood, fact and allegory, from which the skill of a critical mind is able to elicit a real history.

4. It may be contemplated, so to speak, as a substance *in vacuo*, of which the properties are thereby so changed, or rather, perhaps, rendered so difficult of analysis, that we are unable to arrive at a determinate conclusion concerning them. On this hypothesis we must be content to remain in a simply negative state of mind, unable to assert that the poem or narrative before us possesses, or does not possess, a substantial and historical basis; unable to decide how much is fact and how much fiction.

Let us view each of these methods separately.

1. To place such history almost upon a level with that which was witnessed to us by the writings of contemporaries, was the plan pursued by our forefathers in all lands, and the one which has been impressed upon the boyish minds of most men now living who have passed the age of thirty. Take, for instance, Roman history. We have recently had in our hands a copy of Goldsmith's *Rome*. In the edition we have glanced at, not a single authority is cited throughout two octavo volumes. We are left to suppose, that all which is recorded stands upon equally good testimony; Romulus is as real a personage as Julius Cæsar, and the battle of Lake Regillus as historical as that of Cannæ. Why is it that this confidence has ceased?

It has ceased, because it would not bear the light of honest and judicious inquiry; it has ceased, because all who will take the trouble to think over the subject for themselves, must (we believe) inevitably conclude that a real and definite line—how broad a one, is a further question—*must* be drawn between the

two kinds of narrative to which we refer. Where there exists no contemporary evidence in writing, we must needs fall back upon tradition. Now tradition is indeed of more use in the world than most people are apt to imagine. Our trades and the arts, and the learned professions, live upon it very largely. There are numberless 'secrets of the craft' which are never committed to writing, but orally learnt by each apprentice in his generation. But in handiwork of all kinds the result is a sort of check upon the wanderings of fancy and faithlessness of memory. If the work does not issue in the shape expected, the process must be taxed with faultiness.

'Amphora cœpit
Institui; currente rotâ eur urceus exit?'

Nor is this check confined to the useful arts; the painter, the sculptor, and the musician, may all avail themselves of it. Nay, even in pursuits less conversant with the tangible and material, the same rule is capable of application. The young physician may in some measure test the correctness of that which he has heard in a lecture, by the effect produced upon a patient; the lawyer, who receives from his instructor a traditional commentary upon certain statutes, may in time discover how far that interpretation is accepted by the authorities on the bench in our courts of law and equity; and even the divine, who in all communions receives *some* current view of religion, Roman, Genevan, Lambethian, from parents and instructors, will discover, as he grows older, a variety of tests (besides the sacred volume) which, though not necessarily easy of application, yet place a limit upon the power and influence of tradition. But in the case of history which is devoid of contemporaneous written evidence, where upon earth are we to find such checks to the licence of imagination, and who is interested in creating them? Even in our own century a false story does not fall to the ground at once. Barrère sent a flaming report to the French Convention, to the effect that a French ship, *Le Vengeur* (one of the fleet which was conquered by Lord Howe on the famous 1st of June), had gone down without striking her flag, while her crew shouted *Vive la République*. The French preserved a model of the patriotic vessel, and the story found its way into the pages of Alison and Carlyle. This theatrical performance, after a life of many years, has been proved not to possess one atom of truth.¹ Some Germans, with Goethe at their head, accounted for the plot of Lord Byron's *Manfred*, by a tale which attributed at least one murder to its author. The story ac-

¹ Carlyle's *Miscellanies*, vol. iv. (latest editions); Arnold on *Mod. Hist.* Lect. VIII.

counted for apparent difficulties in the drama, and this was enough for a large class of Teutonic critics. But it was a pure and baseless myth.' And let those who would trust to tradition unchecked by writing or by such means as have been just referred to, inquire (we borrow the hint indirectly from Sir G. C. Lewis) in any company of twenty persons, how much each can tell concerning his great-grandfather. There must be no appeal allowed to the family Bible, to histories of the borough or the county, to the Peerage or the Annual Register. If indeed the memory, unaccustomed to lean upon writing, has preserved that vigour which it seems to have possessed in Greece and some other countries, and if the oral accounts supplied to us can be confronted with similar reports concerning the same events and persons, we then do possess a real test, and the tradition may possess great value: though even here a searching examination is needed, lest our concurrent testimonies are, after all, derived from some one popular tale or poem, well known to all our informants, and employed as the groundwork of their narrative.² And just as such false tales as those respecting the ship *Le Vengeur* and the poem of *Manfred* can be tested, because produced in writing, while witnesses of their falsity were yet alive; while similar stories not attested by contemporaries cannot be thus examined; so too does it fare with monuments. They can hardly have been forged in the very sight of those who could at once denounce the forgery. If London's column used of old to lift its head and lie, the lie at least never went unprotected against, and has now disappeared for more than a quarter of a century. But monuments professing to represent bygone events, though not contemporary with those events—how much credence is due to them? A well-known college in Oxford bears the symbol of a brazen nose over its gateway, and now appears in the Latinized documents of the University as *Collegium Ænei Nasi*. Does any antiquary on that account accept this Latin translation (which never, we believe, appears in the statutes of the college itself) as a true rendering of the original meaning of the name? We remember seeing, some ten years since, an ostensible tomb of Juliet at Verona. Among the ancients, we hear of the egg of Leda, hung up in a temple at Sparta; the ivory rib of Pelops; the tools wherewith Epeus made the Trojan horse, preserved at Metapontum; the sow which Æneas saw, pickled at Lavinium; and in several places,

¹ Edinburgh Review, for October, 1846 (vol lxxxiv. p. 350); Moore's *Life of Byron*; recent editions of *Manfred*.

² Have the consentient legends of the Maoris in New Zealand been thoroughly examined in this respect? If not, does not Sir F. Palgrave make too much of them? (*Normandy and England*, vol. i. pp. 13, 14.)

relics of the good ship *Argo*.¹ But who now appeals to such relics as proofs of the truth of the event, in and by themselves, apart from trustworthy contemporary history?

We cannot here stay to recount the numerous internal impossibilities of the earlier Roman history. Niebuhr, Arnold, Mr. Malden, Dean Liddell, and others have set them forth *in extenso*. That they did not ruin the credibility of that early history before they had been subjected to the criticisms of Perizonius, Vico, Beaufort, and finally Niebuhr, is only a proof that they 'lacked severe research.' But since the appearance of Niebuhr's far-famed book, how few men of name and authority have resisted the force of his destructive arguments, whatever they may have thought of his success in building up his own theories of the truth. Some indeed there are, who seem inclined to differ from Niebuhr, by believing more than he did. Such are Messrs. Gerlach and Bachofen; and perhaps Mr. F. W. Newman and Monsieur J. J. Ampère. With the first-named writers, who attempt to establish the historical character of the wars celebrated in the *Æneid*, we are not acquainted; nor do the specimens of their labours given by Sir G. C. Lewis at all tempt us to undertake the task of studying their volume.² Between Niebuhr and Mr. F. W. Newman, the difference is rather one of degree than principle. That a writer usually so incredulous should display a greater willingness of belief than the majority of modern scholars, respecting such annals as those of the early kings of Rome, is a strange, but by no means an unprecedented phenomenon. We can only afford space to remark, that when Professor Newman, in his *Regal and Republican Rome*, asserts the necessity of clinging to Livy and Dionysius, because if they are forsaken we have no one left to lean upon, he is asserting what no man would care to question in the abstract; the real question being (as has been observed) whether, with Rollin, Goldsmith, and the like, we cling to these writers absolutely; or, with Niebuhr and his followers, try to extract facts out of assumed legends; or, with Grote and Lewis, receive the narratives as they stand, not as history, but as a *mélange*, out of which no mortal skill can avail to distinguish with any security and precision between the sound and the fabulous, the true and false. A word, however, must be bestowed upon that very pleasing writer, M. Ampère. He has been recently publishing, in the valuable *Revue* of which he is an editor, a series of papers entitled *L'Histoire Romaine à Rome*.

¹ See Lewis, vol. i. pp. 211, 462; and many parts (notes and text) of Grote's *Greece*, vol. i.

² Lewis, vol. i. pp. 12, 181, 370.

We cannot say that he has treated the subject with his usual felicity. In defending the personal existence of Romulus against the attacks of scepticism, he remarks: '*On arrive ainsi à récuser sans preuves l'existence d'Homère, de Lycurgue et de Jésus-Christ.*' Surely, this is an ill-considered sentence. The followers of Strauss would accept the parallel and rejoice. But, for our own part, while we grant that the real personality of Lycurgus may possibly be questioned on grounds similar to that of Romulus, we utterly deny the similarity of the two other examples. Of Romulus we have no written word, no action attested by a contemporary. Of Homer, we have at least one poem, which, after the severest examination, has been conclusively proved from internal evidence to be the work of one man: that proof, though well supported by many prior writers, having been reserved as the crowning triumph of the toils of Colonel Mure. And of Him (may the association be pardoned) Who is the Life and Light of believing souls, it must be said, that *He* has in a most remarkable manner condescended to our needs, as in all the other circumstances of His marvellous Life and Death, even so too very specially in this; that He deigned to leave behind Him chosen witnesses of His Divine ministry, 'from the baptism of John, unto that same day that He was taken up,' who should hand down to us evidence, which (even apart from the claims of Inspiration) is *contemporary written evidence*. 'That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the word of life; . . . that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you.'

And, to return to that illustration of the case which is afforded by the early Roman history, let those who find it hard to reconcile themselves to such doubt concerning it as is here expressed, remember that we are not asserting positively the *non-existence* of Romulus and Numa, but only avowing that the evidence that they *did* exist is of an inconclusive unsatisfactory nature. And as a large creation of peers in any country is justly held to diminish the value of previously existing coronets, even so, in like manner, to rank Romulus and Augustus in the same category, is to run the greatest risk of ultimately ruining the proper and deserved credence which we yield to solid history, made known to us by the writings of contemporaries. Do even the most indulgent accept the early Roman narrative *pur et simple*? Even Goldsmith is compelled to commence with an allusion to the mists of fable, and he might have supported such language by references to Plutarch and Dionysius, Cicero and Livy. Of old they were compelled to *rationalise* more or less; and among moderns the tone of such as Hooke and the Abbé

Banier respecting the parentage of Æneas is but a specimen of a process which makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for its advocates to retaliate, with any effect, upon the disciples of Niebuhr. For to say with Banier, of the birth of Virgil's hero, '*que cette fable fut inventée pour cacher quelque galanterie, et calmer la jalousie de la femme d'Anchise*;'¹ or to see, in the nurse of Cyrus, a woman named Cynos; or in the famous she-wolf, the nurture of Romulus and Remus by a person of bad character, called *Lupa*; these, and a thousand like instances of attempting to free such histories from their difficulties, can only be considered as a form of rationalism. Nor is M. Ampère free from a like inconsistency. After mentioning the well-known story of Hercules and the robber Cacus, he is led away by his love of geology, to wonder how any one can fail to recognise therein a poetisation of physical phenomena. '*Comment ne pas voir dans cette fable un souvenir des phénomènes physiques, qui ont dû se produire en ce lieu? ... L'antiquité aimait à tout personnifier: la géologie, comme les autres sciences, se transformait en poésie.*' This is simply to give up the entire question. If M. Ampère does not see sufficient evidence for the existence of a real Cacus, why should he expect other men to give more credit to an actual Romulus?

But still, still, it will be urged, there is a sadness in resigning what we have so long believed. 'Those old and inborn kings, never to have been real persons, or done in their lives at least some part of what so long hath been remembered, cannot be thought without too strict incredulity.' Certainly it is a melancholy task. But, in the first place, let it be remembered, that this trial need only be endured by one, or at the most two generations. When once it has been established that the 'incredulity' is not 'too strict,' but reasonable, the junior minds are at least taught such history with less confidence, so that they cannot receive a shock in parting with that which they never firmly held. Few of us are now brought up to believe in that formidable bead-roll of the one hundred and four kings of Scotland, whose existence is represented by Sir Walter Scott as one of the main topics of feud between Sir Arthur Wardour and the Antiquary. Few are now trained to acceptance of that race of British monarchs who were said to have sprung from the consul Brutus, and to have lasted until the time of Julius Cæsar.

And yet those Scottish sovereigns were, as Sir Walter remarks, received by Boethius and rendered classical by Buchanan. It was as their lineal descendant that James VI. claimed his North British kingdom; and their alleged (but not,

¹ Cit. ap. Lewis, vol. i. p. 348, (note.)

we imagine, *contemporary*) portraits still hang in the gallery of Holyrood. And, again, it is to the *English*, and not, as might have been supposed, the *Roman* line of kings, that the words of Milton, which have just been quoted, refer. But if no one in our day thinks that incredulity is 'too strict' with reference to *them*: if all our recent historians, amidst the widest differences, religious and political, agree in ignoring that shadowy pageant of monarchs, and begin the real and trustworthy accounts of England with the invasion of Julius Cæsar; why should we doubt but that a day is near at hand when it will give no more pain to our posterity to give up Romulus and Numa, than it does to us (whatever it may have done to the contemporaries of Milton) to resign the substantial reality of the English kingdom being derived from Brute and the Trojans, or the long Scottish genealogy of the descendants from King Fergus?

And if to that generation which undergoes the process of disenchantment, the relinquishment of cherished visions, entwined as they were with so many bright and ennobling associations, must still appear a cruel sacrifice; what is this, but one of the many forms in which the sternness of duty will, throughout the course of this our mortal life, break in upon the witcheries of imagination, and demand the abandonment of fancies, however dear, however beneficial in their day, at the still holier and more sacred shrine of Truth? If once our reason has been convinced of the lack of evidence, the inconsistencies, the impossibilities of so much that passed for history, then there is neither wisdom, nor courage, nor true faith in shrinking from the inevitable conclusion.

'Forbear to deem the Chronicler unwise,
Ungentle, or untouch'd by seemly ruth,
Who, gathering up all that Time's envious tooth
Has spared of sound and grave realities,
Firmly rejects those dazzling flatteries,
Dear as they are to unsuspecting Youth.'

So sang Wordsworth, after the expression, in a previous sonnet, of his deep regrets at the disappearance of the morning splendours of infant Rome. Yet even the *remembrance* of what those tales had been to him brought comfort with it.

'One solace yet remains for us who came
Into this world in days when story lack'd
Severe research, that in our hearts we know
How, for exciting youth's heroic flame,
Assent is power, belief the soul of fact.'

And assuredly in this, as in the more directly serious problems of life, the truth, which has for the moment robbed us of many a gorgeous illusion, will in season reward us by the display of a loveliness and brilliancy peculiarly her own. It has

been well said, that it is one great duty of life to *face truth*. It has been the boast of Northern races, that they are capable of so doing; that, if not gifted with so keen a sense of beauty as the children of the sunnier South, they are more hardy and resolute in their willingness to track the road of honest, self-renouncing dutifulness; and to feel that there lies in such a course the surest pledge of glory and true greatness.

' Not once or twice in our rough island-story,
The path of duty was the way to glory :
He that walks it, only thirsting
For the right, and learns to deaden
Love of self, before his journey closes,
He shall find the stubborn thistle bursting
Into glossy purples, which outredden
All voluptuous garden-roses.'

Happy indeed are those of whom such things may be predicated, without being an idle vaunt.

2. The second method of treating this branch of historical, or quasi-historical records,—namely, their rejection as so much absolute fiction,—need not occupy our attention long. For if it be irrational to accept their contents as pure history, it must needs be still more irrational to presume that they are wholly false. Differences of degree may of course exist: some such annals will contain more than others of the violently improbable, and of that which is incompatible with acknowledged truth: but, as a general rule, that want of evidence which prevents us from pronouncing a verdict of *moral* acquittal must equally preclude us from returning one of condemnation, and this principle of legal ethics may well be transferred from its own province to that of legendary history. In many cases, we are able to discover a solid basis for much that might, at first sight, seem the creation of the merest phantasy. Thus the Hesiodic and Ovidian accounts of a golden age are evidently based upon true, though transformed traditions of the garden of Eden; insomuch that Voltaire was fain to admit the natural connexion of this universally received legend with the truth of a lost Paradise of innocence and bliss. We have seen how incorrect would be the judgment of that critic who should deduce from the varied and conflicting legends respecting Attila, the conclusion that no such person ever existed. And it is quite conceivable, that the discovery of lost works, or of buried monuments, such as those of Nineveh, may, from time to time, give proof of the really historic character of heroes who had been deemed apocryphal. Nor indeed do any of the great writers, who have discussed these questions, ever seriously propound, so far as we are aware, any sweeping proposals for the utter rejection of these legends.

How far, indeed, their banishment from the realm of pure history into that of legend may tend towards their ultimate denial, is another question, which may be touched upon presently.

3. But if these non-contemporary poems, or annals, can neither be rationalised into sober history by the elimination of a few extravagancies, nor by a contrary treatment be safely consigned, as it were, to a limbo of extinction, there is open to us the ingenious, and certainly very interesting process, of attempting to extract from them the nucleus of fact, which is supposed of necessity to reside there. Such is the plan pursued by that remarkable writer Vico, in his '*Scienza Nuova*,' though not (as Mr. Grote has, we think, proved) with any great measure of consistency or success. Such is the plan now illustrated by many living writers of history, who adopt it because it has been enforced by the precept and example and apparent success of Niebuhr.

And here it is only right to say a few words with reference to the work of Sir G. C. Lewis, which we have placed at the head of this article as one of the most recent and illustrious examples of one branch of the inquiry here attempted, and to which we have already been indirectly much indebted. If we do not propose to place it upon precisely the same shelf with the volumes of Mr. Grote and Colonel Mure, the doubt does not arise from any impression that it is less accurate, less profoundly learned, or less calm and judicial in the tone and method of its investigations. In all these respects it may fairly vie with them: but it strikes us as being upon the whole less interesting, and (what is more important in an estimate of its merits) less original. We do not in this last remark refer so much to Sir G. C. Lewis' obligations to German writers, as *e. g.* to Professors Schweigler and Rubino: for all such treatises must needs draw largely from the stores of learning accumulated by the acuteness and indefatigable research of Germany: but when we compare the volumes of our Chancellor of the Exchequer with those of Grote or Mure, we cannot but think that the priority of publication on the part of those gentlemen is not merely one of time. They could have written, and in fact did write, without the aid of Sir G. C. Lewis; we much doubt if his book *could* have been produced without theirs. It appears to be, in great part, an application of the principles asserted in Mr. Grote's first volume, to Roman, instead of Grecian, history.

But, nevertheless, we feel very grateful to the author of this '*Inquiry*.' We know of no other author at once willing and able to undertake the task. Upon some minor points we might (if Mr. Editor had not — the reader will perhaps say, very

wisely—limited our space) have been inclined to raise an argument. We are not sure, for instance, whether we can quite sympathise with his tendency to leave unexamined what he calls the genesis of fables.¹ Then, again, we fancy that the utter dissimilarity of Sir G. C. Lewis's mind to that of Mr. Macaulay (these two writers being each amply provided with those articles of intellectual furniture in which the other is most deficient) has led him to treat with too much harshness the argumentative portion of the prose attached to the '*Lays of Ancient Rome*.'² Mr. Macaulay, however, can fight his own battles, if he think it worth his while; and we are no such worshippers of his genius as to lament very sorely over his reception of a little sarcasm from his brother politician and essayist. But what we really do prize in the volumes now before us, and receive in the main (without binding ourselves to an unmodified acceptance of all Sir George's canons of credibility), is the careful, searching, and, in our judgment, triumphant exposure of the unsoundness of the principles of Niebuhr.

Now let us not be misunderstood. Niebuhr, by his profound learning and rare sagacity, created a new epoch in the study of ancient history. The novelty of his mode of treatment, the moderation of his political creed, the moral, and frequent religious, tone of his remarks, and the apparently sound and brilliant results of his inquiries, all conduced to the influence which he exercised upon the world of scholars. His genius wrought a kind of fascination upon the mind of many highly-gifted contemporaries. To Dr. Arnold the appearance of Sir G. C. Lewis's work would have probably been almost a shock. It would have been extremely difficult for him to have listened patiently to such an attack upon the authority of his guide through the mazes of Roman history. A feeling similar in kind, though less intense in its degree, may be traced in the preface to the new *History of Rome*, which has just been published by Dean Liddell; and it will probably be shared by many English students. In Germany, where the researches of Dr. Ihne and others have already to some extent shaken the validity of Niebuhr's conclusions, the criticisms of Sir G. C. Lewis may probably find more willing auditors.

For ourselves, never having followed at the chariot-wheels of Niebuhr, never having been satisfied of the soundness of his method of investigation, and having witnessed with regret its application to more solemn subjects (to which, to do him justice, he never intended it to be applied), we can witness with great complacency, on this score, the rise and progress of theories,

¹ Vol. i. p. 410; cf. however, pp. 434, 435.

² Ibid. p. 202, sqq., p. 217, sqq.

which, if true, must effectually ruin the larger portion of his speculations; and if *his*, much more those of subordinate followers in his track. The nature of those theories will come into consideration in our fourth and concluding section: at present, let us try to test, with the assistance of Sir G. C. Lewis, the value of Niebuhr's process in a few instances. If *Niebuhr* can be shown to have failed in his attempts at extracting solid truth from legends, who is he that can possibly hope to succeed?

It may be proper, in the first place, to remind the reader of Niebuhr's pretensions. This should be done by one or two extracts from his great work. Thus, in vol. iii. p. 159 of his history, we find him speaking of his own laborious researches, 'by which he has brought into order the chaos of the early 'times of Rome.' And in the preface to his second volume he speaks as follows:—

'My sight grew dim in its passionate efforts to pierce into the obscurity of the subject; and unless I was to send forth an incomplete work, which sooner or later would have had to be wholly remodelled, I was compelled to wait for what time might gradually bring forth. Nor has he been niggardly, but, though slowly, has granted me one discovery after another.'

In another place he speaks of history which is critically treated proving much richer in facts than mere credulous repetition of tales; and again, elsewhere, he speaks of his own power of discerning truth amidst fictions bearing resemblance to that kind of divination or instinctive sense, which the Greeks expressed by *μαντεία*, *μαντεύομαι*.¹

This last assertion of Niebuhr's, though not remarkable for modesty, at least embodies a truth. Those who believe that he possessed a faculty of divination, will still be ready to accept the main conclusions resulting from his inquiries. They will assert with Arnold and other enthusiastic admirers, that natural gifts, sharpened by long practice, may enable one man to penetrate secrets in physical science, in philology, and in legendary history, which would always elude the observation of the average mass of students. We answer, with Sir G. C. Lewis, that all this may be perfectly true, and yet fall very far short of what is needed for the establishment of the Niebuhrian hypotheses. It *is* perfectly true that a Harvey may discover the circulation of the blood, or a Newton the laws of gravitation, from *data* which have been open to the rest of the world for long ages, but have never suggested such truths to the mind of

¹ Most of these passages are cited by Sir G. C. Lewis: but we would not have quoted them here were we not convinced that they give a fair idea of Niebuhr's position.

the ordinary observer. But, then, these great discoverers must be able to *prove* the accuracy of their results. Harvey and Newton effected this in such wise, as to satisfy all competent judges; and the scientific world at large admits the principles thus gained, as now no longer needing proof, but forming a solid basis, whereon to erect new superstructures. But can the same thing be said of the theories of Niebuhr? Müller investigates the history of the Etruscans; the information afforded him by ancient authors is precisely the same as that possessed by Niebuhr; nevertheless, he arrives at the most opposite conclusions. Dr. Ihne, in like manner, examines the constitutional questions connected with ancient Rome; his views differ very considerably from those of Niebuhr: most scholars allow that it is a fair battle, and many think that Ihne has the best of it. Professor Newman's little volume, already referred to in this article, is expressly written with a view of controverting the decisions of Niebuhr. Unlike the great discoveries of physical philosophers, the theories of Niebuhr are losing ground, instead of becoming, day by day, more firmly rooted and established. Is there not then good reason to suspect that this method of treating legendary history may in itself be radically wrong? Such is the view adopted in the work before us:—

'The main cause of the great multiplicity and wide divergence of opinions, which characterise the recent researches into early Roman history, is the defective method, which not only Niebuhr and his followers, but most of his opponents, have adopted. Instead of employing those tests of credibility which are consistently applied to modern history, they attempt to guide their judgment by the indications of internal evidence, and assume that the truth can be discovered by an occult faculty of historical divination.'—Vol. i. p. 13.

Let us take the famous combat of the Horatii and Curiatii. It is deficient in respect of external evidence, and bears the air of a romance. Triple births are indeed no impossibilities; as they seem to happen in this country in a proportion of one in perhaps 25,000 cases. But the murder of a sister by a brother is an almost unheard-of crime in Europe, or even in Asia; and on the whole it seems reasonable to regard the entire story as highly apocryphal; possibly true, but more probably a striking fiction.¹ Niebuhr, however, expects us to see in the three brethren, on either side, a symbol of three tribes. Now, why are we to believe this? Simply because Niebuhr has so ruled it. On the part of the disciples of these theorists, it is a belief, not in history, but in the *ipse dixit* of the discoverer; on the part of the theorists, it is a belief, not in history, but in themselves.

A like verdict must be passed upon the ethnological speculations, which rest upon a similar basis. Those who have toiled

¹ See Lewis, vol. i. p. 464.

through the chapters of Niebuhr, of O. Müller, or of Mr. Malden, in his History of Rome, concerning the ancient races of Italy, and laid them down in despair of attaining to any clear and definite ideas upon the subject, or of retaining in the memory the isolated gleams of fact which were apparent here and there, will surely read with delight the following spirited characterization of the processes employed.

'When we come to examine the evidence on which the ethnological theories of the majority of antiquarian researches are founded, our wonder at their wide, and indeed almost unlimited divergences, is at an end. No probability is too faint, no conjecture is too bold, no etymology is too uncertain, to resist the credulity of an antiquarian in search of evidence to support an ethnological hypothesis. Gods become men, kings become nations, one nation becomes another nation, opposites are interchanged, at a stroke of the wand of the historical magician. Centuries are to him as minutes; nor indeed is space itself of much account, when national affinities are in question. Chronology, as Niebuhr remarks in the passage quoted above [from Hist. of Rome, vol. i. p. 176], forms no part of such history; dates in such a context are misleading and deceptive. To ask for the ordinary securities of historical truth—determinate assignable witnesses whose credibility can be weighed and estimated—would be an impertinence; would imply an ignorance of the conditions of the problem, which are, that the events are antecedent to the period of regular history and contemporaneous registration.'—Vol. i. pp. 270, 271.

Niebuhr himself admits, as our author proceeds to observe, 'that unless some boldness of divination be allowable, all 'researches into the early history of nations must be abandoned.' For detailed proofs of his many inconsistencies in this, as in other parts of his investigation, we must refer the reader to the elaborate examination of Sir G. C. Lewis, simply specifying, as peculiarly forcible, the remarks contained in vol. i. pp. 9, 93, 98, 115, 143, 192, 196, and in vol. ii. pp. 90, 124—126, 149, with the notes attached to them. He allows the great merit of Niebuhr in explaining and illustrating the nature of the agrarian laws; though, even here, he thinks that the leading point (namely, their reference to public, not to private land,) had already been clearly pointed out by Heyne. It may be, that the checks placed upon tradition, as we have previously remarked, by the existence of actual laws and a constitutional régime, have rendered Niebuhr's task less hopeless in matters connected with government (as distinguished from accounts of foreign policy, &c.), than Sir G. C. Lewis is disposed to allow. It may be, that Niebuhr's rare sagacity could, amidst a multitude of guesses, hit the truth more frequently than might *à priori* have been imagined possible. But it is certainly no reply to the numerous and specific accusations contained in these volumes, to be told that the Dean of Christchurch still retains his respect and admiration for Niebuhr.

Dean Liddell is a great scholar, and there is scarcely a classical student in Great Britain, or America, but must lie under the deepest obligations to his lexicographical labours. But if his fellow-collegian's strictures upon Niebuhr are to be refuted, it must be by something more definite than this.

Leaving Niebuhr and Roman history, we again invite the patient reader to consider, whether it would really have been a hopeful toil for any man to have attempted the construction of a trustworthy account of Attila, from the varied and conflicting legends of which we have previously given a sketch. We would further request his careful attention to one or two of the *jeux d'esprit* which have been published in connexion with this mode of treating history which is supposed to be legendary; that he may thence form an opinion of the probability of its success, when applied to actual legends. For this is certainly a case to which the Horatian—

———'ridentem dicere verum
Quid vetat?'

is fairly applicable. If Archbishop Whately, in his well-known '*Historic Doubts*' showed, no less wittily than powerfully, the absurdity of a kind of scepticism, which, if carried out consistently, would compel us to reject, as fiction, the entire history, nay, the very existence of Napoleon Buonaparte; with scarcely less ability is the danger of trying to settle the exact limits of truth and falsity, in a compound of the two, exhibited in a more recent pamphlet upon the same subject. Probability, our chief guide, can avail us but little here. The just and famous maxim of our neighbours, '*Le vrai n'est pas toujours le vraisemblable*,' is capable of being read backwards: we may say with equal justice, '*Le vraisemblable n'est pas toujours le vrai*. In the case of the first Napoleon, for example, (and the remark might be extended to the lives of Louis Philippe, Napoleon III., and a hundred more,) many of the most patent facts of their career were antecedently well-nigh the most improbable, the most incredible things that could have occurred.' Or let the reader take the example given in Mr. H. Rogers's '*Eclipse of Faith*.' Therein he may see the selection of facts, made by a supposed critic, out of the mythical history of the event commonly known in England as the Papal Aggression of 1850. He may see how clearly it is proved, that the contradictory tendencies of two brothers, of the name of Newman, can only be regarded as symbols of the leanings of the *new men* of the generation referred to by the historian; how Cardinal Wiseman

¹ The pamphlet referred to, attributed to Professor Fitzgerald (or by some to Abp. Whately) was noticed by us on its appearance some three or four years since.

must needs represent a personified idea of the exclusive claims of Rome to the true wisdom; how Alderman Masterman is a mythical hero, embodying the characteristics of the class of *master men*, the leaders in the world of commerce; and, finally, how thoroughly the whole story is shown to be fallacious by the undoubted fact, that (long before the agitation consequent upon them is represented to have subsided) there was held in Hyde Park, in this season of alleged disturbance, a peaceful and most successful Exhibition of the Industry of All Nations. Or, once more, let the inquirer into these problems study the history of the composition of the tale of the 'Amber-Witch,' translated from the German by Lady Duff Gordon, and published in Mr. Murray's 'Home and Colonial Library.' In that instance, a pure fiction was subjected to the analysis of critics, who attempted to cull out the basis of facts contained in the narrative, and thus fell into the snare prepared for them by the ingenious author. These and similar instances appear to us to have, if an indirect, still a very real and important bearing upon this part of our subject. They will, if we mistake not, serve to deepen the distrust—in our opinion the well-merited distrust—which the works of Mr. Grote and Sir G. C. Lewis have already created with reference to the Niebuhrian mode of treating legendary history.

4. There remains, then, the plan of accepting legend simply as legend, admitting, wherever it is possible, its poetic beauty, or again, its ethical character; valuing highly the insight which it affords us into the genius of the races among whom it has obtained, and even into the history of the human mind at large, without making the attempt—so precarious, so questionable in point of utility—of extracting from it a substratum of facts, of marking out its boundaries of truth and fiction. Such is the course pursued, and defended with such remarkable power of argument and richness of illustration, by Mr. Grote; such is the course adopted in the main by Sir George Cornewall Lewis. The juxtaposition of a brief extract from their respective works will serve to show the practical identity of their views:—

Grote on the Siege of Troy.

'If we are asked whether it be not a legend embodying portions of historical matter and raised upon a basis of truth,—whether there may not really have occurred at the foot of the hill at Ilium a war purely human and political, without gods, without heroes, without Helen, without Amazons, without Ethiopians,

Lewis on the Foundation of Rome.

'The different foundation legends of Rome . . . are all mere frost-work; which on the first ray of critical investigation melt away and disappear, leaving behind them not a trace of solid and substantial fact. The whole is equally fictitious; there are no grains of corn in the chaff; no fragments of gold in the

under the beautiful son of Eôs, without the wooden horse, without the characteristic and expressive features of the old epical war,—like the mutilated trunk of Deiphobus in the under world—if we are asked whether there was not really some such historical Trojan war as this, our answer must be, that as the possibility of it cannot be denied, so neither can the reality of it be affirmed.—*History of Greece*, vol. i. p. 434.

sand; no process of historical chemistry can extract truth from any of the stories; their origin and acceptance as history may to a certain extent be explained, but the facts, such as really occurred, were not registered before they were forgotten, and having once passed into oblivion, they can never be recovered or reproduced. . . . It is indeed impossible, with our means of information, to form a well-grounded opinion upon the origin of the received story of Romulus, and to assert that no part of it is true. It is however possible to maintain with confidence the position, that a person holding this story to have been formed, centuries after the time of the alleged events, from legendary materials and oral relations, is not entitled to select certain points from the aggregate, upon mere grounds of apparent internal credibility, and to treat them as historical.—*Inquiry*, &c. vol. i. pp. 405, 439.

It may seem strange, at first sight, that we should recommend, as the safer and more trustworthy, a procedure which is more destructive than even that of Niebuhr. But if the belief of Niebuhrians be, as we maintain, simply an intense faith in their own ingenuity, then it is surely in every way better to confess our ignorance, than to parade a show of belief in what may so often prove the most unsubstantial of all possible figments, a finely-woven, self-spun theory. We are not, however, unaware of the existence of difficulties even in this method of handling legends. One we hasten to state, the rather that we fancy that it has been strangely overlooked by the leading contributors to the discussion. We allude to the real and serious difficulty of remaining in this negative state of mind. There are, indeed, two cases in which it is very possible so to remain. The one is, where the question is of such a nature that we do not feel the slightest interest in its solution. Such is that somewhere given by Mr. Grote, by way of illustration, when he compares the inquiries concerning the amount of fact embodied in a legend, to the question whether, on the day of the battle of Plataea, rain fell upon the place where New York now stands. It is curious to observe that Sir G. C. Lewis's examples of *his* position are of a very different character. 'The task which they [the Niebuhrians] have undertaken resembles an inquiry into the 'internal structure of the earth, or into the question whether

'the stars are inhabited' (vol. i. p. 13). Now, both of these problems excite in many minds a lively interest. The latter has, we know, been warmly discussed within the last few years by such men as Dr. Whewell, Sir D. Brewster, M. Babinet, and a host of minor celebrities; and if it be mentioned in any company of highly-educated persons, a manifest leaning towards one of the mooted views will probably be apparent in the majority of those present, and pure indifferentism prove quite in the minority. A second case, in which the mind may likewise be willing to acquiesce in a passive regardlessness, is that wherein the creations of the highest order of genius are brought before us. King Lear and Hamlet, Juliet and Imogen—we scarcely care to ask whether or not their names can be found in the records of authentic history. And even now the summer tourist, who visits Loch Katrine and the Trosachs, may find writers of hand-books, or may listen to guides, who speak of all the characters and events in the 'Lady of the Lake' as equally historic and real; who specify the point whence Fitz-James swam and Helen gazed, and track the path of Roderick Dhu when accompanying his disguised Sovereign. If there be a possibility of minstrelsy being received as history in the broad daylight of an age of railways, and steam-boats, and electric telegraphs, what must have been its chance in the twilight of the infant states of Greece, or Hungary, or Britain? Doubtless the entire lay was accepted *en masse*. And this seems to us a real reply to Colonel Mure, M. Ampère, and the *Quarterly Reviewers* of Mr. Grote's first volumes, who argue as if the leading characters in a popular poem must, of necessity, be historical. The majority of heroes and heroines may possibly be so; but we cannot admit the universality of the rule.

How far the upholders of this mode of treating legend are consistent, we must not stay to argue. One principle, however, we venture to assert; and that is, that in all cases of legend where neutrality of opinion appears impossible, *it is safer and wiser to incline towards the side of belief*. We may indulge such a feeling without placing legend on a level with history, and without pretending to cull out particular facts from amidst the poetry. Such would be our sentiments with regard to 'the tale of Troy divine.'

Meanwhile, let us thankfully acknowledge the exquisite beauty of many legendary narratives, and the undying truth which they enshrine, as testimonies of so much of nobleness that still abides even in man's unregenerate heart, and which has as often been displayed in real life as in poetry and fiction. Be Pylades and Orestes historic characters or creations of fancy, the idea of their heroic friendship still sheds a ray of golden

light upon that theatre of reiterated strife and war, the Tauric Chersonese. The heroes of the Iliad, and Romulus and Numa, Mucius and Clælia, must enjoy an imperishable fame while earth shall last; King Arthur and his knights still live; and we can listen, in no coldly critical spirit, to the latest appeal of poesy which summons our attention to a legend.

'Ye whose hearts are fresh and simple,
Who have faith in God and Nature,
Who believe, that in all ages
Every human heart is human;
That in even savage bosoms
There are longings, yearnings, strivings,
For the good they comprehend not,
That the feeble hand and helpless,
Groping blindly in the darkness,
Touch God's right hand in that darkness,
And are lifted up and strengthen'd;—
Listen to this simple story,
To this song of Hiawatha.'

We have been trying to set forth and illustrate the following leading 'Canons of Historic Credibility:—

1. That the record must be a genuine and authentic production.
2. That regard must be had to the intention of the author.
3. That we must inquire whether the original authorities are contemporary with the events related.
4. That we must examine their means of information and probable prejudices.
5. That particular caution is needed in such parts as relate to the assignment of motives.
6. That, where it is possible, comparison should be instituted between the contemporary record of events, and the forms they have assumed in subsequent legend.
7. That a clear and firm line of demarcation must be drawn between history, which rests upon contemporaneous written evidence, and that which is not traceable to such testimony.
8. That the attempt to extract the supposed facts from mythical history is dangerous and untrustworthy.
9. That moral truth may be gleaned from many narratives, which we cannot trust for truth of fact.

We need scarcely say that nothing which has here been asserted has the slightest reference to such history as is written by Inspired Penmen. He who made man can dictate to an Isaiah the history of ages yet unborn; or reveal to a Moses the events of centuries that have passed away, either by teaching him to discern the true from the false in old traditions and records, or by special and direct communication from on high. Of the

impiety (far more subtle and perilous than a positive rejection) which would apply the Niebuhrian process to the Old Testament, nothing need be said by those who believe *that* process to fail even in matters of secular history. We feel grateful to the thinkers who have brought forward what seem to us far sounder theories. Such aid, often unintentionally given, is constantly coming to the support of holy Truth. But let us not be impatient, if the answer to each fresh cavil does not appear immediately. He who is Himself the truth (to adopt a sublime thought from Origen¹) stood in silence before his accusers; and still for ever, while evil dwells with men, is false witness continually borne against Him, and oftentimes He maketh no reply by word of mouth, but answers only by the lives of his true disciples. Wait we then His good time for triumph over every fresh assault of unbelief. *Non semper pendebit inter latrones Christus; resurget aliquando crucifixa Veritas.*

¹ Cont. Cels. Præfat.

ART. III.—1. *The Statutes of "God's Gift College" in Dulwich.* Hansard. 1853.

2. *Heads of Proposed Scheme for Dulwich College.* Issued by the Commissioners for Charities. 1854.

DULWICH is no longer the obscure and unfrequented hamlet it used to be some very few years ago. Report had long spoken of it as one of the prettiest spots within many miles of the metropolis; but it was scarcely known to any but the inhabitants of the village and its immediate neighbourhood, and to the few stray tourists and votaries of the arts, who, within the last forty or fifty years, during the summer months, have been drawn thither by the attractions of the Bourgeois collection of pictures possessed by the College. The road to Dulwich, in fact, led to nothing beyond it. Even within the memory of persons now living who have not long passed the meridian of life, there was no road, only a footpath, which in winter was muddy and impassable, between the southern extremity of the village and the rising grounds of Norwood, which bound the view on that side. Literally, therefore, the Dulwich-road was an avenue of the Dulwich estate, which led only to the College, the mansion of the lords of the manor, and to the houses of their tenants which surround it. There was no need in those days for the College authorities (or whoever did it) to place the inscription, "Siste, Viator," "Stop, traveller, and refresh yourself," on the stone¹ which, until very recently, stood at the gate of the College: the traveller was obliged to stop, whether he refreshed himself or not; there was no thoroughfare; his only way was back again whence he came. Nobody, in fact, had a chance of becoming acquainted with Dulwich except by a journey undertaken for the express purpose; and although the hamlet is scarcely further from the city than Belgravia is, it was, until a very few years since, as unfrequented as any remote country village could well be.

Circumstances have entirely changed this state of things. In the first place, the College itself prepared the way for better acquaintance with the metropolis by the formation of excellent roads, which now branch off in various directions—two of them

¹ The story respecting this stone is, that it gave a *bond fide* invitation to any one who liked to accept of it to enter and partake of the hospitality of the College. For many years past, however, it has presented its back to the traveller, and has served only to tell him the length of his journey from town. Within the last year the stone has been moved from its original position to the road-side, where it now forms an ordinary mile-stone.

towards Norwood—and by the improvement of those which had previously existed. In consequence of these changes, the road through Dulwich became the shortest route to the City from Upper Norwood—a favourite place of residence with business men—as well as from certain parts of Lower Norwood, where the tide of population has been rapidly rising for some time past:—in short, from the whole of that amphitheatre of hilly ground which overlooks Dulwich from the south; and the establishment of traffic, and of *omnibus* conveyance through the village were the results. Dulwich was fairly opened up.

Then came the erection of the Sydenham Palace; and the once secluded Dulwich was immediately converted into a great thoroughfare, daily thronged by the crowds who wend their way to the attractions of that gigantic undertaking. And now the College came into view. Familiarity with the village naturally led to inquiry about the College. What was the object of it? asked the practical man. Was it rich? what use did it make of its money? inquired the Spirit of Commerce. These inquiries did not tend to raise the College in the estimation of what the newspapers term the 'general public.' It is, in fact, precisely one of those institutions which, on half emerging from obscurity, was likely to give a shock to the practical and commercial English mind, and to bring down a storm of public indignation on its head. Discovered to be immensely rich, it seemed to do nothing, or next to nothing, for the money. The picture which it presented, at the first view, was that of a wealthy, sleek, comfortable, antiquated, and useless asylum, the inmates of which, having nothing else to do, had fattened themselves on their own exuberant charities and had gone to sleep. What, it was asked, was the use of such an institution? Ought it not to be swept away, and the money with which it gorged itself be applied to some useful purpose? 'The income of Dulwich College,' writes the 'Times,' echoing the public clamour, 'is already 9,000*l.* a-year, and is soon to be 13,000*l.* a-year. How much more it will be, no man can say. 'What shall we do with this?'

But the question of the *future* of Dulwich College, though it has been popularized and rendered familiar to everybody by recent accidental circumstances and by the newspapers, is by no means a new one. In fact, it is a very old one, which, in some shape or other, has always existed since the founder's death. It has been raised, has died away, been smoothed over, postponed and raised again, to be again postponed without any real settlement. Of course we do not mean to say that it has ever been a question whether—as the Charity Commissioners, backed by popular clamour, now propose—the corporation of

Dulwich College should be dissolved, extinguished, and wiped out, and its funds appropriated by the Government for new purposes of education and charity: that is quite a modern idea. Nobody, until the other day, dreamed of asking the question put by the 'Times' newspaper, 'What shall we do with this 9,000*l.* a-year?' because the reply was obvious. We cannot do anything with it; it does not belong to us. It belongs to the corporation of Dulwich College. We might just as well ask (and indeed some people have already whispered the question) what we shall do with the funds of the Goldsmiths' Company, or the Fishmongers', or the Grocers', or any other of the City corporations? If, indeed, it should turn out that the members of the Dulwich corporation are trustees in respect to a certain portion of their funds for charitable purposes, the Charity Commissioners would then so far, we presume, have a right to interfere; but there is no doubt whatever that the bulk of the College property, that is to say, the whole of the original endowment, is held by the corporation in fee simple, and can therefore be touched only by the introduction of a principle of legislation of the most dangerous and sweeping description. No such question as this has ever been entertained until now. The question which has been agitated from the beginning has related to the legal power of the corporation to carry into effect the scheme of the founder, as it is detailed in the statutes of the College promulgated by him a few weeks before his death. In point of fact, that scheme as a whole has never been acted upon: the governing members of the corporation having always assumed, on the strength of certain *quasi* legal decisions, though their proceedings have scarcely ever been consistent with the assumption, that they had no power to appropriate their funds to any purposes not specially defined in the letters patent and the deed of incorporation. The funds accordingly have accumulated, and the purposes of the founder have remained unaccomplished. Dulwich College, in short, from the date of its founder's death, has been leading a sort of paralytic existence,—its powers crippled, its form but the shadow of its proper self; and although, from time to time, efforts have been made, both by the College itself, and by those external to it, to whom the statutes give a right to assist in its government, to throw off this lethargy, those efforts have proved ineffectual; and this, as it appears to us, because the main question in dispute has never been fairly brought to a legal issue.

But before proceeding further, it will be necessary to give some account of the College, of the nature of its foundation, and of the purposes which the founder intended it should accomplish.

The founder, Edward Alleyn, an actor of great repute, the friend of Shakspeare and Ben Jonson, and termed by old Fuller 'the Roscius of our age,' obtained letters patent¹ from King James the First in 1619, by which licence was granted to him to found a College in Dulwich for the 'relief, sustenance, and maintenance of poor men, women, and children, and for the education and instruction of the said poor children.' The College was to consist of 'one master, one warden, four fellows, six poor brethren, six poor sisters, and twelve poor scholars,' who were 'to be maintained, sustained, educated, guided, governed, and ruled according to such ordinance, statute, and foundation,' as the founder, to whom licence was granted for that end, should by himself during his life, or by any other person or persons after his death, specially appointed by him during his life under his hand and seal, should ordain. 'Full power and ample authority' were given to him or his nominees to ordain, make, create, establish, and found ordinances, rules, constitutions, and statutes for the more better and orderly maintenance, sustenance, education, instruction, guiding, government, and rule of the master, warden, four fellows, six poor brethren, six poor sisters, and twelve poor scholars 'of the College, when and as often as need shall require.' These members of the College, poor scholars included, were to be 'in deed and name one body corporate and politic and one perpetual commonalty, and to have perpetual succession for ever to endure,' having a common seal, and liberty to sue and be sued, to plead and be impleaded by and under the name of the master, warden, &c. of the 'College of God's Gift' in Dulwich. The members of the College were to have 'especial licence, and free and lawful liberty, power and autho-

¹ T. Nash, in his 'Pierce Pennyless; his Supplication to the Devil,' 1592, says, 'Not Roscius nor Æsop, those tragedians admyred before Christ was borne, could ever performe more in action than famous Ned Allen.'

² 'Alleyn,' says Mr. Collier ('Memoirs of Edward Alleyn'), 'did not accomplish this great object of his life without much difficulty, for he had to encounter and overcome the opposition of Lord Chancellor Bacon.' The grounds of Lord Bacon's opposition are given by him in a letter to the Marquis of Buckingham, in which he explains his reason why he had 'stayed the patent at the great seal.' 'I now write,' says he, 'to give the King an account of a patent I have stayed at the seal; it is of licence to give in mortmain 800*l.* land, though it be of tenure in chief, to Allen that was the player, for an hospital. I like well that Alleyn playeth the last act of his life so well; but if his Majesty give way thus to amortize his tenures, the Court of Wards will decay. . . . But that which moved me chiefly is that his Majesty now lately did absolutely deny Sir Henry Saville for 200*l.* and Sir Edward Sandys for 100*l.* to the perpetuating of two lectures, the one in Oxford, the other in Cambridge, foundations of singular honour to his Majesty, of which there is great want: whereas hospitals abound, and beggars abound never a whit less.' He then proposes that the 800*l.* should be reduced to 500*l.*, if the King consented to Alleyn's request, and that the remainder should go to the Universities. Bacon proposed to deal in similar fashion with Sutton's foundation at the Charter-House.

'rity, to get, purchase, receive, and take to them and their 'successors for ever,' for their 'maintenance, sustentation, and 'relief, of and from Edward Alleyn, his heirs and assigns,' the manor of Dulwich, and the other lands purchased by Alleyn and devoted to the use of the College.

The Archbishop of Canterbury for the time being, in all succeeding times to come, is 'for ever to be visitor of the 'College, and to have full power and lawful authority the 'same College, and the persons therein being, to visit, order, and 'punish according to the ecclesiastical laws and constitutions 'of the realm of England, and according to such laws, constitutions, and ordinances as shall be made, ordained, and constituted by Edward Alleyn in his life-time, or after his death, 'by any person or persons nominated by him during his life; 'always provided, that such laws, constitutions, and ordinances 'shall not be repugnant to the Royal prerogative, the laws and 'statutes of the realm, nor the ecclesiastical laws, canons, and 'constitutions of the Church of England.'

In the same year, 1619, Alleyn signed the deed of foundation of the College, in which he recites the particulars mentioned in the letters patent, and directs that one copy of the deed should be kept in the common chest of the College, another in the vestry of S. Botolph's, Bishopsgate; a third in the vestry of S. Saviour's, Southwark; and a fourth in the vestry of S. Giles, Cripplegate (now S. Luke); a provision which it is important to notice as evidence that at this early period he had in view—and, in fact, that he contemplated from the very outset—the connexion which he afterwards established by the statutes between the College and those parishes, and which has proved so fertile a source of dispute and litigation.

The letters patent, it will have been observed, are dated 1619. The chapel of the future College, however, had not only been erected by Alleyn, but consecrated by Archbishop Abbot, under the title of 'Christ's Chapel, in the hamlet of Dulwich,' as early as 1616; and, which is singular, has a *quasi*-parochial character assigned to it. The deed of consecration is given in Wilkins, Conc. iv. pp. 455-459. After rehearsing that Edward Alleyn had erected and fitted up a chapel in his home at Dulwich, *which home he intended*, with the leave of the king, *to convert into a College for the poor*, and had set out and enclosed a plot of ground in the neighbourhood as a burial-place for the *inhabitants of the hamlet*; and that, *in his own name, and that of the inhabitants of the hamlet*, he had presented a petition to the Archbishop, praying that his Grace would be pleased to consecrate the same:—the deed proceeds to describe the consecration, from which it appears that the chapel was duly consecrated for the

performance of Divine service. 'Divino cultui,' runs the deed, *divinorum officiorum celebrationi ac tam ad sacramenta canonice dominice ac baptismatis sacri in eadem ministranda quam ad matrimonia inibi solemnizanda, divinas preces Deo fundendas et verbum Dei purè et sincerè predicandum ac ad mortuos precipue infra Domum et predictam hamletam decedentes* 'in capella predicta sepeliendos, ac cetera sacramentalia inibi exequenda et exercenda in Dei honorem, ac pro salute animarum et usu predicti Ed. Alleyn ejusque familiæ, ac præfecti, magistri, sive gubernatoris domûs prædictæ pro tempore existentis omniumque inhabitantium nunc et in futurum in eadem domo et hamleta de Dulwich prædicta.' A reservation is then made in favour of the rights and privileges of the parish church of Camberwell; and a proviso that Alleyn, or the Master, or Governor of the future College for the time being, shall find a fit presbyter for the service of the chapel, who shall be licensed by the ordinary for the time being, and whom Alleyn and his successors shall feed and maintain, and give to him an annual stipend of not less than twenty marks.

From these extracts, it is evident that 'Christ's Chapel, in the hamlet of Dulwich,' was intended to be what is termed a parochial chapel, which Lyndwood defines to be a chapel 'ubi Parochianis deservitur de Ecclesiasticis Sacramentis et sacramentalibus, sic quod non teneantur accedere ad Ecclesiam majorem pro divinis audiendis vel recipiendis Sacramentis et habent ad hoc Sacerdotem specialiter limitatum.' It was not, therefore, a chapel of ease, which has no font, and is designed only for the ease of the parishioners in prayers and preachings—sacraments and burials, being received and performed at the parish church; nor was it merely the private chapel of a college.¹

Alleyn appears to have been very deliberate in the preparation of the statutes and ordinances for the College, which the letters patent reserved power to him to 'make, order, constitute, and establish.' They were not completed by him until

¹ It may be here stated, as a proof of the loose manner in which the affairs of the College have been conducted, that so far as records go, there is no evidence of the granting of a licence by the ordinary to the first or Preacher-fellow, (as he is termed,) for the performance of the duties defined in the deed of consecration, and repeated in the statutes of the founder, though those duties have, in point of fact, always been performed by one or other of the Fellows, who are all of them to be Clergymen in holy orders. In the course of last year, a deputation of the inhabitants of Dulwich had an interview with the Bishop of Winchester, for the purpose of directing his Lordship's attention to the anomalous position of Dulwich, and of ascertaining his views as to the desirableness of forming Dulwich into a parish or district for ecclesiastical purposes. The Bishop replied, that he had never examined minutely into the position that the hamlet of Dulwich bore relative to himself; and that the College had a Visitor of its own, and was therefore in a manner extra-parochial—a statement which is clearly untenable.

Sept. 1626, shortly before his death; and it is owing to a supposed discrepancy between the constitution of the College as it is defined by the statutes, and its constitution as it is given in the letters patent and deed of foundation, that the controversies and litigation, which have been adverted to, have arisen. The letters patent gave to Alleyn power while he lived, or after his death to any person or persons nominated by him during his life, 'to make, ordain, constitute, and establish statutes, ordinances, constitutions, and rules for the good and better maintenance, relief, education, government, and ordering'—1st. Of the College; 2d. The members of the corporation; 3d. Of the lands and endowments given to them; and 4th. Of the rents, issues, revenues, and profits of the same. These statutes, &c. to stand for ever, 'and in all succeeding times be and remain inviolable and in full force and strength in law, to all constructions, intents, and purposes,' provided they were not repugnant to the Royal prerogative, and the laws, civil and ecclesiastical, of England.

No persons, it will be observed, are mentioned as sharing in the privileges and endowments of the College but the thirty members of the corporation. The letters patent, while they briefly state that the College is to be for the maintenance of poor men, women, and children, and for the education of the children, give us no hint whatever as to the precise manner in which these objects were to be accomplished. Who was to teach the children? How were the funds of the College, derived from lands of which the members of the corporation are freeholders, to be specially disposed of? Are the master, warden, and four fellows to be reckoned among the poor men for whose maintenance the College was founded? To the solution of these questions the letters patent afford no clue. It is at all events certain that Alleyn considered himself at liberty to make such statutes, as well for the internal economy and government of the College as for the education of the poor children, and the special disposal of the funds of the corporation, as should impart to the College the peculiar character which he designed to impress upon it. Now, let us see what kind of institution the founder intended his College to be.

In the first place, it was to be a charity for the maintenance of the poor. Six poor men and six poor women were to be members of the corporation, and to reside in apartments provided for them in the College. Thirty poor men and women were to be elected as candidates for the vacancies occurring among the poor brethren and sisters of the corporation, and, receiving certain half-yearly gratuities, were to reside in the almshouses erected by Alleyn and his executors in the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Saviour, and S. Giles.

Secondly, it was to be a school for the education of the young. The school—which was to consist of not more than eighty pupils at one time, of whom twelve, who were to be orphans or the children of poor people, were to be on the foundation—was to take Westminster or S. Paul's School as its model. The foundation scholars were to be maintained and educated by the College till they reached the age of eighteen; at which time they were, according to their several capacities, to be either sent to the Universities, or to be 'set and put to good 'and sweet trades and occupations, as near as may be, and to 'persons of good credit and sufficiency.' Any of the poor scholars sent to the Universities who had proceeded to be Bachelor or Master of Arts, was to be eligible, without a vote, to a vacant fellowship in the College. Children of parents residing in Dulwich, were to have the privilege of education in the College School for a nominal fee; children from other parts, at such a fee as the Master and Warden of the College should fix.

Thirdly, it was to be a religious house, in which particular regard was to be had to the daily celebration of Divine service in the chapel. The service was 'to be daily read and sung 'in such manner and form, as near as may be, as is usually 'observed in the King's Chapel, or in the collegiate church of 'S. Peter's, Westminster;' and particular regard was accordingly to be had to the cultivation of music by all the inmates of the College.

And, lastly, it was to be, in general, governed by the Master, or in his absence by the Warden, according to the statutes: in special cases by a majority of the votes of the Master, Warden, and Fellows; and in certain particulars by these, with the assistance of the churchwardens of the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Saviour, and S. Giles; the Archbishop of Canterbury for the time being acting as Visitor, and having full powers to enforce obedience to the statutes.

This general idea of the College, and of the machinery by which it was to be developed, will be evinced by reference to the statutes themselves.

After stating that the College was for ever to consist of the members of the corporation defined in the letters patent, the founder proceeds:—

'2. For the better furtherance of the honour and service of Almighty God, and for the good and welfare of the said College, I ordain and for ever establish, for all succeeding times to come, that there shall be continually *six* *chanters* for music and singing in the chapel of the said College . . . *six* *assistants* touching the ordering of the said College, and the rent and revenues thereof; and *thirty members*;—the said chanters, assistants, and members, to be employed and taken to such uses, intents, and purposes, as hereafter in these my orders and statutes I shall further direct and appoint.'

This being premised, he proceeds to define the qualifications

duties, and privileges, as well of the members of the corporation as of the chanters, assistants, and out-pensioners of the College. 'The Master,' he says (Art. 30), 'shall be the chiefest person in the said College. . . . He shall govern all the persons thereof, and admonish, correct, and punish them according to the statutes;' and so on. 'The Warden shall' (Art. 31) receive and take the rents, issues, and profits belonging to the said College, and pay, disburse, and defray all the rents, pensions, and all other payments which are to be made by the said College for the use and maintenance thereof, to *'all persons in any sort thereto belonging.'* He is also to act for the Master during his absence, sickness, or infirmity; the Master doing the like for the Warden in case of his absence or sickness.¹

Of the four fellows of the corporation, two are to 'be in degrees, at least Masters of Arts of either of the Universities, Oxford or Cambridge, *preachers*;' the other two, 'Graduates and Divines: the first of them to be an *approved schoolmaster*, the second to be a sufficient scholar to be *usher of the school.*'

The two preacher-fellows are to

'preach two sermons every Sunday, one in the forenoon and the other in the afternoon, and one sermon on the first of September,' (*Alleyn's birthday, and the anniversary of the consecration of the chapel,*) 'another on the Nativity of our Lord God; and on the several days set down, they shall also daily (as likewise all the fellows) attend (but on Sundays and holidays, Saturdays in the afternoon, and all holiday eves, in their surplices) the Master and Warden to the Chapel, and there continue during the whole service time, and they shall sing their parts in the quire: and if the third and fourth fellows (*who by the subsequent statute are to read prayers*) be absent both together, then they shall perform all ministerial duties in the chapel: the senior of them two shall keep the register book for christenings, weddings, and burials, and both of them shall do all offices belonging to their ministry, as celebrating the sacraments, wed, bury, christen, and visit the sick within² the said College; and if they be absent, then the third and fourth fellows shall perform the same.' (Art. 33.)

The third fellow is to be—

'Master of the school, and the fourth, Usher (who shall be obedient to the Master): both of them shall sing their parts in the quire, and shall have a special care for the good and virtuous instruction and education of the scholars committed to their charge; and they shall *alternis vicibus* read prayers weekly in the chapel.'

'The Master and Usher (Art. 65) of the school, and the two

¹ Both the Master and Warden are to bear the name of Alleyn, or as it is now spelt, Allen: a provision for the perpetuation of his name which the founder had every right to make. Still, looking to the future, it must be admitted that this restriction may prove an inconvenient one. Would it not be sufficient if the Master and Warden, if not bearing the name of Allen, were on their election to assume that name by the Queen's permission?

² 'Within' here evidently means 'within the bounds of the College, i. e. including the hamlet of Dulwich,' not within its walls. Marriages and baptisms could hardly be esteemed probable duties of clergymen in a college the members of which were bound to celibacy.

'Masters of Music,' (of whom presently) 'are to teach the twelve poor scholars in good and sound learning, writing, reading, grammar, music, and good manners, and are to admit no scholar (*i. e.* besides the foundation scholars), 'nor put any out, but with the consent of the Master or Warden of the College for the time being; and are not, in regard of other scholars being taught in the school, to neglect the twelve poor scholars; but it shall be their principal and especial care to teach and instruct them with all care and diligence.' They are besides 'freely, without recompense or reward, to teach and instruct the children of the inhabitants of Dulwich in writing and grammar.' It appears by subsequent statutes that the instruction of these children was not to be in writing and grammar exclusively. They were to pay two shillings for admission, sixpence a quarter to the schoolmaster, and to give a pound of candles at Michaelmas for the use of the school. Other children, whose parents were not inhabitants of Dulwich, were to pay the schoolmaster and usher 'such allowance' as the Master and Warden should appoint; and the number of pupils, including the twelve poor scholars, was not to exceed eighty at any one time.

The Master and Usher of the school are 'to teach and instruct the scholars thereof according to the rules and precepts of the grammar allowed in England, and to teach and instruct in such other books as are commanded by public authority, and are usually taught in the free grammar schools of Westminster and Paul's.'

The scholars of the highest form are to be taken yearly to Westminster School or the Merchant Tailors' School in London, 'to hear and see the orations and exercises used and uttered by the scholars of those schools, on election days, to the end they may observe and mark the manner and form thereof.'

Of the chanters—(who, he says, are to be called and esteemed as junior fellows, and to have a vote according to the statutes in certain cases, with the fellows of the corporation, whom he terms the senior fellows)—of the chanters,—

'Two are to be men of approved skill in music, to sound the organ in the chapel and sing their parts in the quire, and shall prick all such services and anthems as the Master shall command for the use of the chapel into fair books, and also all other songs and musics for the private or public use of the College, both for viols and voices, and those they shall keep fair, and at their departure leave them to the College; and they shall teach the poor scholars to sing prick song, and to play upon the viols, virginals, organs, and other instruments, as they shall be found capable; and to teach and direct any other person or persons of the College that are to sing their parts in the Chapel, or any other whom the Master, Warden, and two senior fellows, *i. e.* fellows of the corporation, shall think fit.'

'The other four of the chanters, *alias* junior fellows, are to be singers in the chapel, and persons well skilled and exercised in prick song.' (Figured music.

Then follows a curious provision, which, however, in the view of any enlarged scheme of education for the College which may be proposed, offers, as we shall see, a hint as to the practical character which part of it ought to possess. Besides their skill in music, and their office as choristers, these four chanters are to be men of handicraft pursuits, who may be employed by the College in their crafts for its general good, if the Master, Warden, and senior fellows think it advisable; but whose statutory duty, in addition to singing in the chapel, is 'every day in the 'afternoon to teach and instruct, in their several manufactures, such 'and so many of the poor scholars as shall be found unfit for the 'University.' (Art. 35.)

The assistants, who are to be the two churchwardens of S. Botolph's, Bishopsgate, the two churchwardens of S. Saviour's, Southwark, and the two churchwardens of S. Giles, Cripplegate (S. Luke's), for the time being, are to repair to the College twice a year, to 'hear and see the audit, and view the 'accounts of the Warden and others . . . and also to be present when the Master and Warden are to be elected and sworn.'

The oath taken by the assistants on their admission is as follows:—

'You, A. B., churchwarden of the parish, &c., who are now admitted to be one of the assistants of this College of God's Gift in Dulwich, in the county of Surrey, do swear that you, for your part, shall not willingly or wittingly give consent at any time hereafter to the breaking or alteration of the foundation of this College, or of any ordinance or statute made concerning the same or the government thereof, but, so well as you may, see them truly kept and performed; and that you shall not consent, grant, or agree to the alienation, sale, or putting away any of the lands, tenements, rents, profits, goods, or other things that do belong or appertain, or shall hereafter belong or appertain, to the said College, *nor take of the said profits thereof, than what by the founder of this College has given or allowed to you*; and that you shall not do or consent to the doing of any act, acts, thing or things, to your knowledge which shall or may in any sort disturb, hinder, prejudice, or damage the College; all which you shall swear,' &c.

The poor scholars are—

'To be at the time of their election and admission, between the age of six and eight years, *or thereabouts*, and to remain as scholars in the College no longer but until they be eighteen years *at most*, and then, at the charge of the College, to be put forth either for scholars or trades, as their capacity will fit; all of them at the time of their admission to be *orphans*, without father and mother, or at least such as their parents receive the weekly alms of the parish where they live, or for want of such, any other poor children of the said parishes, such as the assistants of the parish shall think in most need.'

Nine of the poor scholars are to be elected from the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Saviour, and S. Giles—three from each of them,—the remaining three from the parish of Camberwell, preference being given to the lordship of Dulwich. Those of the poor scholars who have attained the age of eighteen years, and are judged fit for the University, (the number, however, so sent

being fixed at neither more nor less than four at any one time,) are to be maintained there for eight years at the expense of the College, and receive such a quarterly allowance as shall be thought sufficient during that time, unless they should obtain preferment before the eight years have expired, in which case their pensions are to cease. They are, besides, to receive gratuities on taking degrees; and if any of them are duly qualified, they are to have the privilege of admission to a vacant fellowship in Dulwich College, without the customary form of election.

The school, it will have been noticed, was to consist of three classes of pupils,—1st. The twelve corporation scholars; 2nd. Children of parents residing in Dulwich; and 3rd. Children from other parts—‘town or foreign scholars,’ as the statutes call them. It would appear, from entries in Alleyn’s diary, that these foreign or town scholars were allowed, if their parents or friends desired it, to be boarded in the College. The entries are the following:—

15th June, 1620.—‘Mem. That Mr. Rogers sent this daye his three sones att boord and schooling for 12li. per Ann. a piece.’

And under date, 12th Sept. of the same year:—

‘This daye Mr. Woodward’s sone came to sojorne and be taught here at 20li. per Ann.’

Mr. Payne Collier, from whose ‘Memoirs of Ed. Alleyn’ these extracts are taken, notices the fact that boys were at that time ‘taken into the College to be boarded and educated:’ ‘but whether,’ he says, ‘the sums paid on this account went to the Master and Usher of the school, or to increase the general funds of the College, must be left to conjecture.’ This, however, is scarcely correct. In the first place, the 69th statute directs that the friends of the town and foreign scholars shall pay the schoolmaster and usher such allowance as the Master and Warden shall appoint. And, secondly, the next statute ordains that ‘all benefits, accruing to the College by reason of any town or foreign scholars, shall be continually divided into three parts, whereof the Master of the school shall have two parts, and the Usher one part; the charge of pens, ink, and paper, for the poor scholars, being first deducted.’

It is obvious from this that there were to be other ‘benefits accruing to the College by reason of the town and foreign scholars,’ besides the allowance to be paid for their instruction, referred to in the previous statute. But the very next statute settles the point. The two music-masters (the first and second chanter-fellows) are to teach any scholars ‘who desire to learn their music and song,’ and are to ‘receive such reward as the

¹ According to Mr. Collier’s estimate, these sums of £12 and £20 correspond to about £60 and £100 of money of our days.

‘Master and Warden for the time being shall appoint, the benefit of which or any otherwise accruing to the said two music-masters shall be equally divided between them, the charge of strings, pens, ink, and paper, *i.e.* for the poor scholars, deducted.’

It is clear from the fact that ‘foreign scholars’ were boarded and educated in the College during Alleyn’s lifetime, that the practice was contemplated by him as part of the College system; but indeed it is authorized by the statutes. There are four statutes which relate to ‘Lodgings in the College.’ The first (97) prescribes the lodgings of the Master, Warden, senior and junior fellows, poor brethren and sisters, poor scholars, and the servants. The next states that ‘all pensioners and commoners in the College shall be lodged at the discretion and appointment of the Master and Warden of the College.’ The next, ‘that it shall not be lawful for any person to lodge any person in the College without the consent or leave of the Master for the time being.’ The conclusion to be drawn from these statutes is obvious. They contemplate the lodging of pensioners and commoners in the College, who are neither members of the corporation, nor persons employed by the College, such as the chanter and servants. Who are these pensioners and commoners? They are not the thirty out-members, for their lodgings were to be in the almshouses, and they were only to come to the College four times a-year to receive their allowances. According to the modern acceptation of the word, ‘a pensioner’ is one who receives a pension or yearly allowance without an equivalent: and in this sense only the more recent dictionaries understand it. But it also signifies the very reverse, *viz.* one who pays a pension or periodical allowance for an equivalent. In French *pension* signifies a boarding-house, a school, the board paid, a pension, an annuity. So *pensionnaire* signifies boarder; and *pensionnat* a boarding-school, the boarder’s room in a college. The sums annually paid by the members of Gray’s Inn to the house are termed *pensions*; and Kersey (‘Dictionary of Law and other Technical Terms’) gives as one meaning of the word *pensioner*, ‘a scholar who pays for his commons.’ It is pretty clear, therefore, that the words ‘pensioners and commoners in the College’ mean simply the scholars boarded in the College; and the statutes accordingly direct—1st. That none are to be boarded without the Master’s consent; and 2nd. That, if admitted, they are to be lodged only where the Master and Warden shall appoint. All doubt, however, is set at rest by a passage in the 69th statute, which orders that ‘if there be any contagious or infectious sickness in Dulwich, it shall be lawful . . . to omit the public

'teaching of the said school of the inhabitants of Dulwich, and 'such other foreign scholars as do not lodge within the said College.'

If, then, we bear in mind that the foundation scholars, or some of them, were to be educated up to the point of fitness for the University; that their education was to proceed until they reached the age of eighteen; that there was to be no restriction as to the amount of education which the other scholars, either residing in Dulwich or boarded in the College, might receive, and that the instruction was to be such as is usually given in Westminster School, we shall have a tolerable idea of the sort of educational establishment contemplated by the founder. Even without the modifications and expansions which the 'Times' newspaper¹ considers to be necessary, by simply carrying into effect the views of the founder, 'Dulwich College would' not only 'take its place with the great public schools,' but, 'in conformity with the character of the founder, might be the seat of an education somewhat more practical 'and religious than our public schools supply.'

There are two other characteristic points in the founder's idea of his College which deserve special notice. Alleyn was not only a man of considerable general ability, but a man of taste. He was a musician as well as an actor, and, as it would seem, a great lover of the beauties of rural scenery. These tastes led him to make, what may be thought, more than ordinary provision for the cultivation of music, by every one immediately connected with the College,² and to lay down the most stringent rules for the preservation of the rural beauty of the College lands.

With respect to his desire for the cultivation of music in the College, notices occur in almost every part of the statutes. He appoints that the instruction to be given daily to the poor scholars in manufactures shall be given to half of them one day, and to the other half the next day, 'that they may not lose their music,' as the music-lessons were to be given during the same hours. Then in his 'orders for the chapel and the celebrating of Divine service,' after ordaining that the service shall be read and sung daily in such manner and form, as near as may be, as is usually observed in the King's Chapel, or the collegiate church of S. Peter at Westminster, and that the inmates of the College shall all be present on Sundays and holidays in *surplices*, and on working days in their *gowns*, to

¹ 'Times,' July 1, 1854.

² 'When Alleyn died,' writes Mr. Collier, 'he left behind him a lute, a pandora, a cythern, and six viols.' He was fond of music, entertained singers at his table, bought an organ for his chapel, and went to considerable expense for 'a music-room.'—'Memoirs,' p. 77. This music-room is noticed in the statutes, as the place where the music-lessons were to be given.

sing their parts in the choir, he directs that 'if the Master, 'Warden, or any of the senior fellows be not present in their 'singing, or cannot sing their parts in the quire, that then he or 'they that shall be defective therein shall find every of them, at 'his and their own charge, a several person that can sing his part 'in the quire, to supply his or their place that is defective, until 'he or they shall be able to perform the same.' And he further ordains 'that, if it may be, all the other servants or officers of the 'said College to have knowledge of prick-song (figured music), 'or learn the same after their coming to the said College, and to 'sing his or their part in the quire, also at times convenient.' These last words evidently imply what is also signified elsewhere, that the cultivation of music in the College was not solely with a view to the choral service of the chapel, but for recreation also; for it must be remembered that, at the time Alleyn wrote, madrigal singing was the almost universal and never-failing amusement of the middle classes.

Alleyn's desire to preserve the rural beauty of Dulwich is not less conspicuous. He will not suffer the home fields adjoining the College to be leased to any one, but to be preserved for ever as places for walking and exercise. No part of the two hundred acres of coppice or woodlands (now called Dulwich Wood), or of the arable and pasture land adjoining, is ever to be let on lease. The wood is never to be cut down, but only twenty acres of it felled annually for the use of the College. He especially prohibits and forbids, for all succeeding times to come, that any timber trees fit for shadow or shelter be cut and felled in any of the grounds adjoining or lying near to the west, south, and south-west parts of the College; and that no trees shall be felled on any lands belonging to the College, but such as are of necessity to be employed for building and repairing the College; and no timber is to be sold to any persons whatever but to the tenants of the College, and to them solely for the building or repairs of their houses.

It has been already noticed that among the recipients of the College bounties there were to be thirty poor men and women, who were to reside in almshouses built by Alleyn, or to be built by his executors in the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Giles, and S. Saviour. These thirty 'members of the College,' as he terms them, were to be probationers for admission to vacancies in the number of the poor brethren and sisters of the corporation; and were to receive 6d. a-week (equal to 2s. 6d. of our money), and a new gown once in every two years. The almshouses in the parish of S. Giles, only, were erected by Alleyn during his life; but he directed by his will that his executors should, within two years after his death, build the almshouses in the

other two parishes. Want of funds seems to have prevented the executors from fulfilling his benevolent intentions. Nothing, at any rate, had been done for six or seven years; and in 1633 the rector of S. Botolph and the churchwardens thought it necessary to institute a suit against Matthias Alleyn (the other executor being dead), for the purpose of enforcing the erection of the ten almshouses in that parish. A decree was pronounced by the Lord Keeper Coventry, in favour of the plaintiff; and subsequently the almshouses both in S. Botolph's and S. Saviour's were erected.¹

The pleadings in this suit contain the germ of all the disputes and litigations in which the College has ever since been more or less engaged. The question, it would appear, was then raised for the first time, whether the corporation of Dulwich College was legally bound to carry into effect the provisions of the statutes, not only with respect to the thirty out-members, but with respect to the other persons, such as the chanters or junior fellows, and the assistants who were not named in the letters patent and deed of foundation.

On the part of the defendant it was argued that—

'There was no power by the patent to alter or add more members to the corporation at the will of the founder, and that if there had been a power, yet the lands at the time of the foundation being at a rack-rent, were since, by decay of tenements and otherwise, much abated in the yearly value; besides, there were many necessary provisions, charges, quit-rents, duties to the King's charges in suits of law, reparations for the College, and other duties, *past and growing expenses which must be necessarily supplied out of the College revenue for the College*, which were never thought on by the founder at the time of the endowment, and when he made the ordinances for the College: and the defendant Matthias Alleyn did deny that he had assets sufficient, but offered, that if the plaintiffs would set him out ground he would buy so far as £120 would extend, which was the moiety of the assets he did acknowledge to be in his hands.'

This offer was accepted by the rector of S. Botolph and the others on the part of the parish; and it was

'Ordered, that upon payment of the said £120 to the said parish, the defendant Matthias Alleyn be from thenceforth acquitted and discharged against the said parish of S. Botolph, for or by reason of the bequest aforesaid.'

But it was at the same time ordered

'That if there shall any new addition of estate come to the College, or that there shall be hereafter an *occurplus of value in the College revenue*, all the

¹ When the Report of the Charity Commissioners for 1835 was drawn up, the almshouses in S. Botolph's were in so ruinous a condition that the poor men and poor women sent to them only occupied them a few nights before they went thence to the College, in order to give them a qualification. Those of S. Saviour's were much dilapidated, but inhabitable, and those of S. Luke's were in good repair.—C. C. Rep. 898, Sept. 1835.

said duties and necessities to the same first discharged, then the said defendant shall be liable to pay such increase to *these additional charities of the founding*, as this court shall think fit.'

How the defendant should be discharged on payment of £120, and still be held liable to pay out of the College revenue such a sum towards the erection of the almshouses, as the court should think fit, does not seem clear; though it is clear enough that the court considered the College revenues chargeable with the erection of the almshouses under the contingencies mentioned. If this be the case, it would seem to follow that under the same contingencies, and with the sanction of the same court, the College was bound to keep the almshouses in repair, as the 103rd statute directs, and to pay the statutory allowances to the thirty inhabitants of them. At any rate, it is a fact, that the College did for certain periods of time, though not continuously, pay the allowances to the thirty out-members.

We learn from the 'Orders, Rules, and Injunctions for the better government of the College,' issued by Archbishop Sheldon in 1667, that no payments had been made to the 'thirty members' for many years previously. It is probable that the allowances had been stopped chiefly on account of the losses sustained by the College (some twenty years before the date of Archbishop Sheldon's visitation), by 'the decay of the 'Fortune playhouse, and the falling down of one whole side of 'the College and a great part of the other side, by which the 'College was not only out of stock, but run into debt.' But, however that may have been, it is certain that there existed also a reluctance on the part of the College to admit the claim of the thirty out-members; for we find that the third fellow was expelled by Archbishop Sheldon for refusing to agree to his order for renewing the payment of the allowances.

In 1724 a visitation of the College was held by Archbishop Wake, who, in the orders and injunctions subsequently issued by him, confirmed the rules laid down by Archbishop Sheldon respecting the disposal of the College revenues; and probably up to that time the allowances to the thirty members had been regularly paid.

The injunctions of Archbishop Wake, however, had the effect of raising a question respecting the rights of another class of the extra-collegiate members. Archbishop Sheldon had decreed that the six assistants and the thirty poor men and women were to be regarded as out-members of the College; and that their offices, duties, and allowances (unless dispensed with by the visitor for the time being) were to be as by the statutes it was set down and ordained. Archbishop Wake, exercising this assumed power of dispensation, limited the number of assistants to three.

'It appearing,' [says he,] 'highly probable to us that the founder—in appointing six churchwardens by the name of assistants, who might be a check upon the society in the management of their revenue, might moderate in all their differences, and take care of the poor of their respective parishes, to have certain allotments out of the College revenue—intended the number of the said assistants should be in proportion to the society as six to twelve (he having, at the same time, appointed a Master, Warden, and ten fellows); but whereas it is very clear that the founder never had any power or authority in law to appoint any such assistants at all, nor to enlarge the number of his fellows beyond four, so that what was done by him in that respect is indeed contrary both to the charter of incorporation and deed of uses; nevertheless, out of a due regard to what was done by him, and at the same time to prevent the many ill-consequences that may be justly apprehended from the said assistants out-numbering the said society, which consists only of a Master, Warden, and four fellows, and for preserving the balance intended by the founder, we are content to allow, and do hereby allow, as far as in us lies, that three churchwardens, which shall be the upper churchwardens of the three parishes out of which they have hitherto been taken, may continue to act as assistants, and have the usual allowances in proportion out of the revenue belonging to the said College.'

In consequence of this order, the churchwardens took in 1726 the opinion of the then Attorney-General, Sir Philip Yorke, as to its legality. The opinion he gave was as follows:—

'The six churchwardens, viz. two of each parish, are not part of the body corporate erected in this College, for that subsists entirely by the letters patent, 21 June, 17 Jac. I., whereby it is created to consist of the master, warden, fellows, brethren, sisters, and poor scholars, no mention being made therein of assistants, and the founder could not afterwards vary from that and add to the corporation. But notwithstanding this, I think the said churchwardens are lawfully entitled to such powers and authorities as were given to them by the ordinances and statutes of the founder of Sept. 29, 2 Car. I.; and such powers and authorities, or any of them, cannot be taken from them, but by some person having power to repeal or alter those ordinances. Therefore I apprehend the question upon which this matter will depend is, whether the Archbishop of Canterbury, being appointed visitor by the charter, has power by himself or his vicar-general to repeal or alter those ordinances or statutes. As to that, it is to be observed, that the appointment of his Grace to be visitor is accompanied with this special respective clause, with power to visit, order, and punish according to the ecclesiastical laws, and such laws as shall be made and ordained by the said Edward Alleyn in his lifetime, or after his death by any other person or persons to be appointed by him under his hand and seal. It does not appear that any such appointment was made by Mr. Alleyn to take place after his death, so that may be laid out of the case; but he did make laws or statutes in his lifetime by that instrument of 29 Sept., 2 Car. I.; and therefore it seems to me that they are binding upon the visitor, and he is obliged to visit and act according to them, and cannot repeal or alter them, for that would be to contradict the intent of the founder, and alter the foundation. Upon this ground, I apprehend that the above-mentioned exclusion of one of the churchwardens of each parish is not well warranted, and that the order for such exclusion being void, all the said churchwardens have (notwithstanding the same) a right to act as assistants pursuant to the said ordinances; and that, if they are hindered from so doing, they may, upon an information exhibited in Chancery in the Attorney-General's name at their relation, be decreed to be restored thereto.'

The College now sent a petition to the Archbishop, in which they represented that they had been informed by counsel learned in the law, that the pensions which, in obedience to Archbishop Sheldon's injunction, had been paid by them to the thirty poor people of the parishes of S. Botolph, S. Giles, and S. Saviour, were utterly illegal and inconsistent with the deeds of foundation; and they prayed that the Archbishop would so far relax or suspend the said injunction, as to leave them at liberty to try their right with the churchwardens by the law of the land.

To this memorial the Archbishop replied, that upon due consideration, he thought their request so reasonable that he had resolved to give his consent to it, and had directed a letter to be prepared for that purpose.

'But in the meantime,' [he continues,] 'the churchwardens laid a representation before me, wherein, among other things, they complained that the said pensions were not paid pursuant to the statutes¹ and the said injunction of my predecessor, and prayed my directions for the execution and enforcement of the said statutes and injunction on this behalf. This gave me occasion not only to reconsider the matter very carefully myself, but also to take the advice of counsel for my further direction herein; and, after mature consideration, I sent the said churchwardens the following answer to that part of their representation, viz., "For the pensions to the thirty out-members, the master, warden, and fellows have represented to me, that they are advised by their counsel, that the founder had no power to lay any such burden upon them; that the whole estate of their College, for several years before the making of the statutes by which these payments are appointed both by the King's charter and the founder's grant, had been legally vested in their corporation, and could not be applied to any other use; and thereupon they have desired my consent, that notwithstanding Archbishop Sheldon's injunction, they may be at liberty to bring the right of those payments to a legal determination. Upon this request made to me by the College, I have advised with counsel for my own satisfaction and direction in this matter, and am by my counsel informed that the College have good reason for what they desire, and that I ought not to deny them the justice they request of bringing this matter to a legal issue, which will be the best direction for us all to follow, and put a final end to all disputes about this matter; and this I have accordingly resolved to do."

Notwithstanding this resolution of the Archbishop, the matter was not fully brought to a legal issue. An information was filed in the name of the Attorney-General, on the relation of Samuel Higgs and the other assistants, against the College and the Archbishop, and the case came on for hearing in April, 1728, before Lord Chancellor King; but the claim of the assistants only was dealt with. 'Edward Alleyn,' ran the

¹ From this it would seem that the College had not actually been paying the allowances to the thirty out-members, notwithstanding their profession of respect to the injunction of Archbishop Sheldon.

judgment of the Lord Chancellor, 'the founder of the College, 'could not by his said ordinances and statutes of 29th Sept., 1626, 'add any persons to the corporation, nor make any new 'person a member of the said body corporate, but he could appoint assistants to the said corporation;' and he ordered and decreed 'that the relators and their successors be admitted to 'be assistants to the corporation, according to the said ordinances and statutes, and are to be quieted in the possession thereof; but this is to be without prejudice to the defendant 'the Archbishop of Canterbury, his right of visitation, or of 'any application to be made to him to correct, alter, or amend 'any of the said ordinances, or to any correction, alteration, or 'amendment that the said Archbishop or his successors shall or 'may lawfully make or ordain.'

It seems to have been assumed by the College, as it in fact still is, that this decree met the case also of the chanter and thirty out-members. As the founder could not make them members of the corporation, so, it was argued, their appointment, and the allowances assigned them by the statutes, were illegal. This, however, has never been admitted by the assistants, so far as the thirty poor out-members are concerned. The Charity Commissioners, in their report for 1835, notice as matters still in dispute, 'the right of the three parishes to have the 'almshouses repaired by the College, and the right of the thirty 'out-members to the clothing, pensions, and proportion of the 'surplus revenue assigned to them by the statutes.' Nor does the matter seem to be cleared up by the recent judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench respecting the right of the assistants to vote in the election of a warden. The case of the chanter and thirty out-members was only incidentally referred to; but the Judges—viz., Lord Campbell, Mr. Justice Patteson, and Mr. Justice Coleridge, who also expressed the opinion of Mr. Justice Wightman—were equally divided on the question whether any real distinction could be drawn between the case of the assistants and that of the chanter and thirty members.

'As to that distinction,' [said Lord Campbell,] 'between the junior fellows and the assistants,' [the distinction he supposed Lord King to have made,] 'if it now arose for the first time, I am not prepared to say what my notion of it would be, or whether I should not say they were both in the same category; although it is very true that the junior fellows are directed by the statutes to have a voice equally and in the same manner with the senior fellows, and the assistants are only to have a voice in certain specified cases, which is not exactly the same; yet the same learned Judge, Lord King, held that the appointment of assistants was good, they not being intended to be members of the corporation, and quieted them in the possession of their office.'

So Mr. Justice Patteson.—

‘I may say in passing, as my brother Campbell has observed, I think that, if this were *res integra*, it would appear to me extremely questionable whether the six chanter, as they are called, do not stand on the same footing, and have not the same rights, as the six assistants. And the more I examine this statute, the less am I satisfied that it was ever the intention of Alleyn to attempt to make these persons members of the foundation of the corporation. *In point of fact, it seems to me, if it is looked at, that the result is exactly the contrary, and that it is quite excluded; the simple circumstance that he gives the junior fellows votes, can, of course, make no difference.* The foundation of our present judgment is, and the point we are labouring at is, that the assistants are not adopted by any one as members of the foundation: but it is remarkable that, after going through, and stating what the junior fellows are to do, he says, “the six assistants, touching the ordering of the said College, and the rents, revenues, and profits thereof, and thirty members.” Now, if you add the junior fellows, you will find you have thirty-six members; but strike them out, the number is exactly thirty members of the College; so that it would have been inconsistent, I think, with this statute, to have supposed there was any intention to make the six junior fellows members of the foundation. Then he goes on, omitting those who are members. He says, “The said chanter, assistants, and members to be employed and taken to such uses, intents, and purposes, as hereinafter in these my orders and statutes I shall further direct and appoint.”’

The latter part of Mr. Justice Patteson’s argument is, we apprehend, based on a mistake, into which an erroneous punctuation in the printed copies of the statutes has led him; but there does not appear to us any doubt on other grounds, that Alleyn never intended the chanter, assistants, and poor out-members to be part of the corporate body. The ‘thirty members’ mentioned in this statute are not, as Sir John Patteson supposed, the thirty members of the corporation, but the thirty candidates for admission into the corporate body. As the statute is now pointed, it reads very like nonsense. The chanter are to have votes, ‘as the four senior fellows have six assistants, touching the ordering of the College and its revenues, and thirty members.’ But the meaning of the statute is obviously this: that for certain specified reasons, viz. for the honour and service of God and for the good and welfare of the *said* College—*i. e.* of the College which in the first statute he had just defined to consist of a master, warden, &c.—the founder ordained that there should be: 1st. Six chanter, with the privilege of being called junior fellows, and of voting according to the statutes with the fellows of the corporation; 2nd. Six assistants to the corporation in the government of the College, and the disposal of its revenues; and 3rd. Thirty poor members, who were to be candidates for admission to vacancies occurring among the poor brethren and sisters of the corporation; and that the said chanter, assistants, and members, were to be

employed and taken to such uses as he should afterwards by his statutes direct. Whatever may have been his intentions in particular instances, it is plain that throughout the statutes the founder employed the word 'college,' and the terms '*of the college*,' '*belonging to the college*,' and the like, in more senses than one. *To belong to the college* does not always mean to be a *member of the corporation*. Membership of the College does not always signify membership of the corporation. Indeed, it is perfectly clear that, according to Alleyn's idea, persons might belong to, or be of the College, or be termed members of it, without being members of the corporation. Thus, though he terms the thirty pensioners in the almshouses, '*members of the College*,' yet they were to be so in another sense when they came to be elected poor brethren or sisters of the corporation. The 49th statute proves this. It runs: 'That none of the thirty poor members that have notice given them for their *'election to be of the College (i.e. to be members of the corporation)*, shall sell or give away any of their goods, &c., but bring them with them to the College.' Then the 31st statute, which prescribes the duties of the warden, directs him to 'pay, disburse, and defray all the rents, pensions, and all other payments which are to be made by the said College for the use and maintenance thereof, *to all persons in any sort belonging thereto*.' And there is no doubt, as has been already noticed, that at the very outset of the statutes, Alleyn clearly distinguishes between the members of the corporation and those other persons who were to belong to the College for specific purposes contemplated by him. The first statute ordains that the College shall, as the letters patent define, consist of a master, warden, four fellows, six poor brethren, six poor sisters, and twelve poor scholars. The second then sets out with a preamble containing the reasons for what is to follow, viz.: that first, '*for the better furtherance of the honour and service of Almighty God*,' and secondly, '*for the good and welfare of the said College*, or for both these reasons, there shall be six men to sing in the chapel, six assistants to the corporation in the government of the College and the management of its funds, and thirty poor men and women, from whom the poor brethren and sisters of the corporation were to be chosen.

With regard, indeed, to the assistants and the thirty members, there is no room for conjecture respecting the intentions of the founder: he expressly mentions them in the 29th statute as distinct from the '*whole corporation of the College*:' '*Whosoever and as often as any master, warden, &c., shall be admitted to be of the College*, and shall have taken his or her oath accordingly, then the senior fellow then present shall

'forthwith say as followeth:—Now, in the name of God and 'of the whole corporation of this College, the assistants and 'members thereof, I do pronounce you to be Master, Warden, '&c., of this College.' . . . The 'assistants' and 'members of the College,' in this instance, were certainly not regarded by the founder as members of the corporation. But did he, by omitting all mention of the chanter, suppose them to be included in 'the whole corporation of the College?' Nothing can be determined on this point, from the circumstance that the '*whole* corporation' is spoken of: for the 13th statute, which relates to the promotion of the warden to the office of master, simply directs that the oath is to be administered (and the foregoing declaration, of course, also made) 'in the presence of **THE** corporation then present;' and in this case the assistants were to be present. Or did he include under the words 'and members thereof' all who 'in any sort' belonged to the College? It is, at all events, very evident that throughout the statutes he speaks of the fellows of the foundation as **THE FELLOWS**. Thus the 21st statute:—'When any of the fellows' or¹ chanter's places shall be void,' &c. Then the 13th statute, which has just been referred to, and the 15th, 18th, 20th, and 21st, are so worded as to render it, to say the very least, extremely questionable whether the chanter, though present, had any voice in the election of the master, warden, fellows, or even of their own body. Within twenty-four hours after the place of master has become void, the warden is to take upon himself the office of master, and 'be admitted thereunto by the fellows, or 'the most part of them then residing in the College, and shall 'take the oath hereafter expressed, to be ministered unto him by 'the senior fellow then present'. . . where it is to be observed that 'senior fellow' does not mean the senior of all the fellows then present ('chanters, *alias* junior fellows,' included), but one of the preachers or first and second fellows of the foundation. So the 15th statute. On the day of the election of a warden, 'the master, the assistants, and fellows,' are to go into the chapel, 'and after service and sermon, made by one of the fellows,' (*i. e.* one of the four corporation fellows,) 'proceed 'to the election of a new warden; after that, the senior 'fellow then present shall read,' &c. So the 20th: 'If both 'the places of master and warden should happen to be void 'at one time, the senior fellow then present shall give notice 'to the assistants . . . to repair to the College . . . to join

¹ 'Or' is used here obviously in the sense of 'and.' All the fellows were not chanters; and those who were not were the fellows of the corporation.

'with the fellows in the election of a new master,' &c. Then follows the 21st, already referred to, in which the so-called *junior fellows* are for the first time referred to in these statutes relating to elections; but it is under their proper name of chanters: 'When any of *the fellows*' or chanters' places shall be void . . . 'then the master, warden, and the rest of the *surviving fellows* shall provide,' &c. If the chanters were to have a vote in this case, it is remarkable that though they are mentioned as persons to be elected distinct from the fellows, they are not, as the parallelism would seem to require, named among the electors. If the statute had run in these words—'When any of the senior 'or junior fellows' places shall be void . . . then the master, warden, and the rest of the surviving fellows shall provide,' &c.—its meaning would have been plain enough: the 'surviving fellows' would have been the surviving senior and junior fellows. But as it stands, we cannot assume that the chanters were to have a vote at all. On the contrary, it seems to be a legitimate conclusion, from the wording of the statute, that they were not to have a vote; otherwise the statute would have run thus:—'When any of the fellows' or chanters' places shall be void . . . 'then the master, warden, and the rest of the surviving fellows *and chanters* shall provide,' &c. The same distinction is also preserved in the next statute, which speaks of the oath and formal admission of the fellows and chanters.

Against this view, it may be urged that the 2nd statute, in which the chanters are first introduced, gives them 'a voice equally and in the same manner with the senior fellows.' This is Lord Campbell's construction of the statute; but with every deference to so eminent an authority, it must be observed that the statute does not say that the chanters are to have a vote in all cases along with the senior fellows, but only that, like the senior fellows, they are to have a voice 'according to the statutes;' so that, even admitting the wording of this statute to be ambiguous, we should still have to determine from the body of the statutes whether the chanters were to have a voice on *all* occasions along with the fellows of the corporation. If on the occasion of the elections they have no voice, it would follow, supposing the recent judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, respecting the claim of the assistants to vote at the election of warden, to be correct, that the founder intended, which is very unlikely, to place the power of choosing the two candidates for that office virtually in the hands of the assistants; since they must always form a majority of the electors. The casting-vote allowed by the statutes to the master, can only be given when the voices are equal; but in this case they never can be equal—the number of the corporators being five at the most, that of the

assistants being always six. This, indeed, is the very contingency anticipated by Archbishop Wake, and which led to his attempt to reduce the number of assistants to three, 'in order,' as he says, 'to prevent the many ill consequences that may be justly apprehended, from the said assistants outnumbering the 'said society.' It is remarkable that the judges never seem to have considered how unlikely it was that the founder should for a moment have thought of making the corporators mere ciphers in a matter of such moment to them as the election of a master or warden; yet the judgment of the court has the effect of doing this. To us it appears more probable that the founder gave no voice either to the assistants or to the chanters, in the election of the governing members of the corporation: at least, that if he gave a voice to either, he gave it to both.

It is, however, as Mr. Justice Patteson observed, not material to the question respecting the intended *status* of the chanters in the College, whether they voted on all or on any occasions. If the founder, in virtue of the powers reserved to him by the charter, could, as the court has decided, give the assistants a vote on any occasion, he could have given them the privilege of voting on all occasions. This privilege did not make them members of the corporation; and the same may be said of the chanters. Besides, the poor brethren and sisters, and the poor scholars, who *are* members of the corporation, have no vote at all on any occasion. Then with respect to the title of junior fellow accorded to the chanters, it is noticeable that the founder, in the 2nd statute, does not say that the chanters are *to be the* junior fellows of the corporation, but only that they are *to be called and esteemed as* junior fellows of the College; and, consistently with this, he elsewhere terms them 'chanters, *alias* junior fellows';—a ridiculous phraseology, if he considered their *alias* as anything but a name and an honorary title; a privilege which it is probable he allowed them out of consideration for their constant and necessary association with the fellows of the corporation in conducting Divine service in the chapel.

But, in truth, it matters not what were the intentions of the founder, if what he did was contrary to law. If, however, what he did was not contrary to law, his erroneous intention, supposing it could be proved, which it cannot, would not render that illegal which in itself is not so. Assuming that he intended to make the chanters and the thirty poor members part of the incorporation: as he could not make them so, his intentions would not go for nothing; yet if his provisions respecting them were consistent with the powers granted him by the letters patent, those provisions must be held good whatever he intended. Much more must they be held good if we do not know what he

intended, and are obliged to interpret his intentions by his acts; and more still, if it can be shown, and we think it has been shown, that he had no intention whatever to make the chanters, assistants, and poor members part of the body corporate. 'The founder,' says Lord Campbell, 'could not add to the corporate body, or alter its component parts; therefore, the provision made by the founder as to the six junior fellows was held by Lord King to be void.' But does it follow that those provisions are void because the founder could not add to the corporation? Surely not. It only follows that the junior fellows were not and could not be members of the corporation. If the founder *could not add* to the corporation, of course he *did not add* to it, whatever he intended to do; but as we do not know for certain what his intentions were, his intentions may be laid out of the case, and the only question will be, whether his powers under the charter enabled him to make his statutory provisions respecting the six chanters?

On this question Mr. Justice Coleridge has, we apprehend, touched the point on which the whole matter turns. 'There is,' he says, 'a clear distinction to be taken between the assistants and the chanters . . . because the chanters were to receive emoluments out of the funds of the corporation.' The learned judge adverts to other particulars of difference between the case of the assistants and that of the chanters, which have been already disposed of; but we imagine that the very pivot of the inquiry is the question how far the founder's powers, under the letters patent, enabled him to deal with the funds of the corporation for specific purposes, deemed by him necessary to the good and welfare of the College.

Now, in regard to this, it is to be observed that the letters patent do unquestionably give him power to make ordinances, statutes, and so forth, respecting the management of the lands as well as the revenues of the College. What are the limits of such powers? In the first place, it is clear enough that he could not by his statutes alienate any part of the funds vested in the corporation for their use, relief, maintenance, sustenance, education, instruction, and the rest. The funds must be applied to those purposes. But then, secondly, it is equally clear that the corporation could *only* use its funds, be relieved, maintained, sustained, educated, instructed, guided, governed, and ruled, according to such statutes and ordinances as the founder should make, set down, establish, and ordain, 'for the more better and orderly maintenance, education, instruction, guiding, government, and rule' of the corporation. Though the funds of the corporation were vested in them for their use, they could only use them in the manner to be prescribed by the statutes, and

deemed necessary by the founder for accomplishing the objects of the foundation, as they are generally defined in the letters patent.

But the letters patent simply say that the College is to be 'for and towards the maintenance of poor men, women, and children, and for the education and instruction of the said children;' and that it is to consist of one master, one warden, four fellows, six poor brethren, six poor sisters, and 'twelve poor scholars.' Beyond this we learn nothing from the charter. The nature of the foundation, the manner of its government, the kind of education the College was to afford, the extent to which its instruction was to be carried, the apparatus by which it was to be given, the manner in which the revenues of the corporation were to be specially disposed of in relation to its two objects of charity and education, are points respecting which the letters patent are entirely silent. Though they say that the corporators are to have perpetual succession, they give no hint whatever of the manner in which the succession is to be perpetuated. Yet these were matters so essential, not only to the objects, but to the very existence of the foundation, that if the Crown did not exercise the power to regulate them, it was obviously because that power had been delegated to the founder; and so, the very meagreness and abstinence of the letters patent may be regarded as evincing the fulness of the powers granted to him. And, indeed, looking at the terms in which this power is allowed him, they seem to be so large and comprehensive as to leave him at full liberty to ordain and establish by his statutes whatever he considered necessary for the 'good and welfare' of the College. There are, it is true, *provisos* in the letters patent respecting the King's prerogative and the civil and ecclesiastical laws of the realm; but so far as the present question is concerned, the prerogative of the Crown had been already exercised. The founder could not vary from, nor add to the corporation defined by the letters patent, nor alienate the funds vested in them; nor could he alter the general purposes of the foundation set forth in the charter; but these conditions being fulfilled, he was left the sole judge of what was necessary for the good and welfare of the College, and for carrying into effect its double purpose of charity and education.

The funds of the College could only be expended for the benefit of the College and for the promotion of certain objects by it; but if the founder did not possess full discretionary power as to the *manner* in which the funds should be disposed of for the benefit of the College, and for the purposes of its foundation, there was no one else who had it. The Crown

possessed the power, but did not exercise it. For all that appears in the letters patent, the members of the corporation have a right to divide the funds among them in equal portions. There is not a word in the charter from which we can gather a hint as to the manner in which the poor scholars were to be educated, or the persons by whom they were to be taught. Is there a single word in the charter which rendered it compulsory on the founder to direct that *members of the corporation only* should be employed in the instruction of the poor scholars? As well might be said that the founder had no power under the charter to ordain that any but members of the corporation should act as cook, butler, bailiff, or ploughman.

Supposing, then, the founder, as it is clear he did, considered that a daily chapel service, performed after the best choral models in the metropolis, was necessary 'for the better furtherance of the honour and service of Almighty God,' in the College, and 'for the good and welfare' of the corporation—could he legally ordain that the College should appoint and perpetually have six singing men 'for music and singing in the chapel,' and pay them out of the corporation funds? Or, supposing that he judged it necessary, in furtherance of his views respecting the education of the poor scholars, that they should all be instructed in music, and some of them in handicraft trades, could he legally direct the appointment of persons, not members of the corporation, qualified to teach music and handicraft trades, who should be paid out of the College revenues? If he could do this, he could legally direct the appointment of the six chanters: for two of them were to be teachers of music to the poor scholars, and organists in the chapel, and the remaining four, singing men in the chapel, and teachers of handicraft trades in the school. So far as these duties were concerned, the chanters were the mere servants of the corporation,—they were to act entirely under the direction, as the case might be, of the master, warden, or fellows of the corporation.

If the founder could make no such provision for these purposes, one does not see how he could legally direct the appointment of 'a porter, a cook, a maltster and brewer, a butler, a bailiff to look to the woods, cattle, and husbandry, a ploughman, a kitchen-boy, or a ploughboy,' and ordain that they should be paid in precisely the same manner as every other person 'in any sort belonging to the College' is paid—that is, by a fixed statutory allowance and a contingent allowance out of surplus revenues,—one does not see how he could order the payment of the assistants' travelling expenses, or bind the corporation to provide them with dinners on the occasions of their visiting the College: And does not this small matter of the dinner involve the whole

question? If the founder could legally bind the corporation to feast the assistants at the expense of the College,¹ could he not bind them to give 6*d.* a-week to a certain number of poor people for another object equally deemed by him conducive to the welfare of the College?

But the case of the thirty out-members deserves more special notice. They were, it will be remembered, to be thirty poor men and women, ten of whom were to be chosen by the assistants out of each of the three parishes of S. Luke, S. Botolph, and S. Saviour; all of them were to reside in almshouses built at the expense of the founder, which were to be kept in repair at the expense of the College; they were to have an allowance of 6*d.* a-week each, and new gowns every two years, and, in addition, a proportionate share of the surplus revenue of the College; and out of their number, the vacancies occurring among the poor brethren and sisters were, with three exceptions, to be filled up. Now, supposing the founder thought it to be of the utmost importance to the well-being of the College, that great care should be exercised in the choice of the poor brethren and sisters, and that, with a view to prevent, as much as might be, the admission of unworthy objects to the privileges of the corporation, he considered it desirable that all candidates should be placed for a time under the superintendence of the assistants, and undergo a period of probation, in order that their character and habits should be duly ascertained by the College; supposing that this preparatory foundation was designed by Alleyn to serve the double purpose of securing the corporation against the intrusion, among its members, of persons of troublesome, vicious, or depraved habits, and of operating as a check on the assistants with whom the selection of the probationers, in the first instance, was to rest; could it be said, with the least show of truth, that this was not a provision in the highest degree conducive to the good and welfare of the College, and therefore one on which the founder had no power under the charter to ordain any expenditure of the corporation funds? Lord Keeper Coventry termed these almshouses 'additional charities of the founding;' but, strictly speaking, they were not charities, because the expenditure incurred by the College on their account was for an equivalent. There was an object to be gained, which was not the maintenance of so many poor

¹ It appears, from the statement of accounts delivered by the College to the Charity Commissioners last year, that the present annual payment to the assistants for their biennial journey from London to Dulwich and back, is 4*8*l. The statutory allowance for the assistants' dinners and the four feasting-days of the twelve poor brothers and sisters (the items are not separated) is 3*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* Besides this, there are $\frac{3\frac{1}{2}}{600}$ parts of the surplus revenue appropriated to the same purposes, which at present amount to 50*l.*, in all 53*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*

people, but another object, to the accomplishment of which the partial maintenance for a time of so many poor people was necessary.¹ And, besides, is not this a provision for perpetuating the succession of part of the corporate body?

The distinction, then, between the case of the assistants and that of the chanters, and, it may be added, that also of the thirty poor members, is not, we apprehend, so clear as Mr. Justice Coleridge supposes. All of them are to have allowances out of the funds of the corporation, and in every case for some purpose directly or indirectly beneficial to the College, and deemed necessary by the founder to its welfare. If the founder had power under the letters patent to appropriate any part of the corporation funds to the assistants who are not members of the corporate body, for purposes which he deemed expedient or necessary, he could do the same in the case of the chanters and thirty poor members. It is not material to the question to say that the allowances to the assistants are merely intended to defray their travelling expenses, and to provide refreshments for them during their visits to the College; because the principle involved is the same, whatever be the special purpose for which the College is compelled to expend part of its funds. There is no mention whatever of the assistants in the letters patent; the appointment of them was a matter depending solely on the judgment of the founder, yet he did appoint them, and compelled the College to incur considerable expense on their account. He considered the office of assistants desirable; and therefore he created it, and appropriated to it so much of 'the profits of the College' as, considering the nature of the office and the condition of the persons who were to fill it,² he judged to be necessary. In the case of the chanters he did no more. The duties of the chanters, as singers and teachers, required their constant residence in the College; they were of a class who could not afford to give their services gratuitously; it followed, therefore, as a matter of course, that they should be paid and maintained all the year round at the expense of the corporation. But there is no difference in principle between maintaining the

¹ It may be said, in opposition to this view, that three of the vacancies among the poor brethren and sisters were to be filled up by the College itself from the parish of Camberwell, and that the persons selected were not to undergo a probationary residence in the almshouses. But it is to be observed that, though the founder mentions the parish of Camberwell, he gave a preference to the lordship of Dulwich, and directed that, *if it might be, the persons chosen should be inhabitants of Dulwich, where the College stood*; evidently implying that the governing body would have, from that circumstance, sufficient opportunity of ascertaining the characters and habits of the persons on whom their choice was likely to fall. A probation elsewhere, therefore, was unnecessary.

² 'The churchwardens,' says Lord Campbell, 'at that time of day, I believe were generally persons of the greatest note and importance in the parish.'

assistants for a day and maintaining the chanters for a year. If the founder legally could order the one,¹ he could legally order the other.²

And so we may say of the titles and privileges of the assistants and chanters. If he could give the assistants votes in the management of the College, he could give votes also to the chanters. If he had chosen, he could have given to each of the assistants the title of 'Junior Warden,' just as he gave the chanters the *alias* of 'Junior Fellows;' but neither the payments, the privileges, nor the titles, constituted these persons members of the corporation.

In few words, then, until it can be shown that there is a single provision in the statutes respecting the expenditure of the funds of the corporation, which cannot be said in some sense or other to promote the interests and welfare of the corporation and the efficiency of the College, we must continue to believe that the founder has not exceeded his powers, and that his statutes are as much the act of the Crown as if they had been contained in the charter.

These observations, if they do not enable us to give an answer to the question put by the 'Times' newspaper, 'What shall we do with Dulwich College?' will at least convey to us some notion of what Dulwich College may do with itself. If it be true, as we really believe, that it rests entirely with the visitor of the College whether the statutes of the College shall be so acted upon as to bring the whole scheme contemplated by the founder into full operation, the question of the future of Dulwich College is greatly simplified; it becomes, in fact, only a question of modification, enlargement, and adaptation to existing circumstances. Let us consider this subject more particularly.

The statutes, it will have been noticed, range themselves under four heads: the first embracing the government of the College, and the management of its funds; the second, its charitable purposes; the third, its provisions for Divine service; and the fourth, its purposes of education.

Now, admitting—and, in fact, it is admitted on every side—that, considering the means at the command of the College, its

¹ Lord King's decree, by which the churchwardens of the three parishes, 'and their successors, were to be admitted to be assistants to the corporation, according to the ordinances and statutes of the College,' of course involves an admission of the legality of the allowances made to them out of the funds of the corporation.

² If the founder could not compel the corporation to spend their funds on purposes which he deemed necessary to their welfare, so neither could he deprive them of available resources or contingent profits from their lands for such purposes. Yet he did this last by prohibiting them for ever from leasing certain lands; and his prohibition has been held good. The College found it necessary to obtain an Act of Parliament to enable them to lease the lands in question.

sphere of usefulness might be greatly enlarged; admitting that its charities might cover a larger field, and the benefit of gratuitous education be afforded to a larger number of poor scholars and others than the founder contemplated,—are there any such radical and inherent defects in the general scheme of the College as to demand the interference of Parliament further than to enable the corporation to extend the benefits of the foundation to a degree commensurate with the largeness of its means, and to modify the plan of the founder, without altering its essential features, so as to adapt it to the circumstances of the times? We do not believe there are.

To evince the justice of that opinion, we can perhaps take no better way than to compare the scheme of the founder with that which the Charity Commissioners propose to substitute for it. The Commissioners, as it is pretty generally known, sent down their inspector, Mr. Hare, in the course of last year, to institute 'an inquiry into the state and administration of the charity.' As to the manner in which that inquiry was conducted, the less we say the better it will be for the credit of the Commissioners. A number of witnesses were examined in the most rambling and desultory way, seemingly for no other purpose than to throw odium on the governing body of the College, to show that the corporation was very rich, and that the poor scholars were very badly taught. The cry of 'Mad dog,' in short, was raised, and anybody who chose was admitted to throw a stone. With the evidence, however, such as it was, the Commissioners appear to have been satisfied. It was proved that the College was very wealthy, and that it did very little for the money; and from these premises, the Commissioners jumped at once to the conclusion that the corporation ought to be abolished, and its funds transferred to their own management. Assuming that they had the power to 'make an order' to put an extinguisher on Dulwich College, they forthwith issued a scheme to that effect; and although, as it turns out, they overrated their power,¹ and the scheme accordingly does not

¹ Twenty years ago the old Charity Commissioners made an attempt to interfere with the management of Dulwich College. In 1836 an information, on the basis of their Report of 1835, was filed in Chancery by the Attorney-General, which, after alleging various abuses, prayed for the interference of the court; but the real object of the suit was to prove that the corporation of Dulwich College were trustees in respect to part of their funds for the benefit of poor men and poor women not members of it. It is hardly necessary to say that the Master of the Rolls, before whom the case was heard, gave for judgment that the corporators held no part of the original endowments of the College in trust for the benefit of any persons not members of it, or for general purposes of charity, and that, as to the alleged abuses, they might, for all that appeared, be remedied by the visitor, who did not refuse to act for himself, although he was willing to concur in all necessary proceedings for introducing such regulations as the court might direct.

tell us what the Commissioners are going to do with Dulwich College, but what they would do with it if they could, their mistake has been attended with this good consequence, that we know beforehand what to expect, should the Commissioners obtain from Parliament such additional powers as are necessary to enable them to take in hand the affairs of the College.

Let us now see what this new scheme is to do with Dulwich College.

In the first place, the existing corporation is to be dissolved, and with it the idea of a College, in the sense in which the word was understood by the founder.

2. The College buildings are to be converted to the uses of a school, in which the masters of it are *not* to reside.

3. The chapel services are to be abolished; and instead, a district church is to be built and endowed at the expense of the charity funds. For all that appears, the boys who are to be boarded in the College to the number of sixty (in the first instance), are to be under no superintendence of any kind. The masters are to reside elsewhere, and to keep boarders themselves; and the warden, a new officer with the old name, a sort of steward, who is to superintend the establishment, keep the accounts, receive rents, &c., is to dwell in a residence provided for him: but where it is not said.

4. The poor brethren and sisters are to be turned out to make room for the boarders, and are to live elsewhere in houses to be provided for them. Their number is to be raised to twenty-four, if the circumstances of the charity permit; but they also may be reduced to *any lower number*. The rule laid down by the founder in the first selection of the poor men and women—that they shall be such as have *longest* received alms from their respective parishes—is reversed in the new scheme; they are not to be eligible if, within three years preceding, they have been in receipt of parochial relief. It is proposed also, that in lieu of the ‘thirty members,’ there shall be sixteen, or *any less number*, of out-pensioners.

5. The governing body of the College is to consist of a president and fifteen governors; of whom ten are to have the sole qualifications of being, in the judgment of the Charity Commissioners, ‘fit and proper persons,’ and of residing within twenty (!) miles of Dulwich. The remaining five are to be the incumbent of the proposed district church, and ‘four fit and proper persons’ elected by the vestry of each of the four parishes of S. Saviour, S. Luke, S. Botolph Bishopsgate, and Camberwell.

6. There are to be two schools, an upper and a lower: the former with a head and under master, and, if need be, assistant

masters and teachers; and the latter with a master, and, if need be, assistant teachers. The upper or 'classical school' to be located in the present College buildings, which are to be altered or added to for that purpose, is to consist of boarders, day-scholars, who may be partially boarded, and, 'when the circumstances of the charity permit,' of foundation scholars. The foundation scholars of the upper school are to be chosen for merit and good conduct from the day-scholars or boarders attending the upper or lower school, without any regard to the qualifications designed by the founder;¹ they are to wear a distinguishing dress, and to be clothed, maintained, and educated at the entire expense of the charity.

There are to be a certain number of exhibitions or scholarships (not exceeding eight) of £100 per annum each, open to the competition of all the boys at the upper school indiscriminately; but only two of them to be awarded in any one year. Each exhibition to be tenable for four years, or any less period: provided that the holder shall continue during his tenure to be a resident member of some one of the English Universities, or a *bonâ fide* student of some one of the learned or scientific professions, or of the Fine Arts.

The lower or grammar-school is to consist of foundation scholars (not exceeding sixty in number at any one time) and day-scholars, who may be partially boarded.

The foundation scholars are to be 'the children of deserving 'parents of the industrial or poorer classes resident in any one 'of the four parishes, one-fourth of the whole number being 'always elected from each parish.' These foundation scholars of the lower school are to be clothed, maintained, and educated at the expense of the charity. Twelve or any less number of exhibitions or scholarships of £40 a-year each, tenable for four years, may be awarded by competition 'for the benefit or support' of foundation or day-scholars in the lower school.

Now, looking at the charitable and educational provisions of this scheme, we are not so much disposed to quarrel with the thing proposed to be done, so far as it goes, as with the proposed mode of doing it. The number of poor brethren and sisters and poor scholars might very well be doubled under the present circumstances of the College,—the College school, large as it was intended by the founder to be, might still be considerably enlarged, and the grammar-school (which has an

¹ It will have been noticed that, although it was the general intention of the founder that the scholars of the corporation were to be selected on the ground of poverty, yet his primary idea was that they were to be 'orphans without father or mother.' It seems to us that this circumstance puts it in the power of the assistants to recommend for nomination to the poor scholarships orphan children of any rank in life, if they are badly provided for.

endowment of its own) improved. But admitting the desirableness of these objects, one does not see any natural or necessary connexion between the accomplishment of them, and the dissolution of the existing corporation. It is, of course, nothing to the purpose to say that there are parts of the scheme which the existing corporation, bound as they are by their charter and statutes, cannot carry into effect; since the immediate question is, not whether the corporation can legally carry the Commissioners' scheme into operation, but whether, supposing the necessary powers were supplied to either the one or the other, the purposes of the scheme could not be accomplished by the corporation more simply, more efficiently, and more in accordance with the mind of the founder, than they could by the new governing body which the Commissioners propose to substitute.

In the first place, then, is the existing government of the College so defective in its plan,—does it present so many openings for abuse and mismanagement,—is it so unsuited to the working of that part of the Commissioners' scheme which relates to education, as to shut the door against any middle course, and make its entire reconstruction a matter of necessity? On the contrary, we believe that the existing form of the government of the College is of that very kind which experience has demonstrated to be the most efficient, and the most easily checked in any tendency towards abuse and mismanagement. The College, it will be remembered, is now placed under the ultimate responsibility of a single head, in the person of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The master governs by the statutes, and in ordinary matters, not statutory, by the votes of the other members of the College. All the proceedings of the corporation are under the *surveillance* of the assistants, who, besides, have to some extent a voice in the government of the College, particularly with respect to the disposal of its funds; and, above these, the ultimate responsibility for the whole management is vested in the archbishop, who, as visitor, is chargeable with every abuse, every neglect of duty, which he has not taken the necessary proceedings to correct. It does not seem to us easy to imagine any scheme offering fewer facilities for corruption and abuse, or greater facility, if not for correcting abuses, at least for laying the public finger on the parties in fault. And will anyone be bold enough to affirm that management by a large, unpaid committee, possesses these characteristics? Is not the reverse invariably true of such bodies?

But then, it may be retorted,—if the system you advocate be so good, why has it not worked better? Why? Simply

because it has not been worked at all; at any rate, for years past. From the days of Archbishop Wake down to the days in which we live, the successive archbishops of Canterbury have neglected their duties, and, for all that appears, seem to have almost forgotten the very existence of Dulwich College. To the credit of the present archbishop, it must be said that he has roused himself from this lethargy, and, having taken the initiative, we trust that his efforts will not cease until the affairs of the College shall have undergone a thorough revision; but during the long period we have mentioned, that is, for more than a century, interference on the part of the visitors seems never to have been thought of. Coming down to more recent times, we find, indeed, the record of some communication between the College and the visitor; but it is not much to the credit of the latter. The Commissioners of Charities, in their Report for 1835-6, state that 'they were informed by the late Master John Allen, that when he became warden in 1811, he communicated to the visitor his desire to make the school as efficient as possible, and that the visitor intimated to him in return that the school had engaged much of his own attention; but he found so many obstacles to any alteration in the course so long pursued, that he recommended the College to go on as they were then doing, and to qualify the boys for becoming respectable tradesmen.' If nothing was done at that time to render the school more efficient, it is clear enough on whose shoulders the blame rested.

And compare the position of the archbishop in the present system with that which the Charity Commissioners propose to assign to his Grace in the new governing body. We are still to have the archbishop as a sort of head to the College; but then, he is to be a head without individual responsibility. An archbishop as visitor of a College, vested with large powers, and ultimately responsible for its well-being, and an archbishop as chairman, merely, of a committee of fifteen governors, are not quite the same thing. In the latter capacity, can the public hook ever lay hold of him? He is one only of sixteen, and may be outvoted and obliged to agree to that which he disapproves of, in every case that comes before them; and, besides, is it likely that his Grace will feel the duty of presiding frequently over so numerous a body of 'fit and proper persons' to be a very pressing one?

But, secondly, is the staff at the disposal of the College for educational purposes insufficient for the working of such a scheme as the Commissioners propose? That cannot be said. The permanent staff contemplated by the Commissioners is precisely the same as that already possessed by the College, viz. one head master and one under master for the College school

(termed by the Commissioners the upper school); and one master (maintained by a separate endowment) for the grammar school, which the Commissioners propose to convert into the lower College school.

We wish, then, to know on what ground, so far as education is concerned, it is proposed to supersede the corporation of Dulwich College. Is there a single advantage to be gained by the substitution of a miscellaneous body of nondescript governors for the present authorities? On the contrary, does not experience warrant our believing that such a change would sooner or later prove the very reverse of beneficial? Or is there anything in the educational scheme of the Commissioners which the corporation itself, supposing they agreed to it and had the necessary powers, could not carry into effect? Nothing whatever that we can discover. By the statutes of the College, the corporation is bound to conduct its classical school on the model of Westminster. Can they do so? If they can,—and what is to hinder them if they choose?—what appreciable object should we gain by dismissing one staff of teachers, and setting up another precisely similar to it? The enlargement of the school is quite another question. Even admitting that the powers of the corporation are defective on that head, does it follow therefore that the corporation ought to be dissolved? No, truly. Just as well might we argue, that because the Commissioners of Charities have no power at all to meddle with Dulwich College, they therefore ought never to have any. If the necessary powers are wanting on both sides, the question is simply, whether the objects in view will be best accomplished by supplying what is deficient in the powers of the corporation, or by abolishing the corporation, and placing the necessary powers in the hands of the proposed new governing body. We do not believe, however, that the powers of the corporation are so deficient as they are supposed to be. What is to prevent them, if they choose, from increasing the pupils in the College school to the statutory number of eighty, the foundation scholars included. The founder considered it to be for the interest of the College that it should have such a school; and he accordingly made provisions for it by his statutes. One of those provisions was, that any number of the sixty-eight *non*-foundation scholars might be boarded in the College; and if the corporation chooses, it may make arrangements for boarding the whole of them, and so exceed the number proposed to be boarded by the scheme of the Charity Commissioners. Or if the corporation thought that the whole number of *non*-foundation pupils in the school might be doubled or trebled with advantage, would the visitor find any difficulty in obtaining power (if he needed it) to authorize such an increase?

The question of increasing the number of foundation scholars is a distinct one; but the solution of it does not appear to us to present any insurmountable difficulties. The power which originally created that section of the corporation still exists, and can mould it into any other shape.

There is, however, another view of the matter, which must be taken. Hitherto we have spoken only of the existing staff of educators in the College, and that solely with reference to the scheme of instruction proposed by the Charity Commissioners; but it will be remembered that Alleyn designed the College school to be *an industrial* as well as a *classical* one. Four of the chanter, *alias* junior fellows, were, as we have seen, to give instruction daily to a certain number of the poor scholars in handicraft trades, or manufactures of the better sort. Let us now consider what is really involved in this idea of the founder.

The notion, of men being at once choristers in the chapel and teachers of handicrafts in the school, sounds, we admit, rather droll to modern ears; but in Alleyn's days, the incongruity of the occupations would not have occurred to any one.¹ Not, indeed, that there is any real incongruity. Everybody knows that Sir Thomas More, when he was Lord High Chancellor of England, used to put on a surplice, and 'sing his part in the quire,' in the parish church of Chelsea; and even now it is a fact that choral service is maintained in some churches entirely by amateurs of all ranks and pursuits. But passing this, let us confine ourselves to the educational employments of the four chanter. Now, it must be borne in mind that the founder wrote in the language and with the ideas of his time, when all manufactures were termed trades, and when *there was no manufacture which was not handicraft*. Everything was at that time produced by *hand labour*. When, therefore, he directed that the scholars should be taught, and afterwards 'put and set to good and sweet trades and occupations,' and among the examples he gave, mentioned one at least which requires considerable knowledge of design, he certainly did not mean that they were merely to be 'qualified to become respectable tradesmen' in the sense in which the words were employed by the Archbishop in 1811, and in which we still use them. Undoubtedly he says that they were to be taught handicraft trades; but then, all handicraft pursuits, from painting and sculpture down to shoemaking, were trades in his days. We conceive,

¹ At the time Alleyn lived, music, especially vocal music, was universally cultivated. Mr. P. Collier mentions the well-known fact, that a gittern or a lute was invariably to be found in 'barbers' shops, in order that their customers might amuse themselves while waiting their turn for the barber's services.

therefore, that his intentions are to be taken in a larger sense than his words, interpreted by the modern use of them, seem to convey. It is not likely that there was in his mind any such hiatus, as there is in ours, between the notion of one scholar being sent to the University and another becoming a shoemaker. All the scholars, it must be remembered, were to be well educated, whether they went to the University or not; and as such an education as he provided, even for those who were judged unfit for the Universities, was not common at that time, except among persons of rank, or among those who were intended for the learned professions, we can hardly imagine his having contemplated for a moment that the poor boys should be elevated out of their sphere, educated, and then thrown back into a grade of society in which the education they had received would prove rather a curse than a blessing to them. It is more probable that he intended merely, in a general way, to signify that the scholars who had not ability enough to warrant their being sent to the University, were to apply themselves to manufactures, as far as might be, of the better sort; and his mention of embroidery (a favourite amusement of ladies of rank at that time), along with the crafts of the glover, the shoemaker, and tailor, as examples of the kind of trades which the scholars were to have, is strongly confirmatory of this. Embroidery is a species of painting, and even in its lower forms depends more on artistic design than on handicraft skill; and if it be remembered that the dresses, gloves, and shoes of the higher orders in the earlier part of the seventeenth century were elaborately ornamented, and far more costly than they are now, there will appear to be good reason for supposing that Alleyn more especially intended that the poor scholars should belong to that middle class of artist-workmen which existed in his time, and ranged between the artist and the mere mechanic, and which the substitution of machinery for hand labour has gradually, since then, almost entirely obliterated. And if the sort of instruction which he provided for had been given continuously from the commencement of the College, and had kept pace, and had been developed in accordance, with the varying circumstances, the requirements and progress of industry, no very great disparity would have existed by this time between the studies and pursuits of those scholars who were to be sent to the University, and of those who were to apply themselves to manufactures. Supposing Alleyn to reappear among us, and be made aware of the altered condition of manufactures, would he still say, 'Let those boys who are unfit for the University be put out apprentices to shoemakers, glovers, or tailors.' We cannot believe it. 'My object,' he would say, 'was that, in

'conformity with the superior education they were to receive, 'they should devote themselves to manufactures of the better sort; but the condition of that kind of industry which I had in view is now entirely changed. My object, therefore, must be 'accomplished by different means; and, looking at the present 'state of things, I should now say, let them be instructed in the 'scientific and artistic elements on which excellence of manufacture depends: instead of specific handicrafts, let them be 'taught generally the application of science and art to industry.' If the 'Department of Science and Art' had existed in Alleyn's days, is it not extremely probable that his alternative for the poor scholars would have been, either to go to the University, or to be sent to the schools of that department with a view to their becoming intelligent manufacturers, overseers of works, designers, engineers, artist-workmen, and the like; or, at the least, that he would have pointed out those schools as the models for the industrial section of the College school, just as he made Westminster and S. Paul's schools the models for the classical section of it?

It will be seen, then, that the endeavour we made to establish the legality of the founder's provisions respecting the chanthers or junior fellows was not without an object. We recognised in those provisions, so far as the school was concerned, not only the germ of an important branch of education, but the means of developing it; and hence it became of consequence to show that it was in the power of the College itself, by means ready prepared to its hand, to promote a kind of instruction, the value of which, and its consistency with the general scheme of the founder, will not be questioned even by those who may take a lower estimate of his specific intentions in this particular than we do. Dulwich College has, we conceive, within it the elements of a great classical, scientific, and artistic, and, we will add, religious school; and if the visitor and the corporation itself have a mind, and will lay their shoulders to the wheel, they have it in power, with comparatively little aid from the Court of Chancery or the Crown, to make it not only take its place in the foremost rank of our public schools, but, as the 'Times' desires, 'become, 'in conformity with the character of the founder, the seat of an 'education somewhat more practical and religious than our 'public schools supply.'

Only two other points remain to be noticed. The Charity Commissioners propose to abolish the College chapel, and build in lieu of it a church, to which a district for spiritual purposes is to be assigned. Now, it will have been seen from the deed of consecration that the chapel is already a parochial one, and, saving the rights of the parish church of Camberwell, was con-

secrated for all spiritual purposes, for the use of the College and of the inhabitants who were then residing, or should for all time to come reside, in the hamlet of Dulwich. So far, then, as the inhabitants of that part of the Dulwich estates are concerned, the proposal of the Commissioners may be said to be in accordance with the founder's intention. But is that the case with respect to the College itself? Surely not. He did not, like the Commissioners, look on religious education as mere 'religious instruction' in conformity with the doctrines of the Church of 'England.' He provided for that, and made the archbishop or his assessor the judge of the scholars' proficiency in that kind of teaching; but he also provided for more, viz. their religious training. Their heads were not to be *crammed* merely with doctrines—they were also to undergo a religious and æsthetical training by daily participation in the services of the Church, conducted after the best models, and by being placed under the constant supervision and guidance of its ministers. Nothing, indeed, is more marked than the founder's solicitude for the moral and religious welfare of every inmate of the College: and that he considered the services of the chapel a main instrument towards that end cannot be doubted. He obviously desired that those services should be attractive in themselves, and interesting to those who attended them. While he provided that the solemnity of Divine service should be enhanced by the best aids of music, he also sought to induce all the inmates of the College to qualify themselves to take part in the musical performance of it.

And then let it be considered how the poor brethren and sisters would fare under the scheme of the Commissioners. The infirm among them, the decrepit, the aged, those unable to move about, would be deprived of the privilege they now enjoy—perhaps the chief solace of their waning years—from inability to resort to the proposed district church. It is one thing to hobble or be wheeled along through the corridors of the College to the chapel on any day of the week when they may be able to attend, and quite another to have to travel perhaps a quarter of a mile to a church, the doors of which may be closed to them except on Sundays.

But it is doubtful whether the proposal of the Commissioners, even were it entertained by the College itself, could be now, at least, carried into effect. No district can be constituted, under the present Act of Parliament, containing within its limits any *consecrated church or chapel* in use for the purposes of Divine worship; and it is uncertain, besides, whether the whole number of inhabitants in Dulwich and its immediate neighbourhood comes up at present to the *minimum* required

by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners as a condition of their entertaining any application for a district. Still, even admitting that the ecclesiastical *status* of Dulwich is an anomalous one, and places the clergy of the College in a somewhat unfair position, we do not believe that the time has come for any further change than might be made through the intervention of the visitor and the bishop of the diocese, by some understanding with the incumbent of Camberwell. If the College were to emerge from its obscure inactivity, and develop itself into a large and important school for literature, and for science and art in their relation to industry, a necessity would arise for adding to the present College buildings, and for reconstructing the chapel on a larger scale. In that case, a fair opening would occur for defining the extra-collegiate duties of the College clergy; and it might then be determined whether their ministry should be confined to the College itself, or extended over the hamlet and its neighbourhood by the legal assignment of a district for spiritual purposes.

The other point remaining to be noticed is amusing. It is seldom that people are able to get up a good grievance—one, at least, which everybody can appreciate and sympathise with; but we think that the Royal Academy has really a strong case against the Charity Commissioners. We had always believed that 'feeding the hungry' was one of the works of charity; but this, it would seem, is not the opinion of the Commissioners for Charities. It is all very well for individuals to feed the hungry; but with Commissioners it is quite another affair; and so they propose to do the very reverse, and to close the doors of Dulwich College against the Royal Academicians, and deprive them of their accustomed feast on their patron S. Luke's day. The case is this: Sir Francis Bourgeois, who was a Royal Academician, in bequeathing his pictures to Dulwich, either directed, or intended to direct, that the President and Academicians of the Royal Academy should be invested with power of ascertaining from time to time that his collection of pictures, &c., was properly cared for, and that for this purpose they should be requested to visit the collection once in every year, on S. Luke's day, and give their opinion as to the state and preservation of the pictures. Though a Frenchman or a Swiss, Sir Francis entertained the very English notion that business is best discussed over a dinner; so he wished that the Academicians should dine together in the gallery on the occasion of their visit to the College. No provision, however, was made for the fulfilment of his hospitable intentions until the death of his executrix Madame Noel Desenfans, who by her will left to the

College a sum of money and other things for the purpose. After reciting the intentions of 'her late dear friend, Sir Peter Francis Bourgeois,' (to whom, by the way, the pictures had been bequeathed by her late husband,) she proceeds to say, that, highly approving as she did of this annual visitation of the Academy, 'she gave and bequeathed the sum of 500*l.* to the 'master and fellows of the College *upon trust*, to lay out and 'invest the same in Government or real securities at interest, 'and apply the interest to arise therefrom *for ever* towards the 'entertainment of the President and Academicians of the Royal 'Academy on their annual visit to Dulwich College; and in 'order that the said annual dinner and entertainment might be 'properly and suitably given, she bequeathed the following 'articles to the master and fellows of the College, which she 'directed should be preserved by them, and *never be used on any 'other occasion or for any other purpose whatsoever.*' Then follows a list of upwards of a hundred articles of silver-plate and other things of less value.

This annual visitation and dinner is the pet enjoyment of the Royal Academicians. It is their own; they have a right to it. Their tenure of the rooms in Trafalgar Square was always disputed by the late Joseph Hume, and is still reckoned questionable by others; some even go the length of saying that it is doubtful whether the funds of the Academy are its exclusive property; but here was an affair entirely its own:—Dulwich was to the Academicians what Greenwich is to Her Majesty's Ministers, and the Star and Garter at Richmond to City Corporations. But, alas, for the perpetuity of artistic felicity! alas, for this green spot in Academic existence! the Charity Commissioners are going to plough it up. The fifteen 'fit and proper persons' are to pack up the Dulwich pictures and send them elsewhere. With the approbation of the Charity Commissioners, they are to 'make provision for the deposit, custody, 'and exhibition of the pictures, either in connexion with the 'National Gallery or elsewhere;' but they are not going to make any provision for the Academic dinner. And what is to become of the hundred and six articles of silver-plate 'with the arms and crest of M. J. Noel Desenfans engraved thereon,' which the corporation was to preserve in trust for ever for the sole use of the Academic body?

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the foregoing was in type, the Commissioners for Charities have issued a second scheme 'for the application and management' of Dulwich College; or, to speak more accurately, they have, within the last few days, put forth the scheme of which the former document professed only to give the heads. So far as education and charity are concerned, the provisions of the scheme remain much as they were; but, in other respects, the Commissioners have introduced considerable modifications.

In the first place, the charity is no longer to be called the 'College of God's Gift,' but 'Alleyne's College in Dulwich.'

Secondly, the Archbishop is not to be President of the Governors, but Visitor of the College, as heretofore.

Thirdly, the Governors are to be twelve in number, instead of fifteen. Four of them are to be called 'Elective Governors,' and are to be chosen respectively by the vestries of the four parishes of S. Saviour, S. Luke, S. Botolph, and S. Giles, Camberwell. The remaining eight are to be appointed by the Court of Chancery in the first instance, but afterwards, subject to the approval of the Charity Commissioners, they are to be *self-elected*.

Fourthly, the Head Master of the Upper School is to be styled the 'Master of Alleyne's College,' and to have the general superintendence and control of the Charity and its establishment, subject to the direction of the Governors, to whom he is to be responsible for its conduct.

Fifthly, there is to be a Chaplain to the College, who is to perform Divine service in the chapel to be attached to it, and who, if an ecclesiastical district comprising the hamlet of Dulwich be created, may become the incumbent of it, subject and without prejudice to the performance of his College duties. Until the appointment of such Chaplain, the present first and other fellows of the College are to continue as heretofore to perform, or provide for the performance of Divine service, either in the present chapel of the College, or in some other building appointed by the Governors; and to discharge the other spiritual duties heretofore discharged by them; but they are to be exempted from residence in the College, and may marry.

Sixthly, 'A suitable chapel, in a convenient situation for the objects and purpose of the Charity, may be erected and fitted up by the Governors, upon a plan to be approved by the Visitor of the College, for the performance of Divine service, according to the rites and ordinances of the Church of England; and

'suitable accommodation shall be provided in such chapel for the
'Governors and the Masters and boys of both schools, and for
'the establishment and servants of the College, and for the alms-
'people, and for all other persons belonging or attached to the
'Charity; and, in the construction of the chapel, arrangements
'shall be made for affording to the inhabitants of the hamlet of
'Dulwich an equal extent of accommodation to that heretofore
'enjoyed by them in the present chapel of the College; having
'regard also to the probable increase of population in the hamlet.
And the present chapel, until some other be erected, is to be
used, as far as practicable, for these purposes; the Governors
reserving the right to require pew-rent from persons not belong-
ing to the establishment.

And, lastly, the officer termed 'Warden,' in the former
document issued by the Commissioners, is now to be called
'Receiver and Clerk;' his duties being to manage the accounts,
receive rents, &c.

These modifications of the original scheme of the Commis-
sioners, while they evince the justness of the strictures we have
passed upon several of its provisions, leave our general argument
where it was. We still cannot regard the proposed scheme for
the government of the charity as any improvement on the
existing one, but the contrary. We still do not understand
why the present corporation cannot do all that the Commis-
sioners propose. The modifications introduced into the new
scheme, so far as they go, are seeming approximations to the
plan of the founder; and very possibly they were intended to
have an air of respect to his intentions; but the approximation
is only in appearance. Although the Archbishop is restored to
his office of Visitor, 'with the same authorities, rights, and
privileges as heretofore,' yet it is only 'so far as the same shall
not be inconsistent with the new scheme;' a qualifying clause
which, it is obvious, lops off the whole of his visitatorial powers,
excepting those which relate to the enforcement of ecclesiastical
laws (for which his special interference is not required), and to
the general religious welfare of the institution. As to the
management of the schools, and the other purposes of the
charity, unless some ecclesiastical law might happen to be
involved, it does not seem that his Grace would ever have any
power to interfere; at all events, his interference would be
unnecessary; and, indeed, the proposed new Governors con-
template so small an amount of supervision on the part of the
Archbishop, even where the offices of religion are concerned,
that they are to take upon themselves to determine on what
days and times, besides Sundays, Divine service shall be per-
formed in the chapel. Perhaps, in this case, the Commissioners

abstained from inserting the clause, 'with the consent of the Visitor,' from a shrewd suspicion that his Grace could only in such a matter refer them to the Act of Uniformity for their guidance. But it is useless to disguise the case:—the Archbishop would have no real power whatever under the proposed scheme. The governing body is to be entirely independent of the Visitor: they are not to be accountable to him; so that, unless we suppose his Grace to act as a kind of inspector on behalf of the twelve 'fit and proper persons,' there does not seem to be anything left for the Archbishop to do,—at least there is nothing which might not and would not be done by the Bishop of the diocese in the ordinary exercise of his Episcopal functions.

With respect to the proposed governing body, there is one provision in the new scheme which deserves particular notice; not, indeed, because there is anything new or unusual in it. Far from it. Nothing, unfortunately, is more usual, in the appointment of large committees of management, than to anticipate and provide for the invariable fact, that one-half, at the least, of the members of such bodies never attend meetings at all, or only at rare intervals; and that, in the long run, the management virtually comes into the hands of a small minority. It never seems to occur to any one, that, if this be true—and nobody denies it—large committees of management are not desirable things; and that, if we are to have such managing bodies at all, they ought to consist of the smallest possible number of persons, whose attendance should all but be compulsory. This, however, is a point of 'administrative reform' which we have not yet reached. Large bodies of governors are reckoned, as yet, among the 'time-honoured institutions' of the country; they cannot be got rid of. Though we know perfectly well beforehand that a large proportion of the members of such bodies will never earnestly and heartily give themselves to the business to be transacted, we appoint them all the same, and content ourselves with laying down a rule that, if any one neglects his duties for a year or two, he shall be compelled to resign his office. Though we are perfectly certain that the management undertaken by a large body will virtually fall into the hands of a minority of its members, the utmost we do is to provide that the minority shall not descend below a certain number. There is, we confess, something to us inexpressibly ludicrous in the estimate which the Commissioners of Charities have gravely and coolly formed of the working of the large body of governors under whose management they propose to place Dulwich College. Experience, no doubt, guided them, when they anticipated that there would be Governors who, for *two*

whole years, would neglect the trust confided to them, and that *five* might be regarded as a reasonably good attendance out of a body of twelve; but surely the same experience might have led them to conclude that if they were to reduce the body of Governors to one-half the proposed number, and make the *quorum* a majority instead of a minority of the whole body, the business committed to it would be all the better transacted.

With reference, however, to the immediate purpose of these remarks, there is another point in which experience may afford us some insight into the probable working of the proposed new governing body. So far as conscientious motives, sense of propriety, and inclination are concerned, all the governors may be assumed to be on an equal footing; but if some of them, in addition to these general incentives to duty, are impelled besides by a special sense of responsibility for certain interests committed to them, we may be quite sure that, whatever others do, these will not be found wanting. Now, the delegates from the four parishes—the ‘Elective Governors’—will be precisely in this position; and it requires, we think, no great discernment to foretell that in the long-run they will form a majority of the *quorum* of the proposed governing body. There is no objection to this: on the contrary, it is just as it should be; but if so, two questions arise. In the first place, if the real governing body, notwithstanding the formidable array of twelve ‘fit and proper persons,’ will turn out, in the main, to consist only of the four representatives of the parishes, why not frankly and openly at once commit to them the government of the charity? Why not formally concentrate on them the responsibilities of its management? But, secondly, if the probabilities of the case are such as we suppose, is not the scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the government of Dulwich College precisely the same in principle and in effect as if they had abolished the corporation, and transferred the management of the charity to the assistants?

Then with respect to the proposed ‘Master of Allyn’s College.’ We have here again a seeming approximation to the plan of the founder; but it is only nominal. The master is to have the general superintendence and control of the charity and its establishment, but subject to the authority and direction of the Governors; and there is, besides, an essential difference between the present and the contemplated mastership, of which the importance can hardly be over-estimated. The office of the present master consists solely in seeing that the statutes of the College are duly obeyed. To the performance of that duty he can be compelled, both by the assistants and the visitor; and if, in the performance of it, he meets with opposition, he can resort

to them for assistance. But he himself undertakes none of those special duties over the exercise of which his supervision extends.

The proposed 'master,' on the other hand, is to be Head Master of the Upper School,—that is to say, he is to *superintend on the part of the Governors*, the performance of duties, the chief part of which are to be done by himself. Can a man, placed in such a position, be expected to furnish to the Governors a very impartial account of the state of the school? Would he ever, under any circumstances, report unfavourably of his own teaching? He is at the best but a witness in his own cause; and we all know what the value of such testimony would be, if for any, or no reason, the governors had lost confidence in his management. The Governors, it is true, might satisfy themselves as to the state of the school by the employment of inspectors: granted. But does not the admission of the necessity of such an expedient only the more forcibly evince the wise simplicity of the founder's scheme, which already possesses, in several forms, this check on efficiency?

ART. IV.—*A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination.* By J. B. MOZLEY, B.D., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street. 1855.

'THE design of this treatise is to give an account of S. Augustine's doctrine of Predestination, together with such comments as may be necessary for a due examination of and judgment upon it.'

Such are the words in which its author commences a work which will be admitted by every competent reader to exhibit very remarkable powers. It is a work of no pretence or assumption, yet there is abundant evidence, in almost every page, that it has formed the careful labour of years. To give our readers any adequate idea of the subjects discussed, or the ground traversed in it, would require a volume of itself, and will therefore greatly exceed both our space and our ability. Almost identical in title with the ponderous folio of Jansen, though entirely free from his occasional Supralapsarian tendencies, it discusses several of the more important historical and doctrinal subjects contained in the work of that learned prelate. Having in his first and second chapters stated and examined the arguments for Predestination, Mr. Mozley's third chapter, like Jansen's first part, is occupied with an historical examination of the Pelagian controversy. His fourth chapter contains, like the Bishop of Ypres' second part, a statement of the doctrine of Original Sin, and of human nature in its fallen state, in relation to which Mr. Mozley, in his four following chapters, like Jansen in his third part, enters at length into S. Augustine's doctrines of Predestination, Grace, and Free-will. The ninth and tenth chapters contain an examination of the doctrines of the Schoolmen, as found in their chief doctor, S. Thomas Aquinas, on Necessity and Predestination; and after a summary of, and judgment on, the systems of S. Augustine and Pelagius, the present writer proceeds in his eleventh or concluding chapter to apply his work in a call to union upon those who, differing on Grace itself, differ also on the Sacrament of Baptism, as the means and instrument of its conveyance.

Mr. Mozley is no advocate for absolute Predestination; on the contrary, it is the object of his work to show that there is no authority for such a doctrine, either in philosophy or revelation; and, in consequence, in so far as S. Augustine does teach it, putting partial or relative for full and perfect truth, we must receive

with caution the writings of the great Western Doctor. Mr. Mozley himself commences his work by laying down the difference between the Predestination of the Predestinarian, and of the Necessitarian or Fatalist. While both agree that men act necessarily, and not by an original motion of the will, the fatalist draws his conclusion merely from philosophy, which teaches him, arguing backwards, that every event must have a cause. He is thus carried back from cause to cause, until he arrives at last at an external cause, by which the agent is moved to act independently of himself, so that to him free-will is proved to be not only false but impossible. The fatal flaw in this argument is, that by making the Divinity the original Source of all things whatever, the Necessitarian must make Him the Source of evil, otherwise he destroys his whole foundation, being compelled to admit that the Divine Omnipotence meets, as Mr. Mozley says, with 'something counter to it, and so cannot be argued upon as if it were the whole of the truth under consideration.' The Predestinarian, on the other hand, concluding from Revelation, and arguing from the great First Cause therein revealed, admits that the first man was created with free-will, and therefore believes its existence possible, though, warned by the Fall, he considers it an endowment no longer existing. S. Augustine and the Jansenists adopt mainly the latter ground, the mediævalist writers mostly the former; each, however, borrowing something from the chief source of the other, and both referring to the fact of the Fall as the ground of the doctrine of Predestination. The result of the Fall is the fact of original sin, which, in the system of S. Augustine, renders necessary to man restoration, not, as at his first creation, a merely conditional grace resting on a will, now overthrown and proved incapable of availing itself of such help, but an absolute and overruling act of Divine power, working in man, its subject, with irresistible might and certainty. From this follows Predestination—follows, that is, as a doctrine, not, of course, as a fact,¹ God necessarily foreseeing from all eternity what He would do. The condition on which He, in His secret counsels, allotted eternal life to those to whom He does allot it, is obedience and holiness, that they may possess which He, in Mr. Mozley's words, 'necessarily resolves to bestow some grace upon them, 'which will control their wills and insure this result . . . the 'Divine saving act being the bestowal of this irresistible grace.'

'Here, then,' he proceeds, 'it must be observed, is the real essence and substance of the doctrine of Predestination. Predestinarians do not differ from their opponents in the idea of eternal Divine decrees, which, though popularly connected with this system more than with others, belongs, in truth,

¹ Mozley, pp. 9, 12.

to all theological systems alike. For the believer in free-will, who only admits an assisting grace of God, and not a controlling one, must still believe that God determined to give that assisting grace, in whatsoever instances He does give it, from all eternity. Nor do they differ from their opponents in the ground or reason of God's final judgment, and dispensing of reward and punishment; for this takes place in both schemes wholly upon the moral ground of the individual's good or bad character. But the difference between the Predestinarians and their opponents is as to that act which is the subject-matter of the Divine decree, and as to the mode in which this difference of moral character is produced—that is to say, the two schools differ as to the nature, quality, and power of Divine grace under the Gospel; one school maintaining that that grace is only assisting grace, depending on the human will for its use and improvement; the other that it is irresistible grace. To the former school belong those who hold one interpretation of the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration; who maintain the Sacrament of Baptism to be the medium by which the power of living a holy life is imparted to the previously corrupt and impotent soul; which power, however, may be used or neglected according to the individual's own choice.

'The mode in which the doctrine of Predestination is extracted from the doctrine of original sin, being thus shown, it may be added that, by thus reducing as we have done, the former doctrine to its pith and substance, we evidently much widen the Scripture argument for it, extending it at once from those few and scattered passages where the word itself occurs, to a whole field of language. The whole Scripture doctrine of grace is now appealed to as being in substance the doctrine of Predestination, because there is only the Divine foreknowledge to be added to it, in order to make it such.'—P. 8.

If against this view it be urged that to ordain some to eternal life and others to eternal punishment is directly opposed, first, to our idea of justice, which teaches us that no man should suffer for another's sin, and secondly, to our experience, which shows us that we act, not as theoretical Predestination teaches, from compulsion, or an influence irresistible by us, but from choice; to the former objection it must be replied that the truth of original sin—that sin which descends from Adam to us, and makes us in God's secret counsels as verily guilty, and therefore as justly subject to punishment as he was, interposes.¹ And to the second objection, that this doctrine contradicts our experience, 'describing us,' to use Mr. Mozley's words, 'as acting from an 'irresistible influence, either for good or for evil; whereas 'we are conscious of will and choice, and feel that we are not 'forced to act in one way or another;' the Predestinarian replies in Mr. Mozley's statement, that 'it proceeds from a misapprehension as to the nature of this irresistible influence;' and Mr. Mozley concludes that, as far as the truth can be expressed in human language, these terms, which commonly signify an

¹ 'Original sins are therefore called the sins of others (aliena), because each derives them from his parents; but they are not without cause called our own also, because in that one parent, as the Apostle says, all sinned.'—S. Aug. de Corres. et Grat. § 9.

overwhelming power compelling a man to act against his inclination, are here used to express a power inclining the will itself, and not contradictory to an inclination already formed—the agent not being caused by it to act in spite of his will, but being caused to will. (Pages 14, 15.)

Having described the doctrine of Predestination, Mr. Mozley proceeds in his second chapter to the examination of the argument for it.

I. Philosophical Predestination, or Fatalism, stands chiefly on two grounds: first, the necessity (as before said) that every event must have a cause; and secondly, the idea of God as the Cause of all things. Mr. Mozley shows that the whole doctrine so supported is of the class not of absolute or complete, but of partial or indistinct, truths, because to the first premiss is opposed the fact, equally certain, that we have in ourselves the consciousness of our own power of free-will to do or not to do as we please. In like manner the second premiss—that the Divine Power is the cause of all things—is reduced from a perfect to a merely partial truth by the counter facts, first, of the existence of evil, and second, of the sense of free-will in ourselves, already alluded to.

‘The two ideas of the Divine Power and free-will are, in short, two great tendencies of thought inherent in our minds, which contradict each other, and can never be united or brought to a common goal; and which, therefore, inasmuch as the essential condition of absolute truth is consistency with other truth, can never, in the present state of our faculties, become absolute truths, but must remain for ever contradictory tendencies of thought, going on side by side, till they are lost sight of and disappear in the haze of our conceptions, like two parallel straight lines which go on to infinity without meeting. While they are sufficiently clear, then, for purposes of practical religion (for we cannot doubt that they are truths so far as and in that mode in which we apprehend them), these are truths upon which we cannot raise definite and absolute systems. All that we build upon either of them must partake of the imperfect nature of the premiss which supports it, and be held under a reserve of consistency with a counter conclusion from the opposite truth . . . I will add, as a natural corollary from this relation of these two ideas, that that alone is a genuine doctrine of free-will which maintains such a free-will in man as is *inconsistent* with our idea of the Divine Power. There is a kind of free-will which is consistent with this idea. All men, whatever be their theory of the motive principle of, admit the *fact* of, the human will; that we act willingly, and not like inanimate machines: nor does the Necessitarian deny that the human will is will, and as far as sensation goes, free, though he represents it as ultimately moved from without. Here, then, is a sort of free-will which is consistent with the idea of the Divine Power. But this, as was above explained, is not such a free-will as meets the demands of natural consciousness, which is satisfied with nothing short of a characteristic of will which comes into collision with our idea of the Divine Power—viz., originality.’—P. 29.

And if it be asserted against the doctrine of free-will, and in favour of an absolute doctrine of predestination, that it would

remove our actions from the control of Divine Providence, and so reduce this whole moral scheme of things to chance; or again, that God is the Author of all good, from which it will follow that man derives all goodness from a source beyond himself, the result of which is a grace that is irresistible, and, with this, Predestination; Mr. Mozley replies to the former—and here, of course, he entirely differs from the Supralapsarian—that whatever contradiction to reason it may be to admit a Divine foresight and prearrangement of events merely contingent, in that both facts are true in themselves, although we cannot solve the manner of their coexistence, we must be content to take them as they are, leaving the difficulty where we find it; and for the latter, the fact of God being the Author of all good, is only a relative, and so an imperfect or partial truth; for we are conscious in ourselves, on the other hand, of possessing the power not only of doing but also of originating actions good in themselves.

II. So too with Theological Predestination. The maintainer of this doctrine has been shown to deduce it from the fact of original sin—the result of the fall; but in order to do this in his manner, viz. to teach it not as a partial but as an absolute truth, he must carry his opinion of the result to us of the fall much further than either Holy Scripture or our own experience and self-knowledge will allow—he must represent man to be so utterly and universally ruined by it, as to have no power to do any one good thing whatever, and to be capable of recovery only by an act of irresistible grace; whereas we have in ourselves the knowledge and feeling of a counter truth—that, namely, of being able to do good and avoid evil, which, as Mr. Mozley says, ‘so far as it goes, contradicts the doctrine of the fall.’

‘The doctrine of the fall,’ he continues, ‘is held under a reserve on the side of the contrary truth; the doctrine of irresistible grace, then, must be held with the same reserve. So far as man is fallen he wants this grace; but so far as he is not fallen he does not want it. One inference, then, from one part of the whole premiss, lies under the liability to be contradicted by another from another part; and the legitimate issue is no whole or perfect conclusion, but only a conditional and imperfect one.

‘The Predestinarian, however, neglects this distinction, and upon an imperfect basis raises a definite and complete doctrine. Or, which is the same thing, he does not see that the basis *is* imperfect; he does not consent to holding the doctrine of the fall with this reserve, but imagines he has in this doctrine a complete truth, and he proceeds to use it as he would any ordinary premiss of reason or experience, and founds a perfect argumentative structure upon it.’—P. 33.

It is clear, then, that on the state of man after the fall will eventually turn the whole question. If he be as utterly ruined by it as is represented by the Predestinarian, nothing short of irresistible grace can recover him; but if he have any portion of

his original uprightness left, a grace which would assist and cooperate with it might be sufficient. Certainly there are two sides of this question revealed to us in Holy Scripture, and two separate lines of truth in consequence therein laid down. On the one hand our blessed Lord spoke—and not of necessity prophetically of Christians after Pentecost—of those who ‘in an honest and good heart bring forth fruit,’ and ‘of the just who need no repentance.’ On the other hand, S. Paul’s language in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans is as strong as it could well have been had he intended to teach in terms, that in no degree could any good act be performed by man not under grace. Still we understand his words of course with a limit, such as enables us to harmonize them with other portions of Scripture, *e. g.* the Dominical declarations above alluded to, and others like them.

And as the doctrine of original sin itself is a partial truth, so is that of the justice of our punishment for it, by which Predestination is defended. It is both just and, as it were, beyond justice, and each is true, though neither is the whole truth. Is it necessary to justice that God should act only in one manner to His creatures, and must that of necessity be on the side of favour? If a son be permitted to inherit good from his father, which he has not earned by his own labour, shall he not also inherit evil? On the other hand, how can the punishment of one for the sin of another, over which he neither had nor could have any control whatever, be reconciled with justice? Nor can the law which, sometimes at least, applies to inherited punishments under the second commandment, apply in this case. A son may be, and often is, punished for the sin of his father by some Divine act or arrangement, which may indeed be a punishment and a most sharp one to the parent, *i. e.* to the sin in his mind, yet be no punishment in itself or to the subject of it; perhaps even it may be a great blessing. Or he may be visited with some infliction of Divine displeasure, which is a real and undoubted punishment both in itself and to him, but which his probationary state may enable him to convert into a final reward. Yet in neither case can it be said that he is not punished. In the former, he will feel the punishment, not indeed in itself but in its effects; in the latter, he will feel it in itself. But the punishment of eternal death for the sin of Adam, considered in itself, is not of this kind; it is both a present punishment and a future; it is to this world and also to eternity; and it is, as far as the subject of it can act, immutable—he cannot convert it into a blessing hereafter. But there is, of God’s mercy, a counter truth to this arrangement of His justice. If we are warned in Scripture, on the one hand, that ‘in Adam all die,’

we are taught as clearly, on the other, that 'in Christ shall all be made alive.' If we are treated therein as creatures under an original sentence of condemnation, it is balanced by the revelation of an actual state of grace.

'If it is a truth of revelation,' says Mr. Mozley, 'that all men deserve eternal punishment in consequence of the sin of Adam, it is a truth of our moral nature equally certain, that no man deserves punishment except for his own personal sin. And the one is declared in revelation itself as plainly as the other; for it is said, "The soul that sinneth it shall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son—the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." It is a truth, then, of reason and Scripture alike, that no man is responsible for another's sin; and so far as this is true at all, it is universally true, applying as much to the case of Adam's sin as to that of any other man. . . . The premiss, then, on which we proceed in this question is a divided one; and if the Predestinarian from one part of it concludes the justice of his doctrine, his opponent can from the other conclude the contrary. If the mystery of our responsibility for the sin of Adam justifies his scheme, the truth of our exclusive responsibility for our own sins condemns it.'—P. 36.

Original sin and its punishment and correlative fact, death—death even to the best and most innocent—are, after all, facts which we cannot escape. God's justice, if we may so speak, is as much above us as His knowledge. We are punished for our fathers' sins, and are under or may pass under God's judgments, and feel ourselves to be so, for things which we have not done, and which we would order otherwise if we could. This is the very law of our being, and the only question is, whether we will submit and turn the arrangement to our grace, or rebel and make it our condemnation. Our children are punished for our sins as we are punished for our fathers' sins. This seems to us, perhaps, unjust. But yet, for *what we know*, it may in truth be the very height and perfection of justice. In a circle too vast for our comprehension, a part of the circumference may appear to us a right line, and yet if our eyes were opened to take in the whole figure, we should see that it was in truth a curve; and this the more so as the circle was vast and our vision defective. There can be but one justice—that of God who *is* Justice, and we can have no idea of justice at all otherwise than as it is His. God's justice, therefore, is not against our own; but it is so much above and beyond it, that its very vastness prevents us from seeing the whole—seeing what it really is. And is our simply being unable to comprehend or measure it, to be the determination of its truth—or that which shall change its nature and make it injustice? Faith bids us wait, and revelation tells us that the present medium of sight—the darkened glass—will in the end be removed, and that we shall then see God as He is—as He is in His attributes as well as in His essence; or because some will be lost, and God must foreknow who they will be,

shall we, therefore, who are joint-heirs with His only Son and His own temple, not say, 'Thanks be to Him for His unspeakable gift?'

As Holy Scripture has in truth two sides on the state of man's nature after the fall, so in like manner it has also two sides on the subject of Predestination. One speaks as if the result and the process alike were wholly in the hands of God, and were to be ordered purely as He wills, irrespectively of any other consideration whatever. The other speaks as if it had pleased Him to put the case wholly out of His own hands, and to leave it entirely in ours. Of the former class are such sayings as those in Matt. xxv. 34; Rom. viii. 29, 30; Ephes. i. 4, 5, 11; ii. 10; 1 Pet. 1, 2. Of the latter, Luke x. 28; John iii. 16; Acts x. 35; 1 Tim. ii. 4, 6. S. Paul had evidently no plenary revelation on predestination and free-will, probably because human nature could not comprehend nor human language express it. He simply states, as strongly as possible, that both are truths together, and there leaves them; God's foreknowledge being, like His justice, a truth to be received dutifully, and held firmly, although it be not seen yet, nor be ever fully discovered perhaps in this world. Indeed, a very little reflection will suffice to show that His dealings in this respect are based on the same general law of mercy to us as regulates His other actions. Ignorance is often our happiness. Take the case of probation and trial. If there were no half-discovered law and no hidden future, and we walked by sight instead of faith, how intolerable would be even the lightest calamity or affliction! If we could know beforehand that the result of our probation on earth would certainly be our salvation in heaven, how unendurable would be the probation itself! And as Christianity, by teaching of, and incorporating us into, a God at once revealed and hidden, has made it a fact that the affliction of to-day may be the happiness of to-morrow, the grief of the present life the express joy of the life to come; so, in the mysterious depths of God's omnipotence at once and omniscience, our ignorance in this world may prove our actual knowledge in the next. If, then, moral opposites may thus be true together, the same may also be the case in questions of merely intellectual difficulty. Predestination, then, on the part of God, the result of His foreknowledge, and free-will on that of man, are both clearly revealed as truths, though such as we cannot yet harmonize, and each acts upon the other. Without fearing, then, to derogate from the truth or dignity of Holy Scripture, which is surely strong enough to bear any weight which man can lay upon it, Mr. Mozley may safely say that 'Scripture as a whole 'makes no assertion, or has no determinate doctrine on the 'subject.' (Page 39.)

We have thus laid down, in connexion with the teaching of S. Augustine, two ideas opposite to each other of predestination and free-will. It will, therefore, be necessary for us to enter upon the history of the Pelagian controversy—following at once Mr. Mozley's arrangement and the nature of the case—if we would exactly comprehend both the system of doctrine which S. Augustine was called upon to oppose, and that which he constructed in its room. The result of this examination will surely be to show (as Mr. Mozley concludes) that the full and perfect truth lay neither with S. Augustine nor with his opponent; that if it were the heresy of Pelagius and his followers to insist too exclusively on, and greatly exaggerate, the line of truth which insists upon the power of the will, S. Augustine, on the other, cannot be wholly acquitted of having relied too entirely, and pushed too much to its naked and merely logical conclusion, the opposite system of predestination.

Pelagius came, as a Theologian, of a bad school. He had been an intimate and pupil of Ruffinus,¹ the opponent of S. Jerome, and a friend of John, the heretical Bishop of Jerusalem. Ruffinus had passed from twenty to thirty years in Syria among the nest of heretics found in that country, and especially at Antioch. Theodore the interpreter, one of their chief teachers, is said by his contemporary, Marius Mercator,² to have been among the first and chief authors of what is termed Pelagianism, and from Photius we learn that he taught the very essence of that heresy—that Adam was created mortal, and would have died whether he had sinned or not, and that infants have no original sin, but are born in a state of innocence such as that of the first parent before his fall. Theodore was made Bishop of Mopsuestia at the earliest in 392, and consequently Ruffinus might have been his occasional auditor—or that of some other of the school—for more than twenty years. From Syria Ruffinus returned to Rome, and there taught the heresy which afterwards received the name of its chief maintainer, Pelagius. Cælestius, Pelagius' pupil, asserted, in the council held at Carthage, A.D. 412, that he had heard many bishops hold different opinions on original sin, but when required by Paulinus, his accuser, to name them, he could only specify 'Ruffinus, priest of Aquileia, who lived at Rome.'³ Pelagius is termed by S. Augustine, in his Epistle to Paulinus of Nola, 'Brito,' to dis-

¹ S. Jerome's Preface to Jeremiah. Petavius de Pelag. et Semi-Pelag. 1, § v. Ittigius de Aramo Scriptore. Bened. Preface to S. Augustine, tom. x. § iii. Fleury Hist. book xxiii. § 1.

² Commonitory against the heresy of Pelagius and Cælestius.

³ As Marius Mercator calls Ruffinus a Syrian, it has been questioned whether the Ruffinus, who was the first author of Pelagianism in the West, is the priest of Aquileia, or another of the same name. The ancients seem unanimous in the former of these opinions, and we agree with Dupin that 'it is more natural to say

tinguish him from another Pelagius of Tarentum; and it is scarcely possible that a native of our island, in those times, should have introduced into the Western Church, and a city like Rome, a refined and systematized heresy. It is, in fact, found in the writings of Theodore, at least as early as Pelagius could have arrived in Rome, and although attributed originally to the teaching of Origen, it is evident that in denying original sin, and making actual sin depend solely on the will of each individual, destroying also, as a necessary consequence, the atonement of Christ, and reducing Him to be a mere teacher and example,—it is simply the logical and natural result of that body of Arian heresy which had so long been pestilently besetting the country, and especially that great University of the East, Antioch. We should however state, in justice to Pelagius himself, that no heresy on the subject of the natures or person of our blessed Lord Himself has ever attached itself to him. On the contrary, his creed (of which we shall speak presently) shows not only that he held the great Catholic verities of those mysteries, but that he had a clear and deep insight into them.¹

Of the undoubted works of Pelagius which remain entire, there are his creed, and a letter of much length to the virgin Demetrias. There is also a Commentary on the Epistles of S. Paul, which is assuredly Pelagian, and would even appear (though it is a disputed point) to be the production of Pelagius himself. The doubt, however, that has been made to rest on its actual authorship renders it of course useless as an appeal or an authority.²

On the subject of his peculiar heresy, his creed, addressed originally to Pope Innocent, contains nothing. It seems to have been composed with the view of proving that the faith of its author was in no respect worthy of censure. But it is not only insufficient for this end, but it is even suspicious, for it scarcely alludes to those charges of which we know that Pelagius was accused at the time of its composition. Nor does S. Augustine suffer this fact to escape his far-seeing eye. He continually upbraids its author for his silence on those very points, on which one of an honest self-trusting mind would in his

that Marius called Rufinus a Syrian because he dwelt long in Syria, and came from thence when he sowed the Pelagian doctrine in Rome.'

¹ Wall's *Infant Baptism*, vol. i. chap. xix. § xxix. contains Pelagius' Creed, with Notes. Waterland on the *Athanasian Creed*, chap. vii. under A.D. 417.

² The evidences in its favour are the fact, that several passages cited by S. Augustine from a Commentary of Pelagius, and a long extract from the same by Mercator are actually found in it. We never doubted that it is the work of Pelagius himself, and we might ask an objector, who there was of that heresy in the West capable of composing such a work, for it is both lucid and forcible? Celestius was, all through, nothing more than a mere mouthpiece of his master.

position have said the most. Pelagius simply says, at the close of this prolix composition, 'The will is free so that we always need the auxilium of God;' and he anathematizes at once the heresy of the Manicheans, that men cannot avoid sin, and of Jovinian, that they cannot commit sin, for each removes the liberty of the will. 'We say,' he concludes, 'that men both can and cannot sin, that we may always confess ourselves to have free-will.'

The letter to Demetrius, written about the year 414, contains most decided statements of the power of the will, to the exclusion of grace. He says it is not the fault of nature if we sin, but of the will; for certain of the Old Testament patriarchs fulfilled the Christian and Apostolic law before in fact it was revealed, and previously to the gift of gospel grace. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob fulfilled the law of God so perfectly, that He was pleased especially to call Himself their God. Joseph also, even before that evangelical saying was uttered, 'Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart,' when provoked by his mistress, not only by look but even by an actual embrace, coveted her not. Job, too, before he had heard our Lord's command to love our enemies, was able to say, 'If I rejoiced at the destruction of him that hated me, or lifted up myself when evil found him; neither have I suffered my mouth to sin by wishing a curse to his soul,' (xxx. 29, 30.) And when the words had not been spoken, 'Give to every man that asketh of thee,' he said, 'If I have withheld the poor from their desire,' (xxx. 16.) He had not read the injunction of the Apostle, 'Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal,' (Coloss. iv. 1,) yet he cried confidently to the Lord, 'If I did despise the cause of my manservant or of my maidservant when they contended with me,' (xxx. 13.) Before the Apostle had commanded us not to trust in the uncertainty of riches, he so regarded them as to prove himself rich elsewhere: 'If I have made gold my hope, or have said to the fine gold, Thou art my confidence' (xxx. 24); 'Oh, man,' he continues, 'evangelic before the Gospel, and apostolic before the Apostles, who hast opened the hidden riches of nature, and by bringing them into the midst hast shown from thyself what we are all able to do, and taught how great is that treasure of the soul which we all possess without use, and which we are unwilling to bring forth, and scarce believe that we have.' In proof of his doctrine of the will he cites the following texts:—Gen. xlix. 5, showing the wilfulness of Simeon and Levi; Isaiah i. 19, 20; Jer. ix. 13, 14; Matt. xxiii. 37, and others. 'There is no other cause,' he says, 'of the difficulty of doing well but custom.' He admits, however, that if before the

law and advent of Christ men are related to have lived holily, much more are we to be believed capable of so doing who ought to be better either than those before or after the law. But chiefly, he tells Demetrias that whilst corporal nobility and wealth are of her relatives and not her own, no one can give her spiritual riches but herself. In these, therefore, he continues, 'she is rightly to be praised, and justly preferred to others, for 'they are not able to be except *of* her and in her.'

S. Augustine, in his 188th Epistle, which was written to Juliana, a widow, and the mother of Demetrias, cites these words, and comments on them with just severity. He accuses the author of saying, as of course he does say, that virtues which may be *in* us are *of* us, thereby doing away at once with the existence of all grace distinctive and properly so called, for the only grace is nature and learning, and all is to be referred to the will. The parts of the letter in question, he says, which seem to refer to grace, may really refer to nature, or doctrine, or the remission of sins. For even confessing that we pray not to enter into temptation, it may mean, according to them, that it is granted to us to have understanding of the truth, by which we may learn what we ought to do, and not that we may receive strength to do it. So, our Lord's example merely teaches and does not assist us.

Again, towards the close of the letter, Pelagius cites the words of S. James, iv. 7, to prove that we ought to resist the devil, if, indeed, we be subdued to God, and that by doing His will we may also *merit* divine grace, and the more easily, by the aid of the Holy Spirit, resist the wicked spirit. To these words S. Augustine refers in his '*De Gratia Christi*,' § 23, as proving with what dissimulation Pelagius condemned, at Diospolis, those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits, and therefore how certainly he holds and teaches that doctrine.

In his '*De Gratia Christi*' S. Augustine says that all Pelagius' confessions of grace apply, or can be made to apply, only to law and doctrine, or Revelation and Christ's example, which may all be included under the head of remission of sins, or recollection of Christ's example, by remembering and following which we may sin no more—§§ 1, 2. S. Augustine also asserts, that after a formal condemnation by him in council of the denial of grace, his books, sent to Rome, contain nothing else—placing grace in the revelation of what we ought to do, not in the help of doing it—§ 3. He says that Pelagius, in making grace to be merely the law and doctrine, does, from this aspect of the case also, undo the very work of grace; for the law had made us transgressors of the commandment, and sent us to grace, expressly that

we might, by grace, have strength and freedom to fulfil it—§§ 8, 9. He says, tersely, Pelagius should confess that grace by which ‘non solum *suadet*ur omne quod bonum est, verum et *persuadet*ur’—§ 11. If, he continues, Pelagius, in saying that the grace of coming to God, submitting the will to Him, closely adhering to Him, in a word, of our membership with Him, is to be ascribed to the mere will, what more *could* be given to grace?—§ 24.

Pelagius thinks the possibility of doing, speaking, and thinking well is of God, but that the actual doing, speaking, and thinking is of ourselves. This is summarily and effectually confuted by appeal to 2 Cor. xiii. 7, ‘Now I pray to God that ye *do* no evil.’ Matt. x. 20, ‘It is not ye that *speak*, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you.’ 2 Cor. iii. 5, ‘Not that we *are sufficient* of ourselves to *think* anything as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God.’ S. Augustine continues that Pelagius’ saying, that what men are commanded to do through free-will they may ‘more easily’ do through grace, would be right, omitting the ‘more easily.’ For the addition of those words signifies that a good work can be done even without the aid of God. Petavius says, that if he had omitted those words he would have been a sound Catholic doctor.¹ It follows that, in their scheme, prayer is useful only that divine doctrine may be revealed, not that we may have power to do it.

Lastly, and most significantly, Pelagius says, ‘To do well is our own;’ he had said, ‘and is God’s.’ Why not keep to that? Apparently, because if he had, it would be replied if to do well is ours and God’s, because He has given the ‘*posse ad utrumque*,’ to do evil must be ours and His also, for the same reason—and thus as we are praised with Him for good, we must be blamed with Him for evil. The clue, then, in S. Augustine’s opinion to Pelagius’ extreme statements of the power of the will is to be found in his desire to avoid the supposed necessity of making God the author of evil.

And here we trust our readers will excuse us for introducing a series of questions, sent by Cælestius to S. Augustine in the year 414. They are deserving of notice, not only as illustrating the remark last made, but also as being by far the most open avowal of the Pelagian tenets that we have. They show that the heresy was exclusively an intellectual system, and as such, one which, however formidable in mere words, must break down on the first practical trial. The original of these questions is given by Archbishop Ussher in his ‘*Antiquitates*,’ &c.

¹ De Pelagianismo, chap. 10, § 15.

and they are cited and replied to by S. Augustine in his 'De Perfectione Justitiæ.'

'1. Before all things ask him who denies that man can be without sin, what sin is? Whether it is what can be avoided, or what cannot? If the latter, it is not sin, and cannot be called such. If the former, man can therefore be without it; for no reason or justice suffers that to be called sin which can in no way be avoided.

'2. Is sin of will or of necessity? If of necessity, it is not sin; if of will, it can be avoided.

'3. Is it natural, or an accident? If the former, it is not sin; if the latter, it is able to recede, and we can avoid it, and be without it.

'4. Is it substantive matter, or an act? If the former, it must have an author, who must be other than God. If this is impious, it must be an act, and can therefore be avoided.

'5. Again, a man ought to be without sin, and if he ought to be without it, he can be without it. If he cannot, he ought not. If he *ought* not to be without it, he *cannot* be without it; and then he ought to be with it, and it is not sin. If this is absurd, he ought necessarily to be without it, and therefore he can be without it.

'6. Is a man commanded to be without sin? If he is not able to be without it, he is not commanded to be without it; or if he is commanded, he is able: for why should that be commanded which is impossible to be done?

'7. Does God will man to be without sin? Then assuredly he can be without it: for who can doubt that that can be which he does not doubt that God wills to be?

'8. Does God will man to be with or without sin? Assuredly He does not will him to be with sin. It is then blasphemy to say that man can be *with* sin, which God does not wish, and to deny that he can be without it, which He does wish—as if he had created anyone to be able to be what He wills not, and not to be able to be what He wills.

'9. By what is man made sinful? By necessity of nature, or by freedom of will? If by the former, there is no fault of his; if by the latter, from whom did he receive his will? from God. But it must therefore be good. Yet how is it so, if it is more prone to evil than to good? And it is more prone if a man can be with, but cannot be without sin. God also both made man good, and commanded him to do good. How then can we say that man *is* evil, which he was neither made nor commanded to be; and deny that he is good, which he was made and commanded to be?

'10. Sin can be in two ways. Either by those things being done which are forbidden, or by those not being done which are commanded. All things prohibited, therefore, can be avoided, and all things commanded can be done; or they are prohibited and commanded in vain. How then can we deny that man can be without sin, when we must necessarily confess that he can as well avoid what is forbidden, as do what is commanded?

'11. How are we able to be without sin? By will or by nature? If by nature, it is not sin; if by will, will can very easily be changed by will.

'12. If a man cannot be without sin, whose fault is it, his own or another's? If his own, how is it a fault that he *is* not that which he *cannot* be?

'13. If man's nature is good, which only Marcion or Manes will deny, *how* is it good, if it cannot be free from evil? for no one doubts that all sin is evil.

'14. God is certainly just; but He imputes sin to every man, and there is no sin which shall not be imputed as such. How then is God just, if He is believed to impute that which cannot be avoided?

The first Council in which this most iniquitous and offensive system was condemned—a system full of profanity and of the subtle sensuality of pride—a system which includes all God's immeasurable powers in a syllogism, and extends our own almost to immensity,—was held at Carthage in the year 412, when Cælestius was the defendant. He there denied that Adam's death followed his disobedience, saying that he was created mortal; and he would not admit that we derive any original sin from him. He said that children newly born are in the same state of sinlessness as that of Adam before the fall, and, consequently, that they receive eternal life without baptism; and that the death of Adam is not the cause of our death, nor the resurrection of Christ the source of our resurrection. He maintained that the law gave the kingdom of heaven, as well as the gospel, (but the Pelagians distinguished between the kingdom of heaven and salvation,) and that there had been sinless men before Christ. These, of course, are the tenets of pure Pelagianism.

At Jerusalem, three years later, Pelagius himself was arraigned in person; but although he expressly said that men may be without sin if they would,¹ John, the heretical Bishop of Jerusalem, who presided, received him as a friend, and forbore to pass any adverse sentence upon him. At Diospolis or Lydda, in the same year, Pelagius was again examined on the same subject, and required to condemn the above tenets of Cælestius, and others like them, among which was that saying which subsequently became the very mark and badge of Pelagianism, 'Grace is given according to merit,' so that S. Augustine used to express the whole doctrine in the short sentence, '*Gratiam Dei secundum meritum hominum dari.*'²

¹ S. Augustine and S. Jerome slightly differ on this point. S. Augustine says that we are not to deny the *possibility* of sinlessness, lest we take from man's free-will and God's mercy; but the *fact* of it, as Scripture says no one *is* without it. (*De Peccat. Merit.* B. II. chap. vi.) S. Jerome argues from the *facts* of the case, and concludes that as no man ever was, so none ever can be, without sin. (*Lib. I. Cont. Pelag.*)

² "That the Grace of God is according to nature," Pelagius in the East—that is in the province of Palestine, in which is the city of Jerusalem—when examined by the Bishops did not dare to affirm. For among other things that were objected to him was this also, that he said the Grace of God was given according to our merits, which is so alien to the Catholic doctrine and inimical to the grace of Christ, that unless he had anathematized it when urged against him, he himself would have gone thence anathematized. But that he anathematized it deceitfully, his subsequent books testify, in which he defends nothing else than that the Grace of God is given according to our merits.' S. Augustine *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, § 10. "The Pelagians dared also to say that "Nature in which we are created is grace, in which nature we are so created as to have a rational mind, by which we are able to understand, being made to the image of God, that we might have rule over the fish of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all the cattle that creep upon the earth." But this is not the Grace which the Apostle commends through the faith of Jesus Christ. For it is certain that the latter is common to us with the impious and infidels; but the Grace through faith of Jesus Christ is theirs

Pelagius escaped condemnation himself by condemning, or rather by explaining away, the doctrines of his pupil. It is hopeless in our limited space to attempt to give any idea of the fallacies and subterfuges of Pelagius. The works of S. Augustine are full of exposures of them, and he has left an entire piece, 'De Gestis Pelagii,' on Pelagius' duplicity at the Council of Diospolis. But though he escaped condemnation here, we learn from Marius Mercator that he was detected and condemned at Jerusalem a year later. The Councils of Carthage and Milevis, in the year 416, at both of which S. Augustine was present, repeat that condemnation. A canon of the latter condemns a significant but natural result of the heresy—the denial of the need of prayer. 'If any say that the words "forgive us our sins" are uttered not for himself but for the multitude who are sinners, Anathema; for S. John said, "In many things we offend all;" and David, "Enter not into judgment with thy servant," &c.' To Innocent the Council writes, 'These enemies of the grace of Christ say, "God has made us men; we have made ourselves righteous." They declare that human nature is free, that they may not want a liberator; that it is safe, that they may not require a Saviour; that they are so strong, that they can of their own strength, received in their creation and without grace, overcome all lusts and temptations. They say *Pelagius was acquitted by the Eastern Bishops because he confessed the grace of God, which word they took in the usual sense of that by which we are justified from sin, not that by which we are created with free-will.* We pray not to receive the commandment, but to do it; although free-will not to sin is not to be doubted; yet its power is not sufficient unless our infirmities are assisted. Pelagius says that grace is nothing but nature. That by which we are created to something is grace;' but *grace proper* is that by which we who are predestinate are called, justified, glorified. *The grace by which we are created is not denied to be grace, but it is not called grace properly.*' The letter, however, treats their assertion of the possibility of sin-

only whose is faith itself, for "all men have not faith." 2 Thess. iii. 2. De Grat. & Lib. Arbit. § 25. 'They affirm again and again that Grace is of merit, and when convicted they say, "although it is not given according to the merits of good works, because through it we work, yet according to the merits of good will it is given, because the good will of him that prays *precedes*, which good will the will of believing has preceded, that according to these merits the Grace of God who hears may follow.'" § 27. This last assertion is rather the doctrine of semi-Pelagianism than of Pelagianism proper, though on the prior motion of the human will to Grace, and the intrinsic goodness in consequence of the former, the two unite and become one; and S. Augustine confutes the semi-Pelagians to themselves by showing them that their system originally is and must be simply that of Pelagius himself, whom they admit to be a heretic.

¹ S. Bernard also allows a 'Gratia Creans;' but he distinguishes it from 'Gratia Salvans.' De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. (Chap. vi.)

lessness merely as an error, adding, no one in the Catholic Church can say that he does not need to cry, 'forgive us our sins,' or 'that he has no sin.' The result of this condemnation of Pelagius and Cælestius was an imperial edict, directing that they with their followers should be banished beyond the hundredth mile from Rome, *i.e.* beyond the jurisdiction of the prefect of the city; and any bishop refusing to sign their condemnation should be expelled his bishopric, driven into banishment, and deprived of communion.

Such was Pelagianism—namely, such a denial of Grace properly so called, and of internal supernatural aid, as to cause both S. Augustine and Prosper to say, 'Grace with them is no grace, but merely nature.' 'In Pelagiana causa hujusmodi controversia versabatur, quod hæretici isti justitiam, et sanctitatem, ac demum gloriam adipisci homines putarent industria suapte, ac naturæ viribus, sine adjumento gratiæ. Sanctos inquam Deoque gratos fieri, et esse reipsa, nec posse tantum esse, dicebant Pelagiani, viribus suis homines. Contra quos contendens Augustinus, et gratiam, atque ejus necessitatem, usumque commendans, non quid illa posset, sed quid reipsa faceret in nobis, prædicare debuit; ut quemadmodum adversarii, quid naturali, et insita virtute sine gratia reipsa fieret, testimoniis Scripturæ, et exemplis adstruebant, sic ipse vicissim, quid nonnisi per Christi gratiam in nobis operaretur Deus, iisdem argumentis ostenderet.'¹ 'No one can give you 'spiritual riches but yourself,' says Pelagius himself to Demetrias; 'and these cannot be except of you and in you.' 'Every man,' says Fuller the historian, in his quaint style,—'every man is born a Pelagian, naturally proud of his power, and needeth little to teach him to think well of himself.' But, however truthful or attractive the heresy may appear from its harmony with nature, its condemnation, when viewed through the medium of Grace, is sealed at once. To a man who should honestly endeavour to rule himself by the Christian law—even in one act of his life alone—the real value of Pelagius' cardinal assertions, 'Grace is according to merits,' and 'nature is Grace,' will appear at once, and whatever he might be, he could never at least become a Pelagian.

But the opposition which Pelagius met with from the Church induced him to qualify his doctrine from time to time, and as far as possible to conceal the most repulsive features of it. Petavius classes his admitted Grace under six heads—nature and free-will, remission of sins, the law or preaching of Christ, inward mental illumination, adoption and sonship by baptism, and eternal life.

¹ Petavius de Prædestinatione, lib. X. chap. xvi. § 10.

S. Augustine concludes them under two, nature and law; and says that his Grace only helps our 'possibilitas,' not our 'velle,' or our 'agere;' and that he teaches that there are three requisites for an action—posse, which lies in nature, and is the gift originally of God; velle, which lies in our own will; esse, which lies in our 'effectus.'

It will be said, perhaps, that S. Augustine is here somewhat unjust to his opponent, for that Pelagius, in confessing Petavius' fourth Grace, inward mental illumination, confesses Grace; but, we ask, was it his meaning when he extended his Grace from an outward to an inward aid, to express by his grace the same thing as the Grace of the Church? He gives it the effects of Grace, indeed, but *what* was it with him that causes those effects? Was it not at most the natural endowments of man—his feelings, affections, emotions, &c.? putting for that which sanctifies and makes them able to work, the things sanctified and made able? Those qualities of our nature which we have in common with the brutes are not Grace; and whatever may be meant by Grace in the natural world, the kingdom of Grace is not ordinarily or properly to be identified with 'the kingdom of this world,' as Pelagius would identify it.

There rose, as might have been expected, a speedy reaction even in the Pelagian camp itself against the more repulsive of the tenets of their leader. From this cause came the less offensive, indeed, but still fundamentally erroneous phase of Semi-Pelagianism. We the rather dwell upon this, as we cannot but think that Mr. Mozley has on the whole done Pelagius something more than justice. By giving an idea of Pelagianism proper, which perhaps more truly applies to Semi-Pelagianism, Mr. Mozley has given the heresiarch himself the benefit of a scheme less faulty than his own—which in truth was not his own, but rather a protest against it—and seems to speak as if the only final difference between the Church and Pelagius were, whether our Grace be a Grace cooperative, or irresistible and controlling; whereas we cannot but think that S. Augustine, from whom Mr. Mozley confesses himself to differ, was correct when he said that the question was, whether there be any Grace properly so called or not. He did not say that the Pelagians deny all Grace, but they confess a Grace improperly so called. It is a Theological question. They admit Grace, but call that Grace which in Theology is not Grace. Pelagius deceived the bishops at Diospolis by the use of the term.

Unless, also, a wide difference be placed in fact between Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, we place S. Augustine's consistency and his work in the Church at stake; for whilst he never ceased to oppose Pelagius and Celestius, he, like S.

Athanasius with the Semi-Arians, 'admitted the Semi-Pelagians to be both friends and Catholics.'¹

Petavius says that, at best, the Pelagians thought that grace was not necessary indeed, but that it was better to have it than not; but the Semi-Pelagians, with the Church, thought it strictly necessary, but that its gift depended on prior good in man. This was, of course, to make it subordinate to nature, and in this consisted the heresy of Semi-Pelagianism.

Semi-Pelagianism was caused by the misunderstanding of the doctrine of S. Augustine, who, as Petavius says, 'had seemed, against Pelagius, to ascribe our salvation and justification only to God, leaving nothing to human *συνεργία*. This greatly offended some, and especially the bishops and clergy of Lyons and Marseilles (where Cassian lived in great repute), the more so as he had a few years previously, when newly made bishop, spoken differently, as in his *Épître* 49, that "faith was a nobis." They thought he had gone too far, giving too much to grace and God's help.'

That our readers may understand the Semi-Pelagian question the better, we will venture to give them some general idea of the chief contents of that particular piece of S. Augustine's which was the original cause of Semi-Pelagianism, the second and longer letter to Sixtus, priest and afterwards Bishop of Rome—a letter not only of singular power and vividness of description, but one which contains in itself an almost perfect system in outline of Augustinian Theology. It is the more free and original as the writer is not directly replying in it to particular assertions of his opponents, but is laying down what he conceives to be the revealed truth on Predestination and Grace.

He begins with saying that to deny free-will because it is not without the 'adjutorium' of God, is not to strengthen but to weaken it, by not basing it upon God. He complains of the Pelagians thinking God an acceptor of persons if He receives without previous merits; for they do not see, he says, that due punishment is given to the condemned, and undue mercy to the acquitted, that the former may not complain nor the latter glory. Nor may it be said that it is unjust that one should be condemned and another acquitted; rather is it just that both

¹ "Semi-Pelagianos minimè pro hæreticis habuit; sed Catholicos et amicos suos appellavit eodem libro." (De dono Perseverantiæ.) Petavius de Predest. lib. IX. chap. ii. § 4. This is, perhaps, more than the strict letter of the De Dono Perseverantiæ would bear Petavius out in saying. S. Augustine, indeed, holds the Semi-Pelagians as friends, but at the same time he also treats them as men holding a very serious error, although, as they held it, it was in germ rather than in development.

² De Pelagianis et Semi-Pelagianis, chap. vii. § 1.

should be punished? Then we should give thanks if we escape the fate of others like ourselves. If all were acquitted there would be no punishment for sin; if none, there would be no gift of Grace.

S. Augustine, in explaining how it is that God will have all men to be saved, supposes that no man is saved except through the will of God, or that 'all' means not all men, but some out of all classes and ranks of men, on the same rule on which we understand the phrase, 'Ye tithe all herbs,'¹ as meaning not that the Pharisees gave literally a tenth of all the herbs in the world, but only of all kinds of herbs; or as in his 'De Correptione,' § 44—all the predestinate, because all the human race is in them.

To return to the letter to Sixtus. When all the lump is justly condemned, justice gives due punishment, and Grace gives undue honour. God's mercy and truth are both inscrutable; his mercy in having mercy not by justice but by Grace, and hardening not by injustice but by truth of vengeance. The Apostle says to such as Pelagius, 'Whom He will He pities, and whom He will He hardens;' and we say in his words, not having better of our own, 'O man, who art thou that repliest to God?' (Romans ix. 18, 20.)

'God hardens not by imparting malice, but by not imparting mercy. Those to whom it is not imparted are not worthy, and do not deserve it, but are worthy and do deserve that it should not be imparted. If we say that faith precedes, in which is the merit of Grace, *what* merit had a man *before* faith that he should receive faith? What has he that he did not not receive? and if he received, how can he boast as if he had not received? . . . And since only Grace works in us every good merit, when God crowns our merits He only crowns his own gifts. As we obtained mercy of faith in the beginning, not because we were, but that we might be faithful, so in the end, in which will be eternal life, He will crown us, as it is written, "in mercy and pity." . . . If sinners are vessels of wrath, let them impute it to Him who made them of that lump to which condemnation is justly given for the sin of one. If they are vessels of mercy, let them not boast, but glorify God who gave them a mercy not due. . . . In the meantime, it is enough for a faithful Christian to know and believe that God frees no one but by undeserved Grace, and condemns no one but by most just truth. *Why* He condemns one and not another, let him examine who can fathom the depths of his judgment.'

At the end of the letter he instances (as in many other of his writings) the case of Jacob and Esau, as a proof that there was no election for works but only by mercy and Grace. He says on Romans ix. 10, and following verses:—

'What does the Apostle mean by one concubitus—"when Rebecca also had conceived by one concubitus"—but to show that Jacob should not

¹ Mozley, p. 755.

boast of the merits either of his forefathers or of his own father, saying that he was beloved by his Creator, because his father when he begat him was worthy of greater praise (than when he begat Esau.) It was, he says, of one concubitus. There was, therefore, one desert of his father in begetting both, and one of his mother in conceiving both. The Apostle did not say, as Pelagius would, that God foresaw their future works, but he referred all to his grace and glory.'

This, however, is merely S. Augustine's own view. S. Chrysostom acknowledges an election for future foreseen merits; and Theodoret says that the difference made by God between Jacob and Esau arose from the same cause.¹ S. Chrysostom also says, that to be a vessel of mercy or wrath depends on ourselves under Grace. Here, we suspect, he would be found to differ widely from S. Augustine. He acknowledges two things in predestination — one the Divine will, the other the human working with it. S. Augustine only acknowledges the former, as in the case of Jacob and Esau; and he puts the act of predestination further back than S. Chrysostom, who indeed seems open to the objection that predestination proper must have taken place before the human will could have cooperated with the Divine. We should prefer S. Chrysostom as a safer teacher of predestination than S. Augustine, for the simple reason, which however may repel some, that he has no system on the subject—that is, he does not teach more on it than Holy Scripture warrants.

'S. Augustine, however,' to use the words of Mr. Mozley, 'takes that further step which Scripture avoids taking, and asserts a determinate doctrine of Predestination. He erects those passages of Scripture which are suggestive of Predestination into a system, explaining away the opposite ones; and converts the obscurity and inconsistency of Scripture language into that clearness and consistency by which a definite truth is stated. His was the error of those who follow, without due consideration, that strong first impression which the human mind entertains, that there must be some definite truth to be arrived at on the question under consideration, whatever it may be; and who therefore imagine that they cannot but be doing service, if they only add to what is defective enough to make it complete, or take away from what is ambiguous enough to make it decisive. Assuming arrival at some determinate truth necessary, he gave an exclusive development to those parts of Scripture which he had previously fixed on as containing, in distinction to any apparently opposite ones, its real meaning. But the assumption itself was gratuitous. There is no reason why Scripture should not designedly limit itself, and stop short of expressing definite truth; though whether it does so or not is a question of fact. If Revelation as a whole does not state a truth of predestination, that stopping short is as much a designed stopping short, as a statement would have been a designed statement. Nor are we to be discontented with the former issue, when the comparison of one part of God's word with another fairly leads to it; to suppose that an indeter-

¹ Petavius de Prædestinatione, lib. IX. chap. iii. §§. 7, 10, 11, 12.

minate conclusion must be a wrong one, and to proceed to obtain by forced interpretation what we had failed to do by natural. If Revelation as a whole does not speak explicitly, Revelation did not intend to do so; and to impose a definite truth upon it, when it designedly stops short of one, is as real an error of interpretation as to deny a truth which it expresses.—P. 156.

Whilst, however, S. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others of the Greek Church, may otherwise differ from S. Augustine, there is perhaps little real difference in their doctrine on the particular question of predestination for foreseen merits; and Mr. Mozley suggests a distinction, the substance of which, without suffering it to carry us into the particular tenet of Semi-Pelagianism, we may well make available to their harmony. Having alluded to the error of the Semi-Pelagian doctrine of election for future merits, *i. e.* because God foresees that men will believe, and not because He is about to make them believing, he adds:—

‘The ground of foreseen merits is expressly rejected by S. Augustine as the ground of predestination, which is referred, instead, to an absolute and inscrutable Divine choice. Though one distinction must here be made: the most rigid Predestinarian must in one sense allow that God predestinates the elect to eternal life, in consequence of goodness foreseen in them. For, however absolutely God may predestinate particular persons to eternal life in the sense of certainty, He plainly does not do it absolutely in the sense of requiring no qualifications. His predetermination, then, to give them eternal life must suppose the foresight of these qualifications for it in them, though it is the foresight of qualifications which He Himself has determined to give them by the operation of efficacious grace. “God foresees his own future work.” He has decreed from all eternity to make, and therefore foresees that He will make, Jacob of such a character. But this is predestination in consequence of foreseen goodness, in quite a different sense from that which is intended in the modification of the doctrine above referred to. The effect of that modification is to make the *whole* of predestination conditional—God predestinating persons to eternal life in consequence of something which, by virtue of the Divine attribute of foreknowledge, He certainly foresees, but which is in itself contingent, depending on the will and efforts of the persons themselves. But of the distinction now spoken of this is not the effect; for though, according to it, God predestinates the elect to their final reward relatively to their qualifications for it, He predestinates them absolutely to those qualifications; so that though one part of predestination is dependent upon another, the whole is unconditional.’—Pp. 148, 149.

The doctrine, then, of Semi-Pelagianism may assist us to see that there is no essential difference between that of S. Augustine and S. Chrysostom. If there were, the latter must inevitably be a Semi-Pelagian, but, in that we are sure that he is not, and never would or could have been, we may see that he intends to teach precisely the same system as S. Augustine on the point in question.

To continue the letter to Sixtus. With regard to election by

grace alone (as opposed to that for foreseen merits), as in the case of infants dying without baptism, S. Augustine says very strongly :—

‘If you consider the infants themselves, they have merits of their own ; if you consider the parents, theirs are good whose children are carried off by sudden death without the baptism of Christ ; and theirs are evil whose offspring, through the power of Christ, have come to the sacraments of the Church. This infant born of a faithful married pair, received with the joy of its parents, overlain and suffocated in the sleep of its mother or nurse, is an exile and alien from their faith : that one, the child of sacrilegious crime, exposed by the cruel fear of its mother, is taken up by the piety of others, baptized through their Christian solicitude, and made a consort and participator of the eternal kingdom. Let them think and consider of these things, who dare to say that God is either an acceptor of persons, or a remunerator of preceding merits.’—§ 32.

And here we will venture to observe, as bearing on original sin, that the difficult or rather inexplicable question of *how* the souls of infants can be sinful and subject to the punishment of sin, raised by Pelagius, latterly engaged much of S. Augustine’s most anxious thought. He seems to have been suddenly thrown back upon it as the first question in the controversy :—

‘How,’ (asks Mr. Mozley,) ‘could there be such a thing as hereditary sin ? sin transmitted from father to son, and succeeded to by birth ? How were moral dispositions involved in the operations of nature ? This appeal to reason was promptly answered by an appeal to mystery ; an answer, however, which was needlessly perplexed by too minute attempts to define the mode of the transmission of sin. The explanation of a mystery cannot really advance beyond the statement of it, but the too subtle explainer forgets his own original admission and the inherent limits of his task, and imagines himself solving what is inexplicable.’—P. 66.

This remark is true. There were, in fact, two attempts of S. Augustine to solve the difficulty ; and the answer from mystery alone not satisfying him (as it might have done, for it is a mystery only because God has been pleased not to reveal but to conceal it, and that which He has hidden from view no effort of ours can penetrate), he tacitly abandoned it by endeavouring to find another. He confessed himself without knowledge, and at a loss to understand *how* the souls of infants can in themselves be under the bond of birth-sin and its penalties. ‘If they come,’ he says, ‘immediately from the hand of God, how can they be made sinful by the mere contact of human bodies ? Whence are they, then,’ he asks, ‘originally ? Are they by immediate creation, or by propagation ?’ If by the latter, the question is answered at once, but for this Holy Scripture gives no warrant. S. Augustine has left us, besides other pieces, a letter of much length to Optatus, and another to S. Jerome, asking his opinion of the matter. It seems, indeed, to be a question of considerable interest both in itself, and as tending to perplex the mind of so great a doctor.

He evidently himself leans to the idea of propagation, but he does so from the necessity of the case alone, for he wishes to think that each soul is created afresh. S. Jerome, we must suppose, did not lay so much stress on the question, for he acknowledged S. Augustine's letter with thanks and commendations, but excused himself for not replying to it. We learn, however, from the letter to Optatus, that S. Jerome himself believed the soul to be created, but that the Western Churches held it rather to be by propagation.

The doctrines contained in this letter to Sixtus amount, it is evident, to nothing less than a statement of irresistible and therefore indefectible grace. S. Augustine, indeed, does not deal with every element of the question. It is true that he considers God's justice, His mercy, and sin with its results; but the individual sinner is left out of sight; the sin in him is considered, he in whom the sin exists, is forgotten. Nor would it satisfy any one to be told that for the sin that is in him he, of God's justice, is to be cast into hell, whereas another, as guilty as himself, is to be admitted to salvation only to show forth another of God's attributes, his mercy. S. Augustine's doctrine, (which is here the same as Calvin's) may be the logical, but it is not the full moral result of what Holy Scripture teaches of God's predestination. It does not harmonise with such declarations as that of our blessed Lord Himself—'God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him shall not perish, but have everlasting life.' (John iii. 16.) It makes no allowance, or an insufficient one, for God's infinite and unfathomable mercy. It may be true in a measure as regards this world, but S. Augustine concludes it to be the whole truth, and then pushes it on to the next world—and here he clearly exceeds his warrant; for how can he or any man, at least any uninspired one, say what other and counteracting elements may be brought into action in a state of absolute perfection?

We do not wonder, then, that he was appealed to by the monks of Atriumetum to explain how, according to the scheme of predestination laid down to Sixtus, free-will could exist or self-discipline be required; for they said that infallible and efficacious (efficacem) Grace altogether abolished the freedom of man to either part. He wrote in reply his works, 'On Grace and Free-will,' and 'On Correction and Grace,' which satisfied them. But it was in Marseilles that this phase of the heresy formally arose and flourished; and first among its defenders, if indeed he be not its author, is Cassian, the pupil of S. Chrysostom and friend of Pope Innocent, who came from the East to Rome, and went thence to Marseilles. The Semi-Pelagians are very

close, indeed, at once to the Church and to the Pelagians. With the former they fully admit the necessity of preventing Grace; but, like the latter, they insist that the first motion towards its reception must come not from God, but from our own nature and will. If it be so, the beginning of the work of salvation is our own, and not God's in us. The difference between this and Pelagianism is evidently—in fact and at bottom—only accidental. Against the latter, the Council of Milevis or Carthage, in its 5th Canon, condemns those who say, 'That Grace is given to enable us to do more easily what we are commanded to do through free-will, as if without Grace we could fulfil the Divine commands, though not easily. Christ said not, "Without Me you can do with more difficulty," but, "Without Me you can do nothing."'

They thought that S. Augustine's doctrine involved a certain fatalist necessity either to good or to evil; and they appealed to the Apostolic words, 'To will is present with me.' S. Augustine met them by the others—'It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do.' They said, if there be any eternal, immutable decree of Providence, men are not born 'judicandi,' but 'judicati.' 'They put obedience before Grace, that the beginning of salvation may depend on him who is saved, not on God who saves; and that man's will may obtain by itself the aid of Divine Grace, not that Grace may subject the human will to itself.'² It is clear that they differ here not only from S. Augustine, but also from S. Chrysostom, when he says that, to show us that if a little is ours the chief part is God's, we are called vessels of mercy and not of good works, and that the being a vessel of wrath or of mercy depends on ourselves *after* Grace; whereas Pelagius and the Semi-Pelagians teach the exact converse, that it depends on Grace after ourselves. Their doctrine was condemned by the second Council of Orange, A. D. 529.

Here, then, is a plain and reasonable objection to S. Augustine's system of predestinarian doctrine: let us observe how he answers it. His writings to the Semi-Pelagians are two letters to Valentinus, the Abbot of Adrumetum, with the 'De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,' which was objected to by them, whence he wrote in explanation the 'De Correptione et Gratia.' This being questioned by the Marseillois, he explained himself in the 'De Prædestinatione Sanctorum,' and 'De Dono Perseverantiæ.' He says, in the beginning of the 'De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio,' 'The Semi-Pelagians do teach free-will as to destroy Grace.' In other words, they did not see how, according to S. Augustine, the

¹ Potavius de Prædestinatione, bk. ix. chap. ii. § 3.

² Prosper to S. Augustine, Eph. 225. S. Augustine answered him and Hilary by his books, 'De Prædestinatione Sanctorum,' and 'De Dono Perseverantiæ.'

scheme of salvation could be any other than the following: absolute predestination either to life or death, the predestinated to life having given to them gratuitously Grace irresistible, and therefore indefectible, which is followed necessarily by justification here, and salvation and glorification hereafter; and the predestinated to death having this Grace withheld from them, and being, consequently, unable to obtain salvation. In fewer words, they thought the scheme of S. Augustine one of absolute predestination to necessary salvation through the gift of irresistible Grace, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, to helpless reprobation through the withholding of that Grace. Of course, this system *could* leave no place either for self-culture or for freedom of will. The question, therefore, for S. Augustine to decide is, first, whether free-will exists; and secondly, if so, how it can coexist with irresistible Grace? Mr. Mozley, in his 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Chapters, has entered very fully, and with singular power and lucidness of statement, into both these questions. S. Augustine's answer to the Semi-Pelagians may be said to contain two different sides or phases of statement,—one in which he repeats that general type of doctrine which he had laid down in his letter to Sixtus; the other in which, to answer the objections of his inquirers, he touches on certain lines of truth before omitted, which form the correlatives of those counterbalancing Divine attributes, and actions their results, the omission of which is so much felt in his Anti-Pelagian treatises, and tends to give his system so great a hardness. These writings embrace four chief subjects—Predestination, Grace, Perseverance, and Free-will. His system on these subjects is as follows. He lays down, in his 'De Correptione,' on the predestinarian side, a doctrine of perseverance depending on absolute election, which, from the words of the Evangelist, 'many are called but few chosen,' he distinguishes from being called, even in this world, saying that none of the really elect, according to God's propositum or purpose (Rom. viii. 28; ix. 11), can change from righteousness into sin, and end their lives in the latter, and perish. (§ 21.) And in § 44, 'God wills all men to be saved, *i.e.* all the predestinate' [who, however, cannot according to him be lost], 'for all men are *in* them.' So that the words of the Apostle become a mere truism; or, rather, he is made to say what he does not say.

S. Augustine, then, as Mr. Mozley says, does not hold 'a predestination by which God has determined from all eternity 'to admit a certain number of mankind to present religious 'privileges, and to reward the good with future salvation,'—the good, that is, who are made such by accepting and gaining increase of the Grace given to them, which was, on the whole, the

doctrine of the Church before his time,—but he holds an arbitrary predestination, a predestination not, indeed, like that of the Semi-Pelagians, for the sake of future foreseen good works; for if men were rewarded for virtues not possessed or good actions not performed by them, they must by the counter law be also condemned and punished for crimes which they had never committed—an idea which he admits to be too abhorrent to our sense of justice to be entertained for a moment;¹ (Calvin, however, did in fact hold it long afterwards, as we shall shortly see,)—but he held a predestination antecedent to all merit, which is hidden and arbitrary, and, as founded on a supposed Divine justice wholly different to our ideas of that quality, mysterious and perplexing, which must be received on faith, and which separates by God's will, and to show His different attributes of mercy and justice, the human race into two great sections, ordaining the one to eternal life, and consigning the other to everlasting misery. On the former, that they may attain salvation, S. Augustine teaches that there is bestowed a Grace, which not merely assists, but overrules the actions of men—a Grace which causes them to act—a Grace given to one and not to another—a Grace by which a man is made to be the good tree which *must* bring forth good fruit, as he who is without it is the evil tree which *can* only bring forth evil fruit; for he says that there is either a good root, and of necessity good actions, or an evil root, and evil actions. Before the fall, indeed, man had free-will, and therefore he only required cooperating Grace, but now he must have a Grace that shall master and control him. And as perseverance is a continuing in this Grace to the end, the Grace itself being purely God's free gift, perseverance must be the same, and, like Grace, also irresistible and indefectible. This doctrine of perseverance is accordingly laid down at much length, and repeated again and again, in his '*De Dono Perseverantiæ*.' 'It is not given to us,' he says, 'according to our merits, but it is given to some by Grace, and is withheld from others by justice; and the giving and withholding are inscrutable mysteries.' With perseverance once given, he says, we cannot cease to persevere, for persevering is as much God's gift as the first coming to Him. It can be gained by supplication, but when given, it cannot be lost by contumaciousness.

On election, also, as regards this world, he lays down a doctrine which has taken no hold on the Church at large, the counter one of sacramental Grace having corrected it. He says there is an election according, and an election not according, to God's purpose, and that those who do not persevere are not

¹ *De Dono Perseverantiæ*, § 22.

chosen, and though they live a holy life, are not even then, whilst so living, among the number of the chosen—they are not called according to God's 'propositum'—they are not *elect* or *chosen*—they are only *called*. Against this we may surely urge that our Lord said to the twelve, the year before His crucifixion, 'You shall sit upon twelve thrones,' and Judas was one of them. Had the traitor died then, should he not have received his throne, as being then verily elect with an election from which he fell away by, as S. Augustine would allow, a voluntary act which cannot be in any way charged to God? Though there was said to be a throne in store for him, was there none?

S. Augustine says on S. John vi. 66—'Those who went away were not disciples; those only were such who remained. Yet the former were called disciples, though proving themselves not to be, for both had not perseverance; for although we call those disciples whom we see to live piously, yet they are not truly such, and are not such if they have not perseverance, for they are not such with God, who knows that of good they will become evil.' But to this we may surely reply, that when called disciples by S. John, they were disciples. They were such whilst they staid with Christ, but they ceased to be such when they went away. Their having ceased to be disciples, is no proof that they never were disciples, as the corpse of a man is no proof that he never was a man; rather it is a proof that he was a man and is not one. The fact that Scripture calls them disciples at a particular time, is a proof unanswerable that they were disciples when so called. If, indeed, S. Augustine meant that they ceased to persevere, and therefore lost their Grace at last, it would be well,—but he does not mean this; he means that, because they did not keep it, they never had it, and therefore, of course, that it is not only irresistible, but also indefectible. S. Paul says, 'Receive not the Grace of God in vain;' but how, in S. Augustine's scheme, is this possible? A man may surely persevere in any kind of labour for a time, and then cease to do so. Every repetition of action is perseverance, and if he continues his perseverance he receives his reward—if he ceases to persevere he forfeits it—and in spiritual labours, if he die persevering, he insures his salvation. Thus, then, S. Augustine's argument is one which, if pushed to its extreme consequence, tends to defeat itself—it proves too much. It tells us more of God's secret counsels than he or any man could know. To lay down a canon of interpretation of Holy Scripture which shall establish that it does not mean what it says, but something not merely beyond, but very different or even opposite to what it says, may prove in the end highly perilous to, if not wholly destructive of the existence of, all true faith.

On the other hand, S. Augustine says of *free-will*:—"As the doctrine of Grace involves salvation, so does the doctrine of the judgment involve free-will, which is not to be denied, nor is it to be separated from Grace as if self-sufficient for thought or action. It is proved from Scripture, and shown in men both when they sin and when they act *secundum Deum*.' It is shown as regards understanding, from Psal. xciv. 8, "Understand, ye brutish among the people;" but it is not to be separated from the adjutorium of God, Psal. cxix. 73, "Give me understanding," &c.² 'The victory by which sin is conquered is nothing but the gift of God helping the free-will in the contest; *e. g.* the commandment, "Watch and pray," and neither without the other, shows the cooperation of Divine Grace and human will; a sentence which may show what was the doctrine of the will when viewed by S. Augustine without relation to the opposition of the Pelagian heresy. He says again, 'If you will, you will keep the commandments, that the man who wills and is not able may know that he does not yet will fully, and may pray to have so much will as suffices to fulfil them.' So, 'The sinner, after regeneration and justification, cannot say, "I have not received Grace," because the Grace of God which he had received he has lost through his free-will to evil. But to work and to believe,' he continues, 'are ours, because of our free-will, and both are given to us.'³ 'He does not mean to deny free-will, but to assert it.' This chain of doctrine, however, leaves no room for the assertion of that independent self-action of free-will which constitutes free-will, and, consequently, Mr. Mozley, in his chapter on S. Augustine's doctrine of free-will, shows, first, that S. Augustine's language on this subject only comes up to the admission of the *existence* of the will, which is not denied; and secondly, that it not only does not state the doctrine of *free-will*, but in fact opposes it, 'his language being that the will has, notwithstanding its freedom, no self-determining power, but is determined to evil and to good respectively by original sin and by Grace.'

It is true that the Greeks, who had questions so widely different to settle, may have shown, on the subject of free-will, less of dialectical skill and more of faith, but we question whether, on close examination, it will not be found that the difference between them and S. Augustine on the point of pre-

¹ S. Augustine's doctrine, generally, is, that man is a free agent as to evil, but not as to good; he sins of himself, he does good not of himself, but only through the Grace of God in him. Pelagius' doctrine was that the will is able to do good of itself alone, without the aid of Divine Grace.

² Letter I. to Valentinus, § 7. ³ De Correptione, § 9. De Gratia Christi, § 30.

destination in itself and taken at large, is *not* merely one of accident, and whether their system does not contain at least the germ of a doctrine differing from that of S. Augustine. We think that they would say, that in such sense as that in which God gives us life, thought, power of motion, action, and the like, and having given them, makes them henceforth verily ours, He gave us power to choose good or evil; whilst S. Augustine's doctrine seems to resolve itself into one of two alternatives—either we have it given to us, and if so, we cannot but use it profitably, or we have it not. Calvin at least seems to have been of this opinion; for he says 'that the Greek fathers, and especially S. Chrysostom, are to be opposed to S. Augustine on 'the side of upholding the powers of the human will.'¹

In a word, the voice of the early Greek Church would seem to show that there may be an alternative between Semi-Pelagianism and Augustinianism; that the will must first be moved by Grace, and Grace must begin all motion of the heart towards Grace; but after that, the will receives or rejects Grace offered or bestowed by Baptism, *i. e.* Grace is first irresistible, and then cooperating. What else, in fact, does S. Paul teach when he says that Christians were in a state of nature (under different metaphors, and in different parts of his writings), but now, by no wish or act of their own, perhaps even by an overruling of their own wishes,—an irresistible Grace by an *opus operatum* (in ordinary cases the sacrament of Baptism) was given them, after which they are called on to keep their Grace, *i. e.*, not that they cannot lose it, and therefore it is indefectible, but that they can lose it, and therefore it is defectible and cooperative.

Even the case of Jacob and Esau, on which S. Augustine lays so much stress, and so frequently recurs to, hardly seems conclusive of his view, for the actual rejection of Esau was for the selling of his birthright. He had power to do this or not to do it, and he did it. He did it himself; God did in no manner compel him to do it; and because he did it, and committed the great sins which accompanied it and were signified by it, therefore he was cast out. Who can say but that if he had resisted that temptation, to give things heavenly for those earthly, to barter high Grace and blessing for 'a morsel of meat,' the birth curse might have been reversed at last? So God indeed hardened Pharaoh's heart, but He did so, as S. Augustine confesses, because Pharaoh had previously hardened his own heart.

The final question, then, is whether, in S. Augustine's opinion, the term *free-will* can be used of man at all or not. If

¹ Institutes, Book II, chap. ii.

it be said that, as creatures, there is no free-will properly to be predicated of us, the position is at least intelligible; but if free-will be allowed in any manner and in any degree, it remains to be asked on what authority it is decided to be wholly on one side. If reference is made, in reply, to S. Paul's words to the Romans, 'In me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing,' those words, if taken in the strictest and most exclusive sense, and applied, we suppose, not to Christians but to heathens, would seem to prove too much—to prevent the possibility of any action ever having been performed by men in any degree good, and so would reduce them to the condition of mere devils; but if they be granted to have been written in any degree generally, so far as such latitude of sense and meaning are extended to them, the free power to good as well as to evil must be granted to men, though the former may exist in no degree correspondingly to the latter; in fact, that the Apostolic doctrine is that the natural will, enslaved by nature and the law of Moses, is now made free by Christian Grace, and that our baptismal membership with Christ gives us this freedom. We are compelled, then, even from this brief view of S. Augustine's writings to the Semi-Pelagians, to conclude that, inasmuch as he still teaches an arbitrary election to salvation or to condemnation, a Grace which is strictly controlling, and a will which is only a will, and not a *free* will, he substantially and in fact repeats the system of doctrine laid down to Sixtus, to Paulinus, and in his Anti-Pelagian writings at large (defending it only by repeating it), but does not reply to the great question, or satisfy the natural doubts, of the Church of Marseilles; and therefore that the real objections raised by them to his teaching, based as they were on truth and reason, still remain.

Having considered at length the doctrines of S. Augustine on Predestination, Grace, and Free-will, Mr. Mozley passes on to the mediæval writers, from whom he selects as the most able exponent of Augustinianism S. Thomas Aquinas; alluding, at the same time, but without citing from their works, to Peter Lombard, S. Bernard, S. Anselm, and Bradwardine. With the works of Archbishop Bradwardine we cannot claim acquaintance; but the others are men of such weight and renown, and their writings for the most part so greatly qualify, in many respects, the stricter doctrines of S. Augustine, that we are loth to pass them over in entire silence. We must first, however, following Mr. Mozley, state the system of Aquinas.

This, as Mr. Mozley shows, was, in essence, necessitarian. He teaches, in outline, that the Divine will and power was the first point from which everything flows, and the cause originally of the motions of the human will; for although the will has a

motion of its own, and is a principle of motion to itself, it is not the first principle, but the secondary one—that is, God supplies the moving power and principle by which it moves itself, and He is therefore in truth the real and only first cause of its motion. As, therefore, in Mr. Mozley's words, 'The will, as 'an original spring of action, is irreconcilable with the Divine 'power, or second cause in nature, being inconsistent with there 'being only one First Cause, it is plain that, according to S. 'Thomas, there can be no real free-will.'¹ But the objection 'Unde malum' here occurs with fatal force; and being quite unanswerable, it destroys the whole system. The answer indeed which Aquinas finally adopts from S. Augustine, is to deny that evil is a real entity. He teaches that it is a nullity, a privation of form, as of heat in fire, or of moisture in water. But this answer, as Mr. Mozley shows, is quite insufficient, or rather is no answer at all; for sense tells us that evil is a substantive matter, and, as such, has a real and positive existence. How, too, are we to conceive of a thing which is at once a nullity in itself, and yet a just cause of Divine anger and punishment? The practical danger of such a theory of evil had been pointed out ages before by S. Justin Martyr, to the heathen. That fate or necessity would be considered the cause of all things, and 'neither good nor evil would be any- 'thing really and in themselves, but things would be considered 'to be good or evil by opinion alone.' Of this the result would either be a kind of Pantheism or Atheism, as one or the other should be thought to prevail in the world.

Mr. Mozley's answer to S. Thomas is both forcible and just. He says that the true solution of the question is our ignorance. The schoolmen treated the Divine power as a known premiss, with which it was necessary to reconcile facts; whereas, to use Mr. Mozley's very forcible words, 'As an unknown premiss, the 'Divine power is in no contradiction to the fact of evil; for we 'must know what a truth is before we see a contradiction in it 'to another truth, and, with no contradiction, no solution would 'have been wanted.'² Mr. Mozley is, we think, correct as well in history as in metaphysics. S. Augustine himself, indeed, seems to feel this difficulty, when in his 'De Hæresibus' he has to oppose, on the one hand, Colluthus, who denied that God was, in all senses, the author of evil; as contradicting the words of Isaiah, 'I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I, the Lord, do all these things' (xlv. 7); to which we may add Amos iii. 6, 'Shall there be evil in the city, and the Lord hath not done it?' And on the other, Florinus

¹ Page 260.² Page 276.

who, in plain contradiction of Genesis i. 31, &c., 'God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good,' taught that He directly created evil. We think that his explanation of the error of Colluthus will scarcely be thought final or satisfactory, '*Creat Deus mala, pœnas justas irrogando,*' although his continuation against Florinus would appear both true and sufficient—'*Non autem malas creando naturas atque substantias, in quantum sunt naturæ atque substantiæ.*' Nor does this assertion at all involve the necessity of denying the substantial nature of evil; at least the adage, '*Ex nihilo nihil fit*' would support us in saying, that if evil is a mere nullity, there can be no substantially evil work done, for something cannot be produced from nothing.

On this theory of necessity S. Thomas grafted, in the main, that of S. Augustine on predestination and irresistible Grace; that is, in Mr. Mozley's words, 'a Grace given in the first instance as a free gift of God, and sustained afterwards by the supporting power of God, exerted gratuitously and arbitrarily.' It was a Grace which depended neither in its first bestowal, nor in its continuance, on the will of the subject; but it is 'a gratuitous act of God's sustaining power, who keeps up the moral and spiritual fabric as He does that of the material world, so long as it suits His sovereign will and pleasure, and no longer.' But although absolute predestination and irresistible Grace were thus taught by Aquinas, as they had been by S. Augustine, the former greatly modified the scheme of the latter. S. Augustine acknowledges predestination and reprobation as based on, and commencing from the Fall, and involving a distinction, as Mr. Mozley says, between positive good and positive evil, and as being their consequences. Aquinas reduced this distinction to one between higher and lower good. Giving more room to the remains of natural virtue in man, he admitted a kind of happiness adapted to the former; a happiness to be arrived at by nature, as that of heaven is the gift of grace. Yet, although he was compelled, as S. Augustine's disciple, 'formally to adopt his master's distinction between the natural and spiritual man, as one of positive good and evil, and to use the terms predestination and reprobation, as involving salvation or condemnation,

'Yet a careful observation of his language will detect a contest between two different rationales in his mind; the Clementine view of human nature struggling with the Augustinian. Reprobation, maintained on one side in full severity, is softened down on the other, and identified with a lower step in the scale of being; and the rigid Augustinian line of defence for the doctrine mixes with another, which implies a reduced

¹ Page 287.

² Page 289.

doctrine to be defended. We are referred, together with an original guilt in human nature, to a principle of variety in the constitution of things, which requires that there should be higher and lower places in the universe, down even to some lowest place of all, which must be occupied. 'The religious philosophy of Aquinas, then,' our author concludes, 'tends simply to two different moral creations, a higher and a lower one. The natural man is created, and has the advantages of his creation; the spiritual man is created, and has the advantages of his; and predestination marks for a special glory, and a higher place in the universe; but exclusion from it does not involve positive evil or misery.'¹

Aquinas, however, applies the distinction only to the case of infants dying unbaptized, although it would, of course, as Mr. Mozley observes, be equally applicable to adults; for it is a doctrine founded on nature, and nature is the same in adults as in infants.² S. Augustine had, as we have seen, from the effects of original sin, consigned unbaptized infants to eternal punishment: S. Thomas, taking original sin to be rather the corruption of natural good than the subtraction of supernatural, would only deprive them of the Divine vision. But this want, as Mr. Mozley says, is, according to S. Chrysostom, (and we may add, according to S. Augustine also in his other writings,) the severest punishment of the condemned. Thus, if S. Augustine seem to include in eternal punishment those whom he could not know to be included in it by God; Aquinas, on the other hand, by his doctrine of a reward for merely natural virtue, leans to the opposite inclination, and excludes some, at least, from it, who, we should fear, would be its just subjects. On this Mr. Mozley's words are well worth consideration. Having alluded to the tendency there has ever been in the Church to the doctrine of a middle state, he says:—

'In this state of the case it is needless to add that the plain statements of Scripture on this subject are to be implicitly received, as containing certain and important truth. One great division of mankind is seen there, that of good and bad; one great distinction of eternal lot, that of heaven and hell. It remains that those who have received this revelation should act accordingly, and, instead of forming conjectures about a middle state, live as for the highest. Those who accept a revelation generally, are bound in consistency to accept its plain assertions in particulars; nor does this obligation cease because difficulties may follow. Those who accept a revelation, accept, in doing so, a limitation to the rights of human reason. There are great and important differences in the Christian world as to the point at which such limitation comes in; but whether traditional interpretation of Scripture, or a present infallible one, or the letter of the Bible itself is the check, a check to private judgment is implied in the very fact of a revelation, and is the common admission of all who accept that revelation; who *so far*—and a very important and vital measure of agreement it is—agree with each other. But when men have accepted the check in general, they must submit to it in the particular case. There is no obligation indeed

¹ Mozley, pp. 304–306.

² Mozley, pp. 307–310.

on any one, to think any individual either better or worse than his observation or knowledge of his character warrants; rather he is bound not to do so; nor because general statements are made in Scripture are we bound to apply them, and bring particular persons under one head or another. An impenetrable veil hides the heart of one man from another, and we see the manifestation but not the substance of the moral creature. In the application, then, of the scriptural assertion, all is mystery and uncertainty; but the statement itself is clear and distinct; and while that dispensation of ignorance under which we are placed, in mercy as well as in discipline, relieves us from the difficulties of the individual case, the general truth is calculated to produce the most salutary effect upon us.—P. 312.

We will now turn to the pages of the other mediæval writers lately referred to. Heavy indeed is the debt of our English Church to those saintly rulers of the middle ages who withstood the tyranny and foiled the rage of the fierce nobles and semi-barbarous kings who would fain have trampled the heritage of our Lord under their feet; who had no affections but for God's Church, no home but in her sanctuary, no object of life but her advancement and prosperity. First among these stands S. Anselm; and if he, like so many others of the Church's saints and doctors, now speaks rather in his actions than in his writings, we should yet remember that the latter had, in his own day, and long after it, an effect on the Church at large almost as great as his life had on that of England.

He has entered at some length on the subjects under discussion; but we regret that our limited space will scarcely allow us to give our readers more than a few of the more important points of his system of doctrine on them—for it is, we think, more carefully matured, if not more profoundly conceived, than, except S. Thomas Aquinas, that of any other mediæval writer. We may be wrong, and if we are, we owe an apology to Mr. Mozley; but we wish that he had discussed both S. Anselm and S. Bernard with S. Thomas Aquinas. It has struck us, from our first acquaintance with the former, that in him, if in no other, we may find, carefully laid down and accurately worked out, a system which is entire and consistent in itself—in perfect harmony with Revelation and fact; and which would show us, as we develop it in our minds, that there is a mean between the heretical opinion of Pelagius on free-will, and the hard predestination of S. Augustine, or rather of Calvin; for there are points in this doctrine considered in itself, on which, if we go with the former, we cannot refuse to go still further with the latter.

On the subjects under discussion, S. Anselm says, in his *Dialogue on Free-will*:—

'Free-will is not the power of sinning or not sinning, or neither God nor the angels could possess it, for they cannot sin, yet Satan and men sin through having it, but not because they have it. No thing and no necessity

compels them, but they both act "sponte," for they sinned through the will, not in that it was free, that is through their power of not sinning, but through the power which they had of sinning, by which they were assisted to freedom of not sinning, and were not compelled to the servitude of sin.'—Chap. ii.

'Yet after their sin they still had free-will, for although rectitude of will is absent, rational nature still has no less that which is its own; for we have no power which alone of itself suffices to action, and yet when those things are wanting, without which our powers cannot by any means be led on to action, we are not the less said to have them in us, as far as in us lies.'—Chap. iii.

'It is never in our power to take rectitude when we have it not; but it is always so to keep it when we have it. Hence, as we cannot go away from sin, we are servants; and hence also, because we cannot be drawn from rectitude, we are free; from sin and its service we can only be drawn by another; from rectitude we can only be led by ourselves; from our freedom we can be seduced neither by ourselves nor by others, for we are always naturally free to keep our rectitude if we have it, even when we have not that which we can keep.'—Chap. xi.

He here teaches the freedom of the will, even after the Fall, in a sense in which S. Augustine, who denies all freedom to good, would not admit it.

Again, in his piece 'On the Agreement of God's Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace, with our free-will,' he entirely opposes the doctrine of necessity; saying, that although God's foreknowledge, by which the future that He foreknows is said to be of necessity, seem to oppose our free-will, it can yet coexist with the freedom of the will, by which many things are done without necessity: for if God's knowledge and foreknowledge involve necessity on all things which He knows and foreknows, He wills and will do nothing of freedom, but all things must be of necessity; but if this is absurd even to think, everything which God knows or foreknows as to be or not to be, is not by necessity, whether it be or be not: and therefore, although God must know and foreknow all that is done in our actions and wills, or that is about to be through free-will, yet many things may be done by no necessity but by free-will. He answers the question as to the existence of evil, like S. Augustine, saying that evil is the absence of good:—

'God,' he says, 'does all things that are done, whether by a good or by an evil will; that is, good works or bad. In the good He causes both that they are, and that they are good; in the evil that they are, but not that they are evil. It is something to everything to be good, but it is not so to be evil. To be evil, or unjust, is not to have justice, which is not a thing, for justice is something, but injustice is not a thing. There is a good which is called *commodum*, and there is its opposite evil which is called *incommodum*, which is nothing, as blindness; and sometimes is something, a pain; God makes the latter, as in Isaiah xlv. 7, but to purge and exercise the just, and to punish the unjust; but He does not cause injustice, He does not cause anything to be unjust. The essence of this injustice is the

absence of rectitude, and it lies only in the *will* of the rational creature. Satan, therefore, has not justice, because he had it and deserted it; if man have it not also, he has either lost it in his first parent and not received it, or he has received it but has cast it away, and thus do the foreknowledge of God, and the free-will of the creature, coexist.'

On predestination and reprobation S. Anselm also, for the most part, follows S. Augustine, saying, that there is no necessity resulting from the former, nor any opposition to free-will *as* free; on the contrary, agreement. But here comes in the scriptural view, apparently contradictory, of Grace. Scripture, he says, sometimes speaks as if free-will avails nothing for salvation, but only Grace, and at others as if all depended on free-will. When it speaks for Grace, he continues, it does not take away free-will, nor when it speaks for free-will does it take away Grace, as if only the one or the other sufficed for our salvation, for when our Lord said, 'Without Me ye can do nothing,' He did not say your free-will is of no avail, but it can do nothing without my Grace; and when we read in Romans ix. 16, 'Neither of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy,' it means not that free-will is useless, but that the running and willing are not to be imputed to free-will, but to Grace; for when to one who is conceived and born in sin, and to whom nothing is due but punishment, God gives to will and to run, it is not of him that wills and runs, but of God who has mercy; and if any do not receive Grace, or, when he has received it, throws it away, it is not God's doing but his own, because he remains in his hardness. S. Anselm's doctrine on these points, then, seems to differ from S. Augustine's to the Semi-Pelagians only in containing a larger and broader confession of genuine free-will.

To S. Anselm succeed S. Bernard and Peter Lombard. S. Bernard has infused into his writings on this subject much of that humility and gentleness of mind for which he is so pre-eminent, with a portion at once of his own sweetness and loftiness of disposition, depriving it in a great measure—perhaps as far as possible—of that hardness with which it is invested in the pages of S. Augustine, and which Calvin restored to it with ten-fold force.

He says, that if things just or unjust can be done by necessity, without consent of the will, man ought not to be made miserable, and could not be made happy; for that would then be wanting in him, on either hand, which alone is capable of happiness or misery, namely, the will; for it is the consent of the will which makes men just or unjust, and therefore happy or unhappy. It is rightly called free-will, as being free of itself,

because of the will ; and judge of itself, because of reason : but except in the single and peculiar case of original sin ; where necessity is, there is no liberty, and if no merit, therefore no judgment. S. Bernard has a noble passage descriptive of the different kinds of grace ; a passage which we will give entire, as it is well qualified to raise the thoughts, and enliven the mind when occupied on a subject like the present.

'A three-fold liberty is proposed to us, from sin, from misery, and from necessity ; the last of these nature bestowed on us in our creation, to the first we are restored by Grace, the middle is reserved for us in our country (*patria*). The first may be called the freedom of nature, the second that of Grace ; the third of life or glory. For in the first place, we were created to a free-will and voluntary liberty, a creature noble to God ; in the second we are reformed in innocence, a new creature in Christ ; in the third we are elevated to glory, a creature perfect in spirit. The first liberty has much of honour ; the second, very much also of virtue ; the last, the height of enjoyment. From the first we excel other animals ; in the second, we overcome the flesh ; in the third, we subject death ; or as in the first God has placed under our feet sheep, and oxen, and the beasts of the field, so also, through the second, He equally overthrows and breaks under our feet the spiritual beasts of the air, of which He says, "Oh deliver not the soul of thy turtle-dove unto the multitude of the wicked," (*ne tradas bestiis animas confitentes tibi*), Psalm lxxiv. 19. In the last He will at length subject us to ourselves, through the victory of corruption and death, when the last death shall be destroyed, and we shall pass into the liberty of the glory of the children of God, by which liberty Christ shall make us free, when He shall deliver us up as the kingdom to God and the Father. Of this liberty, as also of that which I have termed the freedom from sin, I suppose He said to the Jews, "If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed," John viii. 36. Free-will signified that we had need of a liberator, but plainly of one who should free it, not from necessity—of which, since there was will, it was wholly ignorant—but from sin, into which it had rushed as freely as voluntarily ; and at the same time from the punishment of sin, which it had incurred without caution, and which it bore unwillingly—from both which ills it could not be freed at all, except through Him who alone of men was made free among the dead, that is, free from sin among sinners.'¹

S. Bernard holds, like S. Anselm, that freedom from necessity attaches equally to God and to every rational creature, good and evil alike, and that it is lost neither by sin nor by misery, and is no greater in the just man than in the sinner, in the angel than in the man. Indeed, he says, 'that as an angel 'or God Himself remains freely good by his own will and not 'by any extrinsic security, so Satan, with equal freedom, 'rushes into, and persists in, evil by his own voluntary consent 'and no foreign impulse.'²

But although S. Bernard may here seem almost, by implication, to leave open a possibility of Satan's future restoration,

¹ De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, cap. iii.

² Ibid, cap. iv.

this is not, in truth, his meaning, for he proceeds to assert, immediately afterwards, with great stress and earnestness, that 'although every creature has it from nature to will, yet Grace 'is necessary to will what is good;' so that return is, to him, no longer possible, the Grace by which he might do so being of course withheld. Hence, also, he holds, with S. Augustine, that the state of Adam before the Fall was one which could avoid sin, and will good; but after it, although he had still power to will, he had no power to will good. Henceforth he could will evil of himself, but his will could not rise to good again of its own power. His system is wrought out at much length. He also seems to give much more room to the genuine will than S. Augustine, and, therefore, to form another of those mediæval authorities who may be contrasted with him and Aquinas.

Peter Lombard is described by Mr. Mozley as 'more of a 'compiler and collector of facts and references, than an 'exponent and a constructor.' Such is, no doubt, in the main, the nature of his work, although we should, perhaps, ourselves, incline to place him somewhat higher as an exponent, at least on some of the subjects of which he treats, than Mr. Mozley does. The system of the Master of the Sentences, on predestination, is briefly this; he acknowledges, with S. Augustine, that there can be foreknowledge without predestination, for God foreknew those things which He was about to do, as also those which He was not. Predestination he defines to be 'A preparation of Grace, or Divine election, by which God 'chose whom He would before the foundation of the world;' and reprobation is 'A foreknowledge of the iniquity of some, 'and a preparation of their condemnation—a non-election.' 'He foreknew but did not prepare iniquity, He foreknew and 'prepared eternal death, not that, as He prepared the saints for 'justification, He prepared the wicked to lose it.'¹ There is nothing notable in the teaching of Lombard on the subject; he is merely, as far as he goes, the echo of S. Augustine.

Mr. Mozley has given, as we have seen, the system of his chief exponent S. Thomas Aquinas. It is, however, worthy of remark that after S. Thomas there come some commentators on Lombard, or rather on S. Thomas himself, of whom Estius is one of the most lucid, and, what is no slight merit, least voluminous, whose efforts were directed to a reassertion of the doctrine of free-will. The great authority of the modern Romanists, Father Perrone, is merely a compiler from S. Augustine, Lombard, Aquinas, and Petavius, and his pages contain nothing of

¹ Book I. Distinct. xl.

note on the subject. He simply gives a kind of familiar abstract of opinions on predestination, reprobation, &c. We prefer Petavius to him, both for learning and for depth. It is, however, scarcely fair to Father Perrone to institute this comparison, the object of his treatise being so different to that of the more profound and elaborate dissertations of his brother Jesuit.

We come now to the Reformed—and first of these is, of course, Calvin.—Mr. Mozley says, in a note at page 284, ‘Between the Augustinian and Thomist doctrine of predestination, and that of Calvin, I can see no substantial difference.’ On our first acquaintance with the writings of Calvin we thought as Mr. Mozley does, but further and more deliberate study of them has led us to the conclusion that there are, between S. Augustine and him, very wide differences. Enlarging our view beyond the mere subject of predestination, we see that Calvin holds a system of doctrine very different from that of S. Augustine, a system utterly contradictory of Revelation, and which is, if there can be one, a new Gospel and a heresy. We will commence this branch of our subject, by giving a definition of predestination from each. S. Augustine, in his ‘*De Dono Perseverantiæ*,’ says, ‘To dispose his future works in that foreknowledge of his which cannot be deceived or changed, this assuredly, and nothing else, is to predestinate,’ §. 41. ‘This predestination,’ he says, ‘is sometimes expressed by the term foreknowledge, as when the Apostle says, “God hath not cast away his people whom He foreknew,” Rom. xi. 2: that which he calls “foreknew,” is not rightly understood but by predestination, as the context shows, for he is speaking of the remnant of the Jews who were saved when the rest perished,’ §. 47. In his ‘*De Prædestinatione*,’ among many other passages to the same effect, is the following, which we cite as asserting essentially the same thing, but with a remarkable distinction: ‘Between Grace and predestination there is only this difference, that predestination is the preparation of Grace, but Grace is the giving it.’ The words of the Apostle, ‘Not of works, lest any-man should boast, for we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works,’ are Grace; those which follow, ‘which God hath before ordained, that we should walk in them,’ are predestination; which cannot be without foreknowledge; for God, by foreknowledge, foreknew what He was about to do. Whence it is written, ‘He hath created the things which are to come,’ Isaiah xlv. 11, Sept. But He is able also to foreknow the things which He does not do, as some kinds of sins: for although there are some sins which are so sins as to be the punishment also of sins, whence it is

written, 'He gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient,' Rom. i. 28; it is not sin there, but the judgment of God, §. 19. To the same purpose, he says very strongly in his 13th Book, 'De Trinitate,' 'The manner in which man is delivered into the power of the devil, ought not to be so understood as if God did it or commanded it to be done, but only as if He permitted it, though justly,' chap. xii.

God, therefore, in S. Augustine's scheme, foreknows everything; but He does not cause or do everything. There are, he says, sins which He does not cause, and these are, in His eyes, sins proper or merely sins. There are sins which He does cause, and these are, as regards man indeed, sins proper; but, as regards God, sins improper, or rather not sins, but judgments. As they came out of His hand, which, as being His cannot be touched by sin, they are judgments; when they have passed through the corrupted nature of man they are defiled, and become sins. Water welling up from a spring is bright and pure; but if received into some unclean vessel, it is henceforth tainted by the impurities of its receptacle. The love which issues from Him is pure love—*i. e.* love—entering into man, it becomes changed by its contact with that which is sinful into lust, and lust is the parent of actual sin. The zeal which in God is zeal, is changed in man, through union with that selfishness which we know to be the final cause of sin, into wicked anger—for the nature of God in its purity, and the nature of man in its sinfulness, are (so far) hostile natures, and must remain such until the greater is reconciled to the less. That the wrong has been corrected and the evil principle restored to good by the Incarnation of the Godhead in Jesus Christ is indeed true; but is beyond our present question.

A consequence, of course, of the above doctrine of predestination and sin is, evidently, that S. Augustine contemplates the first man as created simply to holiness, and endowed with a will to choose, and a righteousness to perform, good works: and although, of course, liable to temptation, yet created that he should resist, and not that he should yield to it. We accordingly find him speaking as follows:—'He created the first man with free-will, and although ignorant of his future fall, yet therefore happy because he perceived that not to die and not to be made miserable were in his own power. In which state of rectitude and freedom from vice, if he had wished through his free-will to remain, assuredly without any taste of death and unhappiness he would have received that fulness of happiness deservedly, of this perseverance, by which the holy angels also

‘were happy—that is, not to be able to fall any more, and to know this most certainly. But because by free-will he deserted God, he experienced the just judgment of God, that he should be condemned with all his race, the whole of which (as yet in him) sinned with him.’¹ ‘Adam deserted God, and he was deserted.’ ‘The help given to him was such that he could desert God if he willed, not such that he was caused to will.’² ‘God at that time, therefore, gave to man a good will, for in that will He created him, Who created him upright. He had a help given, without which he could not remain in that will if he wished; but that he should wish God left in his own will. He was able then to remain if he would, for there was not wanting the aid by which he might be able, and without which he could not, with perseverance, hold the good that he wished. But because he willed not to persevere, it was assuredly his fault, whose merit it would have been had he willed to persevere.’³ ‘We must distinguish between these aids. There is an aid without which a thing is not done, and there is another by which a thing is done; for without food we are not able to live; but yet food, when supplied, does not cause the man to live who wills not to live. To the first man, then, who, in that good in which he was created upright, received the ability not to sin, and not to desert that good, was given an aid to perseverance, not by which he was made to persevere, but without which he was not able, through free-will, to persevere. But now to the saints of God who are predestinated to the kingdom of God through the Grace of God, not such an aid as this to perseverance is given; but such that to them perseverance itself is given; not only that without that gift they cannot be persevering, but that through it they cannot *but* be persevering.’⁴ Finally, Of this number, which is so certain that no individual can be added to or taken from it, they persevere to whom God has given the Grace of perseverance. Their faith is not the faith of the solifidian, but one that works by love. ‘Men not understanding what the apostle says, ‘We conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law,’ have thought that he said faith is sufficient for us, even if we live unrighteously, and have not good works—which be it far from a vessel of election to think, for when he had said in one place “In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision,” he adds presently after, “but faith which worketh by love,” Gal. v. 6. This is the faith which separates the faithful of God from the unclean devils, for even they, as the Apostle James says,

¹ De Correctione et Gratia, § 28.² Ibid. § 31.³ Ibid. § 32.⁴ Ibid. § 34.

' "believe and tremble," but do not good works. They have not, therefore, that faith by which the just live, that is, the faith which worketh by love, that God may give them life eternal according to their works. But because even those good works themselves we have from God, from whom also is both our faith and love, therefore, the same teacher of the Gentiles has called even eternal life itself grace.'—*De Correptione et Gratia*, § 18.

This Grace, the gift of the predestinate, is to be held in no spirit of pride; but with humility and fear.¹ 'If even to the saints, who are to persevere, it is . . . spoken as if it were uncertain that they would persevere, they ought so to receive it as they whom it becomes not to think highly, but to fear. For who, of the multitude of faithful, as long as he lives in this state of mortality may presume that he is in the number of the predestinate? For it is needful to be hidden in this place, where pride is so to be avoided, that so great an apostle was buffeted even by a messenger of Satan, lest he should be exalted. Hence it was said to the Apostles "If you remain in me," by Him who assuredly knew that they would remain. And by the prophet "If ye be willing and obedient," (and will hear me) when He himself knew in whom He would work even to will. And many like things are said—For, because of the usefulness of this secret, lest any one should by chance be exalted, and that all, even they who run well, may fear, whilst it is hidden who shall attain; we must believe that some of the sons of perdition, not having received the gift of perseverance to the end, began to live in the faith which works by love, and lived in it faithfully and justly for a time, and afterwards fell, nor were taken from this life before this happened to them. If it had happened to none of these, men should have a wholesome fear, by which the vice of pride is kept down, until they arrive at that grace of Christ by which they live holily. Now, from henceforth secure that they will never fall from Him. This presumption is not becoming in

¹ We will here observe, once for all, that there were three different doctrines of grace taught in the time of S. Augustine. 1. His own, which is that of a grace, *data gratis*. 2. That of Pelagius—"Grace which is of you and in you, and which no one can give you but yourself, and you can merit it." This is a Grace which, as S. Augustine says, is not grace proper, because it is not given 'gratis,' but it depends on ourselves both to have and to use it. 3. The Semi-Pelagian grace. This is really grace as being given 'gratis;' but, as they taught, it depends on nature to have and to use it, for God chose to give us grace because we were faithful, as in the case of Cornelius, &c. The Semi-Pelagians, therefore, really confessed grace, but lowered it unduly, subjecting it, in fact, to nature. S. Augustine answers that grace was given us, not because we were, but that we might be faithful. Even to Cornelius, where the Semi-Pelagians take him up, grace, S. Augustine says, must have been given to him first, to make him what he was, and to this grace more grace was added.

‘that place of temptations where the infirmity is so great that security will generate pride. Lastly, this too, which is even now in the angels, will be in man also, but at that time when there will be no possibility of any pride having existence.’¹

The system of Calvin was very different. He defines predestination to be ‘The eternal decree of God by which He determined with Himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All men are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation, and accordingly, as each has been created to one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestined to life or to death.’ The presumptuousness of these words is only to be equalled by their heterodoxy. It is asserted in them, firstly, that God is the ultimate cause of sin—a conclusion of Calvin’s, on which we shall shortly speak at more length—and, secondly, that Calvin knows and can determine those mysteries and secret counsels of God, which are foreknown to Himself alone, and which will be published by Him at his own final judgment, and not before. The temper of mind which could make such assertions without the slightest misgiving of any kind, moral or intellectual, is indeed remarkable—we trust, however, that it will rather prove the Church’s caution than her imitation.

He continues thus, ‘We indeed ascribe both prescience and predestination to God, but we say that it is absurd to make the latter subordinate to the former.’² Again, ‘since all things are in the hand of God, since to Him belongs the disposal of life and death, He arranges all things by His Sovereign will and counsel in such a way that individuals are born who are doomed from the womb to certain death, and are to glorify Him by their destruction. If any one alleges that no necessity is laid upon them by the Providence of God, but rather that they are created by Him in that condition, because He foresaw their future depravity, he says something, but does not say enough. The Schoolmen again rest in it as if it could not be gainsaid; I, for my part, am willing to admit that mere prescience lays no necessity on the creature, though some do not assent to this; but hold that it is itself the cause of things. If God merely foresaw human events, and did not also arrange and dispose of them at his pleasure, there might be room for agitating the question how far His foreknowledge amounts to necessity; but since He foresees the things that are to happen, it is vain to debate about prescience whilst it is clear that all events take place by His sovereign appointment.’³

He speaks still more plainly in the following section; ‘Here

¹ De Correptione et Gratia, § 40.

² Institutes. Book 3, chap. 21. § 5.

³ Institutes. Book iii, chap. 23. §. 6.

'they recur to the distinction between will and permission, the object being to prove that the wicked perish only by the permission, but not by the will of God. But why do we say that He permits, but only because He wills? Nor indeed is there any probability in the thing itself that man brought death upon himself merely by the permission, and not by the ordination of God—as if God had not determined what He wished the condition of the chief of his creatures to be.' In the beginning of this book he says, (as against S. Bernard), 'Many professing a desire to defend the Deity from an invidious charge, admit the doctrine of election, but deny that any one is reprobated. This they do ignorantly and childishly—since there could be no election without its opposite reprobation.'

We have heard S. Augustine on the original state of Adam. Let us now listen to the very different statement of Calvin. 'They deny that it is even said in distinct terms that God decreed that Adam should perish by his revolt. As if the same God, who is declared in Scripture to do whatever He pleases, could have made his noblest creatures without any special purpose. They say that, in accordance with free-will, he was to be the architect of his own fortune, that God had decreed nothing but to treat him according to his desert. If this frigid fiction is received, where will be the omnipotence of God, by which, according to his secret counsel, on which everything depends, He rules over all? Again, how is it that the fall of Adam involves so many nations and their infant children in eternal death without remedy, unless that it so seemed meet to God? The decree I admit is dreadful, and yet it is impossible to deny that God foreknew what the end of man was to be before He made him, and foreknew because He had so ordained by His decree. Nor ought it to seem absurd when I say that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his posterity, but also at His own pleasure, arranged it. For as it belongs to His wisdom to foreknow all future events, so it belongs to His power to rule and govern them by His hand.' And he concludes—'The first man fell because God deemed it meet that he should fall—why He deemed it meet, we know not. It is certain, however, that it was just, because He saw that His own glory would thereby be displayed.'—Institutes, Book iii, Chap. 23, §§ 7, 8.

If in any manner reprobation is implied in the writings of S. Augustine, it is always as the result of Adam's sin, and but for this he holds that it would not have been. Calvin, however, leaving that fact entirely out of sight, ascribes it wholly to God's will, that so, as he assumes, His glory might be immediately magnified. 'From other passages' (than Isaiah xiv. 27, "The

‘Lord of Hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it? and
 ‘His hand that is stretched out, and who shall turn it back?’
 ‘in which God is said to draw or bend Satan himself, and all
 ‘the reprobate to His will, a more difficult question arises. For
 ‘the carnal mind can scarcely comprehend how, when acting by
 ‘their means, He contracts no taint from their impurity, nay,
 ‘how in a common operation He is exempt from all guilt, and
 ‘can justly condemn His own ministers. Hence a distinction
 ‘has been invented between doing and permitting, because to
 ‘many it seemed altogether inexplicable how Satan and all the
 ‘wicked are so under the hand and authority of God, that He
 ‘directs their malice to whatever end He pleases, and employs
 ‘their iniquities to execute His judgments. The modesty of
 ‘those who are thus alarmed at the appearance of absurdity
 ‘might perhaps be excused, did they not endeavour to vindicate
 ‘the justice of God from every semblance of stigma, by defend-
 ‘ing an untruth. It seems absurd that man should be blinded
 ‘by the will and command of God, and yet be forthwith punished
 ‘for his blindness. Hence recourse is had to the evasion that
 ‘this is done only by the permission, and not also by the will, of
 ‘God. He, Himself, however, openly declaring that He *does*
 ‘this, repudiates the evasion. That men do *nothing* save at the
 ‘secret instigation of God, and do not discuss and deliberate on
 ‘anything but what He previously decreed with Himself, and
 ‘brings to pass by His secret direction, is proved by numberless
 ‘clear passages of Scripture.’—Book I. chap. xviii. § 1.

We have heard how S. Augustine treats the rejection of
 Esau; let us now hear Calvin: ‘We now come,’ he says, ‘to
 ‘the reprobate, to whom the Apostle at the same time refers.
 ‘(Rom. ix. 13). For as Jacob, who, as yet, had merited nothing
 ‘by good works, is assumed into favour, so Esau, while as yet
 ‘unpolluted by any crime, is hated. If we turn our view to
 ‘works, we do injustice to the Apostle, as if he had failed to see
 ‘the very thing which is clear to us. Moreover, there is com-
 ‘plete proof of his not having seen it, since he expressly insists
 ‘that when as yet they had done neither good nor evil, the one
 ‘was elected, the other rejected, in order to prove that the founda-
 ‘tion of the Divine predestination is not in works. Then, after
 ‘stating the objection, is God unjust? instead of employing
 ‘what would have been the surest and plainest defence of His
 ‘justice, namely, that God had recompensed Esau according to
 ‘his wickedness, he is contented with a different solution,
 ‘namely, that the reprobate are expressly raised up *in order* that
 ‘the glory of God might thereby be displayed. At last he
 ‘concludes that “God hath mercy on whom He will have
 ‘mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth,” Rom. ix. 18. ‘You

'see how he refers both to the same pleasure of God. Therefore 'if we cannot assign any reason for His bestowing mercy 'on this people, but just that it so pleases Him, neither can we 'have any reason for His reprobating others but His will. 'When God is said to visit in mercy, or to harden whom He 'will, men are reminded that they are not to seek for any 'cause beyond His will.'—Book III. chap. xxii. § 11.

S. Augustine then lays stress on the rejection of Esau from his birth, and so does Calvin. But the difference between them lies in this, that S. Augustine bases that rejection on the sin of Adam, whilst Calvin ascribes it to God's will and pleasure merely, as if the other cause had no existence whatever. Esau is not, according to him, punished for the sin that is in him, but in order that God's glory may be increased. Not as S. Augustine teaches, and as all men hold with him, that God overrules evil to the increase of His own glory, but that He directly causes it to that end. Few, we suppose, will be bound by the false and shallow sophistry with which the above extract concludes. Calvin's system may indeed require, that its recipient ask no question, to which it is not convenient for its author to reply, but with which, if answered, the system itself falls utterly to the ground. We submit, not only that we may seek, but that we are bound to seek for 'a cause beyond God's 'will in the condemnation of the wicked;' for there is such a cause expressly revealed to us; God wills to harden the hearts of impenitent sinners for the same reason which caused Him to harden Pharaoh's, namely, because he hardened his own heart; 'grace for grace' has its complement, and that is hardening for hardening.

But how, if God so wills that sin should be, and so caused Adam to sin, does not the guilt lie *not* on the creature who commits the sin, but on Him who irresistibly causes it to be committed? This Calvin must tell us. Accordingly, forgetful of the axiom, 'Qui facit per alium facit per se,' he says that the guilt rests with Satan or those evil men who actually do what God, however, causes them to do. 'God often acts in the 'reprobate by the agency of Satan, but in such a manner that 'Satan himself performs his part, just as he is impelled, and 'succeeds only in so far as he is permitted.'—Book I. chap. xviii. § 2. Again, he says still more strongly: 'Instrumentum 'cum sit (Satanas) iræ Dei pro Ejus nutu atque imperio huc 'atque illuc se inflectere ad exequenda Ejus justa judicia.'—Book II. chap. iv. § 2; and he admits that the same act may be ascribed to God as to Satan and to evil men, the only difference being in the mode of it, which is to cause, (he does not say how,) on the one hand, the righteousness of God, and,

on the other, the wickedness of Satan and man, to be seen the clearer.

And here we cannot but ask, Is it the truth then, after all, that the only difference between God and Satan is not that the one is in Himself righteous, and the other is in himself wicked, but that they are merely in different positions? And does Satan not disobey and defy God, but merely act in obedience, though it be in forced obedience, to His will? Was it by God's 'nutus et imperium' that he first rebelled in heaven? And do evil men—murderers and adulterers—only cooperate with God? The idea, when stated in other language than Calvin's, is too shocking and repulsive to be entertained for a moment: nor can we easily see how those who have accused him of blasphemy, and termed his God not the God of Christians but of Manicheans, and the like, are at all guilty of essential exaggeration.

We will now pass on to some of the consequences of Calvin's scheme of predestination and absolute Divine decrees. We have seen how S. Augustine defines faith, and a greater than he has termed it 'The substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,' (Heb. xi. 1.) a description regarding equally the subject and the object. Calvin has utterly destroyed this harmony, for he makes faith wholly subjective. Having rightly protested against faith being considered as mere assent to Gospel history, he requires it to be explicit, yet is compelled to grant, from the nature of the case, that it must be in a measure implicit, 'not only because, as yet, many things 'are hidden from us, but because, involved in the mists of 'error, we attain not to all.' He places it in knowledge; that is, not merely knowledge of God, but of His will; yet, again, not in every kind of knowledge, but in a firm and sure knowledge of the Divine favour towards ourselves, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed to our minds, and sealed on our hearts by the Holy Ghost, and its issue is a full assurance.—Book III. chap. ii. §§. 1—11.

The result, of course, must be that such faith is indefectible. 'As God regenerates the elect only, for ever, by an incorruptible 'seed, and as the seed of life once sown in their hearts never 'perishes, so He effectually seals in them the grace of His adoption, that it may be sure and steadfast. We must remember, 'that however feeble and slender the faith of the elect may be, 'yet as the spirit of God is, to them, a true earnest and seal of 'their adoption, the impression once engraven, can never be 'effaced from their hearts, whereas the light which glimmers in 'the reprobate is quenched.' 'Therefore as we have already 'said, we again maintain that faith remaining fixed in the

'believer's breast, can never be eradicated from it. However 'it may seem shaken and bent in this direction or that, its flame 'is never so completely quenched as not at least to lurk under 'the embers.'—Book III. chap. ii. § § 12—21.

Of course, with such a faith, there cannot but be perfect assurance with it. 'God only gives the reprobate a manifestation of 'His present mercy—in the elect alone He implants the living 'root of faith, so that they persevere even to the end.'—Book III. chap. ii. § 11. 'In one word, he only is a true believer who, 'firmly persuaded that God is reconciled, and is a kind Father 'to him, hopes everything from His kindness, who, trusting to 'the promises of the Divine favour, with undoubting confidence 'anticipates salvation'—in support of this he cites Hebrews iii. 14, 'We are made partakers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of 'our confidence—(*ὑποστάσεως*, substantiæ) unto the end,'—with the irrelevant comment, 'He thus holds that none hope well in 'the Lord, save those who confidently glory in being the heirs 'of the Heavenly Kingdom.'—Book III. chap. ii. § 16.

'The spirit of election is called the seal and earnest of the 'future election, because by His testimony He confirms and 'seals the certainty of future adoption in the hearts of the 'elect.'—Book III. chap. xxiv. § 1. 'Moreover, it cannot be 'doubted that, since Christ prays for all the elect, He asks the 'same thing for them as He asked for Peter—namely, that their 'faith fail not. Hence we infer that there is no danger of their 'falling away, since the Son of God, who asks that their piety 'may prove constant, never meets with a refusal.'—Book III. chap. xxiv. § 6. The case of Judas he meets by assuming what he cannot, and by stating what he does not, know; that such never really adhered to Christ—with the confidence, that is, by which *he* lays it down that the certainty of election is secured.

S. Augustine, with S. Paul, teaches, as we have seen, the necessity of humility, lest we lose our grace—not so Calvin. 'Meanwhile believers are taught to examine themselves carefully 'and humbly, lest carnal security creep in and take the place of 'assurance of faith.' Calvin then held directly what S. Augustine did not, that grace is in the strictest sense indefectible, and cannot be otherwise.

It appears, then, that there are the following points of difference between S. Augustine and the so-called 'Reformer' of Geneva—S. Augustine, by laying down so strongly Adam's freedom of will, and asserting that it was in his own power never to have seen death, teaches, with the Church at large, that there was no necessity laid on him to sin, and therefore that the words, 'In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die,' were spoken merely as a warning. According to Calvin, their

true sense must be 'when the day shall have arrived which I have predetermined and ordained, and arranged that thou shalt eat thereof,' &c.

S. Augustine holds the view,—presumptuously derided, but of course not disproved by Calvin,—that God permitted, indeed, but did not cause the sin of man; Calvin, that He caused and decreed it; that He compelled Adam to commit it, that He might thereby show His severity, His justice, and His power—for He, by an eternal and absolute decree, predestined the wicked to reprobation and to damnation, before He saw any stain of corruption in them, for the sake of which He had determined to punish them; and afterwards, that He might follow out his decree, He caused them to fall into sin, by which He might have cause of just hatred to, and punishment of them. This he said, not seeing that God cannot condemn, by an absolute decree, any who, having yet no sin, cannot be a just object of condemnation. They against whom He issues such a decree, must have given cause for it, and their sin must therefore have preceded and not followed that sentence. No man is a criminal, and no human judge punishes, before a crime has actually been committed. Nor is the cause of this the absence merely of prescience on the part of the judge, for if he could certainly foreknow that such a man would be a murderer before next year, that foreknowledge would still form no reason why he should now issue sentence of death against him; and is God less just than man?

Here then is the fatal flaw in the argument of Calvin. His doctrine would make God act not merely against reason, but against justice. S. Augustine and Calvin date predestination from a different period—S. Augustine puts the sin first and deduces the sentence of reprobation from it; Calvin makes the reprobation precede and cause the sin. S. Augustine, in teaching predestination, contemplates men as they *are*, namely, under sin, and not otherwise; he dates predestination from the fall, and not sooner. Calvin applies the same doctrine to man even when as yet there was no sin in him. S. Augustine taught, with S. Paul, that the first act of sin changed the previous counsels of God towards man; a fact which Calvin would never have acknowledged; and that when that act was committed, but not before; God, foreknowing indeed that it would be committed, *then* predetermined to separate some men for salvation, and to punish the rest. The cause of the former decree was purely His mercy, the cause of the latter was not merely His own will (as Calvin said), but the sin that was in the condemned. They in whom this sin is washed away by baptism, still not entering life unless God bestow on them not merely the Grace of Justifi-

cation but also the further Grace of Perseverance. The only cause of S. Augustine's reprobation, then, was sin; for according to him, reprobation, but for sin, could not be just.

We are anxious, indeed, to clear S. Augustine from all suspicion of holding a doctrine so monstrous and horrible as that God is in any manner, directly or indirectly, the author of sin itself and of Adam's sin. He fortunately speaks most decidedly on the subject, 'This rule,' he says to Prosper and Hilary, 'is to be held unshakenly; that sinners were foreknown in their sin, but not prepared for it—their punishment however *was* prepared.' Again, to Sixtus, 'God hardens not by imparting malice, but by not imparting grace, as they (who sin) are not worthy of it. For they to whom He imparts it not, are not worthy of, and do not deserve it, rather they are worthy, and do deserve, that it should not be imparted.' And to Simplician, 'We must not understand that God so hardens as if He compelled any one to sin, but those sinners on whom He does not bestow the mercy of His justification, He is therefore said to harden, because He does not take mercy on them, not because He impels them to sin.'

But it will be replied that Calvin repudiates the making God the author of sin; saying that, 'Between the willing and the commanding there is a very great difference.'—*Inst.* Book I. chap. xviii. § 4. Of course he is compelled to say this in words, for it would be simple Manicheism to hold the contrary; the question really is, whether his system bears out this denial. In that he makes Satan God's instrument of acting, and holds that he acts according to God's will, and not contrarily to it, he surely makes God the original cause of the act. If an irresponsible emperor were to issue a decree commanding the performance of some act of injustice, he himself, and not his minister, would be the person really accountable for it. The words of S. Augustine, '*Voluntas Dei rerum necessitas*,' (meant to apply to God's actions after the Fall,) being used of them, by Calvin, before it, make God the cause of the Fall—for the stain of nature, from which reprobation followed (we might say resulted) is posterior and not prior to reprobation, and if the will of God, determined to condemn some, and to elect others to salvation, and chose sin, as Calvin says, and made that the instrument and means of their condemnation, He is therefore the final cause both of the reprobation and of the will which caused it, and man is not to be blamed because it was a fatal necessity, or the will of God, which caused him to sin.¹ Beza taught this, as Petavius

¹ Calvin makes Satan act, as we have seen, '*Pro Dei nutu atque imperio*.' Wherein, then, lies the difference between Satan tempting Eve, and Gabriel visiting Mary? How could the action of the latter be described as done otherwise than by that '*nutus et imperium*'?

shows even more plainly than Calvin his master. 'In a decree of that kind by which God destined vessels of His wrath, whom He would, from eternity, we must distinguish the execution of the design itself, that is, the purpose of reprobation from condemnation. For we understand no other cause of the design than the will of God itself; but of its execution, that is, of the damnation, the voluntary corruption of Adam derived to us. The hatred of God then in reprobating men we affirm in the order of causes, not to precede the eternal counsel of God, inasmuch as we rightly place it in the last grade of all causes; but rather to follow it. Hence it is, that although those whom God in the beginning predestinates from eternity, He, in His own time, afterwards hates; yet in the beginning to predestinate them is not to have hated them, but to predestinate them to His hatred. But, at the same time, when God destines to His hatred those whom He will, He so supplies causes of His future hatred, as that the material of hatred may be inherent in those who are predestinated to their destruction, and also that His justice in following them with hatred, and at length condemning them, may stand forth.'

This Petavius calls a doctrine in opposition to itself: 'For how,' he asks, 'can God condemn any man by an absolute decree, but that He hates him? . . . Those, therefore, whom He wills to visit with so great a punishment, He, by that, hates and numbers among the cursed and execrated, so that the hatred of God precedes the condemnation of the reprobate, and does not follow it.' *De Prædest.*, Lib. X. cap. xi. §§ vii. viii.

Calvin, again, teaches, firstly, 'that faith and righteousness are never given to the reprobate; and secondly, that they can never fail in the elect even for a moment.' *Institutes*, Book III. chap. ii. § 11.

S. Augustine teaches that faith and righteousness are given to the reprobate and lost, from the case of the Devil and his angels, who had once had grace and faith, but lost them.—*De Correptione*, chap. vi.

Calvin also holds that those who are truly justified are sure of their election and predestination, and he places the test of faith in that certain and absolute persuasion of salvation which will allow no doubt of it.

S. Augustine most emphatically disallows any such security. 'What man can know that he will persevere in the performance and increase of righteousness to the end, unless he is made certain of it by some revelation, from Him, who, on this subject, by a just and hidden judgment, instructs not all, but deceives no one?'—*De Civitate Dei*, chap. xii., quoted by Petavius, *De Prædest.*, lib. X. chap. ix. § iv.

Lastly, it is the doctrine of Calvin, necessarily following those which he holds on predestination and grace, that God does not will *all* men to be saved, but only the elect; and, consequently, that Christ died not for all men, but only for these.

S. Augustine, on the other hand, says, 'God wills all mankind to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. Not so, however, as to take from them free-will, by using which well or ill they are most justly judged.'—*De Spiritu et Litt.* § xxxiii. On which Petavius says, 'By these words he shows not only that God has a secret will within Himself, by which He wishes all men to be saved, although in fact they be not made free by the fault of their own will, but also that outwardly by some sign and effect, He discloses that which is alluring and inviting grace. For if nothing were proposed to the reprobate, which they could either embrace or reject by free-will, they would not be able, in that, to use their free-will well or ill, nor, from repudiation and rejection of that which was offered, to be most justly judged.'—*De Prædest.*, lib. X. chap. iv. § vii.

Calvin's doctrine of an absolute decree evidently strikes at the root of the fact of redemption. God wills all men to be saved. Christ died for all men; not, indeed, as the Schoolmen say, 'actualiter,' that is, as far as the *result* of his death is concerned, but 'efficienter,' as far as regards the *virtue* of it.

S. Augustine says on S. John iii. 17, 'He came not to judge the world, but to save it: as much as is in a physician, He came to heal the sick. He who will not observe the directions of the physician kills himself.'

But how, in the system of Calvin, could Christ suffer for those whom God had predetermined to condemn by an absolute decree from the beginning? Thus, according to him, not merely is a Mediator not required, but there is no real place for one. There is no justice to be satisfied, for there is no original act of disobedience against the commands of God; but an act which He originally caused to be done, and which the agent had no power to refrain from doing. An absolute decree one way should be balanced by a counter decree the other way, as Limborch and the Arminians have actually argued. An absolute decree of condemnation is met not by the blood of a mediator, which has nothing to do with it, but by an absolute decree of salvation; and if the shedding of blood was not necessary to a decree of reprobation, why should it be required to one of election?

We affirm, then, that in one of its phases Calvin has wholly changed the Christian faith. As surely as the Church of Rome,

in the worship of saints, transubstantiation, the supremacy of S. Peter, and the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, has put an objective system of her own into the room of that of the saints of old; so surely, in his doctrines of predestination, reprobation, regeneration, (which, as we should have shown, had it belonged to our particular subject to do so, he has disconnected from, and made independent of, the sacrament of Baptism,) conversion, justification, indefectible grace, and assurance, has Calvin given a new subjective scheme for that of the Apostles. But there is another accusation, and one scarcely less grave, yet remaining against him. He has tampered with the qualities and gifts of God. The depth and freshness of the wonderful love of God has wholly perished from his scheme. His mercy is perverted to arbitrary will. The glorious liberty of Christ is turned into mere licentiousness, the wholesome fear and trembling of Christians into presumption, and that inexhaustible richness and exuberance of grace, which so abounds and overflows in the writings of the Apostles, is wholly lost in his. Who from the pages of Calvin could form the slightest idea that the Church had ever possessed a S. John? The 'frigid fiction,' of which he accuses his opponents, may well be retorted on himself. The great ruling principle of God's dealings with man is not, with him, as with S. John, love without measure, but arbitrary will; will merely to display His own attributes. There is no cry of 'Abba' with him, no interceding spirit 'making intercession with groanings which cannot be uttered,' no necessarily healing virtue in the most precious blood shed on the cross. His system is without comfort to make it alluring, and without truth to recommend it. There is no moral warmth, no heart, no life, no love in it; all is cold, hard, dry, heartless, unloving, intellectual exercise.

How different with the writings of S. Augustine! He may have his faults or deficiencies, indeed, as a teacher; he may speak more absolutely than he has authority for on some questions; his writings may not be wholly without hardness in parts; and on many points he may be no unerring nor satisfactory guide, leaving difficulties where he finds them, or only explaining them by others. From what is revealed in Holy Scripture on predestination he has drawn conclusions, and erected a scheme of his own, and in so doing, has, no doubt, by implication, trenched in some degree on the truth of sacramental grace; but still when he does approach the subject of grace itself, how intense and masterly do we feel his ideas and language to be! What a profound unmatched insight he is seen to possess into a subject in itself so deep and so mysterious! Where, out of inspiration, is anything to be compared to it?

One's feelings, on first making acquaintance with his writings on the question of grace and free-will, are of those which seize us once or twice in our life, and can never be repeated. It awes us to see the vast, almost superhuman, power he puts out. We hold our breath before words so wonderfully concentrated on the one point of the humiliation of the creature, and the exaltation of the Creator. What a lesson of humility, too, is to be learnt in the intensity of the abasement of that most mighty mind before a doctrine which declares that man, of himself alone, cannot even so much as form a wish, utter a sigh, move a finger, towards good; but that, if he do so, it is of God's grace alone, and not in any manner of his own power. There is more comfort in S. Augustine's doctrine of grace, duly considered and realized, than in any other in the range of subjective theology.

The doctrines of Calvin, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, had obtained great hold in Geneva, although even then receding from the supralapsarian form, in which they are found in his works, to the sublapsarian. From his dogma of an absolute decree followed as a necessary consequence the denial of the universality of the redemption by Christ's death. This urged Arminius, a native of Holland, but educated at Geneva, to leave the heterodox innovations of Calvin, and teach, in accordance with the ancient and true faith, that Christ, by His death on the cross, made atonement for the sins of all, though the faithful alone receive the fruits of it. This, after more than one preliminary meeting and debate, caused, in 1618, the holding of the Synod of Dort. The Arminians, or remonstrants, were headed by Episcopius, who had been a pupil of Arminius's, and there were present four English divines—Carleton, bishop of Llandaff, Hall, afterwards bishop of Exeter and Norwich, Davenant of Salisbury, and Dr. Ward. Dr. Hall was afterwards, through ill-health, succeeded by Dr. Goad, chaplain to Abbot, the Calvinistic archbishop of Canterbury, and Walter Balcanqual, another puritan divine of the times, was added to their number.¹

The five points, as they are called, formed the subject-matter of debate. They were as follows:—1. Predestination in its two parts of Election and Reprobation; 2. The Universality of Christ's death; 3. 4. The power of the Will and Divine Grace; 5. Perseverance.

It is impossible to give any thing like all the definitions,

¹ Our chief authority for the following account of the Synod is the Latin folio 'Acti Synodi Nationalis Dordrechtii habitæ.' Lugdun. MDCXX. Hales of Eton was present as a spectator, and has given an account of it. Dr. Heylin, also, has left a work on the five points.

voluminous and wordy as they are, of the different reformed bodies who were present, and took part in the debates. It must suffice to say, briefly, that on the first point the Arminians hold that predestination is 'God's decree to save those who believe 'and continue in faith and faithful obedience to their lives' end.' The cause of their election being 'Their foreseen faith and 'obedience.' Reprobation they declare to be 'A decree of God 'to leave the faithless, who persist in unbelief and disobedience, 'under His wrath and condemnation;' and its cause is 'Impenitence and unbelief, and perseverance in them.' The Calvinists define predestination to be 'God's voluntary decree to save 'certain chosen from the rest, efficaciously call them, justify 'them, preserve them in faith, and at last bring them to glory;' the cause being 'His own will and pleasure alone, without any 'consideration of man's future faith or obedience.' Reprobation, with them, is 'God's most free and just decree by which 'He has determined not to choose some nor call them by His 'Spirit to election, and justification, and future glory.'¹ Our own divines hold that election to life was 'Of God's mercy, by 'which He provided salvation for the elect, and such means as 'should efficaciously and infallibly lead them to it.'² Reprobation they term 'Non-election,' and define it to be 'An eternal Divine decree, by which God, of His most free-will, did 'not so far take pity on some of those who fell in Adam, as to 'snatch them out of a state of misery through Christ, and bring 'them infallibly to happiness.'³

On the second point, the Arminians affirm that Christ died for all alike, 'tam pereuntibus quam servandis.' The Calvinists only allow that He died for the elect.⁴ The British divines side with the former, saying, 'Christ gave Himself for the sins 'of the whole world, so that the offer of salvation is made to 'all, and they who are lost perish through their own wilful 'fault.'⁵

On the third and fourth points, the Arminians admit the existence of free-will. They hold that 'God wills all men to 'have faith by the Gospel, and gives to all and each, sufficiently 'and efficaciously, the means of grace, if they themselves do 'not oppose it, the Holy Spirit being necessary to illuminate 'and regenerate the natural faculties, and enable them to do 'real good; yet the will can resist this grace if it choose, or 'can work with it.' The Calvinists hold the reverse of the first proposition, and on the second they declare 'Regeneration 'and grace of the Holy Ghost to be both infallible and irre-

¹ Fol. Pt. iii., p. 1, &c.

² Fol. Pt. ii., p. 3, &c.

³ Fol. Pt. ii., p. 11.

⁴ Pt. iii., pp. 88, 103, &c.

⁵ Pt. ii., pp. 78, 79.

'sistible.'¹ The British hold that in the Fall the will lost its power, and needs grace to its renewal; and they teach, with the Calvinists, against the Arminians, an indefectible grace; for although they admit that the elect can fall, they deny that they can fall finally and irrecoverably. Throughout their discussions on this article they also, like both Arminians and Calvinists, speak heretically on Baptism, and fully adopt the Calvinistic view of regeneration and conversion.²

On the fifth point, the Arminians hold that 'Perseverance is not the gift of God, properly so called, but a precept and moral condition of the New Testament, for men can fall from grace totally and finally, and none of the faithful can be assured of His salvation, in this life, without a special revelation:'³ a truth, we might say, a matter of common sense, which it has now been long out of the power of controversy to call in question, and which a man would scarcely be thought sane if he doubted, in these days. The Calvinists, however, entirely denied it, with whom our own countrymen agreed, asserting that 'every one of the elect can be certainly assured of his perseverance and final salvation, and placing it among what they call "*Theses heterodoxæ*" to hold otherwise.'⁴ Yet they admit that this assurance is sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker, and sometimes, as in very heavy temptations, does not exist at all.⁵ They place among the same '*Theses heterodoxæ*' that the faithful can sin mortally; that each deadly sin, so far, forfeits the state of justification and adoption; and that the (Calvinistic) doctrine of the certainty of perseverance and salvation is pernicious and deadly to religion.⁶

Yet, although holding doctrines so unscriptural and unwarrantable, the Calvinistic party was too numerous and too strong in political influence for their opponents, who were consequently defeated. The Arminians, in fact, had not a fair trial. 'Their accusers and adversaries were,' as Mosheim truly says, 'their judges;' and, utterly dissenting, as we must do, from much of their teaching, especially that on regeneration, and their statements on the third and fourth points, in which they do seem to come (as they have since been accused of doing) too near to Pelagianism, we may still heartily concur in the decision of the historian just mentioned, that 'the Calvinistic doctrines ruled by the Synod were utterly unknown in the first ages of the Christian Church.'

The Synod of Dort had a very brief popularity, if any at all, in England. Thanks to Archbishop Laud, the perverse

¹ Pt. iii., pp. 181, 186.
p. 223.

⁴ Fol. Pt. ii., p. 196.

² Fol. Pt. ii., pp. 127—136.
³ Ibid. p. 198.

⁵ Fol. Pt. iii.,
⁶ Ibid. pp. 200, 202.

heterodoxies of Calvin were not, in his primacy, to override the land. But, in the year 1643-4, a number of puritan divines, known as 'The Westminster Assembly,' met in Henry VII.'s chapel at Westminster, and composed, and in 1645-6 published, the body of doctrine which has since formed a main authority of that party. It consisted of a confession of faith, and a longer and shorter catechism, in which they assert the system of Calvin in all its most unsound and repulsive parts. In considering the questions of predestination and grace historically, they cannot be omitted, and as they had besides no slight effect on the religious questions of their own and subsequent times, we will venture to give a few extracts, confining ourselves, however, to the Confession, for the catechisms, of course, simply reproduce its matter in another form.

The Confession speaks thus on Predestination under the head of God's Eternal Decree, chapter III:—

'I. God, from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

'II. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet hath He not decreed anything because He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.

'III. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His Glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death.'

The Confession endeavours to support its doctrine by citing texts of Scripture. In proof of the latter of the two assertions in the above paragraph, it refers to Proverbs xvi. 4, 'The Lord hath made all things for Himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil;' which, however, clearly does not assert what the framers of the Confession intend it should.

'IV. These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

'V. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to His eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of His will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free-grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions or causes moving Him thereunto; and all to the praise of His glorious grace.

'VI. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath He, by the eternal and most free purpose of His will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ; are effectually called unto faith in Christ by His Spirit, working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by His power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed

by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.

'VII. The rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of His own will, whereby He extendeth or withholdeth mercy as He pleaseth, for the glory of His sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice.'

On freewill the Confession says, chapter IX:—

'I. God hath endured the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to good or evil.

'II. Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it.

'III. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good, accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.

'IV. When God converts a sinner and translates him into the state of grace, He freeth him from his natural bondage under sin, and by His grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good; yet so as that, by reason of his remaining corruption, he doth not perfectly not only will that which is good, but doth also will that which is evil.'

It teaches an absolute election, chapter X:—

'I. All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only he is pleased, in His appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by His word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds, spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by His almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by His grace.

'II. This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it.

'III. Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ, through His Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how He pleases. So also are all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word.

'IV. Others not elected, although they may be called by the ministry of the word, and may have some common operations of the Spirit, yet they never truly come unto Christ, and therefore cannot be saved; much less can men not professing the Christian religion be saved in any other way whatsoever, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature, and the law of that religion they do profess; and to assert and maintain that they may, is very pernicious, and to be detested.'

It holds grace to be strictly indefectible, and that perseverance in it is certain, chapter XVII:—

'I. They whom God hath accepted in His Beloved, effectually called and sanctified by His Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the

state of grace, but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved.

'II. This perseverance of the saints depends not upon their own free-will, but upon the immutability of the decree of election, flowing from the free and unchangeable love of God the Father; upon the efficacy of the merit and intercession of Jesus Christ; the abiding of the Spirit, and of the seed of God within them; and the nature of the covenant of grace; from all which ariseth also the certainty and infallibility thereof.

'III. Nevertheless they may, through the temptations of Satan and of the world, the prevalency of corruption remaining in them, and the neglect of the means of their preservation, fall into grievous sins, and for a time continue therein; whereby they incur God's displeasure, and grieve His Holy Spirit; come to be deprived of some measure of their graces and comforts; have their hearts hardened, and their consciences wounded; hurt and scandalize others, and bring temporal judgments upon themselves.'

And affirms that there is an infallible assurance of salvation to the truly elect, chapter XVIII:—

'I. As though hypocrites, and other unregenerate men, may vainly deceive themselves with false hopes and carnal presumptions of being in the favour of God and estate of salvation: which hope of theirs shall perish; yet such as truly believe in the Lord Jesus, and love Him in sincerity, endeavouring to walk in all good conscience before Him, may in this life be certainly assured that they are in the state of grace, and may rejoice in the hope of the glory of God; which hope shall never make them ashamed.

'II. This certainty is not a bare conjectural and probable persuasion, grounded upon a fallible hope; but an infallible assurance of faith, founded upon the Divine truth of the promises of salvation, the inward evidence of those graces unto which these promises are made, the testimony of the Spirit of adoption, witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God; which Spirit is the earnest of our inheritance, whereby we are sealed to the day of redemption.

'III. This infallible assurance doth not so belong to the essence of faith, but that a true believer may wait long and conflict with many difficulties, before he be partaker of it: yet being enabled by the Spirit to know the things which are freely given him of God, he may, without extraordinary revelation, in the right use of ordinary means, attain thereunto. And, therefore, it is the duty of every one to give all diligence to make his calling and election sure; that thereby his heart may be enlarged in peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, in love and thankfulness to God, and in strength and cheerfulness in the duties of obedience, the proper fruits of this assurance; so far is it from inclining men to looseness.

'IV. True believers may have the assurance of their salvation divers ways shaken, diminished, and intermitted; as by negligence in preserving of it; by falling into some special sin, which woundeth the conscience and grieveth the spirit; by some sudden or vehement temptation; by God's withdrawing the light of His countenance, and suffering even such as fear Him to walk in darkness, and to have no light; yet are they never utterly destitute of that seed of God, and life of faith, that love of Christ and the brethren, that sincerity of heart and conscience of duty, out of which, by the operation of the Spirit, this assurance may in due time be revived, and by the which, in the mean time, they are supported from despair.'

The reasoning in the last chapter is evidently false. If grace and faith are known to be strictly indefectible and unfailing, and

assurance, as is here taught, ever accompanies it, then, grace being present, assurance can never be absent. It either is present, or it is not. If present, it must be so fully and perfectly; for it is a mere contradiction in terms to speak of a 'shaken, diminished, or intermitted assurance.' If such, it is not assurance at all, it is doubt; and the Westminster Divines should, therefore, either have given up their position, or, to be consistent, they should have taught that sin, or affliction, or, if so be, the withdrawal of the light of God's countenance—though they should have shown how this is not the withdrawal of grace—may, indeed, wound the conscience or trouble the heart, but cannot take away the assurance of the result of that which itself can never be lost. Their conclusion, then, is baseless, because their premises are untrue assumptions.

The doctrines of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, however, cannot but recal to memory those of the Lambeth Articles, which also taught, 1. That God has from eternity predestinated some to life, and has reprobated others. 2. That the moving or efficient cause of predestination to life is not our faith or works, but only the good will and pleasure of God. 3. That there is a certain number of predestinate, which can neither be increased nor diminished. 4. That those who are not predestined to salvation shall infallibly be condemned for their sins. 5. That a true living and justifying faith, and the Spirit of God justifying, is not extinguished, falleth not away, vanisheth not in the elect, either finally or totally. 6. A man truly faithful—that is, such an one as is endued with a justifying faith—is certain, with a full assurance of faith, of the remission of his sins, and of his everlasting salvation by Christ. 7. Saving grace is not given, granted, or communicated to all men, by which they may be saved if they will. 8. No man can come unto Christ unless it shall be given to him, and the Father draw him: and all men are not drawn to Him. 9. It is not in the will and power of every man to be saved. It is well known that Elizabeth caused the suppression of these Articles as soon as they were published, and that Archbishop Whitgift narrowly escaped a præmunire for them. Collier is content to show, from their variance with the Homilies on the same points, that they are in utter opposition to the real doctrine of the Church.

There soon arose a division among the Calvinistic body into rigid and moderate Calvinists. The former held, and the latter—among whom were Usher, Davenant, Baxter, Howe, and others, with the Synod of Dort—rejected, the doctrine of absolute Divine decrees, on the ground that it must inevitably and necessarily make God the author of sin. Few we imagine, if any, in the

Church at least, could be found to accept the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, in all that they involve and imply, as well as directly assert.

The divisions which had been sown by Calvin, and had proved such a fruitful source of heart-burning among the Reformed Churches, were soon to find their way into the Church of Rome. The year 1640 is, indeed, a memorable one in her history, for it saw published the great work of Jansen, the Bishop of Ypres. Our readers would scarcely thank us for commencing at the end of our article a discussion on a folio volume of nearly 1,200 small and closely printed pages. It is recorded of Jansen, that he had read over the whole writings of *S. Augustine*, ten, and those in particular against the Pelagians thirty, times; and it was the labour of his life to compose, as it would almost be that of another thoroughly to master, his vast commentary on them. As condemning many of his own Church, and giving a certain authority to some of the doctrines of moderate Calvinism, his work has met with Papal and other condemnations; which, however, have proved unable to prevent numbers of his own Church, and some of the most learned writers among them, from becoming his followers. He is, however, deficient in that clearness of expression, the result of the deep and wonderful comprehension of his subject in all its branches, which marks the pages of *S. Augustine*. Many write to *S. Augustine* on the subject of predestination, grace, free-will, &c., who, from their confused and scarcely intelligible language, evidently have not fathomed their own thoughts, and therefore do not know, but require to be taught, their own meaning. Their ideas are vague, and their expressions, therefore, cannot be clear. *S. Augustine*, then, as by a touch of some magic wand, shows them what they mean; explains their thoughts to themselves; fills up what is imperfect in their ideas; and gives system to crudeness, method and lucidness to obscurity. This could never be said of Jansen. As a divine, he follows *S. Augustine* on all points, as thinking him by far the greatest of all expositors on predestination and grace. To say this is almost, at once, to state his own place as a writer on those subjects. He defines predestination as we have seen that *S. Augustine* does, and opposes Calvin's denial of free-will, and his doctrines of irresistible and inflexible grace; so that we may well remember his caution, '*Non propter Calvinum Augustino indignandum est.*'¹ He repudiates the idea of an absolute decree of reprobation from eternity, on which Calvin lays so much stress, not only as the first act of the Creator towards a large portion of

¹ Part III. book viii. chap. 21.

His living creatures, but even as an intention on His part so to act towards them before they yet had existence; and with S. Augustine, he dates Reprobation itself after, and not before, the Fall.¹ Pope Innocent X., in his Bull on the subject, and Petavius, indeed, accuse him by implication of supralapsarianism; but, if he do sometimes err in this direction, it does not seem to have been his systematic intention to do so. On the whole, and as far as we are acquainted with his prodigious work, we still think that he is one of the most close and faithful of all the exponents of the system of S. Augustine. But our space permits us to say but little more.

With a few forcible and thoughtful remarks upon the opposite systems of S. Augustine and Pelagius, Mr. Mozley concludes his volume. The doctrines of S. Augustine and his school, he says, came from ignorance of the limits of human reason and knowledge;

‘They commenced with an assumption, which no modern philosopher would allow, that the Divine Power must be an absolutely unlimited thing.’²

Unlimited that is from within—for of course no one would dispute that it is so from without. Hence they proceeded to assert that, if He pleased, He could have created a better Universe than He has; one without evil and sin: and by His simple power have removed sin or changed it to good. But here arises the question, Why did He not? and here it cannot be denied that the doctrine of Calvin, that God is to be considered not only as having permitted, but as having caused that sin should be committed, monstrous and unchristian as it is, is, in itself, more consistent than that of S. Augustine. The fact, indeed, that it is so, shows that the latter must contain in itself, the germ of error; as in fact it does, for it paved the way for the above perversion of Calvin.

S. Augustine, then, from the above view of the unlimited nature of the Divine Power, drew out his scheme of Predestination and Grace; whilst Pelagianism was based, on the other hand, on the opposite assumption of the human will. Whereas the truth lies between, or rather is with, both, and both should be held together; for, although opposite truths, they are only such accidentally, *i. e.* as to time and this life;

“And this is, in fact,” says Mr. Mozley, “the mode in which this question is settled by the practical common sense of mankind; for what do the common phrases employed in ordinary conversation and writing upon this question—the popular and received modes of deciding it, whenever it incidentally turns up—amount to but this solution? Such phrases, I mean, as

¹ Part III. book x. chap. 3.

² P. 325.

that we must hold man's free-will together with God's foreknowledge and Predestination, although we do not see *how* they agree, and other like formulae? Such forms of language for deciding the question, evidently proceed upon the acknowledgment of two contradictory truths on this subject, which cannot be reconciled, but must be held together in inconsistency. They imply that the doctrine of Predestination and the doctrine of Free-will are both true, and that one who would hold the truth must hold both."—P. 327.

At the same time, Mr. Mozley clearly states the difference between the two systems. The Predestinarian, he says, mistakes from forgetting the fact of the originality of our will, and throws all therefore upon God's will, being unable, of course, when he has done so, to say how God is not the author of sin; whilst the sin of the Pelagian is that of presumption, in that he tampers with our innate sense of sin, and with the infirmity of our will and nature; added to which he wholly destroys the force of the great objective doctrines of Christianity. We would specify two points on which we think S. Augustine's teachings at fault. The former is perhaps only an inconsistency; the latter is an error. He condemns without hope all unbaptized infants to eternal punishment, yet he lays down a doctrine of Predestination which does in no way depend upon Baptism, but is prior to, and independent of it. Secondly, he distinguishes between 'calling' or 'choice' and 'election,' and says that the latter, if once given, can never be lost. But, according to Holy Scripture, they are the same grace, and, like every other, can be lost. The Apostle does not say 'Make, or pray God to make, your calling become election, and then it is sure,' but he says, 'Make your calling and election sure.' The Fall, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection, and Sacraments as the means and instruments of conveying grace. Consequently, the Church has allowed Predestination, but rejected Pelagianism.¹

Mr. Mozley ends with a caution to those who differ in religious teaching, lest they be found to differ, not in holding truth and error, but only in holding different sides of the same truth. Applied to abstract doctrines, such as that of Predestination, on which we have no full system of revealed truth, and its bearings on other truths, we heartily concur with his wise and temperate language; but when he extends his caution to the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, we confess that we can follow him no further.

"If the question of grace," he says, "is one which, depending on irreconcilable, but equally true tendencies of thought in man, cannot be settled absolutely either way, it seems to follow that a difference upon it should not occasion a distance or separation: and this remark will apply

¹ P. 328, and following.

to such further and more particular questions as are connected with this general question, and are necessarily affected by the view we take upon, and the mode in which we decide, the general question. Such, for example, is the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. A slight consideration will be enough to show how intimately this doctrine is connected with the general doctrine of grace; and that one who holds an extreme, and one who holds a modified doctrine of grace in general, cannot hold the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration in the same sense. If a latitude of opinion then may be allowed, on the general question, it seems to follow that an equal latitude may be allowed on this further and more particular one; and that if an extreme Predestinarian and a maintainer of free-will can maintain and teach their respective doctrines within the same communion, they need not exclude each other when they come to give to their respective doctrines their necessary and legitimate application in a particular case."—P. 347.

We trust that it is not to be thought that Mr. Mozley means, by these words, to recommend any lax hold or qualification, much less any actual abandonment of essential truth; or that it is our duty to act and speak as if differences *do* not, only because they *ought* not, to exist. He has, we think, been both praised and blamed for this part of his work wrongly. We stand by his own words. They recommend harmony and toleration to those who hold the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration in different senses; but do not inculcate, or even hint at, any union between those who hold and those who deny it, as if, like Predestination, it were a truth as yet imperfectly revealed, or which was to be counterbalanced by some other, as is God's foreknowledge by man's free-will.

The question of grace, in itself, may be connected with the intellectual difficulties he describes; but since Holy Scripture and the Church alike teach us that the Sacrament of Baptism is the instrument of its conveyance to us, we dare not tolerate any contradiction of, or departure from, their voice. We cannot, therefore, but wish that the words above-cited had not been written, or at least that their author had explained what degree of liberty of statement he would permit, and what amount of difference in holding the doctrine he is prepared to tolerate. Whether for instance, he would have those who hold, with the early Church, that Regeneration is the Grace given to the right administration of the Sacrament of Baptism in all cases, agree with others who hold that it is only given in some; and whether he would have those who think it a Divine act of the Holy Ghost involving an entire moral and spiritual change in the mind and heart of the subject, which is begun and perfected in Baptism, unite with such as think that it is only then begun, and perfected gradually throughout life—what license, in short, he would think consistent with an honest belief in the doctrine of Holy Scripture, and the plain and reiterated statements of our own, and every other branch of the Christian Church—that

Regeneration is the peculiar gift of God, bestowed by Him in all cases of proper administration (and in the case of adults of the right receipt) of Holy Baptism, never separated from it, and never given but through it? The absence of such a safeguard is a real want in Mr. Mozley's work. Had it been supplied he would have rendered it impossible for an opponent to say that he had even so much as tended to leave a moral question, for such in truth it is in its fulness, in any manner open. He seems, in more than one passage of his work, to promise something like an addition to, or continuation of it. We earnestly trust that he will, at some future time, turn that half-promise into a whole one. Should he do so, and should the question of Sacramental Grace again occur, he will, perhaps, bear in mind our suggestion; meantime, whilst first principles are being daily called into question, and first truths have to be maintained again and again, he, assuredly, is not one whom the Church can afford to have unoccupied and silent.

ART. V.—*Spicilegium Syriacum: containing Remains of Bardenasan, Meliton, Ambrose, and Mara Bar Serapion. Now first edited, with an English Translation and Notes. By the REV. WILLIAM CURETON, M.A., F.R.S., Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen, Rector of St. Margaret's, and Canon of Westminster.* London: Rivingtons, Waterloo Place. 1855.

THIS is a thoroughly disappointing book, whether we look to the contents, or to the time that we have been waiting for it, or to the hopes that have been excited about it. Never were we more tempted to exclaim, 'Parturiunt montes,' than at the sight of these few—just fifty—pages of Syriac, swelled by a hundred pages of introduction, translation, notes, and other et ceteras, into a volume of one hundred and fifty pages. This book is, indeed, a poor little mouse, if we contrast it with the great expectations that have been raised of what was to be brought out of the treasures of the Nitrian Convents, now stored up in our Museum, and heralded so loudly. And the volume has been the fruit of a long period of gestation, itself exciting great expectations, kept alive by occasional intimations of what was to come, so that not we in England, but a foreigner thus speaks of the expected work, in part of a letter which Mr. Cureton prints in a note—'Spicilegio isto Syriaco, quod omnes Europæ viri eruditi tanta expectatione præstolantur.' But we do not refer only or chiefly to the long delay of Mr. Cureton's book. It is, indeed, we are told, *nine years* since the pages of the Syriac text were printed, and much of the translation, apparently, was done about that time, and yet the rest of the work, writing, printing and all, might have been easily done in a few months. Mr. Cureton cites, indeed, the rule: 'nonumque prematur in annum,' and tells us of his own observance of it. But Horace's rule referred not to works such as this; and it implied that the intended publication was to benefit by the delay. In this instance we see no benefit whatever that has accrued from the delay.

The fact is, and it must be matter of general regret among scholars, that the learned editor has been interrupted by other occupations; some of them, indeed, more important labours in the same field, the preparation and publication of Syriac texts. His time, in this respect, has been well spent; but still we can see no adequate reason for delaying the publication of these tracts, except there had been an intention of adding to their number, or editing them more eruditely, or gaining fresh evi-

dence for their genuineness; because Mr. Cureton has done nothing, in regard to them, which might not have been done quite as well nine years ago. And the nine years' delay has kept public expectation in suspense, deprived scholars of the opportunity of learning what the MSS. contained, or benefitting by anything of value which there might be in them. Gieseler and Neander have died in ignorance of their contents; and they have been spared the disappointment of seeing only this poor result of nine years' expectation.

But the delay of hope arising from Mr. Cureton's waiting so long was not uppermost in our minds. What we thought of was the warm and sanguine anticipation of what these Syriac treasures were to reveal to us. They were to bring to light all sorts of hidden truths; they were to restore the true text of the Fathers; they were to reveal what Greek ecclesiastics wished to hide; they were to place the facts of Ecclesiastical History in a new light; they were, as seemed to be fully expected, to overthrow the entire system of primitive doctrine, as hitherto received, and to establish a new one in its stead. We have had, and we do not forget it, the publication of the so-called genuine Ignatian Epistles, from an abridged and imperfect Syriac version. We have had works recovered in Syriac versions which were interesting and important, but which threw little light on the history of the Church or its doctrines,—the Festal Epistles of S. Athanasius, and the Theophania of Eusebius; and we have also had, and we gratefully acknowledge it, the Church History of John of Ephesus. But the learned men of Europe looked for greater and more valuable results. They anticipated much, and now they have the *Spicilegium Syriacum*, 'the Syriac Gleanings,' in which, excepting what was previously extant in Greek, and some extracts of most questionable genuineness, there is but very little of Christian doctrine, sentiment, or history. We must confess feeling grievously disappointed; and we feel this all the more, because we do not see why the book should not have been sent out eight or nine years ago, and then at least we should not have had our disappointment increased by the exaggerated excitement of hope and expectation. It is indeed matter of regret that there should not be a greater number of Syriac scholars capable of sharing the labours of transcription or translation. We should have thought that in nine years there might have been men trained up, if they could not have been found to do such work, to have shared the heavy burdens of the Editor, or to have acted under his guidance. But for much of what is needed in the satisfactory editing such a work as this is, not mere Syriac scholars, but Patristic Divines are wanted. It is to be regretted that Mr. Cureton should

attempt what he is not able to perform alone, and wait nine years to write an introduction, and a very few notes, when the associating with himself as editor a person well read in the Fathers and Church History, might have given us the treatises many years ago, with illustrative notes and an introduction really throwing more light on the subject, and, if possible, drawing out of it some instruction in the history of those early days, which might have given to the tract or tracts, if possible, a connexion with Patristic literature, and hence have let us see what their value is. Mr. Cureton has done his work alone, and it has consequently been delayed for nine years. It is extorted, we cannot but suppose, at last, by others taking the subject up, and seems, after all, to be an immature production. Mr. Cureton's own account of some who were likely to do the work, and to do it ill, will put the matter in the clearest light; it will show also his great readiness and kindness in communicating his discoveries:—

‘ In 1852 M. Ernest Renan, a young orientalist, from whose zeal and diligence we may hope for much hereafter, in a Letter addressed to M. Reinaud, inserted in the “*Journal Asiatique*” an account of some Syriac Manuscripts which he had seen in the British Museum the year before, and, amongst the rest, a notice of that in which are found the treatises comprised in this volume. Not having seen the announcement of my intended publication, he believed that he had been the first to discover the existence of these precious remains of antiquity. In writing to thank M. Renan for the copy of this Letter, which he had been good enough to send to me, I pointed out to him the fact that they had been already printed four years before. His reply, which is now in my hands, reflects far greater honour upon M. Renan, than the reputation of any such discovery could have done. He is most anxious to repair an injury, which, although in ignorance and unintentionally, he thought that he had done to me by assuming to himself a discovery which I had already made, and to restore to me the full credit—if indeed there be any in so small a matter—by taking the earliest opportunity of stating in the “*Journal Asiatique*” how the case really stood. Nor did this satisfy him. In a brief notice prefixed to a Latin Translation of this tract of Meliton, which came into my hands in time for me to refer to it in the notes of this volume, he again alludes to the same matter.

‘ Besides the Syriac text which I had communicated to M. Renan, for the purpose of being inserted in the “*Spicilegium Solesmense*,” edited by my very learned friend, M. Pitra, I also placed in the hands of the Chevalier Bunsen the English translation in manuscript, as well as the printed text, with full permission to make any use of it that he might deem proper for the second edition of his work, “*Hippolytus and his Age*.”

‘ In the course of the present year, a writer who seems to have been altogether unaware of these facts has inserted, in the “*Journal of Sacred Literature*,” a translation of the pieces attributed to Meliton, published in this volume. It appears to be the attempt of some young man who at present has but a very imperfect acquaintance with the language, as well as with what has been done in Syriac literature of late, or he could hardly have been ignorant that my volume was in the press. It has been my duty, in the course of the Notes, to point out some of the errors into which he has fallen, although I could not undertake to notice them all. Whoever

he be, let him not take this amiss. He deserves encouragement for having applied himself at all to such studies; but he will certainly render a greater benefit to literature, and better consult his own reputation, if henceforth he will advisedly follow the caution of the Roman poet whose words I have quoted above."—Pp. i—iii.

That caution is to wait for nine years;—shall we add, doing nothing to improve the work you are going to send out?—only waiting nine years.

It is true, that the tracts printed in this volume are either the originals or translations of works of the second century of the Christian era, a period so distant, out of the wreck of whose once copious literature so few fragments can now by any chance be recovered, that we feel grateful for any, even the smallest, contribution. And we should not speak so slightly of this work, if it is to be regarded as an instalment only. But we are sorry to see that the Editor does not seem conscious of the scanty value of what he has sent out. To Lord John Russell, in his dedication, he says:—

'The publication for the first time of remains of writers who have been among the most celebrated in the earliest ages of the Christian Church, cannot fail of securing for this volume an interest with the scholar, and a place in the libraries of our colleges and public institutions, in spite of any deficiencies on the part of the Editor.'

Yet what are these works? I. The work of the Syrian Gnostic Bardesanes, on Freewill, or, as it is here entitled, on the Laws of Countries, extending over twenty-one pages. II. What professes to be an Oration (or an Apology), addressed by Melito of Sardis to the Emperor Antoninus, ten pages in length, which we feel sure was not written by Melito, and is intrinsically of little value as a Christian document. III. A few fragments which are called Melito's, but which are (most probably) only called so. IV. An Attack on the Heathen Mythology, hitherto known to us under the title *Oratio ad Græcos*, and placed among the works of S. Justin Martyr, translated into Syriac, but with so much alteration as to be almost entirely a new treatise. V. A letter from one Mara, the son of Serapion, to his son Serapion, both father and son being alike unknown, but whom Mr. Cureton assumes, we think without sufficient ground, to have been certainly a Syrian Christian. Such are the contents of this volume. But we will try to extract, from a more detailed examination of them, something which may interest and inform our readers, and at the same time show the real value of the *Spicilegium*.

I. The first tract, then, in this collection, and in our judgment the most valuable, perhaps the only valuable one, is a dialogue, after the Platonic fashion, on the freedom of the will, by Bardesan, whom we know better by the Græcised form of

his name, as Bardesanes. He is known as the teacher of a modified form of Gnosticism, and as the first composer of Hymns for the Syrian Christians; and probably as among the earliest composers of Metrical Hymns such as we now use. He was a person of widespread influence, of high reputation, of bland and winning address, adopting the language of Catholics, and pretending to agree with them—thus gaining for his errors an admission into hearts that would have repudiated them in their naked forms. With these moral qualities he combined a fine imagination, a graceful style, and a highly poetic genius. His Hymns won over the hearts of the Syrians, and for a hundred years or more Bardesanes and his views were dominant in Mesopotamia.

If any of our readers wish for an interesting account of Bardesanes and the Syriac Hymns, they will find it in a volume which we gladly take this opportunity of recommending,—Dr. Burgess' translation of 'Select Metrical Hymns and Homilies of Ephrem Syrus.' Beauty of poetry, the deepest Christian piety, and evidence of the Catholic faith of the great Syrian teacher of that day, will be found united there. The introduction to this volume contains in English the substance of what Hahn and others have collected about Bardesanes, in which the extracts from Ephrem Syrus about him are most interesting. We will take the liberty of making some extracts from Dr. Burgess.

'The name of Bardesanes, a Gnostic Christian, stands first in relation to this metrical literature. He was a native of Edessa, from whose river, Daison, he took his name. To this circumstance Ephraem alludes in his second homily against heresies (tom. v. p. 439):—

"Who first by the name of Daison
Surnamed Bardesanes?
He has more affinity with a son of Daison (a man)
Than with the river Daison;
For that stream never brought forth
Thistles and tares!"

'Neander attributes the reputation of Bardesanes for a kind of orthodoxy, to the cunning manner in which he concealed and modified his opinions in public. He says, "Bardesanes, like other Gnostics, was in the habit of accommodating himself, when he spoke publicly in the Church, to the prevailing opinions; he let himself down in this way to the level of *physical natures*." Yet Neander concedes that he was moderate in his errors, compared with some others. "He did in many points really agree, more than other Gnostics, with the orthodox doctrine. He could even write, from honest conviction, against many other Gnostic sects then spreading themselves in Syria."

'It is agreed on every hand, that Bardesanes acquired great influence in the second century in Syria, by the use of metrical compositions, in which he adapted his heresies to the public taste, and gained for them an extensive circulation. This we learn especially from Ephraem, who, from living and labouring in the scenes formerly occupied by his deceased opponent, and among his followers, is continually alluding to him in his writings. In his

fifty-third Homily against heretics, (tom. v. p. 553,) he gives the following explicit account of his musical genius, written in pentasyllabic metre :—

"For these things Bardesanes
Uttered in his writings,—
He composed odes,
And mingled them with music;
He harmonized Psalms,
And introduced measures.—
By measures and balances
He divided words.
He thus concealed for the simple
The bitter with the sweet,
For the sickly do not prefer
Food which is wholesome.
He sought to imitate David,
To adorn himself with his beauty
So that he might be praised by the likeness.
He therefore set in order,
Psalms one hundred and fifty.
But he deserted the truth of David,
And only imitated his numbers."

'Certainly Ephraem appears, in this passage, to give to Bardesanes the credit of inventing the Syriac hymnology. He expressly says that he introduced measures, although it may admit of a doubt whether this means that he invented them in the first instance, or brought into fashion some novel ones of his own, or even that he used existing machinery for the circulation of his opinions. However this may be, his testimony is clear as to the popularity which the productions of Bardesanes secured, for in the first homily of the same collection (tom. v. p. 439), he pays a compliment to his skill and influence, while he blames his use of them :—

"In the resorts of Bardesanes
There are songs and melodies.
For seeing that young persons
Loved sweet music,
By the harmony of his songs
He corrupted their minds."

'One more passage may be quoted, bearing the same testimony to the captivating power of this modulator of the rugged language of the Syrians. In the fifty-fifth homily against heresies (tom. v. p. 557), Ephraem gives some extracts from a work of Bardesanes in hexasyllabic metre, and, after a quotation of a very objectionable character, says :—

"Thus in his Odes he testified—
(This wizard by his blandishments,
And this law one by his melodies),—
That he dishonours the fair name
Of the Holy Spirit."

Metrical Hymns, pp. xxviii—xxxi.

'In the life of Ephraem Syrus, by an anonymous Syrian author, a natural and graphic description is given, of the way in which he was first led to cultivate metrical composition, (*Opera Ephraemi*, tom. vi. p. 1). He is first introduced, saying in a heptasyllabic piece of autobiography :—

"I found the book of Bardesanes,
And was distressed by it continually;
For it defiled my ears and my whole nature,

With its offensive blasphemies.
 For I heard in his homilies profane things,
 And things execrable in his songs.
 For if the body rises not
 It will be equal with things accursed!
 If He created the body for corruption,
 And it shall not rise for ever,
 Behold he blasphemes the Just One,
 And contemns Divine Providence;
 Ascribing hatred to the Loving One,
 And repressing the hope of immortality.
 I have therefore read again, my brethren,
 The writings of the Holy Ghost:
 And my ears were quickly closed
 Against the impurity of that sinner!"

Metrical Hymns, pp. xxxvii. xxxviii.

Such is the character of the distinguished Syrian, whose most celebrated tract is now brought to light.

To this, and the well-known notices in the Greek ecclesiastical writers, we have only to add the confirmations of these representations of him which Mr. Cureton has found in the Syriac of Philoxenus, and translated in his preface:—

‘But thou hast not been mindful of thy instructor, Bardesan, whom his disciples celebrate in their books for his patience and polite answers to every man. Whoso confesseth that boy which was born of the Virgin, that her child is the Highest, he assents to Bardesan.

‘Therefore this also, that “the Antient of Eternity was a boy,” we have not taken this from Bardesan, but he has made use of it as a means of concealing his own error, and took it from the doctrine of the Church.

‘There are some of them who say, that he sent down the Word a body from heaven, as thou saidest just now, and didest assent to thy teacher Bardesan Because thou hast not comprehended the mind of Bardesan, who assumeth the body of Christ to be from heaven.’

The doctrine here alluded to is Bardesanes’ denial that our Lord’s Body was of the substance of His mother. The first extract indicates his winning personal character, and way of writing.

It appears that this treatise is the earliest specimen of Syriac literature which we possess. (We except, of course, the Syriac Version of the Scriptures.) Hitherto the writings of S. Ephrem Syrus were the earliest Syriac known; we now go back a century or a century and a half earlier, and have in our hands, in its own original Syriac, the best-known work of one who may be regarded as the father of Syriac literature.

The tract was well known in the Christian Church, and often referred to. Two large portions of it, in a Greek translation, had been preserved in the *Præparatio Evangelica* of Eusebius. Of its identity with the Syriac now discovered there can be no doubt. To Eusebius, and those who followed him, the treatise was known by the title ‘Of Fate’ (*περὶ εἰμαρμένης*); in the Syriac MS. its title is, ‘Of the Laws of Different

Countries.' This latter title, no doubt, arose from the circumstance that the portion of the treatise which was most frequently cited, and which appears to have been most generally known, was on the customs of different countries—as the author, in the course of his argument, alleges them. The bringing together these instances of the varying customs of different nations was naturally the most interesting portion of the work, and free from Gnosticism. It is that part which is most fully cited by Eusebius. It was used without acknowledgment by Cæsarius (the brother of S. Gregory Nazianzen) in his *Dialogues*; and in Ruffinus' translation of the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions* it is given very fully in Latin.

It appears from a statement of Theodoret (*Hist. Eccl.* iv. 30) that the writings of Bardesanes were translated by his friends into Greek; and the circumstance that in this treatise he maintains the doctrine of freedom and responsibility, in opposition to the heretical teaching of necessity, with comparatively little of Gnostic views, probably led to its being generally known and read. In one respect the tract is most interesting—that it is the genuine, original, and, so far as we know, the ungarbled work of a Gnostic writer. We say Gnostic, although, as we have noticed above, the author was opposed to the extreme doctrines of Marcion and Valentinus, and wrote against them, yet he himself held the Gnostic doctrines in a less exaggerated form. Of the contents of the treatise, and the views of the author, we will speak presently. We must first notice the points in which the work illustrates the statements made respecting it by early writers.

The treatise itself is a dialogue, in which Avida (in Greek Abidas) is the person addressed; and so we find it described in Epiphanius. Speaking of Bardesanes, he says, *ὃς πολλὰ πρὸς Ἀβειδάν τὸν ἀστρονόμον κατὰ εἰμαρμένης λέγων συνέλογησατο*. But Eusebius, in his *Ecclesiastical History*, iv. 30, calls it, *ὁ πρὸς Ἀντωνίνον ἱκανώτατος αὐτοῦ περὶ εἰμαρμένης διάλογος*. This Jerome interprets, '*Clarissimus et fortissimus liber, quem Marco Antonino de fato tradidit.*' Mr. Cureton speaks of it as 'the celebrated Treatise of Bardesan on Fate, said to have been addressed to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, commonly known as Marcus Aurelius; although, with the document now complete before us, we find no intimation of its having been so addressed.' We are surprised that Mr. Cureton has not noticed the further difficulty in such a supposition, which has been known to the readers of Eusebius, from Valesius' note on the passage—viz. the improbability that a treatise written in Syriac would have been addressed or presented to a Roman emperor. Indeed, we conceive that the simple words of Euse-

bⁱus, ὁ πρὸς Ἀντωνίνον διάλογος, are scarcely compatible with such an interpretation; certainly not with that adopted by Jerome, that it was presented to the Emperor. Ὁ πρὸς τινα διάλογος, would most naturally be understood to mean a dialogue addressed to the party in question, as one of the interlocutors, or as the party *against* whom it was composed; as it is rightly described by Epiphanius, ὁ πρὸς Ἀβειδάν τὸν ἀστρονόμον διάλογος; and by Eusebius himself, in his *Præparatio Evangelica*, Βαρδησάνης, ὃς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοῖς ἐταίρους διαλόγοις. We should rather suspect an error in Eusebius, or in some very early transcript, of πρὸς Ἀντωνίνον for πρὸς Ἀβειδάν τὸν ἀστρονόμον, or some similar words. There is a difficulty in supposing that this treatise was addressed or presented to Marcus Aurelius, which is this:—the birth of Bardesanes is set down in the Chronicle of Edessa, as having taken place July 11, in the 465th year of the æra of the Seleucidae, that is, A.D. 154; this would make the author only twenty-six in 180, when Marcus Aurelius died—an early age to present books to emperors; and Bardesanes, in his treatise, speaks of his own earlier writings, and of modifications of his opinions such as could scarcely have occurred at that age; nay, in the passage we are about to cite, he speaks of himself as much older than those he is conversing with. Mr. Cureton does not notice this circumstance; it is one of the many difficulties that hang around the history of this heretical teacher. Hahn places his birth much earlier; we must either do this or place this treatise much later; we incline to the latter course. Eusebius, it is to be observed, places him among those who flourished under Antoninus. Of course, if we were to take to conjectures, we might suppose that Bardesanes, who was a man of learning, both in Greek and Syriac, may have himself translated or re-written his treatise in Greek, and addressed it to the emperor; but this is mere conjecture; and the difficulty of the expression πρὸς Ἀντωνίνον διάλογος remains.

The treatise itself opens thus:—

‘A few days ago we went up to visit Shemashgram, our brother. And Bardesan came and found us there; and when he had felt him, and seen that he was well, he asked us, “What were you talking about, for I heard your voice from without as I was coming in?” For he was accustomed, whenever he found us talking about anything before him, to ask us, “What were you saying?” that he might converse with us about it. We therefore said to him, “This Avida was saying to us: ‘That if God be one, as you say, and He created mankind, and willeth that you should do that which you are commanded, why did he not create men so that they should not be able to go wrong, but always should do what is good; for by this His will would be accomplished.’”

‘Bardesan saith to him, “Tell me, my son Avida, why dost thou think

that the God of all is not one, or that He is one, and doth not will that men should conduct themselves holily and uprightly?"

'Avida saith, "I, my Lord, asked these of my own age in order that they might give me a reply."

'Bardesan saith to him, "If thou desirest to learn, it would be advantageous for thee, that thou shouldest learn from one who is older than they: but if to teach, it is not requisite that thou shouldest question them, but that thou shouldest persuade them to ask thee what they desire. For teachers are usually asked, and do not themselves ask. And whenever they do put a question, it should be to direct the mind of the questioner so that he may ask properly, and they may know what his desire is. For it is a good thing that a man should know how to put questions."

'Avida saith, "I am desirous of learning, but I began first to question these my brethren, because I was ashamed of asking thee."

'Bardesan saith, "Thou speakest cleverly. Nevertheless know that he who putteth his inquiries properly, and is willing to be convinced, and draweth near to the way of truth without obstinacy, needeth not to be ashamed, because he will certainly give pleasure to him to whom the inquiry is directed, by those things which I have mentioned. If therefore, my son, thou hast anything in thy mind respecting this about which thou wast inquiring, tell it to us all; and if it please us also, we shall participate with thee; and if it please us not, necessity will compel us to show thee why it does not please us. And if thou wert only desiring to know this word, without having anything in thy mind respecting it, as a man who has lately attached himself to the Disciples and is a recent inquirer, I will inform thee, in order that thou mayest not depart from us without profit; and if those things which I tell thee please thee, we have also for thee other things respecting this matter, but if they please thee not, we for our part shall have spoken without any ill feeling."

'Avida saith, "I even greatly desire to hear and to be convinced, because it is not from any other I have heard this word; but I have spoken it of my own mind to these my brethren, and they were not willing to convince me, but say, 'Believe really, and thou wilt be able to know every thing;' but I am not able to believe unless I be convinced."

'Bardesan saith, "Not Avida alone is unwilling to believe, but also many, because they have in them no faith, are not even able to be convinced, but always are pulling down and building up, and are found destitute of all knowledge of the truth. Nevertheless, because Avida is not willing to believe, lo! I will speak to you who do believe concerning this which he inquireth, and he will hear something more."

'And he began to say to us, "There are many men who have not faith, and have not received knowledge from the wisdom of the truth. And on this account they are not competent to speak and to instruct, and do not easily incline themselves to hear. For they have not the foundation of faith to build upon, and they have no confidence upon which they may hope."—Pp. 1—3.

We see the Gnostic 'Disciples,' and their view of faith. It will be observed also in the first words attributed to Avida, 'If God be one, &c.' that the existence of sin and evil was alleged as an argument for the dualistic theory of Marcion,—of a good and an evil God; a view which Bardesanes strongly opposes. This agrees with the statement of S. Ephrem Syrus; that he wished to appear to have rejected this doctrine, though he accuses him of really holding it. He says that Bardesanes really taught with Marcion the doctrine of two Gods, though

he wished to be thought to have rejected it. It seems as if the ground for the accusation was the power attributed by Bardesanes to inferior or ministering Æons, or to the Evil one.

Presently after we find the following statement of his views:

'But as to what Avida was saying, "Why did not God create us so that we should not sin and be guilty?"—if man had been created so, he would not have been for himself, but would have been the instrument of him who moved him; and it is known that whoso moveth as he chuseth he moveth him either to good or to evil. And how then would a man differ from a harp, upon which another playeth, or from a ship, which another steereth: but the praise and the blame stand in the hand of the artist, and the harp itself knoweth not what is played upon it, nor the ship whether it be well steered and guided; but they are instruments which are made for the use of him who possesseth in himself the science. But God in his kindness did not will that he should create man so. But he exalted him by free-will above many things, and made him equal with the angels. For observe the sun and the moon and the sphere, and the rest of those creatures which are greater than we in some things, that there is not given to them free-will of themselves, but they are all fixed by ordinance that they should do that only which is ordained for them, and nothing else.'—P. 3.

The expression, 'There is not given them freewill of themselves,' and what follows in p. 4, 'there hath been given to him freewill *more than* to all those elements of which we have been speaking;' are explained by the following statement in p. 5, which indicates the strange notions which the philosophic views of the time sanctioned.

'But nevertheless know ye, that even those things of which I have said that they stand by ordinance, are not entirely devoid of all freedom, and on this account at the last day they all shall be subject to judgment.

'I say to him, "And how can those things which are fixed be judged?"

'He saith to me, "Not in so far as they are fixed, oh, Philip, will the Elements be judged, but in so far as they have power; for Beings when they are set in order are not deprived of their natural property, but of their force of energy, being diminished by the mingling of one with another, and they are subdued by the power of their Creator; and in so far as they are subject they will not be judged, but in that which is their own.'"

To which Avida replies, 'Those things which thou hast said are very good.' It would seem that the notion of the personality of the heavenly bodies was one generally received among the Syrian Gnostics; it was certainly the doctrine of Bardesanes, that the sun, moon, and stars being a lower order of Æons, or beings of that kind, were 'set in order' by the framer of the world, the Demiurgus.

Avida alleges as an objection the severity of the commandments given to men, and their inability to perform them. Bardesanes replies at length, asserting, in the course of his argument, that 'men are not commanded to do anything but what they are able to do.' That the avoiding of sinful acts is possible, for 'all these things are subject to the mind of man, and it is not in the power of the body they are, but in the

'will of the soul.' Here we notice, by the way, what bears upon the error attributed to Bardesanes, that while those things which concern the soul are not subject to fate, bodily and external things are. What follows is very beautiful:

'For even if a man be poor and sick and old, or impotent in his limbs, he is able to avoid doing all these things; and as he is able to avoid doing these things, so is he able to love, and to bless, and to speak the truth, and to pray for that which is good for every one whom he knoweth: and if he be in health and have the use of his hands, he is able too to give something of that which he hath; also to support by the strength of body him who is sick and broken down, this too he is able to do. Who, therefore, it is that is not able to do what those devoid of faith murmur about, I know not. For I think, that it is in these commandments more than in any thing man has power. For they are easy, and there is nothing that is able to hinder them.'—P. 5.

And again, 'there hath been given to us, according to the goodness of God, commandments without grudging, such as every man who possesseth a soul within him can do without grudging.' But presently we meet with an exception: 'nor is there any one who doth not delight within himself when he refraineth from evil things, with the exception of those who were not made for this grace, and are called Tares; for would not that judge be unjust who should blame a man for such a thing as he is not able to do?' And presently after, page 7, 'for the good is the man's own, and on this account he rejoiceth whenever he doeth good; but the evil is the operation of the enemy, and on this account when man is troubled, and not sound in his nature, he doeth wicked things.' Here we see peeping out probably the views which led S. Ephrem to accuse Bardesanes of really, though not professedly, holding with Marcion the doctrine of two principles—two Gods.

But at this place we must pause. We have to observe that, among the extant ecclesiastical writings of early times, there remain two especially which profess to give a representation of the opinions of Bardesanes: one, the fifty-six and other Homilies of S. Ephrem Syrus against Heresies, which are extant in the original Syriac, some of which were particularly intended to counteract the influence of his opinions, and which throughout contain numerous allusions to him; the other, the Dialogues or Dialogue against Marcion, or, *De recta Fide*, as it is called, bearing the name of Origen; in three of which Dialogues a Bardesianist is introduced as one of the parties in the discussion, and as representing, whether truly or not, the opinions of his master Bardesanes. Of these works the former, S. Ephrem's Homilies, are of the utmost importance in the illustration of the Syriac treatise now published, because the meaning of Syriac theological terms may be most decidedly ascertained

from that writer; those, for example, for *Æons* and the like. And in each case it would be important to illustrate the newly-recovered work of the Gnostic, by the statements of his views contained in these treatises: to explain those views so far as the representations seem to be true, and to show the incorrectness, if so be, in the picture of his system made by his opponents, or the distortions of it by his followers. The difficulty which there is in reconciling or accounting for the various statements respecting him makes this a very important work. It seems clear that the Bardesianist in the so-called Origen does not express the views of freewill contained in this tract; and the opinions attributed to Bardesanes in S. Augustin against Heresies, as they agree with those of Origen, are also different from these. It is possible that the followers of Bardesanes carried out notions, of which hints are found in this tract, about things external to the soul being fated, so as to contradict other opinions of their master. Or again, it is possible that the views of Bardesanes himself underwent a change. Or, what is most probable, it may be that it was the plausible, and, as S. Ephrem Syrus says, the crafty way in which he concealed his real views and passed himself off for orthodox, by assuming the language of catholics, and by the general piety of his tone, which deceived those writers. It is certain that the history of his opinions was either imperfectly known to ecclesiastical writers, or that mistakes were made about him; those writers seem to agree in the statement, that at one time or other he changed his notions, whether falling into deeper heresy as he went on, or cleansing himself, though imperfectly, from the heresies of Valentinus, whose follower he had been. Any how the subject of his opinions is very interesting in the history of Gnosticism, and the preciousness of this tract consists in the circumstance that we have so very few works of the early heretics. We know their opinions through the representations of their opponents; and, however faithful these representations may be, they give us no adequate idea of the same opinions as they were embodied in the earnest and eloquent writings of the men who propagated them. Take any bare analysis, however correct, of the views entertained and taught by misbelievers and philosophical Christians of our own day, and consider how very poorly it would shadow forth the actual living breathing system which they propagate. It would give no more idea of it than would the human skeleton suggest the fair and noble form of the perfection of God's work on earth. Add to this the horror felt by Catholic writers of the views they are depicting, and you have the account of the strange incongruity which exists between the pictures of Gnostic systems set

forth by S. Irenæus, and the fact that those systems were living, energetic, influential, that they spread like wildfire through the Church, were embraced, defended, enlarged, developed by men of high intellect and seemingly noble aspirations. S. Irenæus gives the skeleton, true and faithful in representing the real notions of heretical schools in their naked horrors; the heretics themselves kept back those notions, or put them forth in connexion with the philosophical opinions of their own time, of which they formed a phase, or combined them with noble and religious sentiments. One writing of Marcion is known to have been of such high esteem, that a theorist of our own day would identify it with the beautiful Epistle to Diognetus. A fragment of Valentinus on the Origin of Evil is still preserved; it is a monument of the fine sentiments and great ability of that once influential writer. The present treatise of Bardesanes is another instance of sentiments generally good, and a religious tone of writing. In these instances the heretics speak for themselves, and tell their own tale.

And the lessons that result from such facts as these are no unprofitable ones to ourselves. They show us what the ancient heretics really were. They solve the difficulty which must very often have presented itself strongly to a student of Ecclesiastical History, viz. how reasonable beings could ever have believed or taught the wild dreams of the Gnostic schools. But they do more. They enable us to put ourselves in the position of the Christians of those days. We can see the temptations to which they were exposed, and that their trials were not so unlike our own. The living heresy looks fair and winning: if we saw the same heresy that thus tempts us laid down in the noisomeness of death, we should draw back with horror. The attempt to reconcile those facts of Christianity, which scepticism cannot deny, with the philosophy of the day; and to frame from them a system of so-called Christian faith and practice, is a temptation to ourselves: but it is no strange thing that has happened to us; only the very same trial which beset the early Christians, which misled and deluded them when they were at rest in the intervals of persecution. To know Bardesanes or Valentinus by their own works, is to realize the position of the early Christians. The writings of the Catholic controversialists represent their views simply as they are in themselves, blasphemous and horrible; just as a bare analysis of the opinions of some winning plausible writer of our own time (we will not give any names) would horrify good Christians now. It is some comfort to look at other points of the analogy; most of the telling and influential talent of those days was on the side of the philosophizers; mere Christian honesty, simplicity, and common sense were opposed

to them. To all their fine-drawn arguments the answer was ready: We have received no such doctrine. And the ultimate success was complete. The philosophical Christians of those days flourished for their time. They did indeed desolate the Church and destroy souls: they were influential, like Bardesanes, for a time, but they passed away, and are only remembered as the follies of a bygone age.

Now such being the importance of this treatise of Bardesanes, the comparison of it with the earliest representations of his views, for illustration or correction, is manifest; and though it may lie out of the province of a translator and editor of the Syriac text to do this—yet when he takes nine years to think over the Syriac text already printed and translated we might have expected something of it. At all events, S. Ephrem Syrus ought to have been used abundantly for the mere purpose of determining and explaining the *very* obscure language of the English translation. Will our readers believe us? There are, as we have said, *two*, and only *two*, important sources of information on the doctrine of Bardesanes; these are the so-called Origen and S. Ephrem. *Now in Mr. Cureton's notes there is no extract, no reference, no allusion whatever to either of these writers.* Other writers are cited, sacred and profane; we are referred to Justin Martyr, to Origen against Celsus, and others, on divers subjects. The name of S. Ephraem Syrus is never once mentioned in these notes; when his work must have been the best possible means for illustrating the language of Bardesanes, being his countryman and his great opponent. Now this is one of the most unaccountable things we ever met with; unless we suppose that Mr. Cureton's notes were made accidentally and desultorily, without systematic study or research; for if the editor was wishing really to illustrate Bardesanes, why did he not read the writings which bear upon his works? To give an instance of what is done, thereby to show what might have been done; the Syriac word which M. Cureton translates 'Being' with a capital letter, he says, p. 77, 'is often used for Æon. See Hahn, Bardesanes Gnosticus, p. 58, *et seq.*' Now, except this one reference to Hahn, the only materials used for illustrating the Syriac seem to be the Greek and Latin Versions of some portions of the latter part of the treatise. In two places, indeed, we are told that the Greek word corresponding to Mr. Cureton's 'established,' or 'set in order,' is *δημιουργέω*, or 'set in order by the Demiurgus;' and again, of 'fortune,' 'the corresponding Greek is *γένησις*,' but this is from Eusebius. These are the kinds of illustration which the treatise needs, had they only been systematically done. This would have been better than noticing M. Renan's blunders; as for instance:—

'M. Renan has mistaken this for the name of a place, and supposed the particle and verb which follow to be the name of a person. It is hardly possible to commit a greater number of errors in the same space than M. Renan has fallen into in translating the first lines of this treatise.'—P. 76.

But this we shall have to notice presently.

We left off our account of the tract of Bardesanes, when we felt, and when our readers would feel, the need of some illustrations and explanations.

We proceed. The general argument for man's free-will having been discussed, the first objection is that he is influenced by his nature:—

'I say to him, "After this manner again was this Avida saying, 'That it is from his Nature man acteth wrongly; for if he had not been formed naturally to do wrong, he would not do wrong.'"

'Bardesan saith, "If all men did one deed and acted with the one mind, it would then be known that it was their Nature governed them, and they would not have the Free-will of which I spake to you. Nevertheless, in order that ye may understand what is Nature and what is Free-will, I will proceed to inform you."

'The Nature of man is this: that he should be born, and grow up, and rise in stature, and beget children, and grow old, by eating and by drinking, and sleeping, and waking, and that he should die. These, because they are of Nature, belong to all men, and not to all men only, but also to all animals which have a soul in them; and some of them also to trees. For this is a physical operation which performeth and produceth and establisheth every thing as it has been ordained. But Nature also is found to be maintained by animals too in their actions. For the lion eateth flesh, by his Nature; and on this account all lions are eaters of flesh. And the sheep eateth grass; and for this reason all sheep are eaters of grass. And the bee maketh honey by which it sustains itself; for this reason all bees are honey-makers. And the ant layeth up for itself a store in summer, that it may sustain itself from it in the winter; and for this reason all ants do likewise. And the scorpion striketh with its sting him who hath not hurt it; and so likewise all scorpions strike. And all animals maintain their Nature; and those which feed upon grass do not eat flesh; nor do those that feed upon flesh eat grass. But men are not governed in this manner; but in the things belonging to their bodies they maintain their Nature like animals, and in the things which belong to their minds they do that which they wish, as being free and with power, and as the likeness of God.'—Pp. 8, 9.

We need not pursue the quotation. This is one of the passages which have been cited in Greek by Eusebius; but, in order that our readers may see how far the translations of the early centuries were intended to be exact representations of the originals, they must carefully notice those parts of the original which are not in the translation (or at least, to a great extent, differently represented); and that, by way of compensating for these omissions, Eusebius's Greek has a good deal which is not in the Syriac. To cite Mr. Cureton's words:—

'It will be seen, upon comparing the passages comprised in this and the following pages with that cited by Eusebius, *Præpar. Evan.* vi. c. 10, printed

below, that the Greek varies considerably from the Syriac: there are many interpolations which are not found in the original; and again several sentences of the Syriac have been omitted in the Greek.—P. 79.

We will give a very mild instance from the passage we have just cited. The Greek is—‘The lion eateth flesh [by his Nature] (and defends himself if he is injured); and on this account all lions are eaters of flesh (and defend themselves). And the sheep eat grass (and do not touch flesh, and if injured do not defend themselves); and this is the way of all sheep.’ We insert the words in [] to show what is in the Syriac, and not in the Greek; the words in () are in the Greek, and not in the Syriac; the words in italics are substituted for the words of the Syriac. The next sentences are transposed in the Greek; the scorpion taking precedence of the bee and the ant.

To account for all this is not our concern. Our own opinion is, that the so-called translators wished to reproduce useful works for the Greek or Syriac speaking Christians, respectively, out of the literature of the other language, and did not think of giving more than a paraphrastic, abridged, or enlarged representation of the original, as the case might be. It was not material to reproduce Bardesanes exactly, but to remodel him for general use. But what becomes of the edifice of the *Corpus Ignatianum*? What standing ground is there left for those who would make a Syriac translation the absolute standard by which to decide on the integrity, the readings, the interpretation of the Greek?

When we consider how Mr. Cureton and his *ὑπερασπιστής*, Dr. Bunsen, fought every inch of ground in maintaining the authority of the text as represented in a Syriac translation, against the form in which it appears in the original language,—how the controversy ran into questions of this kind,—what is the character of Syriac translations? such facts as are now before us respecting Greek translations of that day (which will be exhibited in an infinitely higher degree in the Syriac translation or rifacimento of the *Oratio ad Græcos*), such facts, we repeat, were of the utmost importance. Witness Bunsen's eagerness to overthrow the evidence of an Armenian Version that was fuller than the Syriac; of which we shall have occasion to speak presently. This, then, was the very class of facts which were wanted, and on which the whole controversy hinged. Now here is a large amount of evidence, and that of the most important kind; but it was not produced. All we would say is, that if this *Spicilegium* had been published when it was printed, if it had come out in the time of the Ignatian controversy, the value of the Syriac texts would have been greatly depreciated by it. We shall, however, have occasion to revert to the subject in another part of this article.

We will refresh our readers with another extract from Bardesanes, soon after our last citation—

‘And if any one should say, they have each individually a Nature to do so, let him see that it is not so. For there are some who were fornicators and drunkards, and when the admonition of good counsels reached them, they became chaste and temperate, and abandoned the lust of their bodies. And there are some who conducted themselves with chastity and temperance; and when they became negligent of right admonition, and despised the commands of the Deity, and of their instructors, fell from the way of truth, and became fornicators and prodigals; and there are some who repented again after their fall; and fear came upon them, and they returned to the truth in which they stood. What, then, is man’s Nature? for lo! all men differ one from another in their conduct, and in their desires; and those who stood in one will and in one counsel resemble one another; but those men whose lust is enticing them up to the present moment, and whose passion governs them, desire to attribute whatsoever they do wrong to their Creator; so that they themselves may be found without fault, and He who created them may be condemned by a vain plea; and they do not see that Nature has no law, for a man is not blamed because he is tall in his stature or little, or white or black; or because his eyes be large or small; or for any one of the defects of the body: but he is blamed if he steal, or lie, or practise deceit, or poisoneth, or curseth, or doeth such things as are like these; for lo! from hence it is evident, that as to those things which are not done by our hands, but which we have from Nature, we are not indeed condemned by these; neither by these are we justified; but those things which we do by our own Free-will, if they be good, by them we are justified and praised, and if they be wicked, by them we are condemned and blamed.’—P. 10.

Then follows the real objection of Fortune, or their Nativity; the Greek, as we noticed above, is Genesis.

‘Again we asked him, and said to him, “There are others who say, that by the decree of Fortune men are governed, at one time wickedly, and at another time well.”’—P. 11.

The answer of Bardesanes to this is important, as containing an acknowledgment of a change of opinion:—

‘He said to us, “I likewise, O Philip and Baryama, know that there are men who are called Chaldeans, and others who love this knowledge of the art, as I also once loved it; for it has been said by me, in another place, that the soul of man is capable of knowing that which many do not know, and the same men meditate to do; and all that they do wrong, and all that they do good, and all the things which happen to them in riches and in poverty, and in sickness and in health, and in defects of the body, it is from the influence of those Stars, which are called the Seven, they befall them, and they are governed by them. But there are others which say the opposite of these things, &c.”—P. 11.

He states some differing opinions, and proceeds, in that spirit of accommodation of which S. Ephrem accuses him, to say:—

‘But as for myself, in my humble opinion, it appeareth to me that these three sects are partly true, and partly false. They are true, because men

speaking after the fashion which they see, and because, also, men see how things happen to them, and mistake;—because the wisdom of God is richer than they, which has established the worlds and created man, and has ordained the Governors, and has given to all things the power which is suitable for each one of them. But I say that God and the Angels, and the Powers, and the Governors, and the Elements, and men and animals have this power: but all these orders of which I have spoken have not power given to them in every thing. For he that is powerful in every thing is One; but they have power in some things, and in some things they have no power, as I have said: that the goodness of God may be seen in that in which they have power, and in that in which they have no power they may know that they have a Lord. There is, therefore, Fortune, as the Chaldeans say: but that everything is not in our will is apparent from hence—that the majority of men have wished to be rich and to have power over their fellows, and to be healthy in their bodies, and that things should be subject to them as they desire: yet wealth is not found but with few; nor power, except with one here and there; nor health of body with all men; neither do those who are rich have entire possession of their riches; nor those who are in power have all things obedient to them as they wish: and sometimes they are disobedient in a manner which they do not wish.—Pp. 11, 12.

He concludes: 'We men are found to be governed by Nature equally, and by Fortune differently, and by our free-will each as he wishes.'

The 'Heads,' the 'Governors,' and the 'Powers,' and the Elements, represented as possessed of freewill, are the *Æons* of the ancient philosophic or Gnostic systems,—*δυνάμεις, ἄρχαι, ἐξουσίαι*. Mr. Cureton leaves them unexplained, unillustrated.

Now for Bardesanes' view of this 'fortune,' or our nativity:—

'But let us speak now, and show with respect to Fortune, that it has not power over every thing; for this very thing itself which is called Fortune is an order of procession which is given to the Powers and the Elements by God; and according to this procession and order, intelligences are changed by their coming down to be with the soul, and souls are changed by their coming down to be with the body: and this alternation itself is called the Fortune, and the Nativity of this assemblage, which is being sifted and purified, for the assistance of that which by the favour of God and by grace has been assisted, and is being assisted, till the consummation of all. The body, therefore, is governed by Nature, the soul also suffering with it and perceiving; and the body is not constrained nor assisted by Fortune in all the things which it does individually.'—Pp. 13, 14.

Below he says what may illustrate his view: 'From nature cometh the growth and perfection of the body; but apart from nature, and by fortune, come sicknesses and defects in the body.'

And again:—

'And know ye distinctly that, whenever Nature is disturbed from its right course, its disturbance is from the cause of Fortune, because those Heads and Governors, upon whom that alternation is which is called Nativity, are in opposition one to the other. And those of them which are called Right, they assist Nature, and add to its excellency, whenever the procession helps them, and they stand in the high places, which are in the

sphere, in their own portions; and those which are called Left are evil; and whenever they, too, occupy the places of height, they are opposed to Nature, and not only injure men, but, at different times, also animals, and trees and fruit, and the produce of the year, and the fountains of water, and every thing that is in the Nature which is under their control. And on account of these divisions and sects which exist among the Powers, some men have supposed that the world is governed without any superintendence because they do not know that these sects and divisions and justification and condemnation proceed from that influence which is given in Free-will by God, that those actors also by the power of themselves may either be justified or condemned: as we see that Fortune crushes Nature, so we can also see the Free-will of man repelling and crushing Fortune itself; but not in every thing, as also Fortune itself doth not repel Nature in every thing; for it is proper that the three things, Nature and Fortune and Free-will, should be maintained in their lives until the procession be accomplished, and the measure and number be fulfilled, as it seemed good before Him who ordained how should be the life and perfection of all creatures, and the state of all Beings and Natures.'—Pp. 14, 15.

This is a pretty specimen of the Gnostic views, and enables us to see something of the truth of S. Irenæus's representations. And again:—

'Bardesan saith, "From this, that men are not equally governed, art thou persuaded that it is not from their Nature they act wrongly? Therefore the matter constrains thee to believe that neither also from their Fortune do they altogether act wrongly, if we be able to show thee that the decree of the Fortunes and the Powers does not move all men equally, but we have Free-will in ourselves to avoid serving Physical nature and being moved by the control of the Powers."—P. 15.

This leads to a discussion on the influences of the heavenly bodies:—

'Avida saith, "Prove me this, and I will be convinced by thee, and whatever thou shalt charge me I will do."

'Bardesan saith, "Have you read the books of the Chaldeans which are in Babylon, in which are written what the stars effect by their associations at the Nativities of men? And the books of the Egyptians, in which are written all the modes which happen to men?"

'Avida saith, "I have read the books of Chaldeans, but I do not know which belong to the Babylonians and which to the Egyptians."

'Bardesan saith, "The doctrine of both countries is the same."

'Avida saith, "It is known that it is so."

'Bardesan saith, "Hear now and understand, that it is not what the stars decree in their Fortune and in their portions, that all men equally do who are in all the earth; for men have established laws in different places, by that Free-will which has been given to them by God. Because the gift itself is opposed to that Fortune of the Powers, which assume for themselves that which has not been given to them. I will begin to speak so far as I remember from the east, the head of the whole world."—Pp. 15, 16.

We have now landed our readers on the second portion of the treatise which is cited by Eusebius. In this case, as in the former, the Greek of the *Præparatio Evangelica* is printed at the bottom of the page; and in this latter a Latin version also, as it appears in Rufinus's translation of the *Recognitions* of

Clement. With these translations at the foot of the page, the account of the customs of different countries, the conclusion, which we shall cite presently, runs on to the thirty-fourth page of the volume. We may repeat that this was the portion of the treatise best known and most valued, forming a sort of established storehouse from which to derive accounts of the manners and customs of different nations.

As an illustration of the doctrine attributed to Bardesanes by the early Christian writers, that he made man's soul free, but his outer man subject to fate, we cite the following:—

‘In every country, and in every nation, all men use the Free-will of their Nature as they wish, and do service to Fortune and to Nature, on account of the body with which they are clad, at one time as they wish, at another as they do not wish; for in every country and in every nation there are rich and poor, and rulers and subjects, and healthy and sick, each of them, according as Fortune and Nativty has reached him.’—P. 27.

Now that our readers may have a little about Christianity—we cite the only passage that indicates any Christian belief in the writer; it is in the conclusion of the tract. Let it be observed that the *fact* of the promulgation and influence of Christianity is admitted; but we see no evidence in the whole treatise of almost any Christian *doctrine*; only going to church on Sundays, and keeping fast-days duly, were the marks by which Christians were known in the second century.

‘What, then, shall we say respecting the new race of ourselves who are Christians, whom in every country and in every region the Messiah established at His coming; for, lo! wherever we be, all of us are called by the one name of the Messiah—Christians; and upon one day, which is the first of the week, we assemble ourselves together, and on the appointed days we abstain from food. Neither do the Brethren . . . which are in Parthia take two wives; nor those which are in Judea circumcise themselves; nor do our sisters which are amongst the Geli and amongst the Cashani have connexion with strangers; nor do those which are in Persia take their daughters for wives; nor those who are in Media fly from their dead, or bury them alive, or give them for food to the dogs; nor do those who are in Edessa kill their wives that commit fornication, or their sisters, but withdraw themselves from them, and commit them to the judgment of God. Nor do those who are in Hatra stone the thieves. But wherever they be, and in whatever place that they are, the laws of the countries do not separate them from the laws of their Messiah; neither does the Fortune of the Governors compel them to make use of things which are impure to them; but sickness and health, and riches and poverty—this which does not appertain to their Free-will, befalls them wherever they are. For as the Free-will of men is not governed by the necessity of the Seven, and whenever it is governed it is able to stand against its influences, so also is this visible man not able readily to deliver himself from the commands of his Governors, for he is a slave and a subject. For if we were able to do every thing we should be everything; and if nothing came within the reach of our hands to do, we should be the instruments of others. But whenever God pleaseth, all things are possible to be, without hindrance. For there is nothing which can hinder that great and holy will. For even such as think that they stand against Him, it is not in strength they stand, but in

evil and in error; and this may subsist a short time, because He is kind and permitteth all Natures that they should stand in what they are, and be governed by their own will, but being bound nevertheless by the deeds which are done, and by the plans which have been devised for their help. For this order and government which have been given, and association of one with another, softens down the force of the Natures, that they should not be altogether injurious, nor be altogether injured, as they were injuring and injured before the creation of the world. And there will be a time, when also this injury which remaineth in them shall be brought to an end by the instruction which shall be in another association. And at the establishment of that new world, all evil motions will cease, and all rebellions will be brought to an end, and the foolish will be persuaded, and deficiencies will be filled up, and there will be peace and safety, by the gift of Him who is the Lord of all Natures.'—Pp. 32—34.

This will not, we hope, be altogether uninteresting to our readers. They have before them specimens of a long-buried treasure, of what may well be likened to the fossil skeleton of some extinct species of animal, an instance and an illustration of the life, the Christian, or Pseudo-Christian, life of the second century.

We will not dwell longer on Bardesanes; but proceed to the next treatise, simply observing the value of the publication of such a work as this.

II. The second work in the collection, then, is a Syriac Version, or supposed Syriac Version, of a tract, which bears the name of Melito, and professes to be an Oratio or Apology, addressed by Melito, the Bishop of Sardis, to the Emperor Antoninus. The date of it would be soon after the middle of the second century. It is an exhortation to relinquish the follies of idolatry, and to embrace the worship of the one true God.

We will presently give an account of the tract; but we must first premise some observations on what is really the point at issue, viz. whether it is indeed a work of Melito, Bishop of Sardis, or not. It is obvious how much the importance of the treatise would be enhanced, if this could be shown to be the fact.

We may first notice, incidentally, that it ought to be a translation from the Greek. We should have been glad to have evidence of this, which is an item of some importance in the investigation, because it might very easily have been a Syriac forgery; and the eliciting the Greek corresponding to the Syriac, is itself most useful.

And here we must observe, that to notice a point of this kind came naturally into the province of the translator. Mr. Cureton has simply translated the Syriac text very literally; the result is an obscure representation of the *original* author. No doubt it is right to give us an exact representation of the Syriac as it stands; but, inasmuch as the object of the publication of these

texts is to give us, in the only form in which we can have them, the hitherto lost works of the first ages, the *notes* ought to have supplied what is necessary for representing truly the original Greek—so far, that is, as sure-footed conjecture could do it. The translator ought to do this, because the knowledge of the Syriac language, and of the phrases by which the translators were accustomed to render particular Greek words, is necessary for doing it; and also because the same translator, who gives us what is occasionally almost unintelligible English, ought to do all he can to facilitate our understanding it.

Instead of this, which seems, as we have said, naturally to fall under his province, the Editor has written many pages of notes on this Oration, which are, we regret to say, almost wholly devoted to exhibiting the mistakes made by the unlucky wight, yclept B. H. C., who in an evil hour copied in the British Museum that very Syriac treasure which Mr. Cureton had printed nine years ago—but on which he was still in a state of incubation. The mistakes of B. H. C., that is, of a writer in the *Quarterly Periodical* called the 'Journal of Sacred Literature,' and of M. Renan, (the French scholar who made such ample amends for his mistake,) form the bulk of the notes. Now in the '*Spicilegium Syriacum*,' which is of a high order of literature, containing the very texts of writers of the early centuries, which is to be the subject of research, comment, and exposition; in such a book mere temporary and trivial matter, like the mistakes of a 'young Syriac scholar' in a periodical publication, are undeserving of notice; one general intimation, such as that in the preface, would have been sufficient. What does it concern the readers of the so-called Melito's Oration, in this or a future age, to know what mistakes B. H. C. made—which B. H. C., as he grows older, will himself very likely confess? Yet we have them recurring in almost every line. One conclusion we are forced to draw from it,—that to translate Syriac texts, as Mr. Cureton does, is not in everybody's power. Our readers ought to see a specimen of the young culprit's blunders: we select those given at the end of the preface, or rather the preface itself: 'Notice:—

B. H. C.'s TRANSLATION.

I say that rejection is denounced against those.

Now the understanding is free and a knower of the truth: whether it is in these things consider with thyself. And if they dress up for thee the figure of a woman.

Against this generation.

But perhaps thou wilt say, How

MY TRANSLATION.

I affirm that also the Sibyl has said respecting them.

But thou, a free intelligence and cognizant of the truth, enter into thyself, and if they clothe thee in the fashion of a woman.

Touching this matter.

But perchance thou mayest say,

is my work not the God whom thou worshippest, and not an image?

~ And art thou not ashamed that blood should be required of the maker of it?

Wherein thou wallowest on the earth, and yet art favoured. For things which are destitute of consciousness are afraid of Him who maketh the earth tremble.

Was seized by the shearer.

Thou didst lie down against rectitude of mind.

Why did not God create me, so that I should then have served Him, and not idols?

And art thou not ashamed, perchance it should be deficient to demand of him who made it?

Why rollest thou thyself upon the earth, and offerest supplication to things which are without perception? Fear him who shaketh the earth.

Was taken from the flock.

Thou wast reclining on a soft bed.

Notice, p. iii.

General readers are not much interested in B. H. C.'s errors; but they do wish to know what the real meaning of the Syriac is, and, in obscure places, they wish to know what the words of the original Greek probably were, so far as this can be made out. But Mr. Cureton gives us no help here; and, except a very few parallel passages from early apologists, given very unevenly—sometimes full even to the citation of the words of several writers, sometimes most meagre—except these, the whole of the notes consist of exhibitions of the mistakes of this nameless young scholar. And in the case of a Syriac scholar of so high reputation as Mr. Cureton, it was not necessary for his own justification to explain the causes of the discrepancies between his translation and that in the 'Journal of Sacred Literature.'

Is this tract, then, a work of Melito, Bishop of Sardis? The opinion of Dr. Routh, to whom Mr. Cureton sent his translation, is not told us. M. Bunsen declares 'it bears the stamp of a late and confused composition;' but Mr. Cureton assures us that at first he thought it genuine, till he found allusions in it which clearly indicated an acquaintance with the third chapter of the Second Epistle of S. Peter: and then he changed his mind. So at least we understand Mr. Cureton's words; he says:—

'Meliton evidently alludes here to 2 Pet. iii. 10. 12. This may probably be one reason why my friend, the Chevalier Bunsen, to whom I lent the translation of this *Apology*, and who at first did not doubt its authenticity, might have been led afterwards to think that it "bears the stamp of a late and confused composition;" and "for that reason to abstain from giving it a place among the genuine texts;" *Hippolytus and his Age*, vol. i. p. xi. 1851. Mr. Bunsen does not admit the authenticity of the Second Epistle of St. Peter. It is, however, certainly alluded to here by one of the earliest and most learned writers of the Christian Church in the second century, and consequently appears to have been admitted by him as genuine.'—P. 95.

Mr. Cureton himself appears to have been convinced that it was genuine. In 1845, in the *Quarterly Review*, (vol. lxxvii. p. 65,) it was announced, indeed, as 'an Oration of Melito,

Bishop of Sardis, to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, which, however, does not agree with that cited by Eusebius.' Mr. Cureton gave the translation of it as genuine to Dr. Routh and Bunsen. He evidently thought it genuine while writing the note we have just cited; and also, in the epistle dedicatory to Lord John Russell, for he says: 'The publication for the first 'time of remains of writers who have been amongst the most 'celebrated in the earliest ages of the Christian Church, cannot 'fail of securing for this volume,' &c.—which does not apply to any work in the volume except this, and that of Bardesanes. And he argues strenuously throughout for its genuineness, as we shall see.

M. Renan thought it genuine, apparently; with the simplicity which was too transparent in the first volume sent out by the Benedictine fraternity of Solesmes. B. H. C. argues strongly in its favour in the 'Journal of Sacred Literature' for April last; and Mr. Westcott, in his work on the 'Canon, having only seen the unfortunate translation of B. H. C., says: 'it 'contains several allusions to the Epistles, but no quotations 'from them . . . In this respect it agrees very well with other 'apologetic writings; and on other grounds I see no reason to 'doubt its authenticity.' We readily concur in part of this observation of Mr. Westcott's in evidence of the period at which the tract was written, as against Bunsen's assertion that it bears marks of a *late* composition; but we must say, not only that our verdict as to its being Melito's work is 'Not proven,' but further, that we cannot coincide in Mr. Westcott's opinion, or 'see no reason to doubt its authenticity.' We do not think it could possibly have been what it pretends to be, an address of the Bishop of Sardis to the Emperor Antoninus, or a writing of the Bishop of Sardis at all.

Our readers shall have a brief statement of the arguments:—

1. Eusebius enumerates those writings of Melito which he had met with, concluding his list with the words, 'and above all (or after all) *the* little work addressed to Antoninus;' and (iv. 13) speaks of 'the apology which he made for our doctrine to the Emperor Verus.' Eusebius, then, knew of one such discourse only: and that, as is allowed, is not the discourse before us; for there are long passages extracted by Eusebius which are not in this discourse, nor is there anything at all like them. They could not have formed any part of this address.

2. But, it is alleged, there is evidence that Melito wrote two Apologies, though Eusebius had only met with one, (and we are fortunate enough to have recovered the other.) The evidence of this consists of a passage in the 'Paschal Chronicle,' which, besides mentioning the known Apology of Melito under the year

A.D. 169, has, in the year A.D. 165, mention of his presenting an Apology to the Emperors in that year.¹

Now the first observation we make is, that the 'Paschal Chronicle' is not to be depended on. There is so great a similarity in the entries in the two passages, that it is more probable that the repetition should be a mistake of the compiler of the Chronicle than not. He might easily have put down, under two different years, what he found noticed in his authorities as having occurred in each of those years, when the Apology was really but one; only placed in different years by different chronologers. For it is plain, from the words of Eusebius, that he not only did not himself know of any other Apology, but that no other was known (at least in the Church generally) in his time; as we infer from his marked manner of speaking of the work, and his use of the article: 'And, above all, *the* little work,' &c.—that is, the well-known Apology. If, then, another Apology of Melito's existed, it was not then known to the Greek-speaking Christian world. It had been early removed into the regions of Syria, and there translated; and was lying hid in those parts till it has now come back to claim its rightful place. It is plain that some decisive evidence is necessary to prove this claim. We believe there is none but the party's own assertion. The treatise is headed: 'An Oration of Meliton, the philosopher, 'who was in the presence of Antoninus Cæsar, and bade the same 'Cæsar know God, and showed him the way of truth. And 'he began speaking after this manner. Melito saith: It is not 'an easy matter readily to bring into the right way that man who 'has been a long time preoccupied by error.' There is no allusion whatever to the Emperor in the body of the tract: no semblance of its being a defence or argument addressed to any one. It is a hortatory treatise, but it ends with a few words addressed to Antoninus:—

'But when thou, O Antonius (Antoninus) Cæsar shalt learn these things thyself, and thy children also with thee, thou wilt bequeath to them an eternal inheritance which fadeth not away; and thou wilt deliver thine own soul, and also the soul of thy children from that which is about to befall the whole earth in the judgment of truth and righteousness. Because, as thou hast acknowledged Him here, He will acknowledge thee there; and if thou esteem him great here, He esteemeth not thee more than those who have

¹ In the cxxxvii. Ol. A. C. 169: Μερίτων, Ἀσιανὸς τῆς Σάρδεων πόλεως ἐπίσκοπος, καὶ Ἀπολλινάριος Ἱεραπόλεως ἐπίσκοπος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς λόγου βιβλίον ἀπολογίας Ἀνρηλίου Ἀντωνίνῳ ἐπέδωκαν, Ἰουστίνῳ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, κ. τ. λ., p. 484. *ibid.*

Ἀλλὰ καὶ Μερίτων Ἀσιανὸς, Σαρδιανῶν ἐπίσκοπος, βιβλίον ἀπολογίας ἔδωκεν τοῖς λεγόμενοις βασιλεῦσιν (Μάρκῳ Ἀνρηλίῳ καὶ Ἀντωνίνῳ Βήρῳ), καὶ ἕτεροι δὲ πολλοί, ὧν ὁ θρωπεύς Ἰουστίνος, κ. τ. λ., p. 482 in the cxxxvi. Olympiad. A. Mund. 5672: A.D. 164–65. edit. Dindorf. p. 482.

known Him and confessed Him. Sufficient be these for thy majesty; and if they be too many,—as thou wilt.

'HERE ENDETH MELITON.'—P. 51.

But this is surely not sufficient. It is easy to add such heads and tails to treatises; and these additions have no connexion or correspondence whatever with the body of the treatise, in which, as we have said, there is no reference, even where it was most natural, to the Emperor: *e.g.* it contains frequent allusions to the deification of sovereigns, yet no turn of the subject to him who is supposed to be addressed. Again, it has these words:—

'Perchance one who is a sovereign may say that I am not able to conduct myself well, because I am a sovereign. It behoveth me to do the will of the many. He who should plead thus, truly deserves to be laughed at. For why should not the sovereign be himself the leader in all good things, and persuade the people which is subject to him, that they should conduct themselves with purity, and know God in truth, and set them in himself examples of all good deeds? Because so it becometh him. For it is an absurd thing that a sovereign, while he conducts himself badly, should be the judge, and condemn those who go wrong.

'But my opinion is this: that in this way a realm may be governed in peace, whenever the sovereign shall be acquainted with the God of truth, and through fear of Him shall be withheld from injuring those who are his subjects, but shall judge everything with equity, as one who knoweth that he himself also is about to be judged before God; while those also who are under his hand shall be withheld by the fear of God from acting wrongly towards their sovereign, and shall also be withheld by fear from doing what is wrong to each other. And by this knowledge and fear of God all wickedness may be removed from the realm. For if the sovereign abstain from injuring those who are under his hand, and they abstain from doing wrong against him, and against each other, it is evident that the whole country will dwell in peace. And many advantages will be there, because amongst them all the name of God will be glorified. For what advantage is greater than this, that a sovereign should deliver the people which is under his hand from error, and by this good deed obtain the favour of God? For from error all those evils arise. But the chief of error is this: that while a man is ignorant of God, he should worship in God's stead that which is not God.'—Pp. 48, 49.

Now, if it had been an Apology, what would have been more natural, than in this place to have addressed some personal appeal to the Emperor, such as does actually occur in the portion still preserved of Melito's known Apology.

But, unfortunately, the tract itself contains a contradiction to the heading thus prefixed. At p. 43, the author says: 'But I, according as I know, will *write* and show how and for what cause images were made for kings and tyrants, and they became 'as gods'; and p. 45, 'of which I will not *write* farther;' an inconsistency which Mr. Cureton would get over by supposing that Melito spoke first in the presence of the Emperor, and then wrote down his speech: it is much more likely that this

was a written treatise to which some one affixed the heading and the conclusion.

However, to turn to another point: the evidence of the 'Paschal Chronicle,' supposing it admitted, shows that Melito had written an Apology before that one which Eusebius and all the world knew as 'The Apology of Melito.' But what evidence is there that our tract is that earlier Apology? Why none: but rather there is evidence to the contrary. For the 'Paschal Chronicle' says that Melito presented a written Apology (*βιβλίον ἀπολογίας*) to the Emperor; whilst the work before us does not profess to be an Apology or defence of Christians: it is a work against paganism. Again: the 'Chronicle,' mentioning the Apology in the time of the two Emperors Antoninus and Verus, says it was made to them. The production before us, like that described by Eusebius, professes to be addressed to Antoninus only. But, lastly, the 'Paschal Chronicle' gives an extract from this very Apology, which, it says, was presented to Antoninus in this year 165, and neither the words of that extract themselves, nor any words at all equivalent to them, or really like them, are found in the address before us. Here, then, the question may be decisively settled. This is not the Apology of Melito known to Eusebius, for it does not contain any of the passages which he cites. True, say the advocates for the genuineness of this Syriac treatise, but Melito wrote an earlier Apology—the 'Paschal Chronicle' proves that he did—and our tract is that Apology. But the 'Paschal Chronicle' gives an extract from the Apology of which it is speaking: so that we have a means of testing our Apology. That test fails. The passage is not to be found in the Syriac tract. We say this decisively: and we consider that it settles the question, and that the little tract which is now published is not that address of Melito of which the 'Paschal Chronicle' is supposed to speak, and it is not the well-known Apology which Eusebius knew, and from which he cites largely. Therefore there is no evidence that it is Melito's at all.

But B. H. C. and Mr. Cureton do not give up their case so easily. They say, that the citation in the 'Paschal Chronicle' is made from their new-found Oration. We will give the passage as it is in the 'Paschal Chronicle':—'We are not worshippers of 'stones that have no sense, but of the only God, who is before 'all and over all; and also are worshippers of His Christ, who 'is indeed God the Word (in being) before the worlds.' The most important part of this passage is the latter clause, which declares that the Christians are not merely not idolaters, but followers of Christ. The first portion could not well be without something like it in any work against idolatry (nor, as

we think, could the latter be without something corresponding to it in any real Christian apology). It is the former portion only, to some words of which the editors of this address have found a few expressions similar; and to diminish the force of objections arising from the absence of sufficient similarity to identify them, they remind us that we have the Melito in a Syriac Version.

That we may do no injustice to Mr. Cureton, we cite his argument entire, though we have already replied to much of it:—

'There is no reason why we must suppose that Meliton should not have written two Addresses to the Roman Emperor as well as Justin Martyr, or that one of them might not have escaped the knowledge of Eusebius, or at least we have had no mention of it made by him, as well as that of Athenagoras. The *Apology* cited by Eusebius was probably amongst the latest, or indeed the last of all the works which Meliton wrote; and internal evidence has led critics to conclude that it was presented to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus in the tenth year of his reign, after the death of his associate in the Empire, Lucius Aurelius Verus, about A.D. 169—70. External testimony by the author of the *Chronicon Paschale* attributes it to the same date, A.D. 169. But the same writer, five years before, A.D. 164—65, speaks also of an *Apology* presented by Meliton to the Emperor. Unless, therefore, we assume that he was not sufficiently well and clearly informed, and has therefore given a confused account—an assumption for which the silence of Eusebius cannot afford sufficient grounds—we can hardly draw any other conclusion from his words than that Meliton presented two Apologetical addresses to the Roman Emperors—the one before us, which contains rather a defence of the true religion against the Polytheism, idolatry, and incorrect ideas of the Deity entertained by Pagans; and the other, as the extract preserved by Eusebius would lead us to infer, against the persecution of the Christians on account of their faith. Indeed the passage which the author of the *Chronicon Paschale* cites as from Meliton's *Apology*, and which, from its having been given before he mentions the later date, would lead us, if there were two, to refer it to the former, seems to be sufficiently near to be almost identified with expressions found in the work before us, if we bear in mind, that it must necessarily have undergone some change in phraseology, by the translation out of Greek into Syriac, and also suppose it not to have been intended for an exact and verbatim quotation, but only as an allusion.'—Pp. viii. ix.

So we must suppose two things; one, that, in the address we have, the passage has been changed by translation into something utterly unlike itself; the other, that the very exact citation in the 'Paschal Chronicle' is not 'intended for an exact and verbatim quotation, but only as an allusion;' a supposition utterly contradictory to the manner and language of the citation. In his note to this extract, in which the agreement between the passage cited in the 'Paschal Chronicle' and our Syriac address is to be shown, Mr. Cureton very quietly suppresses the latter portion of the extract, and presents to us the former portion only. We will place the two in parallel columns, and our readers shall judge; only we give the context of the passages, supposed to be parallel, marking by inverted commas

the words taken out of them by Cureton, and retaining his italics, which indicate the 'almost identified expressions':—

Citation in the Paschal Chronicle.

'We are not worshippers of stones that have no sense; but of the only God, who is before all and over all, [and also adorers of His Christ, who is indeed God the Word (in being) before the worlds.']

The words in brackets are omitted by Mr. Cureton.

Passages in the Syriac Tract.

'For what end, therefore, this world was created, and why it passeth away, and why the body exists, and why it falleth, and why it standeth, thou art not able to know until thou shalt have lifted up thy head from this sleep in which thou art sunken, and have opened thine eyes, and seen that "*There is one God, the Lord of all,*" and have served Him with all thy heart. Then will He grant thee to know His will; for every one who is far removed from the knowledge of the living God is dead and buried in his body. On this account thou rollest thyself upon the ground before demons and shadows, and asketh vain petitions from such as hath not what to give. But thou, stand thou up from amongst those who are lying on the earth and "*embracing stones,*" and giving their sustenance as food for the fire, and offering their clothes to idols, "and are willing, while they themselves are endowed with senses, to serve that which is insensible."—P. 47.

'But thou, feeble man, "within whom He is, and without whom He is, and *above* whom He is," hast gone and bought for thyself wood from the carpenter's house, which is graven and made into an abomination of God.'—P. 49.

We hope our readers sufficiently admire the evidence which this extract affords of the identity of our Syriac Address with the (supposed) earlier Apology of Melito. We hope they admire sufficiently the skilful alembic of the Canon of Westminster, by which any words can be drawn from the passages before us and forced into a likeness to the real words of Melito. Only let them remember that, as Mr. Cureton puts the passages before us in his note, (Preface, p. ix,) we have only part of the extract in the 'Paschal Chronicle,' and, on the other hand, only occasional words, without a hint of their context, taken out of the passages which we have cited in full.

His words are: 'Compare "*οὐκ ἔσμεν κ.τ.λ.*" 'we are not worshippers of stones that have no sense, but of the only God 'who is before all and over all,' with '*There is one God the Lord*

'of all . . . embracing stones . . . and are willing, while they themselves are endowed with sense, to serve that which is 'insensible,' p. 47, 'and within whom He is, and above whom,' &c. p. 49.'

Here is a pretty case; eight words, then a long interval, then one word, then another interval, then four words, then, after nearly two pages, one word more; and these are words and thoughts which, or their like, must occur in all treatises against idolatry, often many times over. Take away half the extract which you are going to use as your test, you do not pretend to find anything like that; then suggest the change of phraseology which takes place in the process of translation. Why, even B. H. C. could not have translated in this way. The 'change of phraseology,' indeed, which could produce a noble, brief, and simple statement of the Christian worship, out of a diluted appeal to a heathen on the unreasonableness of idolatry; then consider that the words in the 'Paschal Chronicle' may only be intended for allusions. It is a process indeed worthy of a conjuror, thus to prove the identity of two passages utterly unlike; and quite fatal to the Editor's critical character.

And here we might stop the trial for want of sufficient evidence on the part of the claimant. But we wish to take advantage of this very citation to show why we do not think that the address now printed could have been an Apology of Melito at all. First from the matter, then from the manner, of the extract.

First from the matter. The extract is plainly Christian. It puts forward boldly and explicitly, as all the extant Apologies do, the name of Him whom the Christians adored—that Holy Name whereby they were called. They were not ashamed of the name or of the doctrine. They regarded explicitness in laying open their faith thus far as necessary. But in the whole of this Syriac address, the name of Christ is never found at all. The tract might in this respect have been written by an Alexandrian Jew before the birth of our Saviour, were it not for such a passage as this:—

'But I say nevertheless, that so long as a man not having heard, neither discerneth nor understands that there is a Lord over these creatures, perhaps he is not to be blamed, because no one blameth the blind when he walketh badly. For in the same manner also men, while they were seeking after God, stumbled against stones and stocks; and such of them as were rich, stumbled against gold and silver, and by their stumbling were kept back from that which they were seeking after. But now that a voice has been heard in all the earth that there is a God of truth, and an eye has been given to every man to see withal, they are without excuse who are influenced by a feeling of shame towards the many with whom they have been in error, but otherwise desire to walk in the right way. For those who are ashamed to be saved, necessity compels them to die. On this

account I counsel them that they open their eyes and see; for, lo! light without envy is given to all of us, that we may see thereby: and if, when light hath risen upon us, any one closeth his eyes that he may not see, his course is to the ditch. For why is a man influenced by feelings of shame towards those who have been in error together with himself?—P. 42.

Were it not for the words in italics, and the concluding passage, which we shall quote presently, on the destruction of the world by fire, we should have said it might be a composition of the date of the Book of Wisdom, as indeed it is not unlike some of the later chapters of that book. The true Melito openly professes himself a worshipper of Christ; the false one advocated only the worship of the one God, instead of idols, and not only calls this religion a 'philosophy,' as the real Melito does, but advocates it as a philosophy; not as revealed by God, but as commending itself to our own minds. A good consideration, in its place, and used by Christian apologists, in subordination to the Gospel; and really forming the argument of one class of treatises belonging to the second century, written with the view not of defending Christianity, but of drawing persons from Paganism.

Secondly, as to manner. The style of the short extract in the 'Paschal Chronicle' is simple, concise, compressed; and such is the style of the other extracts from Melito's known Apology in Eusebius. There is a plain business-like air about them, and a character of common sense. We know the peril of arguing on such a ground as the diversity of styles. We know that one who seems mystical, nay, almost dreamy, in devotional writings, can be as plain, concise, and business-like as any man, when his work calls him to be so. But yet the fact must be noted, that the style of this new address is quite unlike the plain simple style of the known fragments of Melito.

We cite those which are preserved by Eusebius:—

'... what never has happened yet, the whole family of the devout worshippers of God is now under persecution, harassed throughout all Asia by the new edicts. For informers, and they that are eager after the property of others, men without any sense of shame, having their handle from the injunctions, commit open robbery, both by night and by day, seizing on the goods of those who are doing no wrong. . . . And if it be so indeed that these things are done at thy command, be it so; for a righteous emperor would never determine unrighteously; and we bear cheerfully the meed of such a death: only we prefer to thee one request, that thou wouldest thyself first take cognizance of those that are the causes of such strife and contention' (Christians, *i.e.* who disturbed the peace of society); 'and that thou wouldest then decide with justice whether they are worthy of death and punishment, or of security and quiet. But if indeed it be so, that this plan and this new injunction is not from thyself,—an injunction which would not be fitting even against barbarian enemies,—so much the more do we entreat thee not negligently to leave us thus exposed as objects of general plunder. . . . For our philosophy first arose among

barbarians; but having sprung up among thy people in the glorious reign of thy ancestor Augustus, it became most especially a propitious blessing to thy Empire. For from that time the Roman power increased so as to be great and glorious: of which power thou hast become the desired possessor, and wilt be so, together with thy son, if thou guardest the philosophy which was nursed together with the Empire, and grew up with Augustus; which, moreover, thy ancestors honoured in addition to all other religions. And this is the strongest evidence that it was for good that our doctrine grew up together with the Empire, in its brilliant beginning—viz. that since the reign of Augustus nothing calamitous has occurred, but on the contrary everything glorious and honourable, according to the prayers of all. Only Nero and Domitian, persuaded by some malevolent persons, wished to make our doctrine the object of suspicion and ill-will: from whom the lying system of information originated, which has spread by an unreasonable custom against persons such as we are. But thy religious ancestors corrected the want of information of Nero and Domitian, and frequently by edicts rebuked many who presumed to take to new courses against us. Among these thy grandfather Adrian appears to have written to many, and especially to Fundanus the proconsul, in government of Asia; and thy father, at the time when thou thyself wast administering all things for him, wrote to the cities to take no new measure respecting us; and among them to the people of Larissa, Thessalonica, Athens, and to all the Greeks. And we are persuaded that thou thyself, even in a greater degree entertaining the same views with them on these subjects, and even views more humane and more worthy of a philosopher, wilt do all that we ask of thee.'

Compare this with any part of the Syriac address. Pleasing as the thoughts and composition of the latter seem to be, even in the wretched condition of having undergone one or two processes of translation, they are quite different from the character of Melito's writings.

Of its general argument our readers shall judge for themselves. It begins thus:—

'Melito saith: It is not an easy matter readily to bring into the right way that man who has been a long time preoccupied by error. But nevertheless it is possible to be done; for when a man has been turned from error a little, the mention of the truth is acceptable to him; for in the same manner as, when the cloud has been broken a little, there is fine weather, so also a man, too, when he is turned towards God, the thick cloud of error which hindered him from the true vision, is quickly removed from his face. For error, like passion and sleep, holdeth for a long time those who alight under it; but truth, using the word as a stimulus, and smiting such as are asleep, also awaketh them; and when they are awake, seeing the truth, they also understand, and hearing, they also distinguish that which exists from that which doth not exist. For there are men that call wickedness righteousness, and so then they suppose that this is righteousness when a man shall be in error together with the many. But I say that this is not a good excuse, that a man be in error with the many: for if one only act foolishly his folly is great; how much greater, then, must the folly be when the many are foolish together?'—P. 41.

This seems like a mere literary composition, the work of

one who was studying to arrange his arguments according to the rules of art, and to write well.

The author then sets forth the simple attributes of the one Eternal God, and contrasts with devotion to Him, the worship of the elements, or heavenly bodies, or idols of wood and stone, of which we must cite the following:—

‘But the folly of which I speak is this, if a man should leave that which really exists, and serve that which really does not exist: but there is that which really exists, and is called God, and He really exists, and by His power every thing subsists; and this same was not made, nor yet brought into being, but exists from eternity, and will exist for ever and ever. He undergoes no change, while all things are changed. No sight is able to behold Him; nor understanding able to comprehend Him, nor words to describe Him; and those who love Him call him after this manner—Father and God of Truth.’—Pp. 41, 42.

After this follows the passage we cited before, ‘But I say this, &c.’; and then the writer proceeds to dwell on the origin of idolatry, and after opening his argument proceeds:—

‘But I affirm that also the Sybil has said respecting them, that it is the images of kings, who are dead, they worship. And this is easy to understand; for, lo! even now they worship and honour the images of those belonging to the Cæsars, more than those former *Gods*: for from those their former Gods, both tribute and produce are *paid* to Caesar as to one, who is greater than they. And on this account those are slain who despise them, and diminish the revenue of Caesar. For also to the treasury of other kings in various places it is appointed how much the worshippers supply, and how many sacks full of water from the sea. And this is the wickedness of the world, of such as worship and fear that which hath no perception; and many of those who are cunning, either for the sake of profit, or on account of vain-glory, or for the sake of swaying the many, both worship themselves, and instigate the deficient in understanding to worship that which hath no perception.’—P. 43.

‘Is not this a dainty dish to set before a king?’ Is it likely that this should be the Apology addressed by Melito to one of these same Cæsars?—that the most offensive things should be said, about that delicate subject of revenue, without one word of courtesy to him who is addressed? A pretty republican Melito must have been! an American citizen, or friend Bright telling his mind to the Emperor of All the Russias, is nothing to him! nay, setting aside the offensiveness of the matter, that such an argument should be addressed to an Emperor, without one single word in it to indicate that he who is addressed is the Cæsar. He is spoken of as a third party; by no means as a hearer. Contrast this with the respectful and beautifully deferential language of the genuine Melito, in Eusebius.

Then comes a list of instances of idolatrous worship being given to dead kings and tyrants, in which every reader must be struck by the oriental character of the instances adduced.

Greek and Roman history might have furnished mythical histories in abundant illustration; but even Hercules must be mentioned in connexion with 'Zuradi the Persian, his friend,' a person we never heard of before; and then, after slight mention of the Greeks, and the people of Attica, we have the Egyptians worshipping Joseph as Serapis, a common opinion among Christians at the end of the second century, then the Phœnicians, the Elamites, the Syrians, the people of Mesopotamia; and, finally:—

'But touching Nebo, which is in Mabug, why should I write to you; for, lo! all the priests which are in Mabug know that it is the image of Orpheus, a Thracian Magus. And Hadrian is the image of Zaradusht, a Persian Magus, because both of these Magi practised Magism to a well which is in a wood in Mabug, in which was an unclean spirit, and it committed violence and attacked the passage of every one who was passing by in all that place in which now the fortress of Mabug is located; and these same Magi charged Simi, the daughter of Hadad, that she should draw water from the sea, and cast it into the well, in order that the spirit should not come up and commit injury, according to that which was a mystery in their Magism. And in like manner, also, the rest of mankind made images of their kings, and worshipped them, of which I will not write further.'—Pp. 44, 45.

All this looks as if the treatise was written among the Eastern people, even among the Syrians themselves.

But just before this we read:—

'The Syrians worshipped Athi, a Hadibite, who sent the daughter of Belat, who was skilled in medicine, and she cured Simi, daughter of Hadad, King of Syria; and after a time, when the leprosy attacked Hadad himself, Athi entreated Elisha, the Hebrew, and he came and cured him of his leprosy.'—P. 44.

Is it likely that this should have been written by Melito, the accurate enquirer into the canon of the Hebrew Scriptures?

Afterwards we have one of the most beautiful passages in the tract:—

'But thou, a free intelligence and cognizant of the truth, if thou wilt consider these things, enter into thyself; and if they clothe thee in the fashion of a woman, remember that thou art a man, and be a believer in Him who really is God, and to Him open thy mind, and to Him commit thyself, and He is able to give thee everlasting life, which dieth not; for every thing cometh through His hands: and all other things so let them be esteemed by thee as they are, images as images, sculptures as sculptures; and let not any thing which has been made be put by thee in the place of Him who is not made. But let Him, the ever-living God, be always running in thy mind, for thy mind itself is His likeness, for it, too, is invisible and impalpable, and without form; and by its will the whole body is moved. Know thou, therefore, that if thou wilt always be serving Him that is immoveable, as He exists for ever, so thou also, when thou shalt have put off this which is visible and corruptible, shalt stand before Him for ever, living and endowed with knowledge; and thy works shall be

for thee riches which fail not, and possessions that do not lack. But know thou that the chief of all thy good works is this : that thou shouldest know God and serve Him. And know that He asketh not for any thing of thee : He needeth nothing.

'Who is that God? He who is himself truth, and his word truth. But what is truth? That which is not fashioned, and not made, and not formed; that is, that which, without having been brought into existence, does exist, and is called truth.'—P. 45.

Throughout this passage we may recognise Christian expressions, (e.g. 'and His Word (is) truth,') and the thoughts and arguments of other writers of that age.

So again in the following extract, which comes after some pleasing passages, containing arguments from the works of God :—

'Therefore I counsel thee that thou shouldest know thyself, and shouldest know God. For understand how there is within thee that which is called the soul : by it the eye seeth, by it the ear heareth, by it the mouth speaketh : and how it employeth the whole body. And whensoever He pleaseth to remove the soul from the body, it falleth and goeth to decay. From this, therefore, which exists within thyself and is invisible, understand how God also moveth the whole world by his power, like the body, and that whensoever it pleaseth Him to withdraw his power, the whole world also, like the body, will fall and go to decay.'—P. 47.

Then we have the passages we cited before in a parallel column, by the side of the real Melito of the 'Paschal Chronicle,' and that about the wisdom of a sovereign setting an example of true wisdom to his subjects, in which occurs the only real resemblance to Melito's known writings—we mean the calling Christianity a philosophy.

We will now give the conclusion. We only wish our readers to know, that, in the passage with which the extract opens, Mr. Cureton considers there is an allusion to the father, and to the son of the Emperor Antoninus, who, he supposes, is the person addressed. It would be a pity if they lost the perception of such an allusion. Mr. Cureton says :—

'Judging merely from what we read in the Address itself, I should have been disposed to fix the date about four years earlier than that in which mention is first made of Meliton by the *Chronicon Paschale*, either to the end of 160, or the beginning of 161, a short time before the death of Antoninus Pius, and probably when his health had sensibly begun to decline. Unless, indeed, the expression be intended as generally applicable to every one whose father is still alive, the words "Be solicitous respecting thy father—so long as thy solicitude may be of avail to help him," would imply that Antoninus Pius was still surviving, although perhaps in a state to cause anxiety. In the inscription, Marcus Antoninus is designated Cæsar, and not Autocrat, or Emperor. His being associated with Antoninus Pius, and taking a part in the administration of the empire, would be sufficient grounds for Meliton to address him; and in the words of the *Apology* cited by Eusebius, he alludes to the part which he took in the government: "During the times that thou also with him wast governing every thing." The prospect of his early succession to be the head of the state, might also

have prompted Meliton to offer his opinion as to the surest means of governing a realm in peace—by knowing the truth, and living conformably thereto. At the end of the Address he refers to the children of Antoninus. Of these he had several, both sons and daughters.'—Pp. ix. x.

The words of the Syriac Address are:—

'Wherefore, inquire if thy father walked well; *if so*, do thou also follow after him; but if thy father walked ill, walk thou well, and let thy children also follow after thee. Be solicitous too respecting thy father, because he walketh ill, so long as thy solicitude may be of avail to help him. But as for thy children, say to them thus, That there does exist a God, the Father of all, who never was brought into being, neither was He made, and everything subsisteth by his will; and He made the lights that *his* works may behold one another, and He concealth himself in his might from all his works; for it is not possible for any mutable thing to see Him who is immutable. But such as have been admonished and admitted into that covenant which is immutable, they see God so far as it is possible for them to see him. These same will be able to escape from being consumed when the flood of fire shall come upon all the world. For there was once a flood and wind, and the chosen men were destroyed by a mighty north wind, and the just were left for demonstration of the truth; but again, at another time there was a flood of waters, and all men and living creatures were destroyed by the multitudes of water, and the just were preserved in an ark of wood, by the ordinance of God. So also it will be at the last time; there shall be a flood of fire, and the earth shall be burnt up together with its mountains, and men shall be burnt up together with the idols which they have made, and with the graven images which they have worshipped; and the sea, together with its isles, shall be burnt; and the just shall be delivered from the fury, like their fellows in the ark from the waters of the deluge. And then those who have not known God, and those who have made idols for themselves, shall lament, when they behold the same idols on fire together with themselves, and nothing shall be found to help them.'—Pp. 50, 51.

This is the passage on which Mr. Cureton lays the blame of leading his friend Bunsen to consider his Melito's Apology a late and confused composition, because it appears to allude to the second Epistle of S. Peter. We cited Mr. Cureton's words in p. 221. We shall not be suspected of doubting the authority of the Epistle; but we must remind Mr. Cureton, that the question is not merely as to the existence of that Epistle in the time of Melito, but of its authority and its genuineness, and that the 'consequently' of his last clause, in which he says, 'It is, however, certainly alluded to here by one of the earliest 'and most learned writers of the Christian Church in the second 'century, and *consequently* appears to have been admitted by 'him as genuine,' would scarcely be admitted by his friend. The confidence with which Mr. Cureton speaks of this passage, as if really written by Melito, is marvellous.

On the other hand, we conceive that Bunsen, in his eagerness to get rid of the fact that the Epistle is alluded to by a writer of the middle of the second century, has been unhappy in his selection of the epithets, 'a late and confused composition.' We see no signs of lateness; none of confusion. It is a regular,

well, and even neatly arranged treatise—the tone and notions of which correspond, as Mr. Cureton has pointed out in several instances, to those which prevailed in the second century.

In the course of our argument, we have not turned aside to refer to the article of B. H. C. in the 'Journal of Sacred Literature' for April last, in defence of the genuineness of the Treatise. The points adduced by him, which have not been noticed by implication in our argument, are these:—

1. That Verus is not joined in the address with Antoninus, because he was absent at the war in the East, and Antoninus alone at the seat of empire. We ask, why then should the 'Paschal Chronicle' mention both emperors?

2. B. H. C. is bolder than Cureton on the subject of the extract in the 'Paschal Chronicle.' He states the difficulty, and answers it thus: 'Either, *first*, we have not the entire document preserved; or *secondly*, it is not quoted with literal accuracy; or *thirdly*, the author quoted from the second instead of the first by mistake. We are disposed to think the second is the most probable reason, as we find the sentence substantially in the Syriac; and we know that quotations were not always exactly correct, being sometimes made from memory.' It seems to us that the third supposition would have been nearest to the truth; but it would have taken away the only support for the genuineness of the treatise. We have said enough of the second supposition, in which B. H. C. and Mr. Cureton only rival each other in absurdity. M. Renan, as we understand from Mr. Cureton's note, would adopt the first alternative, and calls the Syriac a fragment of the supposed earlier Apology. Of this there is absolutely no trace whatever.

3. B. H. C. argues in favour of the genuineness of the Syriac tract, from its likeness to the extracts given by Eusebius. He says (p. 123): 'The previous extracts contain nothing from the Apology in Eusebius which is inconsistent with the style and spirit of the Syrian document, but much which is, in a singular manner, coincident with it. 1. There is no such word as Christ or Christianity.' [We answer: i. We have only short extracts given in Eusebius; and yet the Christian religion and Church form the topic of the whole, though it so happens that the word does not occur. ii. In the few lines extracted in the 'Paschal Chronicle' Christ is plainly spoken of.] '2. There is no quotation from Scripture, and no direct mention of it.' [This arises from the nature of the treatise, whoever wrote it.] '3. There is the same manly and straightforward style of address.' [In this we do not agree with B. H. C.] '4. In the inscription to the Syriac document, Melito, a Christian teacher, is called a philosopher, and here (in the Eusebian

'extract) Christianity is more than once called philosophy.' [This is true, and let it have its full weight.] '5. Both are the productions of a man possessing varied and accurate knowledge, and great freedom of expression.' [We doubt of the accuracy of the Syrian's knowledge.]

In conclusion, it seems to us: I. That internal evidence is decidedly destructive of this supposition. This tract could not have been an address to a Roman emperor. II. That no trace of the extract given in the 'Paschal Chronicle' is to be found here, and therefore this is not the Apology mentioned there.

It seems to us quite clear, that what has happened in so very many other instances, has happened here; there was a good book without an author's name; and Melito's Apology was not known; and the addition of a beginning and end enabled a transcriber to pass this off as the genuine work of Melito. We regret that Mr. Cureton should have committed himself to defending it.

III. After this Oration come some fragments bearing the name of Melito, and extending over rather more than four pages. They appear as five separate fragments; but the fifth, which is only two and a half lines in length, is really a repetition of part of the fourth, word for word the same, but breaking off abruptly. It is found in a different MS. from the others. We do not observe that Mr. Cureton notices the circumstance of its being really a part of his fourth fragment, which is the more strange as it is from these very words in the fourth fragment, except two that are lost by the abrupt ending of the fifth, that he argues for its identity with a passage cited from Melito by Anastasius Sinaita. Neither does Mr. Cureton notice the fact that his third fragment here printed as Melito's, has already made its appearance out of the Syriac treasures of the Museum, nay, out of the very same MS., and that through the instrumentality of Mr. Cureton himself, under the name of S. Irenæus, so that it has now done double duty under different names, and that not for the first time, as we shall see presently.

In the headings of the last two fragments, Melito is called Bishop of the city of Attica, and Bishop of Ittica. Mr. Cureton seems to suppose that the error lay in the copyist inserting the words 'of the city;' and adduces the circumstance mentioned by Eusebius (E. H. vii. 32) of Meletius, Bishop of Sebastopolis, being called on account of the sweetness of his eloquence (and with an allusion we presume to his name), τὸ μέλι τῆς Ἀττικῆς; and this Meletius and our Melito may, he thinks, have been confounded, and the name of 'the honey of Attica' hence attached to the Bishop of Sardis. But he identifies the

extract as a part of the works of Melito of Sardis by the correspondence of one passage,

'He that supported the earth was supported upon a tree. The Lord was exposed to ignominy with a naked body. God put to death; the King of Israel slain by the Israelitish right hand.'

with the words cited by Anastasius from the discourse of Melito on the Passion (λόγος εἰς τὸ πάθος), 'God suffered by the Israelitish right hand.' (The fifth fragment is a repetition of this passage, only ending at the word 'slain.') So this seems to confirm the authority of the Syriac MS. which attributes them to Melito.

Mr. Cureton adds, 'No one who compares this (extract) with 'the preceding can fail, I think, to draw the conclusion that 'they are by the same hand, although perhaps by a different 'one from that of the Apologies.' On the point of similarity between the fourth and preceding extracts we quite differ from Mr. Cureton. The fourth seems to be by another, and more able, writer. From this it does not appear distinctly what Mr. Cureton thinks of the authorship of the extracts: they were all, he conceives, by the same author, and him the author cited as Melito by Anastasius; but not the same 'perhaps' as the author of the Apologies. But the author of the Apologies, Mr. C. clearly holds to be the Bishop of Sardis; therefore we infer that he doubts the genuineness of the fragments. And yet elsewhere he speaks as if they were certainly Melito's.

In such a state of the inquiry it becomes important to know the nature and value of the authority on which or by which the name of Melito is attached to them. The headings of the extracts are, 1. 'By Meliton, Bishop of Sardis, from the Discourse on the Soul and Body;' 2. 'By the same, from the Discourse on the Cross;' 3. 'From Meliton the Bishop on Faith;' 4. 'Of Meliton, Bishop of the city of Attica,' which last is identified with the extract in Anastasius from the discourse on the Passion. 5. 'Of the Holy Meliton, Bishop of Irtica.' Among the treatises of Melito of Sardis, enumerated by Eusebius, we have one 'On the Soul and Body;' one 'On the Obedience of Faith,' and one 'On the Faith' simply, if we follow the Syriac version of Eusebius, and read *περὶ πίστεως* for *περὶ κτίσεως (καὶ γενέσεως Χριστοῦ)*. The other extracts, 'On the Cross,' and 'On the Passion' might, as far as that goes, be from portions of the work *περὶ ἐνσωμάτων Θεοῦ*. Now by whom, or on whose authority, are the headings to these extracts attached? Mr. Cureton vouchsafes to tell us only that they are thus found in a Syriac MS. written in the year A.D. 562 at Edessa. For further information respecting that MS. he refers us to his *Corpus Ignatianum*. The information which the reader of the 'Spicilegium' wants would not have occupied many lines;

and so much of the account of the MS. as was necessary might have been repeated out of the *Corpus Ignatianum*, a work which is not universally accessible. But the 'Corpus' itself does not tell us what we want to know, and what Mr. Cureton ought to have told us. We are obliged to elicit this as well as we can with the aid of another work, the '*Spicilegium Solesmense*,' in which we happen to know that this same Syriac MS. makes a figure.

We will give what Mr. Cureton says in his own words. In the notes to the '*Spicilegium Syriacum*,' p. 95, we read: 'The four following extracts are taken from one of the Syriac manuscripts brought from Nitria, now in the British Museum, No. 12,156, f. 70, 76, 77, written A.D. 562. As I have already given a description of this manuscript in my *Corpus Ignatianum*, p. 352, it is needless for me to repeat it here.' Perhaps it may be; but it is not needless that we should be told whether these extracts are like Sybilline leaves, blown together into MS. No. 12,156, f. 70, 76, 77, or whether they form part of some other work. This Mr. Cureton could easily have told us; and he has not told it us either here or in the '*Corpus Ignatianum*.' There we read in a note on an extract from S. Ignatius:—

'This extract is taken from a work by Timotheus, Patriarch of Alexandria, against the Council of Chalcedon. The same volume contains also the Apology of Cyril of Alexandria for the twelve chapters against the Oriental Bishops; a treatise ascribed to Gregory Thaumaturgus, on the Possibility and Impassibility of our Lord; and a summary of heresies by Epiphanius. A note at the end, indicating the monastery to which the book belonged, has been partly erased; but what remains states that it was presented in the year of the Greeks 873 (A.D. 562), about which time it seems to have been written by a scribe of Edessa. One or two leaves have been lost from the beginning; and consequently the work of Timothy is imperfect. This volume is a large quarto, written in three columns, and is one of those obtained in 1839. Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 12,156, fol. 1, and fol. 69.

Now we are told, in the note before us, that the four extracts from Melito come from fol. 70, 76, 77 of this volume, but out of which of the treatises do they come? We should have known this if Mr. Cureton had given us an exact account of the contents of the volume and the folio at which each treatise began. But he has been so sparing of information, that he has not even told us all the treatises that are in this volume. For further light upon the subject we must go to the '*Spicilegium Solesmense*,' in which (Prolegomena, p. vii.) the contents of the volume are given, translated into Latin by M. Renan, from the last page of the MS. Here we read:

'Explicit liber iste (quo continentur)—

'I. Liber servi Dei Timothei, Episcopi Alexandrini, contra Synodum Chalcedonensem.

'II. Capitula duodecim S. Cyrilli.

'III. Objectio quam fecerunt eis Andreas Samosatensis et Theodoretus Cyrensis.

'IV. Rursus Apologia quam fecit contra eos sanctus Cyrillus (condemnavit et detexit fraudem eorum argumentis manifestis e libris sanctis).

'V. Oratio servi Dei Gregorii Episcopi Neocæsariensis in Ponto ad Theopompum.

'VI. Descriptio hæresium servi Dei Epiphani Episcopi Cypri.'

Here we come nearer to the point. It is out of some one of these treatises that these extracts come; and it would certainly have added to the value of the evidence for their genuineness, at all events have made clear what it really was, if the sponsors for their being Melito's had been said to be some one of the distinguished and exalted personages whose treatises are contained in this volume, rather than the nameless scribe at Edessa who wrote it out, A.D. 562. It would have thrown back the testimony at least a century earlier, and it would have been given by a Greek writer, addressing himself to Greeks, writing a work in the midst of a controversy, interesting to the whole Greek world and carried on in the broad daylight of the cognizance of the whole Christian Church. Such an one so putting forward a citation as from Melito, may be wrong, but he is more likely to be right than an Edessene monk.

Now we are left to draw our own inference as to the treatise in which these extracts from Melito at fol. 70, 76, 77 of the volume occur. We suppose they are out of that of Timothy, since the other treatises near the beginning of the volume are all extant, in whole or in part, and the extract from Ignatius in the '*Corpus Ignatianum*,' which is in Timothy's work, *seems to be* from fol. 69. So that we infer that the first treatise in the volume extends so far, at any rate; and as Cyril's twelve chapters come next, and our extracts at fol. 70, 76, 77, are certainly not in them, the work of Timothy must extend further than fol. 69, and reach over these folios. If we are wrong in this inference we are very sorry; it is not our fault. Mr. Cureton could have spared us the trouble of this investigation, and have said in a single line whether the person who cited these passages as Melito's was Timothy or Cyril, or Andrew of Samosata, or Theodoret. Anyhow they were thus cited between the years 430 and (we suppose we may safely say) 460, in a controversial work on the great subject which divided the Christian world at that time,—the Union of the Two Natures in the One Person of Christ. We suppose these passages, then, to have been cited by Timothy, who is distinguished as *Ælurus*, the Monophysite intruder into the See of Alexandria, which he occupied from A.D. 457 to 460. Whether Mr. Cureton was unwilling to acknowledge a Monophysite source for his extracts we know not. He certainly seemed very much grieved that any stain

of Monophysite heresy should attach to his MSS. of S. Ignatius. But we do not except against Timothy Ælurus' testimony on the ground of his heresy.

We observed before that Mr. Cureton alleges the few words cited by Anastasius from the work of Melito on the Passion, which are found in his fourth extract, as an evidence of that being rightly attributed to Melito. Would it not have been much better to have cited Timothy Ælurus himself, who lived two hundred years earlier than Anastasius, and who published these extracts as Melito's, when all the world was looking on; the more so, when it is well known that the Hodegus of Anastasius, in which those words occur, is very much made up of materials derived from the writers on the Incarnation in the fifth century; as indeed Mr. Cureton must have known that large portions of the Greek original of the treatise of Andreas Samosatensis, which stands third in the table of contents of this same Syriac volume, No. 12,156, are preserved in the Hodegus of Anastasius. So that, for anything that appears to the contrary, Anastasius may have derived this very extract of Melito from the work of Timothy Ælurus, or some of those who were engaged in the controversy with him.

But what, after all, is the value of the testimony by Timothy Ælurus to the authorship of these extracts? We have set it as high as we could, and, we think, have not been unfair in doing so. But if, as we inferred, Timothy's work be the source from which these extracts are derived, then it will appear that Timothy had himself, in this very same work, cited a portion of the third extract, which he here attributes to Melito, as the writing of S. Irenæus; and we know, from other sources, that the whole third extract itself passed in some portions of the Church for the work of S. Irenæus. So that if Timothy's work be the source of our extract, the value of his authority is reduced to very little indeed; and if it be not, still Melito's claim to be the author of this third extract is to be settled with another ancient and contemporary bishop, S. Irenæus. The case stands thus: In a work called the '*Spicilegium Solesmense*,' published in 1852, there is a Syriac fragment bearing the name of S. Irenæus, which was taken out of this same Syriac MS., No. 12,156, fol. 1, and out of this same work of Timothy's against the Council of Chalcedon. It has a different beginning from the one here attributed to Melito (this one having had the beginning cut away), and is much shorter. But in the same '*Spicilegium*' is a longer form of the same passage, in Armenian, beginning, indeed, as the Syriac does, but, except this and one or two slight variations, being identical with what Mr. Cureton has published in his present '*Spicilegium*' as Melito's. We will present the whole to our readers, and leave them to judge.

Syriac, No. 1, in
Spic. Solesm.
IRENÆUS.

The Law and the Prophets, and the Evangelists have proclaimed of Christ, that He was born of a virgin; and that He suffered on the tree; and that He rose from the dead; and ascended into Heaven; and that He was glorified by the Father; and that He is King for ever; that He is, &c., as in Italics of No. 2.

In place of the words in parentheses; among men, man;

the Shepherd of the saved,

NO. XCI.—N.S.

Syriac, No. 2, in
Spic. Syriacum.
MELITO.

We have made collections from the Law and the Prophets relative to those things which have been declared respecting our Lord Jesus Christ, that we may prove to your love;

that He is perfect reason, the Word of God; who was begotten before the light; who was Creator together with the Father; who was the fashioner of man; who was all in all; who among the Patriarchs was Patriarch; who in the law was the Law; among the priests Chief priest; amongst kings Governor, among prophets the Prophet; among the angels Archangel; (in the Voice the Word; among spirits Spirit); in the Father the Son; in God, God—the king for ever and ever. For this was He who was pilot to Noah; who conducted Abraham; who was bound with Isaac, who was exile with Jacob, who was sold with Joseph, who was captain with Moses, (who was the divider of the inheritance with Jesus the Son of Nun,) who in (David and) the prophets foretold (his own sufferings), who was incarnate in the Virgin, who was born at Bethlehem, (who was wrapped in swaddling clothes in the manger, who was seen of the shepherds, who was glorified of the angels, who was worshipped of the Magi,) who was pointed out by John,

who assembled the Apostles, who preached the kingdom, (who healed the maimed,) who gave light to the blind, who raised the dead, who appeared in the temple, who was not believed on by the people, (who was betrayed by Judas,) who was laid hold on by the priests, who was condemned by Pilate, who was transfixed in the flesh, who was hanged upon the tree, (who was buried in the earth,) who rose from the dead, who appeared to the Apostles, who ascended to heaven, who sitteth on the right hand of the Father, (who is the rest of those that are departed,) the recoverer of those who were lost, the light of those who are in darkness, the deliverer of those who are captives, (the guide of those who have gone astray, the refuge of the afflicted,) the bridegroom of the Church, the charioteer of the Cherubim, the captain of the angels, God who is of God, the Son who is of the Father, Jesus Christ, the King for ever and ever. Amen.

R

Armenian, in
Spic. Solesm.
IRENÆUS.

Same as Syriac, No. 1.

among men, man;

same as Syriac, No. 2, omitting words in parentheses, and adding what is in this column.

who was baptized in the Jordan, tempted in the wilderness, and found to be the Lord,

and is glorified by Him, as the resurrection of the dead,

the Shepherd of the saved,

Our readers will see, that the portions of the passage from Melito in Mr. Cureton's present publication, here printed in Italics, were published in Syriac in the '*Spicilegium Solesmense*,' 1852, as an extract from Irenæus, so given in Timothy's work (from this same MS. Syr., No. 12,156, fol 1); and that the whole of the passage, with only such variations as are indicated in our third column, was printed in the same volume in Armenian, as an extract from S. Irenæus on the Resurrection. (See *Spicileg. Solesm.* vol. i. pp. 3—6.)

Now, we think Mr. Cureton ought to have known all this, and knowing it, should have told his readers. He should have told us, on every ground: first, because what he now sends out is not absolutely new; secondly, because the question of authorship is materially affected by it; thirdly, because the authority of Timothy Ælurus, if it is to him we are indebted for these extracts, is considerably lessened by the fact that he alleges the same words first as Irenæus's, and then as Melito's; and Mr. Cureton ought to have known this, because he had much to do with it. This the sad consequence of his waiting nine years; keeping his work on hand so long that he forgets the passages he has transcribed, translated, revised, given away, which have even been the subject of a controversy in which his 'dear friend' Bunsen took up arms in defence of Mr. Cureton himself, who is ungrateful or inconsiderate enough to know nothing about the matter. All this is very strange; yet so it is.

If we understand Mr. Cureton rightly, the Syriac of this third extract, which we have given in English, was printed by him as Melito's, in 1846; in 1849 (we believe) the Benedictine Pitra was in the British Museum; he was received there with '*humanissima benevolentia*;' viewed its rich treasures with admiration; above all admired the Syriac MSS., above 500 in number, which Mr. Cureton told him were by far the most ancient in Europe: '*contestante cl. V. Curetono, eos esse facile omnium antiquissimos quos occiduae bibliothecæ asservavere.*' (*Spic. Solesm. Proleg.* p. vi.) We must give the account of Mr. Cureton's further kindness, in the good Frenchman's own words: '*Quin, ea siquidem fuit eruditi viri prompta munificentia, optio data mihi est quem potissimum vellem ad usus meos exscribendi. Gallus ego quidem et e Lugduno oriundus, appello D. Irenæum. Nec mora: ipsius eruditi viri excipiente manu, unus et alter Irenæi locus, æque insignis ac plane novus, mihi præsto est.*' (*Ib.*)

Mr. Cureton gave Pitra the offer of transcribing a piece of any author he liked. Pitra, a Frenchman and Lyonnese, asked for a bit of Irenæus; no sooner asked than given. Mr. Cureton with his own hand showed him two pieces of Irenæus, out of this very book of Timothy Ælurus, and this unlucky volume, No. 12,156.

Now, when Mr. Cureton gave to Dom Pitra, or rather allowed him to transcribe, these extracts, one of which is what we have exhibited above, in col. 1, and the Italics of col. 2, did he know that it was a part of what he had himself printed as Melito's or not? We wonder how it came to pass that Mr. Cureton had not printed these extracts from Irenæus for his own '*Spicilegium*.' We cannot suppose that his 'prompt munificence,' which affected the Benedictine so much, consisted in giving away as Irenæus', what he himself was going to publish in a fuller form as Melito's. Surely by one preparing a '*Spicilegium Syriacum*' of the second century, the extracts from S. Irenæus ought to have been examined at least, if not included in it; and Mr. Cureton should have known that these extracts called Irenæus's and Melito's were the same. But this is not all. A Latin translation of the very fragment in question was made by Renan, and this translation was revised by Mr. Cureton; so the note on the extract informs us, (*Spicil. Solesm. p. 3.*)

'E. Cod. Syr. Britann. Musci inter codd. addit. no. 12,156, fol. 1. Interpretatus est E. RENAN; eadem recensuerunt clariss. et doctiss. viri W. CURETON et QUATREMERE.'

Here is another way in which the fragment of Irenæus certainly came under his notice. Yet Mr. Cureton seems not to have recognised his Melito. Nay more, Dom Pitra, (shall we say ungratefully?) assailed Mr. Cureton's great Ignatian theory with the very weapon he had himself given him,—this very piece of Irenæus. It seems that contemporaneously with his obtaining this Syriac of Irenæus from Cureton he received an Armenian version of the same passage, only much more full (as in our col. 3), from the Mechitarists at Venice. This Armenian version also bore the name of S. Irenæus; from the circumstance, then, that the Syriac of Irenæus, given to Pitra by Cureton, was, as it appeared, a shorter form of the same passage as the Armenian, and from the fact that the Armenian version of S. Ignatius, just published by Peterman, gave the longer text, while Cureton's Syriac Ignatius was shorter, Pitra proceeded to argue that the Syrian translators were wont to abridge the authors whom they translated.—(*Spic. Solesm. Proleg. pp. viii. ix.*)

Of all this we suppose Mr. Cureton to have been ignorant. He had given up all further controversy about his Ignatius. But his 'learned and very dear friend Bunsen' had not; and accordingly, in the preface to the fourth volume of his '*Hippolytus*,' ed. 1, he replies to Pitra, and maintains that the Syriac (that in our first column) is the genuine text, and the Armenian (our third column) is interpolated. Of all this battling around and over the dead body of his Ignatius, Mr. Cureton may have been supremely ignorant. At all events, we are left to discover

as we can the curious fact, that at this very time Mr. Cureton had in print a fuller than this very fuller form itself in Syriac (our col. 2), only bearing the name of Melito, of which he said not a word at the time, nor does he say one word now. Yet he has printed, translated, written notes upon it. He found both extracts, one under the name of Irenæus, the other under that of Melito, in one and the same Syriac MS., and, we believe, in one and the same treatise in that MS., the one at fol. 1, the other at fol. 70, 76, or 77, we are not told which. The one he gave to Pitra, the other he has published himself, without a hint of there being any connexion between them. And now they who are interested in such investigations are left to decide whether the Bishop of Sardis or of Lyons is to have the fragment assigned to him; Mr. Cureton printing his as Melito's, and suppressing, or being ignorant of the fact, that the Armenian version and this very same Syriac volume assigned it to Irenæus. We noticed the question as between Pitra and Bunsen (as to which was the genuine text), and gave the passage at length in the 'Christian Remembrancer' for July, 1853, pp. 228, seq. We do not think it worth while to say more than what we then said, that we could 'have no hesitation in agreeing with 'the view that the Syriac is mutilated, from the abrupt transition from Jacob to the Church, and the recurrence of "King for ever and ever," in the space of a few lines: but whether 'the Armenian also may not be interpolated,' we said, 'is not 'so easy to determine.' The publication of this other Syriac form of the passage remarkably confirms our view.

We will only add the observation, that it is highly probable, if there were stray fragments, such as these we have cited, on the Divine and Human Natures of our Lord, going about in the world without owners, that Melito and Irenæus are the two persons to whom they would be attributed, on account of that remarkable testimony of S. Hippolytus or Caius of Rome, cited by Eusebius: 'Who is ignorant of the works 'of Irenæus, and Melito, and the rest, *which set forth the 'Christ as God and man?*' The variations in the three copies make us think that the passage has not been regarded as the allowed work of any great Father, or it would scarcely have been altered or abridged so freely.

Of Mr. Cureton's editorial negligence we leave the learned world to judge; as also of the value of Timothy Ælurus' authority for the authorship of the extracts which he gives.¹

¹ After these extracts Mr. Cureton prints the Syriac of that part of Eusebius which contains an account of Melito and a list of his works, which is interesting as suggesting variations of reading. We wish he had done the same in regard to Bardesanes.

We must now hasten to conclude this review. Two treatises remain, each of which requires some notice.

IV. The first (pp. 61-69) is a tract bearing this title:—

'Hypomnemata, which Ambrose, a chief man of Greece, wrote: who became a Christian: and all his fellow-senators raised a clamour against him; and he fled from them, and wrote and showed them all their folly; and at the beginning of his discourse he answered and said.'

The publication of the Syriac text of this discourse is of no importance, except as showing the strange way in which our Christian early writings have been cut about and altered. The tract is that which, as we said at first, has long been known as the '*Oratio ad Græcos*,' printed among the works of S. Justin Martyr, but placed by his latest editor, Otto, more properly, as we think, among the spurious works bearing his name. It will be seen that in the Syriac the tract has a different title, and bears the name of Ambrose, whom Mr. Cureton would identify with Ambrose of Alexandria, the convert and friend of Origen. This we think absurdly groundless, and highly improbable, from the absence of any philosophizing tone in it, or any reference to the mythicizing tendencies of the Alexandrians of that day, who saw in the fables of their religion representations of the truths of nature and of morality.

But though we have said that the address is the *Oratio ad Græcos*, we ought to add that it is an entire remodelling of it; the beginning and latter parts are to some extent the same; the middle, which sets forth the follies and wickednesses of the heathen mythology, goes indeed over the same ground, and takes the same line of argument, and every now and then agrees with the Greek; but on the whole is different, both in the instances alleged and the language in which they are expressed. This may easily be seen by a cursory view of Mr. Cureton's book, as he has printed the Greek along the bottom of the page under his translation of the Syriac; but without indicating, as we think he might have done, what parts of the two are the same and what are different.

We cite the beginning of this address; what is printed across the page is common to the Greek and the Syriac; what is in the first column is only in the Syriac; what is in the second only in the Greek; we would remind our readers that this is a part of the tract in which the two are most alike.

'Do not suppose, Men and Greeks, that my separation from your customs has taken place without a besitting and just cause;

For I have investigated the whole of your wisdom of poetry, and rhetoric, and philosophy; and when I found not	For there is not in them
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any thing right or worthy of the Deity,

I was desirous of investigating the wisdom of the Christians also, and of learning and seeing who *they are*, and when, and what is this its recent and strange production, or on what good things they rely who follow this wisdom, so as to speak the truth.

Men and Greeks, when I had made the inquiry I found not any folly, as in the famous Homer, who says respecting the wars of the two trials, "for the sake of Helen many of the Greeks perished at Troy, far from their beloved home."

For first they say respecting Agamemnon their king, that through the folly of Menelaus his brother, and the vehemence of his madness, and the incontinence of his lust;

He was desirous to go and

For the compositions of your poets are themselves monuments of insanity and incontinence.

For any one who goes to him who stands out most prominently in your education is of all men most foolish.

Cooperating with these, he was content to give his daughter for a sacrifice, and to throw all Greece into confusion that he might

rescue Helen from a leprous shepherd.'

This will be a sufficient specimen of the least marked variations of the two forms of the tract. We supposed it was a popular work, bearing no one's name and owned by none, which persons remodelled each as it suited him. The conclusion, however, is worthy of being cited:—

'Come, then, and be instructed by the Word of God, and by consoling wisdom: rejoice and partake of it: know too the King incorruptible, and become acquainted with his servants, which boast not in armour, neither make slaughter; because our Captain delighteth not in the multitude of an army, neither in the horsemen and in their beauty, nor in the illustriousness of family; but he delighteth in the pure soul, which a wall of justice surrounds. But the word of God is always instructing us, and the promises of our good King and the works of God. Oh the soul that is purchased by the power of the Word! oh the trumpet of peace without war! oh the doctrine quenching the natural fire of the soul, which maketh not poets, nor produceth philosophers, nor the crowd-followed orator; but goeth and maketh the dead pass over that he die not, and raiseth men from earth as Gods, to the region which is above the firmament. Come, be instructed, and be like me, for I also have been like you.'—Pp. 68, 69.

The Syriac ends here. The Greek continues a little further, with a pleasing testimony to the convert's own experience of his change. So much for Syriac translations.

V. The concluding tract (pp. 70—76) is an Epistle of one Mara, son of Serapion, to his son Serapion. Mr. Cureton tries to identify this Serapion with some one or other of the known persons of that name: and also to determine the time when the letter was written: being uncertain himself on both points, and unsuccessful, as it seems to us, in the whole subject.

The Epistle is from a father who had been removed from his house at Samosata, with others of his countrymen, by the Romans, and thrown into captivity. He writes kindly and morally to his son, to exhort him to good conduct. This seems to us from its length and prosiness to have much more the air of a fiction than a letter really written. But what is most remarkable in it is the absence of any such distinct and plain statements as would show the writer to be a Christian. It may at least be made matter of question whether he was one or not. If he was, he must have designedly suppressed explicit statements about it, in order, we may suppose, not to bring his little son into trouble. But the absence of all distinct Christian motives, or Christian doctrines, is very worthy of notice. We cite all the passages bearing that way, that our readers may judge for themselves:—

‘When thy master and tutor wrote to me a letter, and informed me that thou art very diligent in learning for a child of few years, I blessed God, that thou, being a little boy without one to guide thee, hast begun with a good intention; and as for me myself this has been a consolation to me, that respecting thee, a little boy, I have heard of this greatness of mind and good conscience, such as does not readily remain in many. On this account, lo! I have written to thee this memorial of what I have experienced in the world; for the manner of men’s living has been experienced by me, and I have walked in instruction, and all those things of the instruction of the Greeks I have found them wrecked together with the birth of life. Be careful, therefore, my son, of those things which are suitable for such as be free, to meditate upon learning, and to pursue after wisdom: and in this manner reckon to be confirmed in that with which thou hast begun; and remember my injunctions with diligence, as a quiet man, who loveth discipline: and although it appear to thee to be very bitter, when thou shalt experience it for a little while, it will be very pleasant to thee, because so also it hath happened to me. But a man when he shall be departed from among his family, and shall be able to retain his own habit, and shall do with justice whatsoever is proper for him, he is that chosen man who is called the Blessing of God, and with whose liberty nothing else can be compared. For such men as are called to discipline, seek to disentangle themselves from the struggle of the time; and such as lay hold upon wisdom are elevated by the hope of righteousness; and those that stand in the truth exhibit the standard of their virtue; and those that devote themselves to philosophy look to escape from the miseries of the world. But thou, too, my son, conduct thyself so wisely in these things, as a wise man who endeavoureth to spend a pure life: and beware lest the acquisition of wealth, which the many thirst after, subdue thee, and thy mind be turned to desire riches which are not real; for neither when *men* obtain their desire do they abide, nor even while they continue in righteousness: and all these things which are seen by thee in the world, as of one who is for a short time, are to be dissolved like a dream; for they are the ups and downs of the times.’—Pp. 70, 71.

The words, ‘I have found them wrecked together with the birth of life,’ Mr. Cureton conceives may mean that the Greek learning became worthless to him on his becoming a Christian

by a new birth. He says further, 'There are several very 'obscure passages in this letter. Although I have endeavoured 'to give the meaning of them as accurately as I could, I cannot 'confidently assert that I have in no instance failed.'

The next extract we shall make shows that the companions of Mara at least were heathens:—

'For I have heard respecting our companions, that when they were departing from Samosata it grieved them; and like those who blame the time, they also spake after this manner: "Henceforth we are driven far away from the habitation of men, and we are not allowed to return to our city, and to behold our men, and to embrace our *gods* with praise." It is meet that that should be called a day of lamentation, because one heavy grief laid hold upon them all equally.'—P. 71.

The tone of the following is as like that of a Greek rhetorist as it is of a Christian:

'But as for thee, my beloved, let it not grieve thee that thy loneliness has been driven from place to place; because men are born for this end, to receive the accidents of the time. But thus reckon thou, that for wise men every place is equally the same; and for the virtuous, fathers and mothers abound in every city. Even indeed from thine own self take the trial. How many men, who know thee not, love thee as their own children, and a multitude of women receive thee like their own beloved ones. Verily as a stranger thou hast been successful, verily for thy little love many men have desired thee.'—P. 72.

So the following:—

'But thou, my little son, choose for thyself that which fadeth not away because they that occupy themselves in such things are called modest and beloved, and lovers of a good name: but whenever any evil thing opposeth thee, blame not man, nor be angry against God, neither murmur against thy time. If thou continue in this mind, thy gift is not a small one which thou hast received from God, which standeth not in need of riches, nor is brought near to poverty, because thou wilt perform thy part in the world without fear, and with rejoicing; for fear and excuse of that which cometh naturally is not for the sake of the wise, but for the sake of those who walk without law.'—Pp. 72, 73.

And this:—

'If, therefore, thou art wise, and diligently keepest watch, God will not cease from helping thee, nor man from loving thee. Whatsoever thou art able to acquire, let that be sufficient for thee; and if indeed thou be able to do without possessions, then shalt thou be called blessed because no one will even envy thee.'—P. 73.

The next passage we shall give is that which Cureton cites as alone referring expressly to Christianity:

'For what else have we to say, when wise men are forcibly dragged by the hands of tyrants, and their wisdom is taken captive by calumny, and they are oppressed in their intelligence without defence? For what advantage did the Athenians gain by the murder of Socrates, the recompense of which they received in famine and pestilence? Or the people of Samos by the burning of Pythagoras, because in one hour their country was entirely covered with sand? Or the Jews by the death of their wise king,

because from that same time their kingdom was taken away? For with justice did God make recompense to the wisdom of these three: for the Athenians died of famine; and the Samians were overwhelmed by the sea without remedy; and the Jews, desolate and driven from their own kingdom, are scattered through every country. Socrates is not dead, because of Plato; neither Pythagoras, because of the statue of Juno; nor the Wise King, because of the laws which he promulgated.'—Pp. 73, 74.

Whether this is the way in which a Christian would speak of his Lord and Saviour, who had risen, and liveth for ever and ever, is another question. It shows a recognition of the fact of Christianity, not a belief in Christ.

The following should be cited also :

'And here, too, in prison we give thanks to God that we have obtained the love of many; for we essayed our soul to continue in wisdom and in rejoicing. But if any drive us by force, he will proclaim the witness against himself, that he is far removed from all good things, and will receive disgrace and shame from the vile object of shame. For we have shown our truth, that we have no vice in an empire. But if the Romans will permit us to return to our country in justice and righteousness, let them act like humane men, and they will be called good and righteous, and the country in which they abide will also be in tranquillity. For let them show their own greatness by leaving us free. Let us be obedient to that dominion which the times has assigned to us, and let them not, like tyrants, treat us as slaves; and whatever may be decreed to take place, we shall not receive any thing more than the tranquil death which is reserved for us.'—Pp. 75, 76.

Another paragraph concludes the letter. The following is an evident addition, though put as part of the letter:—

'One of his friends asked Mara, the son of Serapion, when he was in bonds by his side; "On my life, Mara, I pray thee tell me what laughable thing has appeared to thee that thou laughedst?" Mara said to him, "I was laughing at the Time, because without having borrowed any evil from me, it repays me."—P. 76.

This seems to us a very ordinary production, which was probably circulated as good reading for little boys, which the bulk of it is. It may certainly afford ample materials for essays, and we may have many little monographs by German scholars on Mara Ben-Serapion, whether he were a heathen, or a Jew, or an Ebionite, or a Gnostic of any kind.

And now, to conclude. We wish much for the publication of the Syriac MSS., *i. e.* of all of them that are of any value. What we have written is put out with real gratitude to Mr. Cureton for the great service he has rendered to theological literature in this way, and we should be sorry if anything said or written by any one should discourage Mr. Cureton in proceeding with his labours. But we must express a hope that the critical part of the work, *if attempted at all*, may be more carefully done. The work of reading and translating the Syriac,

for which Mr. Cureton is so preeminently qualified, is quite distinct from that of illustrating the works from Patristic sources, and indeed from determining their genuineness. For this purpose, it is true, the Syriac and its relation to the Greek might contribute much material evidence, but that must be subordinated to the general critical judgment. In his critical attempts in this volume Mr. Cureton, we feel bound to say, appears to us singularly unfortunate. And so also in his notes.

He was not called on to write notes at all, except such as belong to the explanation of the Syriac; though any good notes would have been gratefully received. As it is, almost all the notes might have been altogether omitted, with little or no disadvantage to the volume: most of them with a positive advantage. They tell us, what we do not want to know, about other men's blunders. And they do not tell us, what we do want to know, about the sources of the passages published, the language, the corresponding Greek, or the theological and Gnostic terms represented by the Syriac.

We can only suppose that Mr. Cureton printed these few tracts nine years ago, intending to add more to them, and hoping to edit them with learned notes; that he has been hindered from doing so by a multiplicity of other occupations, and that he has now been forced on premature publication by the fact that other persons would bring out these treasures, with errors of translation in almost every line, if he did not anticipate and correct them by publishing his own. We quite sympathise with the difficulty of his position.

Indeed it must be a regret to all who are interested in the subject, that when we have acquired treasures of so great value as these were supposed to be, our busy life, our money-making propensities, or our theological controversies, should draw away those who might have devoted themselves to such literary works, and that there is not any source of a public or national kind from which persons could be enabled to edit and publish such works, except at a ruinous loss to themselves. The Rector of S. Margaret's, Westminster, is otherwise engaged, as much or more than was the Librarian of the Museum; as a Canon of Westminster only, he might have had leisure, which he too evidently has not had for finishing his work. So much for one feature of 'Cathedral Reform.'

ART. VI.—*The Judgment of the Right Hon. Stephen Lushington, D.C.L., delivered in the Consistory Court of the Bishop of London, in the cases of Westerton against Liddell, &c., Beal against Liddell, &c. on the 5th of December, 1855.* Edited by A. F. BAYFORD, D.C.L. London: Butterworth.

THE voluntary organization of Churchmen for self-defence, which was so active as well as so useful, a few years back, has in more recent times receded into a less conspicuous, though not less really healthy or vigorous position. Prudence and principle alike dictated this reticence. Convocation had made its first great step towards life and usefulness; and any large contemporaneous movement which was open, however unfairly, to the charge of playing at business, would, in the interests of Convocation, have been alike indecorous and imprudent. That such a condition of quiet would, however, be chronic, was an expectation which no one moderately endowed with reflection ought to have embraced. The opponents of Church principles, within and without the Church, were not only vigilant and strong, but were provoked to attempting something by observing the steady daily advance of the system which they hated and dreaded. A blow from some quarter or other was inevitable, and when it came, Churchmen could but fall back upon the attitude which they had assumed in 1848 and in 1850. Convocation, still struggling for its own existence, would be powerless to help them; potentially to appeal to it would be but to endanger its making that existence good. To wait till it had made it good, and to hope that then it would turn back the course of months, and perhaps of years, at the disadvantage which that so long inaction had created, would be to forfeit the first requisite of help from elsewhere—self-assistance.

These are axioms the truth of which, no one, we trust, will dispute. The practical question of to-day is, Has this crisis arrived in the recent judgment of Dr. Lushington in the case of the Belgravian Churches? We have no hesitation in saying that Churchmen are at this moment called upon to combine in opposition to the judgment, and to take every step, which the laws of the Church and the land allow them, to have it arrested and reversed. We are aware that in assuming this position we open ourselves and the Church's cause to the whole artillery of set phrases which has so often been levelled at us by enemies and half-hearted friends; and, of course, we shall be told that we

want to break up the peace of the Church for non-essentials—to set society at strife for things external and indifferent—that we have enough left of majesty and beauty in our ritual to convince all reasonable persons that we ought to obey the constituted tribunal, &c. &c. The answer to all this talking is very simple. Were we all of us living in a supersubstantial state of existence, these theories might be exceedingly practical; but as such is not the case, they fall into the limbus of impossibilities. The blow is not aimed at the material altar—so many hundred weight of stone; the material altar-cloth—so many yards of silk; the material cross—so much bulk of brass or wood, arranged so as to present four right-angles. But at that great fact which all these particulars indicate—that ceremonial worship of God, which has ever been the correlative of the sacramental system in the Catholic, as previously in the Jewish, Church. To ignore this, and to let the enemy make its lodgment on the vantage ground, would be to act as if the Western Powers had overlooked the Russian occupation of the Danubian principalities, or Russia acquiesced in the English and French seizing the Crimea. ‘It is only Wallachia and Moldavia,’ the English or French optimist might have said. ‘What matters the Crimea?’ the Russian might have asked, ‘when we have all Russia in Europe besides, and all Siberia, not to mention the Aleutic islands.’

Such language sounds not a little ridiculous when applied to an international crisis; and that its ridicule is not equally patent when it is made use of in regard to the Church’s interest is because Churchmen, as a body, have not adequately educated themselves in that most necessary branch of study, the politics of their position. They may take a useful warning even from the sharp practice of the party of which Lord Shaftesbury is the head, and Mr. Westerton the other extremity. This party was for years determined, if the opportunity rose, to pull down the restored propriety of Anglican worship. The Church of S. Barnabas was selected, not only because it was a very perfect exemplar of that propriety, but because it was situated in an accessible part of London. The happy moment of the Papal Aggression was seized, and some of the most disgraceful scenes of a foreign revolution were put into rehearsal within the consecrated walls. The public was, it was thought, lashed into a sufficient excess of rabies, and that memorable meeting was called, in which the now Lord Shaftesbury heroically announced his preference for worshipping ‘with Lydia by the banks of the river-side;’ and the now Sir John Dean Paul piously ejaculated the assertion, that the Church ought to be named after the robber, and not after the saint—S. Barabbas and not S. Barnabas.

Still, brutality did not succeed, and the Church stood its ground. The repulsed party had too much tact to recommence prematurely the campaign. A few years were allowed to elapse, and the decorous form of a lawsuit was substituted for the indecencies of violence and slander, which formed the apparatus of the former attack. Accordingly, although this time unable to find a more eloquent or learned spokesman than a jovial Irish Colonel of Militia, strong in the assertion that the Church of England only recognises one Sacrament, they have for all that gained the temporary success of a favourable decision in the lowest Court of resort. To leave that decision where it is would be to yield obedience, not to the Consistory Court, but to Mr. Drummond's butler and Sir John Dean Paul.

So much for general considerations of policy, supposing that the evil of Dr. Lushington's judgment was limited to the actual prohibitions which it contains, and that he had confined his speech to its three last minutes, which recapitulated the effect of his intended decree. But the reasons for that decree are so infinitely worse than even the results, that we must be allowed to dwell a little upon some of their more conspicuous features. These being viewed as they are, the duty of resistance becomes inevitable, in proportion as the principles set up by the judge are antagonistic to the essence of the Church of England, in its character of a portion of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. We do not say that the judgment affects any point of faith or doctrine, but it does lay down rules which, if applied to the decision of faith and doctrine, would be fatal to an orthodox result; and it is therefore a sacred obligation to repudiate them, while the repudiation can still be made upon non-vital questions.

We do not pretend to analyze the judgment, however incompletely. This will be most amply done, we doubt not, in court and out of court, before the question is settled. But assuming that our readers have read it, or have it before them to refer to, we will indicate some of its worst principles, and more monstrous conclusions.

The proposition underlying the whole judgment—the judgment of one who sits in a pre-reformational court, as the holder of a pre-reformational office, in virtue of which he has continually to deal with, and to pronounce sentence according to pre-reformational canons and constitutions—is, that the reformed Church of England is a new thing, the creation of the Reformation, without continuity or dependence, descent, or affinity to any thing before or beyond the England of three centuries. Faintly deny it as he may, admit as he may incidentally in one passage that the Church of England is not the mere negative of the Church of Rome, yet in the length and breadth, the common

sense of his whole judgment, Dr. Lushington goes to the utmost extent of this suicidal position in his illustrations of 'the principles and intentions of the Reformation,' as assumed, and as expounded by *himself*, which, as he mildly phrases it, he is bound to 'bear in mind.' We need not pause to show the monstrous stretch of authority which a judge assumes when he thus, by one stroke of his pen, constructs a vague and fluctuating common law, of which he is at once the author and the expositor, and puts it in the place of that painstaking investigation of antecedent and contemporaneous evidence, which is the duty of the judicial office. But to come to our proofs. First, the learned Chancellor starts with the statement, that 'our Church did not adopt by its silence every use and custom 'of the ancient Church which it did not expressly prohibit.' Loose and vague as this dictum is, it might pass muster in an innocent sense. But what is its immediate sequel? The assertion, that 'Our Church has set forth what it did adopt, 'though not perhaps in the most perspicuous manner, that what 'the Church has prescribed is a virtual prohibition of every 'thing else, *ejusdem generis*; that the provision *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius* does apply.' These words are so sweeping in their signification that you almost lose their sting in their extent. Adopt them, and your claim to continuity with the antecedent Church has gone for ever. All things depend upon the express prescription of the [post-reformational] Church, and this so absolutely, that parity and tradition are not allowed to exist as explanatory even in case of doubt—where, according to Dr. Lushington's assertion, the normal imperspicuity of the Church of England shows itself—for '*Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*,' and so, in a doubtful matter, the light that is to guide our path, is not the innocent practice of the primitive Church—not the traditional common-law—the ancient use of the English Church, before, up to, and during the second year of Edward VI., for all these are not expressed, and so they are concluded. There remains behind, the choice either of chaos or of the arbitrary interpretations of a living individual judge, one who, by his own confession, is little 'accustomed to antiquarian questions, as to that accurate historical understanding of the Reformation, which is the peculiar province of theologians.' In 1848, M. Carnot, in the name of the French Provisional Government, issued a circular, advising the election of 'ignorantines' representatives to the National Assembly. Till now we thought the deliberate preference of ignorance over knowledge, in the solution of knotty questions, had been limited to that memorable instance.

Dr. Lushington, indeed, absolutely revels in the repudiation of

the primitive Church. 'If all the usages in indifferent matters in the ancient and primitive Church were to be sanctioned, our Reformers would have so declared. Had such been the intention, words might have easily made it clear. They have done the contrary.' 'The contrary,' means grammatically, and Dr. Lushington intends it to mean, that they sanctioned nothing,—prohibited everything. Again, at the risk of tautology, we ask Churchmen to consider and to say whether they are willing to sanction by their acquiescence the admission into ecclesiastic jurisprudence of these principles, which, if allowed to pass into precedents, will, of course, be held to rule questions no less of doctrine than of ritual. Briefly stated, the judge's grounds of decision amount to this: 'There are, I assert, principles and intentions of the Reformation,'—these to me are 'not, perhaps, set forth in the most perspicuous manner; therefore I will assume them for myself, and apply them according to my own assumption, and so *make* perspicuous law for the Church, as I should like it to be, for all time to come.'

We have only space to indicate here most briefly the pregnant silence with which throughout the entire judgment Dr. Lushington contrives to glide on, without the slightest allusion to the rubric,—'the chancels shall remain as they have done in times past.' Whatever may be the scope as to particular fittings, of this rubric, its rank contrariety to the whole principle of the judgment is glaring and self-evident. It is accordingly slurred over by that judge, who says, 'I hold in great contempt a judgment apparently strong; but only made so to appear by concealing difficulties which ought to be encountered.'

To proceed to those details of the judgment which further help to illustrate its spirit, we shall confine ourselves to two instances. And first, we shall deal with that which is of the least importance,—the vituperative prohibition of ornamented altar-cloths, varying according to the Christian seasons. This, we are told, is a 'servile imitation of the Church of Rome'—and a 'meretricious display of fanciful and unnecessary ornament.' These abusive asseverations (made by one who commenced his judgment with the strongest protestations of his determination to adhere to the dry law of the case) refute themselves by their own flaunting injustice; and whether altar-cloths may be handsome or the contrary, whether they may seem 'meretricious,' 'fanciful,' and 'unnecessary' to Dr. Lushington, to repeat his staid and cool phraseology; yet, unless the Prayerbook itself is nothing but a servile imitation of the Missal and the Breviary, the accusation rests on record among the melancholy instances, which here and there occur in modern history, of the judge forgetting his appropriate duties, to enact the advocate and par-

tisan. The Missal and Breviary observe distinctions of days—so does the Prayerbook. Among those days we find Christmas, Easter, Ascension-day, Whitsunday, sundry Saints-days, Lent, Advent, in the Missal and the Breviary; we find the same likewise in the Prayerbook. We find, on the one hand, an *Altare* and coverings prescribed; on the other, the Lord's-table occurs, and that is also directed to be covered with silk or some other decent stuff. If the matter rested here, there might arise the question, whether it was right to cover our 'Lord's-table' in at all the same way in which the 'altare' was covered upon the days of like observance. But when we see that our reformed Prayerbook actually preserves, generally speaking, the Collect, Epistle, and Gospel of the older Missal for the holy-days and seasons retained in its pages, together with, to some extent, the prefaces, including the artificial plan of octaves, no candid mind can doubt as to the allowableness (this is all we plead for) of the Church of England indicating those days and times of sacred observances, derived from the older traditions, by varieties of colour in the 'carpet,' not more like the analogous Roman varieties than the Collect of the Church of England resembles that of the Missal.

The servile imitation would exist if we used Roman changes of frontals, on days which Rome observes and we do not. So long as we specially avoid such an abuse, and specially commemorate our own holy and fast days—and those alone—then, in contradiction to Dr. Lushington, we assert, and challenge him to deny it, that the practice, so far from being a servile imitation of the Church of Rome, is the clear and bold proclamation to the whole world of the independence and the authority of the Reformed Church of these lands. Enter S. Paul's or S. Barnabas on the 15th of August, and you will find displayed the simple green frontal of an ordinary day. The Roman Catholic churches are all putting forth their most gorgeous white—for that day is the Festival of the Assumption, which ranks so supremely high in their calendar, while with us it is not even named. Again, on the 8th of December, we have nothing more gaudy to show than the sombre violet of Advent; for although our own calendar retains the commemoration of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, yet our own Church—wisely, we think—has no form or circumstance to celebrate the event; and so the course of Advent runs unbroken;—Rome, on the other hand, neglecting the penitential associations of the season, breaks out into the most festal display; for then she feasts her newest and most daring aggression of papal infallibility.

These are distinctions obvious to the perception of a school-child or a Westerton. That the judge should have overlooked

them is nearly incredible—that not overlooking them, he should have suppressed them, is still more perplexing.

We do not dwell upon the pitiful and petty obliquity of perception which tries to torture the order to have continually a carpet of silk or other decent stuff, into a prohibition to have any stated change of these cloths, and blandly constructs an autocratic power for the Ordinary, in that same breath which limits the discretion given by the Canon to judging of materials other than silk. We refrain, because we feel that we might be tempted into phrases not consistent with the respect which we desire to maintain for Dr. Lushington's office.

A graver prohibition stamps the judgment—that of the great symbol of salvation. Two altar-crosses, and one chancel-screen cross were debated. Dr. Bayford delivered an elaborate and ingenious argument to prove that they came under the prohibition levelled against images by an Act revived in the time of James I. Dr. Lushington throws this argument over. It is too little that the cross should be condemned as it were by a side-wind. Its fall is ordered on its own merits—not as an image, but as the cross; not because it is an altar-cross, and therefore a piece of furniture misplaced where it is; not because it is a chancel-screen cross, and so an unnecessary element in the barely-acquitted screen; but wholly, simply, roundly, absolutely, universally, without evasion, equivocation, or limitation, as the cross. The judge has at last been found, in the English Church, to say that the Cross of Christ should not occur in a place of Christian worship—and why? because the '*Crucifix*,' the cross bearing the moulded image of the Son of God 'had been abused'!

Queen Elizabeth had a 'crucifix' in her chapel—Mr. Liddell claimed to keep his 'cross.' The judge, in aiming his blow at the living incumbent through the dead monarch, parades the opposition which certain Bishops made to Elizabeth's crucifix; 'who,' says he, 'desired to retain the use of crucifixes and 'crosses' in her own chapel.' When we say that this assertion is inaccurate, we do not use language stronger than our feelings. Queen Elizabeth did not desire to retain a cross, but a crucifix. Mr. Liddell does not desire to retain a crucifix, but a cross. On either side, what reciprocally becomes of Dr. Lushington's own guiding maxim, *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*? This dictum would be fatal to the use he himself makes of Queen Elizabeth's case; and so that case is coaxed, by her being made to desire what she *did not*, but what Mr. Liddell *does* care for.

But Queen Elizabeth, who adhered to the crucifix, is gently handled compared with Bishop Butler, who was contented in his chapel to use the plain cross. He is 'a beacon on high, to 'warn us all from the dangers of so perilous a course.'

Bishop Butler was what is called a High-Churchman, and so he meets with this treatment. Archbishop Tenison was a Low-Churchman. And yet, as Dr. Phillimore urged in his argument, this Primate, in his 'Discourse of Idolatry,' brands the 'breaking down of crosses,' in the great rebellion; 'which authority' (i.e. of the Bishops of Laud's and Juxon's school, whom Dr. Lushington treats so cheaply) 'had suffered to remain entire,' as being '*high superstition*.' Mr. Liddell's advocate urged this passage on the judge, and yet no notice was taken of it in the judgment.

Let us give up the principle of our crosses, and we shall prove an object of contempt, not only to the unreformed Churches of the East and West, but to the Lutheran communities. In Sweden (be that a true Episcopal Church or not) not the cross but the crucifix stands over the altar; before it the Priest celebrates the Swedish Communion Service or 'high mass,' as it is still called. In the new Prussian Liturgy the crucifix and lighted candles are ordered. In the church recently built by the King of Prussia at Potsdam, the cross of marble rises six feet sheer from the ground, behind an immoveable marble altar, on which the candles are figured burning. Archbishop Secker, whom Dr. Lushington uses to knock Bishop Butler down with, asked more than a century ago, 'Most of our churches have crosses upon them; are they therefore Popish? The Lutherans have more than 'crosses in theirs; are the Lutherans therefore Papists?' We think we hear the comment—Well, but what is Swedish life or German orthodoxy? Better the life and the orthodoxy of the English Church, with an 'oyster-board' for the Lord's Table, than the gorgeous altars of Sweden and Prussia, with the deadness of the one, and the neology and defective ministry of the other. This is most true. But what has it to do with our conduct, when the case for us to consider, the evil for us to ward off, is being reduced to the oyster-board, as a step to bring about that deadness, that neology, that loss of valid ministrations? If we allow this to be done, we shall indeed be 'of 'all men most miserable.'

Of the offence to the growing art-culture, to the general perception of beauty in form and colour, to the improvement of manufactures keeping pace with that perception, which this judgment will be, we need hardly speak. True it seems aimed at a few particulars only, but its spirit is that of Dowsing and Barebones, and strikes to the root of all artistic feeling, and the dedication of all beauty to the house of God. Everything rare and costly is as equally liable, at the caprice of the judge, to be set down as '*meretricious*,' '*corrupt*,' and '*unnecessary*,' as op-

posed to the 'principles and intentions of the Reformation,' as any of the innocent details which have just raised the bile of the Chancellor of London. Every artist, every man of taste, every person of common sense, every one, in short, who has not placed himself under the heavy yoke of puritan superstition, must be the natural opponent of this most bigoted decision.

We have sufficiently indicated the leading principle of Dr. Lushington's judgment; we have illustrated this by his way of handling two of the details. The more elaborate work of testing his law, and sifting his facts, and of investigating by history, what was the Church-apparatus in the second year of Edward VI., still remains untouched; and we do not purpose to handle it, confident that it is, and will be, amply cared for. We have but to draw our practical conclusion, and tender our advice upon the crisis which the judgment creates.

A few words will dispose of the reasons which have been urged in favour of acquiescing in the judgment: among these, the one which has been most insisted on is that the judgment at present only *binds* one Diocese—that of London. If affirmed by the Court above, it will be law for all the English Church. This argument, strong as it looks nakedly put, is really marrowless and shadowy. Granted that in form Dr. Lushington's judgment does not bind more than the Diocese of which he is Chancellor, yet, if acquiesced in, it will become a precedent, and one that will be all the more binding from the fact of that acquiescence. The natural inference will be, that it was not appealed against because it was irrefragable; and so it will, to all intents and purposes, become, for a perpetual hereafter, the law of all England, without the advantage to its opponents (whatever be the ultimate result) of that further and more complete dissection which the case will receive during subsequent arguments. In truth, the pages of the judgment itself contain two pregnant instances of the evils of non-appeal, in the authority which Dr. Lushington gives, on the one hand, to Sir Herbert Jenner Fust's decision in the *S. Sepulchre's* case—a case which demanded, if any ever did, an appeal; and, on the other, to the Bishop of Exeter's too trenchant condemnation of Mr. Park Smith's flowers and cross, acquiesced in after the mere preliminary form of a *prima facie* inquiry—a condemnation, let us add, which can be, and we trust will be, effectually distinguished from the present decision.

It will be observed that the Appeal which we have been all along contemplating is not to stop at the Arches' Court, but, if necessary, to be carried before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. No Churchman will, we trust, be startled by his concurrence being claimed in a resort to a tribunal connected

in his eyes with very laic associations, and with a memorable case. The looming Appeal is not one directly of doctrine, but of law and fact, to which the class of mind, and a very high class unquestionably, sitting on that Committee, is peculiarly fitted to do justice. But, again, are the so-called Church Courts sitting in London, as at present constituted, really so *very* ecclesiastical as to make the distinction between them and the high tribunal of Whitehall broadly perceptible, except in the greater weight which, from or against our own inclinations, we are compelled to render to the wisdom and the learning of the latter? Desiring, as we all do, some real measure of Church reform, which shall restore to the Church of England genuine discipline, administered by a *bond fide* ecclesiastical machinery, it is something very like pretence to assume any extreme reverence for the actual Doctors' Commons, on the ground of its antiquated assumptions of possessing legitimate Church mission.

We have reasons for supposing that some persons, whose opinion is entitled to the highest consideration, are, if not averse, at least to some extent indifferent, to the prosecution of the Appeal in the present instance, from their anxieties being centered in the grave debate in which the Archdeacon of Taunton's precipitancy threatens to involve the Church. In answer to them we have but to refer to the considerations with which we commenced this Article. In proportion as they feel anxious, (and they cannot be more so than we are,) to avoid a direct doctrinal conflict, or, if inevitably plunged into it, to come out again with success, so they must avoid affording the enemy the coveted vantage-ground of a success in a contest in which the mere inventory of articles nominally in dispute is but the mask to conceal aggressions on our faith, and to cripple us before the batteries open the fire upon abstract doctrine itself.

To accept the recent judgment is to admit the principle that the worship of the Established Church of England is a new thing, invented by the Reformers upon the principle of 'prohibiting and discouraging all things, indifferent in themselves, and even, perhaps, laudable in themselves, which had been abused to superstitious purposes,'—the proof of such abuse being rested by the judge on the basis of the non-existence of a specific ideal Act of Parliament of the *one* second year of Edward VI. which is desiderated by him in order to create innocence and admissibility. To resist the judgment is to refuse to accept, at Dr. Lushington's hands, this monstrous proposition—a proposition involving the utmost extent of what we may call ritual antinomianism, and which Dr. Lushington had himself to violate when he allowed the candlesticks, the screen, and the gates, to pass.

NOTICES.

WE have heard a good deal lately of the dishonesty of the inferior clergy preaching sermons of other than their own composition; and strictures, not altogether undeserved, have been passed on the practice of advertising a regular supply of clerical pseudo-manuscripts. But we were not aware how high in the hierarchy this practice of strutting in borrowed plumes had soared, until we met with 'A Charge delivered to the Clergy of the 'United Dioceses of Killala and Achonry at the Annual Visitation, 29th Sept., '1854. By the Right Hon. and Right Rev. Thomas Lord Plunket, D.D. Bishop 'of Tuam, Killala, and Achonry.' (Dublin: J. B. Oldham, 1855). This Charge, consisting of fifteen printed pages, is, with the exception of about thirty lines, taken verbatim, and without the slightest acknowledgment, from two Charges delivered by the present Archbishop of Canterbury, when Bishop of Chester—the one in 1838, and the other in 1841. This latter Charge of Dr. Sumner is the somewhat famous or notorious composition of which the Bishop of Exeter remarked, that he 'could not name 'any one work of any one minister in our Church which, though of double the 'bulk, contains half so many heretical statements.' Of these Chester Charges most of our readers will remember some of the more virulent passages. 'Under the specious pretence of deference to antiquity, and respect for 'primitive models, the foundations of our Protestant Church are undermined by men who dwell within her walls;' 'And here it is impossible 'not to remark on the subtle wiles of that adversary,' &c. &c. All this cold cabbage of seventeen years' staleness the Right Rev. Baron and Bishop dishes up for the indiscriminating Irish palate; and, with a careless defiance both of the Copyright Act and of common decency, prints as an original work under his own name. We say nothing of the literary piracy, unparalleled in our whole experience of the world of letters, but the insult to the clergy addressed, we trust that there are some of them who will have the spirit to resent. Such little self-reliance does his lordship possess, that he cannot even trust himself to compose the opening words of his pastoral, but boldly copies, word for word, from the Archbishop's Charge of 1838, this important exordium, 'We meet together, Rev. Brethren, once again to take council respecting the things in which we are mutually concerned,'—one of which was probably not the eighth commandment. We observe but two paragraphs, amounting, as we have said, to thirty lines, which we have not traced to the Archbishop's Charges; doubtless these two passages are cribbed from somebody. But in transcribing the last (p. 14), it would be curious to inquire whether Bishop Plunket felt any twinge of conscience. Speaking of the Irish clergy, his lordship is unwilling to forecast the day, 'when the people would be justly warranted in refusing to acknowledge 'in the ministers of the Church an authority which was found rather to 'cover *indolence and inefficiency*, than to secure ability and exertion.' Certainly his lordship is skilled in the rare art of painting his own portrait.

Charity would of course suggest that the incapable Bishop has been imposed upon by some idle and unprincipled hack whom he employed to get up the document to order: for incredible as the whole matter is, it is still more incredible that one who had committed a conscious larceny should invite detection by printing and publishing the fatal evidence of his own 'indolence and inefficiency.'

It requires something of an apology to the Bishop of Salisbury to mention in such immediate connexion with this Irish production his lordship's 'Primary Charge,' (Rivingtons,) delivered during the autumn. If we are bold to denounce fraud even in the highest places of the Church, we are not called upon to treat, in the ordinary terms of discriminating praise, even such an affecting and solemn document as the present. Did we reserve to ourselves such a right, we should find it difficult to express adequately our admiration and respect for the deep piety and simple, honest, earnest dignity, the affectionate and brotherly spirit, and the working character of this Pastoral Address, which in its way is almost as much an innovation in the English, as we should like to hope that Bishop Plunket's is an exception in the Irish, Church.

We have also to acknowledge the Bishop of Lincoln's 'Primary Charge,' (Skeffington,) which is of a practical and level character, and favourably expresses his lordship's cautious and moderate temper.

J. H. Parker's 'Church Calendar' seems to be a great improvement on last year's publication. It is fuller in matter, neater in form, and as cheap in price. It comprises that great clerical necessity—a blank-paged diary.—Masters' very useful 'Churchman's Diary,' which is more strictly of an ecclesiastical character, continues its useful course. If we are to distinguish between these publications, we should say that the former is more fitted for the writing-table, and the latter for the reading-desk.—Cleave's 'Companion for Churchmen' is comprehensive and cheap.—And a penny publication by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge is rather cheap than comprehensive. The *crux* for all these almanacs consists in settling, as in 1845, the calendar lessons for the twenty-seventh Sunday after Trinity.

An able and remarkable work, the 'Internal History of German Protestantism,' by Dr. Kahnis, has been translated by Mr. Theodore Meyer, and published by the well-known house of Clark of Edinburgh. It is the work of a Lutheran of a high type; and exhibits more than any work with which we are acquainted the sacramental and better tendencies of this communion. It is a history of literature as well as of opinion; and with the usual characteristics of German writing, displays a depth but seldom plunging into obscurity; but at the same time it is written in a kind and sympathising spirit. We observe that the translator takes credit for 'faithfully translating whatever Dr. Kahnis has written, only now and then recording 'his protest by an interspersed (!)'. The respectable publishers would have done well to have forbidden this impertinence in Mr. Theodore Meyer.

'Christ and other Masters,' (Macmillan,)—a title with which we are not particularly pleased—is a work by the Christian Advocate, Mr. C. Hardwick, designed to fulfil the especial obligation of his office to combat the prevailing assault upon the Gospel of the day. Consequently, this intel-

ligent and painstaking writer has read with great diligence the works of Messrs. F. Newman, Mackay, Fox, Parker, and other exponents of 'the Absolute Religion,' and we must say that he has produced in an available form a valuable body of criticism, especially in treating that most important question, the characteristics of Religion under the Old Testament Dispensation. We look for valuable productions from Mr. Hardwick.

'The Promises of Christianity' is a republication of certain Essays published in India by Mr. Kay, the Principal of Bishop's College, Calcutta, (J. H. Parker). We find here not only an interesting specimen of the cast of thought which is forced upon an earnest and reflective mind engaged in the higher department of Missionary work; but Mr. Kay's work grapples, and for its compass successfully, with the great problem of reconciling the unquestionably ascetic character and high acquirements of the Gospel precepts with duties towards the world as it now is. Whether entirely realized or not, the latent suspicion in minds nominally Christian, as well as heathen, is that Christianity does not suit the actual work of life. Mr. Kay meets this.

We have received a handsomely printed volume, 'The Gospel on Ezekiel,' (A. & C. Black,) a collection of Sermons by Dr. Guthrie, one, we believe, of the most popular preachers in the Scotch Establishment. The title is a misnomer, or misleader: only the texts are taken from Ezekiel, and not an attempt is made to draw out the instructive and interesting subject promised in the title-page. (We may remark, in passing, that Mr. Fairbairn, a Scotch writer, has published a volume on Ezekiel, of remarkable depth and completeness.) Dr. Guthrie's line is the rhetorical, and he exhibits 'pulpit qualifications'—we should call them tricks—which it is a standing wonder to us why they should be so much admired in the very prosaic atmosphere of the Scotch metropolis. Here is one of Dr. Guthrie's ordinary periods. 'Near by a stone—a mass of rock that had 'fallen from the overhanging crag—which had some wild flowers growing 'in its fissures, and on its top the foxglove, with its spike of beautiful but 'deadly flowers, we once came upon an adder as it lay in ribbon coil, 'basking on the sunny ground. At our approach the reptile stirred, 'uncoiled itself, and raising its venomous head, with eyes like burning 'coals, it shook its cloven tongue, and, hissing, gave signs of battle, &c. &c. '.... And in looking on that shattered rock it seemed to us an 'emblem of that heart described in the text as a stone,' &c. &c. What we should like to know is the fact, whether this anecdote and image really do detail an actual event? If so, the circumstance that Dr. Guthrie's interview with the adder really did suggest the parallel of an unconverted heart is a remarkable psychological fact: if it were not so, we do greater honour to Dr. Guthrie's imagination than to his sense of propriety in inventing his events.

'Everley, a Tale,' (Masters,) is an imitation of Miss Young's manner and matter. Like most imitations, it exaggerates; and the style of the authoress of the 'Heir of Redclyffe,' with its close and accurate reproduction of really brilliant dialogue, and its minute analysis of character, will not bear repetition in the shape of common-place talk and unmarked

varieties of interlocutor and incident. The writer—and intimate knowledge of the mysteries of dress and some curious innovations in syntax betray the gentle female pen—exhibits very good intentions, and an occasional specimen of bad grammar. Her glimpses of English social life are not very accurate: *ex grat.* It is not the custom, nor would it be desirable even in, or rather still less in, the case of a brilliant marriage, 'for every one in the neighbourhood of Eaton Square to call on the bride.' There is a spirit and a right mind in the tale which is creditable to the writer; but our objections to religious tales are not removed by the perusal of 'Everley.'

A superior volume of 'Sermons,' (J.H. Parker,) many of them academical, reaches us from Mr. Eden, formerly of St. Mary's, Oxford. They seem to combine characteristics which seldom meet, warmth, with sound, business-like precision.

'The Sampler; a System of teaching Plain Needlework,' (Rivingtons,) written by Lady E. Finch, and dedicated to Lady Guernsey, looks as though Mr. Maurice had, in some quarters of society at least, been anticipated. His 'Practical Lectures to Ladies' are hardly needed, where high blood and titled dames in person superintend in our village schools the mysteries of 'seam, and gusset, and band.'

We have not hitherto expressed great admiration for Mr. Archer Gurney's poetical achievements; but in two recent publications, 'Iphigenia in Delphi,' and an 'Ode of Peace,' (Longmans,) he has exhibited high powers. The former is a correct, and because correct, cold, yet elaborate and learned reproduction of Greek Tragedy; the latter deals with a subject as trying to the political sympathies of the day as it seems unpromising to the Pindaric lyre. Mr. Gurney turns into an ode the argument, not of the peace societies, but of all rational and Christian men, that enough has been spent both of blood and treasure in the unprofitable Russian war: and he pursues his thesis into all the arguments which we usually meet with in newspapers. The result is a laureate's leading article. Here is the trite argument, that anyhow we have thrown back Russia twenty years, done into Mr. Gurney's sonorous lines:—

' Full twenty times this orb must round the vast,
Circling around the parent sun,
Ere she could play the part she now hath done.'

There is in the whole poem a great deal of vigorous language and a nice sense of harmony.

Mr. Wright, of Dalston, has delivered a very agreeable and useful 'Lecture on the Choral Service,' which is published by Rivingtons.

We can seriously recommend as a little gift-book suitable for the season, and at once amusing, indeed extremely comic, and at the same time instructive, 'Mrs. Boss's Niece,' (Mozleys.) It is by the author of 'Stories on Proverbs,' and, if we remember right, 'The Conceited Pig,'—an especial weakness of ours.

Our excellent friend and monitor, Mr. Paget, is almost reconciling us to the ecclesiastical tale, and this chiefly because his recent stories are by no means Church novels; that is to say, they are not designed to teach 'Church

principles' by improbable dialogue and impossible fiction. We are not sure that we have kept up with Mr. J. H. Parker's amusing and instructive series: but a recent instalment, 'The Tenants of Tinker's End,' struck us as unusually good.

But 'The Owlet of Owlstone Edge' (Masters) is this ingenious author's last and, we must add, most elaborate work. It is a disquisition on Parsons' Wives, who are presented in a series of sketches, after the manner of Theophrastus or Bishop Earle. There is not a little wit and satire, occasionally running into sarcasm, in this volume, of which the title, a frigid conceit, is its least recommendation.

'The Beauty of Holiness Illustrated,' (W. White,) is a collection of detached passages of Holy Scripture, arranged according to a classification which we are unable to comprehend. We confess to a distaste for 'Beauties of the Bible.'

We are disposed to place far above the average of such collections a set of 'Parish Sermons,' by Mr. C. A. West, (Deighton & Bell.) The volume is a posthumous publication; and Mr. West's style is a very good model for a village preacher.—A volume which comprises some thoughtful and careful discourses 'On the Lord's Day,' by Mr. Gowing, of Banbury, (J. H. Parker,) is also to be unhesitatingly commended.

The two books of the year, Dean Milman's 'Latin Christianity,' vols. iv. v. vi., concluding the work, (Murray,) and Macaulay's 'History,' vols. iii. and iv. (Longmans,) reach us only in time to acknowledge. They will, of course, receive other than the present notice at our hands.

Dr. Pusey, always alive to the immediate duties of the Church in raising its solemn protest against every heretical statement as it rises, has just published two weighty 'Sermons on Faith.' (J. H. Parker.) They are remarkable, even among their author's profusion of ancient lore, for richness of Patristic learning, and still richer with that devout and earnest love which ranks their author first among our religious as among our doctrinal teachers. The second sermon deals with the subjective unbelief of Mr. F. Newman, and the sentimental school of misbelief in the Gospel. Incidentally, Dr. Pusey criticizes Professor Jowett's denial of the doctrine of the Atonement, and accepts as the starting-point of his objections, that they would involve human passions in God. Is it not rather,—or, more correctly, is it not as well,—that Professor Jowett has no real belief in the Divinity of the Saviour? By the way, we used to hear a good deal of non-natural interpretations some years ago: we should much like to hear Professor Jowett's explanation of the sense in which, within the last week or two, he renewed his subscription to the Articles.

Two handsome reprints, from Mr. J. H. Parker's beautiful press, Laud's 'Devotions' and Spinckes' 'Devotions,' are satisfactory and sufficient proofs that, amidst heavy clouds and difficulties, the practical and essential Church principles are still gaining on society.

Among Christmas Books, and among competing editions of the particular author, we can specify Routledge's Edition of 'Longfellow's Poems,'

profusely illustrated, as having attained a high, if not the first, place. The wood-cuts are beautifully executed, and 'worked' with a truth and precision which is highly creditable. The 'Golden Legend' is not included, which, considering the character of the edition as a gift-book, is perhaps as well; for with all the beauty of this poem, it is certainly unreadable for the young.—We may here mention that an article on *Hiawatha*, and other Poems of the Year, is unavoidably excluded from the present number.

Mr. Gresley has added to the many claims which he has upon the regard and respect of Churchmen, 'Three Sermons on the present State of the Controversy with Rome,' (Masters,) which are characterized by his well-known earnest spirit and sound practical sense.

'The Life of Alderman Kelly,' by Mr. Fell, (Groombridge,) is a tedious narrative of the life of a respectable but very common-place person.

'The Suffering Saviour,' (Clark: Edinburgh,) translated from Krummacher, is a series of Meditations on the Passion, conceived in much of the realizing devotional spirit of the best ages and writers of the Church; and exhibits a very favourable, and we fear exceptional, specimen of the communion to which the warm-hearted author belongs.

First in the sleet of pamphlets which is destined to assail Dr. Lushington's judgment, and not likely to be the last in the way of argument, is a careful brochure by 'a Parish Priest, who has not in use the Articles complained of,' under the title of 'Dr. Lushington's Judgment, &c. considered.' (Masters)

The authoress of the 'Heir of Redclyffe' has presented children with a noble Christmas book—'The History of Sir Thomas Thumb,' (Constable,) illustrated with some first-rate wood-cuts of animal life, by J. B., an artist equal to, and praised by, Landseer, and already favourably known by some noble illustrations of Scripture. In the notes there is a great deal of curious literature.

Mr. Blatch's 'Memoir of Bishop Low,' (Rivingtons,) is a valuable monograph of a character now extinct, the Highland Jacobite clergyman. The good Bishop was almost a great man: great from the solidity and simplicity of his character, and quite recalling the primitive life. The indigenous Episcopate of the non-established Scotch Church is a bright page in ecclesiastical history.

Mr. John Hewitt's noble work on 'Ancient Armour,' is one of those important works, profusely and accurately illustrated, and full of archaeological research, which it is a labour of love to Mr. J. H. Parker to publish. This gentleman's services to Christian and monumental art it would be difficult to exaggerate.